a', JAMES I . DAWSON, JR . . V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCEDURE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (e), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
'Suputtt Qlaurf of ~k
2003-SC-0363-MR
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JAMES I. DAWSON, JR .
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. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
01-CR-00102
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, James Dawson, was convicted of First-Degree Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance and First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance, and he
was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. He contends (1) that the trial court
erred in not asking him whether he consented to his lawyer's decision to admit guilt
during opening statement, (2) that a mistrial should have been declared based upon the
testimony of the arresting officer as to Appellant's resistance during his arrest, and (3)
that the possession charge should have merged with the trafficking charge . Because
Appellant admitted his guilt on cross-examination, the court offered to instruct the jury
on the improper testimony, and the possession and trafficking charges arose from
separate events, we find no error. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
II. BACKGROUND
On April 7, 2001, Appellant was driving to a local bar to assist his girlfriend,
Melanie Dawson, in closing the bar. As Appellant neared the bar, he noticed a woman
standing by the road, waving her arms in an attempt to flag him down . When Appellant
stopped his car, the women entered his car and told Appellant that there were two men
who wanted to buy crack cocaine . The woman said that although she had already
received money for the cocaine, she had no intention of delivering the cocaine to the
men. After identifying the car in which the purported drug purchasers were located, the
woman opened the car door and walked away, leaving a small amount of crack cocaine
in the passenger seat. Appellant, seeing an opportunity to make some money, drove to
where the men were parked and sold some of the crack to them . After securing his
money, Appellant left the men, taking with him a small piece of the crack the woman
had left in his car. Shortly thereafter, police stopped Appellant and arrested him for
trafficking and possession of cocaine .
Appellant was indicted for First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance and
First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance, and he entered a plea of not guilty .
Prior to trial, Appellant made two motions . First, he sought to dismiss the possession
charge, arguing that this charge was a lesser-included offense of trafficking in cocaine .
The trial court denied this motion . Second, Appellant made a motion to exclude any
testimony relating to an altercation between Appellant and the arresting police officer,
Sergeant Hayden, at the time of arrest, insisting that such evidence would be unduly
prejudicial to Appellant. The trial court agreed and prohibited the admission of any
evidence concerning this encounter .
In his opening statement, Appellant's lawyer said that Appellant had sold crack
cocaine and retained a small quantity in his car, thereby admitting that Appellant had
committed both of the offenses with which he was charged . Based upon this admission,
the trial judge summoned the attorneys to the bench . The trial judge stated that the
admissions meant that there was no contest in this case, and he asked Appellant's
lawyer if he would agree to a stipulation . Appellant's lawyer refused and, despite the
admissions, insisted that he be allowed to proceed with his case. The judge did not
directly question Appellant about this trial strategy.
During trial, the Commonwealth called Sergeant Hayden to testify . Although the
court had ruled such testimony inadmissible, Hayden, without being asked about the
altercation, mentioned that there was a minor struggle between Appellant and himself at
the time of arrest . Appellant's lawyer immediately objected, arguing that the admission
of this evidence, in light of the court's prior ruling on the motion in limine, warranted a
mistrial . The judge denied the motion for a mistrial, but stated that he would be willing
to give a curative admonition to the jury, i .e. direct the jury to disregard the testimony
concerning the altercation between Appellant and Sergeant Hayden . Appellant's lawyer
rejected the judge's offer to give the jury a curative admonition.
The jury convicted Appellant on both counts and recommended a sentence of
twenty years for Trafficking and five years for Possession, to be served consecutively,
and the judge entered final judgment in accord with the jury's recommendation .
Appellant has appealed to this court as a matter of right .'
1111 . ANALYSIS
We address the issues in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief.
1
KY . CONST.
§110(2)(b) .
A. Admission of Guilt
Appellant contends that, based upon his attorney's admission of guilt during his
opening statement and closing argument, the trial court had the responsibility to find out
whether Appellant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consented to this
strategy . In making his argument, Appellant relies upon Wiley v . Sowders ("Wiley I"),2 a
Sixth Circuit case involving an appeal of a denial of a habeas corpus petition of Earl
Wiley . The court said that "where counsel advises his client that the latter's guilt should
be admitted, the client's knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear outside the
presence of the jury on the trial record in the manner consistent with Bo kinL
Alabama ."3 This language supports Appellant's claim that the trial judge erred in
refusing to question Appellant concerning defense counsel's "strategic" admissions of
guilt .
The Sixth Circuit, however, revisited this issue only a year later in the similarly
styled Wiley v. Sowders ("Wiley II "), 4 which involved an appeal of a denial of a habeas
corpus petition of Early Wiley's brother, Elmer Wiley . In Wiley II , the Sixth Circuit
clarified its position in Wiley l , saying that such colloquies, though preferred, are not
required . Thus, the rule is that although trial judges have the authority to question
defendants about their acquiescence in trial strategy, such interrogation is not required
2 647 F .2d 646 (6th Cir. 1981) .
3 Id . at 650 .
4 Wiley v. Sowders , 669 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1982) .
5 Id. at 389.
and is left to the discretion of the trial judge . We cannot say that the trial judge abused
his discretion in not conducting such a colloquy with Appellant .'
Furthermore, Appellant, himself, admitted to possessing and trafficking cocaine
when he was cross-examined by the prosecutor. The prosecutor asked, "You don't
deny that you sold cocaine to Detective Waters on April 7th, right?" Appellant
responded, "Right." Next, the prosecutor asked, "You don't deny that you had cocaine
in your pocket when the police arrested you, right?" Again, Appellant responded,
"Right ." Appellant not only did not hesitate in answering these questions but
unequivocally admitted his guilt with no discernible uncertainty or lack of conviction .
Our review of the record indicates that Appellant gave the trial judge no reason to
question the voluntariness of his consent to the lawyer's chosen trial strategy, thus the
failure to engage in a Boykin colloquy was not error.
Moreover, the fact that Appellant admitted to selling and possessing cocaine
likely diffused or, at least, superceded any prejudice caused by his lawyer's comments,
thus rendering any error in his lawyer's comments harmless . Given that the jury heard
what amounted to a confession from Appellant while he was on the stand, there is no
"substantial possibility that the result would have been any different" $ had the lawyer not
admitted Appellant's guilt . Thus, if there was error, it was rendered harmless by
Appellant's own testimony .9
6 Wiley v. Sowders , 669 F.2d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 1982) .
See Furnish v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W .3d 34, 52 (Ky. 2002) ("Thus, contrary to
Appellant's argument, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a sua sponte inquiry
as to Appellant's consent to his counsel's strategy .").
8 Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S .W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983).
9 CR 9 .24.
Finally, as we have noted in similar cases, Appellant's argument in this regard "is
essentially an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." 1° Such claims must be raised in
a post-trial RCr 11 .42 motion and not on direct appeal ."
B. Motion for a Mistrial
Appellant also contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial
when Sergeant Hayden testified as to the struggle during Appellant's arrest, which the
trial court had previously ruled inadmissible . We agree with Appellant that Sergeant
Hayden's reference to a minor struggle at the time of arrest was inadmissible, but we do
not agree with Appellant's contention that this statement, standing alone, warrants the
extreme remedy of a mistrial. Upon a motion for mistrial, a court will only declare a
mistrial "when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a
manifest injustice . "12 This "manifest necessity" language underscores the dramatic
nature of granting a motion for mistrial . In this case, there was overwhelming evidence,
apart from Sergeant Hayden's testimony, of Appellant's guilt. In fact, when asked about
the charges against him on cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he sold and
possessed cocaine . Thus, any improper reference to a minor struggle at the time of
arrest was harmless .
Furthermore, the trial court offered to admonish the jury to disregard Sergeant
Hayden's reference to a "minor struggle ." We have previously held that where an
admonishment is sufficient to cure an error and the defendant fails to ask for the
admonishment, we will not review the error. 13 Thus, because the judge's offer to
10 Furnish , 95 S.W.3d at 52.
11
Id . ; Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 962 S.W .2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998).
12
Gould v. Chariton Co., Inc., 929 S .W .2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996) .
13
Graves v. Commonwealth , 17 S .W .3d 858, 865 (Ky. 2000).
admonish the jury would have rectified the problem under Johnson v. Commonwealth 14
and Appellant's lawyer not only failed to ask for relief but actually declined relief when
offered, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a
mistrial .
C. Merger of Charges
Appellant argues that he was denied due process based upon the trial court's
refusal to merge the possession charge with the trafficking charge. We disagree .
Appellant relies primarily on Jackson v. Commonwealth , , where we said that
possession of a controlled substance is a lesser-included offense of trafficking in a
controlled substance. 16 Although Appellant correctly states the holding of Jackson , he
fails to note a distinguishing factor between Jackson and this case. The defendant in
Jackson , unlike Appellant, was charged with trafficking and possession for actions
arising out of one transaction involving a single quantity of drugs . In such a situation,
we said that possession of a controlled substance must merge with a trafficking charge
when there is one transaction . Similarly, in Johnson v. Commonwealth , where we had
to determine whether the Appellant could be found guilty of possession and
manufacture of methamphetamine, we said that "the answer turned on whether the
defendant was convicted for possessing the same methamphetamine he was convicted
of manufacturing . "8 Here, Appellant sold cocaine to the undercover officers, thus giving
rise to the trafficking charge . After this transaction, Appellant drove away with more
14
105 S.W.3d 430, 431 (Ky. 2003) ("A jury is presumed to follow an admonition
to disregard evidence and the admonition thus cures any error .").
15
633 S .W.2d 61 (Ky. 1982) .
16
17
Id.
134 S .W.3d 563 (Ky. 2004) .
18 Id . at 568.
cocaine still in his car, thus giving rise to the possession charge. He was not charged
with nor convicted of possessing the cocaine that he sold. So, under these facts, two
charges against Appellant were justified, as there were two distinct events involving two
distinct quantities of cocaine, and the prosecution and conviction for both offenses is not
barred since a single course of conduct did not "establish the commission of more than
one (1) offense ." 19 Merger, therefore, is inapplicable in this case as Appellant
committed two separate offenses and convictions for both are not barred .20
IV. CONCLUSION
Appellant admitted guilt during cross-examination, rejected the court's offer to
admonish the jury regarding impermissible testimony, and was charged with Trafficking
and Possession of separate quantities of cocaine. For these reasons, we find no error
and affirm Appellant's convictions .
Lambert, C.J. ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
19 KRS 505 .020(1).
Id .
20
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
Matthew D . Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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