AND STEVIE LYN ENGLAND V 01-C R-00068 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2003-SC-0328-MR
AND
2004-SC-0506-TG
STEVIE LYN ENGLAND
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
01-C R-00068
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Steven England was convicted of complicity to murder Lisa Halvorson .
The jury sentenced him to life without parole after finding the aggravating circumstance
of committing the crime for profit.' England appeals to this Court as a matter of right.2
On or about July 7, 2000, England ended the life of Lisa Halvorson in her
front yard . Lisa died from blunt-force trauma to the neck, and her body was bloodied
and bruised from being strangled and run over by a car, among other things . England
' KRS 532 .025(2)(a)(4) . The aggravating factors located in KRS 532.025(2) act to
enhance a convict's sentence when the conviction was for an offense that authorizes
the death penalty. In this case, England was convicted of complicity to commit murder,
which is a capital offense . When one is convicted of complicity she is sentenced as if
she had committed the crime herself. KRS 502.020. Murder is a capital offense . KRS
507.020(2) .
2 KY CONST. § 110(2)(b) .
raises fifteen claims that this Court should grant him a new trial . Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm the conviction .
I.
Facts
Lisa Halvorson was found dead on July 10, 2000, by her mother and her
sister. She was found in the gravel portion of her driveway, and had been lying there
for about three days when she was found . It was later determined that Lisa died of
asphyxia . The Kentucky State Police identified Cori Poindexter, a friend of the victim,
as being the last person to see Lisa alive late on the night of July 7.
The police searched the home of Lisa's boyfriend, Tyrone McCary, and
collected evidence from his body. That search did not lead to any evidence that
merited his arrest. The police then focused the investigation on Lisa's former husband,
Pat Halvorson . Halvorson's employees were interviewed in late 2000, and Halvorson
himself was questioned in February 2001 . The KSP also attempted to obtain more
information regarding the life insurance policy Halvorson had on Lisa. However, while
the KSP was conducting this investigation, Karl Woodfork contacted the KSP and
informed a detective that he had information about Lisa's murder. After meeting with
Woodfork, the KSP wired him for sound and sent him to England's house with
instructions to record discussions about the murder . During those taped conversations,
England made statements that were sufficient to warrant further questioning .
England was brought in for questioning on March 30, 2001 . During the
interrogation England asked whether he should be talking and asked whether he should
talk to his lawyer. His lawyer was not called, and England gave an inculpatory
statement about the incident . He said that he and McCary went to Lisa's home at dusk
where McCary repeatedly choked, beat, and ran over Lisa with a car. England admits
that he punched Lisa in the jaw, knocking her to the ground . But he insists that he did
not participate in the murder, and that he even tried to persuade McCary to stop. When
McCary disregarded his entreaty, England went to the truck to wait for McCary.
England claimed that they left her alive at the end of her driveway . Incidentally, Lisa
was found dead where England said they left her. England was tried separately from
McCary on November 6, 2002 . He was convicted of complicity to murder, and
sentenced to life in prison without parole . Additional relevant facts will be discussed
below.
I.
Analysis
A.
The statement
England asserts that the inculpatory statement he gave to the police while
being interrogated should not have been admitted into evidence because his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated or because his statement was a result of coercion on
the part of the police. Either of his two theories would suffice to exclude this evidence .
However, we find that the statement was properly admitted by the trial judge .
1.
Right to counsel
England asserts that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the
police when they continued to question him after he invoked his right to counsel . But
England's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time England
confessed to the crime because adversarial judicial proceedings had not commenced .3
Therefore, his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. However, even if England
had claimed that it was his Fifth Amendment right to counsel that was violated, rather
Brewer v. Williams , 430 U .S . 387, 97 S . Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed . 2d 424 (1977) ;
Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S .W .2d 805 (Ky. 1996) .
3
than his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he still would not prevail . This is not a
pedantic distinction. Though both the Fifth and Sixth amendments contain a right to
counsel, the effect of those rights is very different .
In any event, England had not unambiguously invoked his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel . His confession was properly admitted at trial . Indeed,
even cases cited by England do not support his contention . For instance, England cites
to this Court Dean v. Commonwealth4 wherein we held that the statement "[s]hould,
should I, should I have somebody here? I don't know" insufficient to invoke his Fifth
Amendment rights .5 This was a response to the police-interrogator ensuring that Dean
understood his Miranda6 rights . In Dean the Court noted that this statement was
ineffectual to invoke the right to counsel because it was not "unambiguous and
unequivocal ."' The same is true here . After being advised that he had the right to
counsel, Detective John Saylor informed England that he was being questioned
because of his role in the murder of Lisa . Detective Saylor told England that he knew
that England was there when Lisa was killed and that England was paid money to do it.
England responded that he did not know what Detective Saylor was talking about and
that he did not know Lisa. Therefore, it was clear that England understood the reasons
for which he was being interrogated . A little later, England responded : "I guess you'll
just have to go on and lock me up then and call my lawyer, cause I don't, I don't know
what you're talking about. I'll be honest with you. Like I said, me and Tyrone are
4 844 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1992) .
5 _Id . at 420.
G Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U .S . 436, 86 S . Ct . 1602, 16 L. Ed . 2d 694 (1966) .
Dean, 844 S .W .2d at 420 .
friends . I've never seen that woman." After further questioning England said, "I don't
want to get in no trouble. I mean my lawyer . I don't know."
These are not unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of the right to
counsel . The United States Supreme Court held in Davis v. United States $ that the
words "maybe I should talk to a lawyer" are insufficient to invoke the right to counsel
because the statement is equivocal . And contrary to England's assertion that
mentioning that he had an attorney to Detective Saylor - "my lawyer" - was sufficient to
invoke the right to counsel, the mere hint that a defendant has an attorney in another
matter does not constitute a request for counsel in the present issue. 9 In essence,
England merely said that I guess you will have to call my lawyer and I don't know if I
need my lawyer because I don't want to get into trouble . We hold that these statements
do not rise to the level of impressing upon the interrogator that the suspect has
requested an attorney before continuing the questioning . The statements were properly
admitted at trial .
2.
Coercion
Second, England also argues that his confession to the police was
involuntary because he was coerced. Consequently, he argues, his conviction should
be overturned because the evidence should have been excluded at trial . There are
three criteria that must be present for a confession to be deemed involuntary such that
it should be inadmissible as evidence . First, the police activity should be objectively
coercive . Second, the defendant's free will must be overwhelmed by the coercive
8
9
512 U .S. 452, 459,114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
See, e .a . , Delap Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11 th Cir. 1989) .
v.
5
activity. Finally, the coercive activity must be the crucial motivating factor behind the
defendant's confession.' °
To show that his confession was coerced England argues that the police
promised him that if he cooperated the death penalty would be taken off the table and
that he might see his kids and sick father again . He also claims that use of a false
friend during the interrogation constituted coercion .
First, we do not agree that the statements made by the interrogators with
regard to the death penalty and England's family constitute coercion . The comments
about the death penalty did not tell England anything he did not already know. The
police had already informed England of the reason for his being questioned, and had
already played a tape of England talking with Woodfork making inculpatory responses .
This would lead anyone to understand the gravity of the situation . In fact, England said
that he knew Lisa's murder could be punished by the death penalty when the police
informed him of this fact. And the police were not telling England anything that was
illegal or untrue . The death penalty could legally have been sought upon a conviction
for the murder. Therefore, we do not agree that these comments amounted to
objective coercion on behalf of the police such that England's confession should have
been excluded .
Second, the false-friend technique is often used to make the suspect feel
more at ease so that he will not feel intimidated by the situation . This technique does
not amount to coercion in most circumstances . While there are situations when using a
false-friend could amount to coercion, such a situation is not present here . Sergeant
'° Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S .W .3d 466, 469 (Ky. 2000) . See also Colorado v.
Spring, 479 U .S. 564, 574, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987) .
Hendley and England played on the same athletics teams in high school, which was
more than twenty-five years earlier . Furthermore, there was no evidence in the record
that the two had continued a friendly relationship after high school . This is not the type
of relationship one would consider as inherently coercive . It is, rather, more akin to a
good cop, bad cop routine . And there is nothing in the record that would show that
Hendley's role in the interrogation was objectively coercive .
Additionally, England's will was never overcome by any allegedly
objectively coercive actions on the part of the police . He made a reasoned
determination to cooperate with the police after being presented with the evidence
already compiled against him. In sum, we affirm the trial court's ruling to admit the
confession because it was not coercively obtained .
B.
Death penalty as an option
England asserts that the death penalty should have been taken out of the
realm of potential penalties because he relied on an offer by the Commonwealth when
he confessed to the crime . However, there never was an offer to England. It is true
that the interrogators noted that the death penalty was an option, and it is also true that
the interrogators said they had talked to the prosecutor and there was only one deal.
But England puts words into the interrogators' mouths when he states that the deal was
that the death penalty would not be pursued. The prosecution is not required to be
absolutely honest with the suspect, and since there was no true offer upon which
England could rely, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the prosecution was properly
allowed to seek the death penalty in England's trial .
C.
The restraining order affidavit
England further asserts that information contained in an affidavit in
support of an Emergency Protective Order against his co-conspirator should have been
excluded, and its admission was reversible error. England is correct insofar as he
contends that this evidence is inadmissible because it does not meet any exceptions to
the hearsay rule, is inherently unreliable, and violates his Sixth Amendment right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."" This Court has made it abundantly clear
that statements made for the purpose of obtaining a restraining order are not
admissible at trial .
In both Bray v . Commonwe alth '2 and Barnes v. Commonwealth '3 we said
that affidavits for restraining orders were inadmissible hearsay because they were
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted - that the defendant had made a threat
against the victim's life . And the facts of this case present distinctions without a
difference . For example, the statement in Barnes , given by the victim, stated that the
defendant had assaulted and threatened to kill her. The same is true here, except that
it was against a co-conspirator of the defendant rather than the defendant himself .
Lisa's statement was that McCary threatened to kill her or get someone to do it for him.
Additionally, neither statement was subject to cross-examination . The distinction here
is that the evidence regarding the restraining order was not against the defendant, but
rather against the defendant's co-conspirator, Tyrone McCary. We see no meaningful
difference in using this hearsay evidence against the defendant and in using it against a
co-conspirator of the defendant. In both cases the evidence was used to establish
" U .S . CONST. amend. VI . See also Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S . 36, 124 S . Ct.
1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) .
12
68 S .W .3d 375 (Ky. 2002) .
13
794 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1990) .
intent by proving a threat had been made . This violates the hearsay rule regardless of
whether the matter asserted was about the defendant or a co-conspirator . The
Commonwealth's contention that the evidence was not against the defendant may be
germane as to relevance, but not as to hearsay. As England was being prosecuted for
complicity with McCary in the murder of Lisa Halvorson, and proof of McCary's intent
was an element, '4 hearsay evidence that would have been error against McCary is also
error against England .
Therefore, we reaffirm and extend the Barnes doctrine, 15 which is that an
affidavit in support of a motion for a restraining order is not admissible at trial regardless
of whether the defendant on trial is the person against whom the restraining order was
sought .' 6
Of course, to overturn England's conviction, the improperly admitted
evidence must have been prejudicial to his case . The Kentucky Rules of Evidence
state that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party has been affected ."" And in Crane v.
Commonwealth we noted that one's substantial rights are affected when there is a
"reasonable possibility that absent error the verdict would have been different . 08 We
now turn to the harmless error inquiry .
If ever there were evidence that (put into the context of the particular facts
of the case) failed to satisfy the "verdict would have been different" standard required
KRS 502 .020.
_Id .
' 6 Obviously, this evidence may be admitted for other reasons provided that the hearsay
and relevance rules are satisfied . For instance, it may be used under KRE 801 A as a
prior statement of a witness.
" KRE 103(a) .
18 726 S.W .2d 302, 307 (Ky. 1987) .
14
15
for reversal, it is here . Simply put, had this evidence been excluded from the jury's
consideration no different result could have logically been reached. The prosecution
had a taped confession with England admitting participation in this crime . This
evidence is corroborated by both the circumstances of the murder and the crime scene,
and is enough to deem the admission of the affidavit against England's co-conspirator
harmless. But there is more . The prosecution also introduced competent evidence of a
taped conversation between England and Karl Woodfork . In March 2000, Woodfork
contacted the police and informed it that he had information regarding Lisa's murder.
After telling the police that McCary had sought to hire him and England to murder Lisa,
Woodfork agreed to record conversations with England . In those conversations, which
were played for the jury, England said McCary had not paid money owed to him and
considered ways to coerce McCary to pay him the money .
With this abundance of evidence, we hold that the improper admission of
the affidavit was harmless, as the jury would not have returned a different verdict had
the evidence been excluded .
D.
Motion to sever trials
England next asserts that granting the Commonwealth's motion to sever
the trials of England and McCary was reversible error. England argues that the
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden for severance, and that he was prejudiced
because had he and McCary been tried jointly the most England could have been
convicted of was assault. This contention is based on the fact that at a joint trial the
Commonwealth would not have been able to use any portions of England's confession
that referred to McCary.' 9 This only proves the Commonwealth's argument that it would
'~ Bruton v . United States , 391 U.S . 123, 88 S . Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968) .
10
have been prejudiced had its motion to sever the trials not been granted. In fact, this is
a picture-perfect case for the efficacy of severing trials. Here there are two defendants
who conspired to murder. Without severance, one's confession could not have been
fully used against him to avoid violating the constitutional rights of the other.
Furthermore, England made a motion to sever the trials one week before
the trial was scheduled to begin on September 3, 2002, which shows that he must not
have seriously objected to severance . From the foregoing, the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in granting the Commonwealth's motion to sever the trials of England and
McCary.2°
E.
Right to employ a criminologist
England next claims that his conviction should be reversed because he
was denied sufficient public funds to employ a criminologist . The criminologist was
purportedly going to testify that the body was moved after death, that Caucasian hairs
were found in Lisa's hands and panties, and that the sperm found in Lisa's vagina did
not come from either England or McCary. However, this evidence, except for
movement of the body, was presented at trial from other witnesses . The only facts that
the criminologist was to testify to that could merit reversal is that the body was moved
after death. However, upon England's motion for the Commonwealth to pay for a
criminologist, the trial judge disallowed the employment of the criminologist because the
cost was an unreasonable $3,500 per day. The judge stated that England could submit
other names, but England failed to do this. Instead, England requested that the state
See Boggs v. Commonwealth , 424 S .W .2d 806 (Ky. 1966) (holding that there should
be no reversal of a judge's ruling to sever in the absence of an abuse of discretion) .
2°
pay for the purchase of a forensic pathology treatise, which was granted by the trial
court. There was no reversible error.
F.
Statements of the victim
England next contends that it was improper to allow Cori Poindexter to
testify about statements made by Lisa during a telephone conversation she overheard
between Lisa and McCary. Poindexter testified that during the conversation McCary
accused Lisa of having an affair, that Lisa responded by crying and refusing to eat, and
that Lisa told her that McCary had said if he could not have her, nobody would .
England appeals from the admission of this evidence because it is not relevant and
violates the hearsay rule .
Hearsay is a statement by a declarant, other than one made while
testifying at trial or at a hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted .
There were three statements about which Poindexter testified . First, Poindexter
testified that she overheard McCary accuse Lisa of having an affair. This statement is
not hearsay . The matter asserted was that Lisa was having an affair, and it was not
offered by the Commonwealth to prove the truth of it. It was ostensibly used, rather, to
show the general belligerency McCary had toward Lisa at a time near to her murder .
Second, Poindexter testified that Lisa cried and refused to eat in response to the
conversation with McCary. This, too, is not hearsay. To be hearsay, there must be a
statement. A statement is defined in KRE 801(a)(2), and it requires that the statement
be intended as an assertion . Crying is not an assertion . Rather, it is a physical
manifestation of an emotion or sensation . It is not a statement for hearsay purposes.
However, even if crying were intended as an assertion and offered to prove the truth of
'' KRE 801(c) .
12
whatever was asserted - thereby implicating the hearsay rule, it would still be subject to
admission into evidence as a statement of Lisa's then-existing emotional condition of
mental feeling or pain . Finally, Poindexter testified that Lisa told her that McCary told
her that if he couldn't have her, nobody would. This is hearsay. The declarant was
Lisa, and the matter asserted is that McCary said that nobody would have her if he
couldn't . 23 However, this statement is admissible under the spontaneous statement
exceptions to the hearsay rule, present sense impressions 24 and excited utterances . 25
The underlying premise behind these exceptions is that they are inherently reliable
because they are contemporaneous with the observation, safe from defects in memory,
and unlikely to result from calculated thought. Lisa's statement described what McCary
said immediately after their phone conversation ended. Thus it qualifies as an
exception under KRE 803(1). Furthermore, Lisa's statement was an excited utterance
because McCary's statement that he would not let anybody else have her if he couldn't
precipitated a startling event to Lisa, and her statement to Poindexter relating to
McCary's threat was made immediately after the phone conversation while she was
crying . Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the statement was
properly admitted .
KRE 803(3) .
It is important to note that the matter asserted is not that nobody would have Lisa if
McCary couldn't, but that McCary said those words. Lisa is the declarant, not McCary.
Had the declarant been McCary, then this statement would not be hearsay because the
statement was not offered to prove that Lisa would not be had by anyone but McCary .
Rather, the statement was offered to prove that McCary made that threat.
24
KRE 803(1).
KRE 803(2) .
21
See Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1986) (trial court rulings
regarding hearsay exceptions are entitled to deference) .
22
23
13
Second, this evidence meets the test of relevance . The Commonwealth
was charged with the burden of proving that England conspired with McCary to kill his
ex-girlfriend, Lisa. The trial court allowed this statement into evidence after considering
its relevance, noting that evidence that McCary threatened Lisa the day of the murder
and that Lisa was scared of McCary goes to the Commonwealth's theory .
England further contends that the out of court statements should have
been excluded because their probative value is substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial effect .2' We agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, that we
should not disturb a trial court's KRE 403 ruling to admit evidence unless the trial judge
has abused his discretion .2s This deference is bestowed upon the trial judge because
she is in a much better position to determine the prejudicial effect of particular evidence
due to being infinitely more familiar with the case than are appellate judges. In light of
the deference given to the trial court, we affirm this ruling of the trial court .
However, even if we were to conclude that the trial judge abused his
discretion in admitting this evidence, such an error would be harmless in light of the
remaining competent evidence . As discussed above, the Commonwealth presented
two audio tapes to the jury: in one England confessed to the crime at the police station,
and in the other England made inculpatory statements to Woodfork.
G.
African-Americans on the jury panel
England further asserts that his conviction should be overturned because
there were not a sufficient number of African-Americans on the jury panel . England
does not, however, assert any wrongdoing on the part of the judicial system . His only
'-' KRE 403.
'g See Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.10 (3d ed . 1993)
for a more thorough discussion of federal decisions regarding FRE 403.
14
assertion is that the courts are required to ensure that African-Americans are
represented in the jury panel, regardless of the results of the selection process, which is
random . Here, the jury panel was randomly selected by computer from registered
voters who also had a driver's license . This process resulted in two African-Americans
being randomly selected to be on the jury panel . One of two was dismissed for cause
because of a familial relationship with the defendant. The other was not dismissed for
cause or peremptorily challenged, but was not seated on the jury because of the draw.
Because there is not even a scintilla of evidence that African-Americans were
systematically excluded from the jury panel, England is not entitled to reversal of his
conviction. Simply put, one is entitled to a fair process whereby there is no systematic
exclusion of qualified candidates for the jury panel ; but one is not entitled to a jury
composed of a certain number of persons of a given race.
H.
Death-qualified jury
Similarly, England argues that his conviction should be reversed because
jurors who were opposed to the death penalty should have been allowed to remain on
the jury. It is well-settled law in this Commonwealth that a juror may be stricken for
cause if she is unable to consider the death penalty when considering the sentence
upon conviction of the defendant. 3° We hold that England's constitutional rights were
not violated by excusing jurors who could not consider the death penalty as a sentence
upon his conviction .
I.
Tape transcripts used during closing argument
See Patterson v. Commonwealth , 555 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. App. 1977) (disproportionate
number of young people on the jury panel did not establish systematic exclusion).
1 ° E.a. , Mabe v. Commonwealth , 884 S .W.2d 668 (Ky. 1994) . See also 9 Leslie W.
Abramson, Kentucky Practice § 25 .49 (4th ed. 2003) .
15
21
England's next assertion is that he is entitled to a new trial because the
Commonwealth used enlarged, typewritten transcripts of portions of the audio tapes
between England and Woodfork. The Commonwealth attempted to introduce this
evidence as an exhibit during the proof phase of the trial, but the trial court sustained
England's objection because it was difficult to conclude what was said on the tapes and
the interpretation was properly left to the jury. However, the trial court allowed this
evidence to be used during the Commonwealth's closing argument because the
prosecutor's closing remarks were the Commonwealth's theory of the case rather than
evidence .
This was the proper ruling by the trial court. A party has the right to
present his theory of the case to the jury as long as the evidence supports such a
theory .3' Appellant cites Sanborn v. Commonwealth 32 as support for his argument that
giving the jury a transcript of an unclear tape recording is reversible error. However, the
issue in Sanborn was whether it was reversible error to give the jury a transcript of such
a tape recording during the proof stage of trial . Here the issue is whether a transcript is
improperly presented to the jury during closing argument, not as proof but as a theory of
the case . But this evidence is more akin to the transcript in Norton v. Commonwealth 33
than it is to Sanborn . The Court of Appeals, in affirming Judge (now Justice) Graves'
decision to admit the transcript, noted in Norton that there is a difference in a transcript
offered as evidence and one offered as guidance .34 Also, there is no allegation of
particularized errors in the Commonwealth's transcript . Such was not the case in
Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W .2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987) .
754 S.W.2d 534 (1988) .
33
890 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. App. 1995) .
34 Id . at 637.
32
16
Sanborn, where there were discrepancies even between the court reporter's transcript
of the trial and the Commonwealth's transcript . We find that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion, and decline to extend Sanborn to include all instances where a
transcript is presented to the jury when the tape is unclear .
J.
Commonwealth's closing argument about instructions
England claims that his conviction should be reversed because he was
prejudiced by the Commonwealth's improper closing argument. England argues that
the Commonwealth's argument was in contradiction to the instructions given to the jury.
The instructions stated that the jury could return a verdict of guilty if it believed that
England killed her by "striking her, running over her with a truck, and causing her death
by strangulation ." During its closing the Commonwealth stated that the jury could
return a verdict of guilty if it found that England engaged in one of those actions . The
Commonwealth concedes that the prosecutor made the alleged statement. However,
England did not make a proper objection to this statement. Pursuant to RCr 9.22,
counsel must make a contemporaneous objection to any improper comment during
closing argument. If counsel fails to so object, then a reviewing court will not reverse a
conviction unless the comment rises to the level of palpable error, as enunciated in RCr
10.26 .
The only question respecting this issue is whether there was palpable
error, which exists when a reviewing court concludes that a substantial possibility exists
that the result would have been different . When taken as a whole, we find that the
Commonwealth's closing argument was not palpable error. Had England properly
~5
E.
Jackson v. Commonwealth , 717 S .W.2d 511 (Ky. App. 1986) .
17
objected to the comment he may have been entitled to some form of relief, such as an
admonition . However, he did not, and we do not find palpable error.
K.
Notice of aggravating circumstances
Furthermore, England claims that his conviction should be reversed
because he did not receive notice of the Commonwealth's evidence of aggravation,
which triggered the death penalty. However, KRS 532.025 does not require written
notice to the defendant of the Commonwealth's evidence . It only requires that the
defendant be made known of such evidence . Here, England was certainly made known
of the aggravating evidence, which was that England participated in the murder of Lisa
for profit. This was dealt with at the pre-trial suppression hearing, where England
claimed that he had not received notice that the Commonwealth was seeking the death
penalty. However, England had such notice. For example, England received the
revised notice dated August 12, 2002, of aggravating circumstances sent to both him
and McCary (his co-conspirator) . England's argument that it does not reference him in
the body of the notice is unpersuasive, as he was mentioned in the heading and the
notice was sent to his attorney . In fact, England attached the notice to his motion and
argued that such notice was not contained in the indictment.
This is not a novel proposition . In Francis v. Commonwealth 36 we held
that it was not necessary for the defendant to receive written notice. What was
important was that the defendant be apprised of the aggravating evidence and have the
ability to prepare to meet it . 37 The same is true here . It is clear that England
understood that the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty, he understood the
752 S .W.2d 309 (Ky. 1988) .
j' Id. at 311 .
36
18
evidence upon which the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty, and he had
the opportunity to prepare to meet that evidence . In short, England had the type of
notice KRS 532.025 contemplated. We decline this invitation to overturn his conviction .
L.
Aggravating circumstances
in the
indictment
Closely akin to England's most previous argument, England asserts that
because the aggravating circumstances were not included in the indictment the
Commonwealth was prohibited from seeking the death penalty . However, this issue
has been recently decided by this Court in Furnish v. Commonwealth, 38 a case in which
three opinions were written, but all agreeing to the pertinent issue in this case :
aggravating circumstances need not be included in the indictment for the
Commonwealth to seek the death penalty . 39 Like in Furnish , the indictment here clearly
noted that England was being charged with "Murder, A Capital Offense" for "running
over and strangling Lisa Halvorson ." Moreover, England was made known of the
specific evidence upon which it intended to seek capital punishment . Additionally, this
was not preserved for review by a pre-trial motion as required by RCr 8.18, which was
also the case in Furnish .
M.
Recorded conversations
England further contends (apparently without the agreement of his
counsel) that the trial court should not have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce
the taped conversation between himself and Woodfork. He claims that this is a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that he is entitled to a new trial . However, use of this type of
~g 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2003) .
39
Id . at 41 .
40
Id .
19
evidence does not violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. A defendant's
conversations with a police informant do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights
where the informant was legally in the place where the taped conversations took place
and every conversation used by the prosecution was either directly with the informant or
carried on with the defendant's knowledge of his presence
N.
41
Exculpatory evidence
England's last claim for reversal of his conviction is that he was not given
exculpatory evidence by the Commonwealth . Specifically, he contends that he was not
informed that the sperm found in Lisa's vagina was from her boyfriend, Shannon
Jenkins, that there was a Caucasian head hair found in Lisa's panties, and that there
were Caucasian head hairs in her hands . However, England was aware of the crucial
parts of this information prior to trial. For instance, he was aware that the hair in Lisa's
hand was probably from a cat. As to the sperm found, England argued that the sperm
taken from Lisa did not match either England or McCary. Also, England was aware that
Jenkins stated that he recently had sexual intercourse with Lisa. In fact, the additional
test taken with Jenkins' sample was done so the prosecutor could rebut a claim that the
sperm could have come from Lisa's killer .
Therefore, all the evidence England claims could have given the jury a
reasonable doubt was available to England: that the hairs and sperm did not match
England or McCary . The trial judge's ruling is not to be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion, 42 and we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial . This
is true especially in light of the competent evidence that England and McCary left Lisa
See e.g. . Hoffa v. United States , 385 U .S . 293, 87 S . Ct . 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374
(1966) .
42 E .g_,
Anderson v. Commonwealth , 63 S.W.3d 135,141 (Ky . 2001) .
20
4'
to die in the exact location in which she was found. "It is clear that in order to warrant a
new trial, the defendant must make a showing of reasonable certainty that a different
verdict would have been reached had the evidence been presented." 43 Had the
evidence been as England wishes, the result would not have changed . He was
properly convicted on the competent evidence, and we see no reason to overturn that
conviction .
Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, Johnstone, Keller, Scott, and Wintersheimer,
JJ., concur. Cooper, J ., concurs in result only .
43
Id. (citing Carwile v. Commonwealth , 694 S .W.2d 469, 470 (1985)) .
21
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Benjamin J . Lookofsky
P. O . Box 696
Mayfield, KY 42066
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Sturnbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G . Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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