MICHAEL J. BAYLESS, II; ET AL V. ROBERT L. BOYER, M.D., ET AL
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MICHAEL J. BAYLESS, II ; MICHAEL J.
BAYLESS ; AND DEBORAH BAYLESS
V.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-001021-MR
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 96-CI-00438
ROBERT L . BOYER, M .D . ; AND
WALTER EISEMAN, M.D.
APPELANTS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ROACH
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from Appellants' allegation of medical malpractice against
Robert L . Boyer, M .D. and Walter Eiseman, M .D., for failing to diagnose a wrist fracture .
At trial, Appellants, Michael J. Bayless, If, and his parents, Michael J . and Deborah
Bayless, were awarded damages for medical bills but no damages for pain and
suffering . They appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial of their
motion for a new trial in the Kenton Circuit Court . Appellants allege that numerous
errors occurred, the cumulative effect of which entitles them to a new trial. Primarily,
they claim : (1) that the jury's "zero" verdict for pain and suffering damages was
inappropriate ; and (2) that limitations on the scope of questioning allowed by the trial
court, particularly as related to the alleged bias of witnesses, were improper. In addition
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to their two central claims, Appellants raise several additional issues which we discuss
below. Having reviewed each of Appellants' claims of error, we conclude they are
without merit . Thus we affirm the Court of Appeals.
II. BACKGROUND
Michael Bayless, II, fractured his right wrist while playing with friends on March
12, 1995. Later that night, his wrist became swollen and painful, so his mother took him
to the emergency room of St. Elizabeth Medical Center ("Medical Center") .'
The triage nurse at the emergency room ordered an x-ray of Michael's wrist. Dr.
Robert L. Boyer examined Michael . Dr. Boyer's notes of this examination included the
entry "no wrist pain ." Deborah Bayless's testimony suggested that, in addition to his
physical examination of Michael, Dr. Boyer had also examined x-rays of the boy's wrist.
Although Dr. Boyer did not remember any details of their meeting, he testified that
because Michael had not complained of any acute pain during his brief examination, he
thought it was unlikely that he would have reviewed the wrist x-rays . Dr. Boyer failed to
diagnose the fracture and concluded instead that Michael had only a sprained wrist. He
instructed Michael to wrap the injured wrist with an elastic bandage, apply ice, and take
ibuprofen for pain. Pre-printed instructions on Michael's discharge paperwork stated,
"IF YOUR CONDITION WORSENS OR RETURNS, PLEASE CALL OR SEE YOUR
PHYSICIAN OR RETURN TO THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT ."
The Medical Center was named as a defendant in the original lawsuit, but the
jury did not find against it. Appellants declined to pursue an appeal as to this portion of
the jury's verdict, exonerating the Medical Center of any liability .
The next day, Dr. Walter Eiseman, a radiologist under contract with the Medical
Center, examined the x-ray of Michael's wrist. He too failed to recognize the fracture.
At trial, Dr. Eiseman stipulated that he had violated the standard of care applicable to
him in failing to diagnose Michael's broken wrist, but he argued that his failure to detect
the fracture had not been a substantial factor contributing to Michael's injury .
After his discharge from the hospital, Michael continued to lead a very active
lifestyle as a member of his high school's freshman baseball team . During this time, he
claimed that he also experienced chronic pain in his wrist, routinely icing his arm and
taking over the counter medications in an effort to relieve his symptoms . Despite his
claim of constant pain, neither Michael nor his parents sought follow-up medical
treatment until two months after his visit to the emergency room. Michael finally learned
that he had a fractured wrist during a visit to his pediatrician . Although Michael testified
at trial that the injury was not discovered until after the baseball season ended, this
testimony was impeached by his prior deposition testimony which indicated that he had
actually learned of the injury shortly before the end of the season and had continued to
play .
After the season, Dr. John Wyrick, an orthopedic surgeon, evaluated and treated
Michael's fractured wrist. Because of the delay in diagnosis, movement and
calcification of the fractured bone made treatment by casting the wrist impossible . Dr.
Wyrick subsequently performed surgery to repair the fractured bone . He testified that
he had great confidence that the surgery was successful, that Michael would have
normal strength in the wrist, and that the surgery had not rendered Michael any more
susceptible to chronic pain or arthritis-in short, Michael's surgical treatment was no
less successful than had his wrist been treated promptly by casting.
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At trial, the jury found no liability on the part of Dr. Boyer for his care and
treatment of Michael. However, the jury concluded that Dr . Eiseman was liable for his
negligence in Michael's treatment . The jury also found that Michael and his parents
failed to exercise ordinary care for Michael's safety and health, and apportioned liability
between Dr. Eiseman and Appellants equally. The jury found damages of $9,802 .16
based on the amount of his medical expenses, primarily the costs of the surgical
procedure, but the jury declined to award any damages for Michael's pain and suffering.
The final judgment of the trial court against Dr. Eiseman was $4,901 .08.
The trial court denied Appellants' motion for a new trial, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed on direct appeal . We granted discretionary review .
III. ANALYSIS
As noted above, Appellants allege numerous trial errors. The two primary
issues-the appropriateness of the jury's "zero" verdict for pain and suffering and the
trial court's restriction as to the scope of witness questioning-demand the greatest
attention and will be discussed first.
A. "Zero" Verdict for Pain and Suffering
Appellants claim it was error for the trial court to deny their motion for a new trial
on the issue of damages for pain and suffering . Appellants' motion, pursuant to CR
59 .01(d), specifically challenged the validity of the jury's verdict of zero damages for
Michael's pain and suffering. Appellants claim that uncontroverted evidence of
Michael's pain from the surgery entitled them to an award for these damages . In
response, Appellees argue that Appellants' evidence was inconclusive and that the jury
verdict was justified by testimony at trial.
It is well-established that appellate courts in this state review trial court rulings on
a motion for new trial on grounds of inadequate damages under a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. See, e.g. , Cooper v. Fufz, 812 S .W.2d 497 (Ky. 1991) . "Our
decision in Cooper amounts to a recognition that a proper ruling on a motion for new
trial depends to a great extent upon factors which may not readily appear in an
appellate record . Only if the appellate court concludes that the trial court's order was
clearly erroneous may it reverse ." Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin , 834 S.W .2d
667, 669 (Ky. 1992) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we treat the decision of a trial
court on this issue with a great deal of deference .
In addition, we recently rejected the notion that a jury verdict of zero for pain and
suffering is inadequate as a matter of law in cases where a jury also awards damages
for medical expenses. In Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001), we held, "[t]he law
in Kentucky . . . does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering in
every case in which it awards medical expenses." Id. at 601 . Relying heavily on
Turfway Park, we reiterated that "[o]ur review . . . is limited to whether the trial court's
denial of [the motion for retrial] was clearly erroneous." Id . Although not specifically
argued in this case, we must also note that the general principle advanced in Millerthat a zero verdict for pain and suffering may sometimes be appropriate-is not
constrained to the facts of that case . Rather, that principle is broadly applicable to
2 In Miller , the plaintiff suffered from a variety of chronic illnesses prior to the
accident . The basis of her claim for pain and suffering damages was that the pain from
these conditions had been exacerbated by her injuries and had increased in the wake of
the accident . We noted that the trial judge's decision denying retrial on the issue of
damages was appropriate "[b]ecause the evidence at trial supported a finding by the
jury that Miller did not suffer additional pain as a result of the accident . . . ." Miller, 42
S .W. 3d at 599 .
cases which claim this type of error. We note this only to confirm that our holding here
reaffirms and does not expand or alter the principle set forth in Miller.
Appellants claim that had Michael been properly diagnosed, his fractured wrist
could have been treated with a cast and would not have required surgery. They argue
that because this fact was uncontroverted at trial and because the surgical procedure
was necessarily painful, the judge's denial of their motion for a new trial was clearly
erroneous .
Appellants cite Hazelwood v. Beauchamp , 766 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. App . 1989), in
support of this contention . In that case the Court of Appeals stated : "While it is true that
the jury did not have to believe [the plaintiff's] testimony regarding the pain he claims to
have endured, it was not free to disregard the uncontroverted evidence of the nature of
the accident itself and the medical procedures performed ." Id . at 441 . We would first
point out that because Hazelwood is a case from the Court of Appeals, it is not binding
on this Court . But the facts in Hazelwood are also markedly different from the facts in
this case. In Hazelwood , the plaintiff sued his employer and a coworker after having his
hand maimed in a mechanical hay bailer that he was attempting to repair. The jury
concluded that his injury was, at least in part, the result of his coworker's negligence.
Nevertheless, they awarded only nominal damages for pain and suffering . In contrast,
Appellants in this case sued on a theory of medical malpractice ; damages were not
based directly on a physical injury, but resulted from a delay in the diagnosis and
treatment of Michael's broken wrist. The nature of any pain and suffering damages that
Michael could have rightfully claimed is fundamentally different than that discussed in
Hazelwood .
Additionally, despite Appellants' claim that the evidence of Michael's pain and
suffering was uncontroverted, there were numerous instances where relevant testimony
on the subject was either impeached or contradicted . In fact, we note substantial
problems in three key areas of Appellants' proof of pain and suffering: (1) Michael's
deposition and trial testimony, (2) Dr. Wyrick's testimony, and (3) Michael's medical
records describing the surgical procedure and follow-up treatments .
First, Michael's claim that he constantly suffered pain after the surgery was not
corroborated by Dr. Wyrick's notes describing Michael's follow-up appointments .
Remarkably, the notes, which detail several separate visits, do not include any
indication that Michael was experiencing pain until after this lawsuit was initiated . In
addition, Dr. Wyrick's notes directly contradicted Michael's testimony on this point, since
they expressly observed that Michael "denie[d] any pain at all" on one occasion and was
"having no pain" on another. Second, although Michael claimed that the pain in his arm
following surgery prevented the normal use of this hand during his day-to-day activities,
he admitted under cross examination that he had fully participated in two baseball
seasons after the surgery. This fact was substantially confirmed in his medical records,
which noted he had been playing baseball and could do pushups without any significant
problems . Third, Dr. Wyrick testified that there would likely have been significant pain
associated with treatment of Michael's fractured wrist regardless of the treatment option,
either casting or surgery, that was used. He further testified that he could not predict
any significant difference in pain between the two options . Finally, Michael's surgery
was performed under general anesthesia, preventing or limiting the acute pain directly
related to the procedure . There was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that
Appellants were not entitled to a damages award for pain and suffering.
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B. Scope of Cross-Examination
Appellants claim their due process rights were violated by the trial court's
decision to limit the scope of cross-examination of witnesses as to possible bias and
prejudice . Specifically they claim that they should have been freely permitted to ask
questions relating (1) to the compensation of expert witnesses and (2) to whether there
was any commonality between the insurance carriers of those experts and the
Appellees . We address these claims individually.
1 . Cross-Examination as to Compensation
This issue was not even addressed, much less preserved by objection, at trial.
Appellants admit that they did not raise the issue of expert compensation and justify this
failure because, at the time of trial, Kentucky courts were not generally required to allow
such questioning . See Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc. , 383 S .W.2d 139 (Ky.
1964) (holding that although it was a matter within the trial court's discretion, admission
of testimony disclosing specific details of witness compensation was not generally
favored) . Current was overruled by this Court in Tuttle v . Perry, 82 S .W .3d 920 (Ky.
2002), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal. In Tuttle, which reversed
a defense judgment in a medical malpractice trial, we held that "the amount of money a
witness is paid for testifying in a particular case is unquestionably disclosable on cross.
examination To the extent Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky is to the contrary, it
is overruled ." Id. at 923 (citing Wrobleski v. Nora de Lara , 727 A.2d 930 (Md . 1999)) .
Despite their failure to preserve or even address the issue at trial, Appellants ask
that we reverse the judgment in this case on the authority of Mitchell v. Hadl , 816
S .W.2d 183 (Ky. 1991) ("When the facts reveal a fundamental basis for decision not
presented by the parties, it is our duty to address the issue to avoid a misleading
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application of the law."). This we will not do . The Appellants' reliance on Mitchell ,
wherein the Court decided the case on a unique legal theory that was not addressed by
any party, is clearly misplaced . Appellants do not, indeed cannot, claim that the trial
court took any action preventing them from raising the issue of expert witness
compensation . More importantly, however, Current only discouraged the introduction of
testimony as to expert witness compensation ; the decision to admit such testimony was
still ultimately left to the discretion of a trial court. Had Appellants wished to introduce
the testimony, they could, and should, have raised the issue at trial. As such, there is
no doubt that Appellants' decision to forego the issue was unquestionably their own .
Such a mistake in judgment, even one that is arguably understandable, provides no
basis for reversal .
2. Cross-Examination as to Commonality of Insurance Providers
In contrast to their failure to address the compensation of defense experts,
Appellants did make some attempt to raise the issue of commonality between the
malpractice insurance carriers of the defense witnesses and the defendants as a source
of potential bias.3 This issue has previously been addressed only by the Court of
Appeals . In Wallace v. Leedhanachoke , 949 S.W .2d 624 (Ky. App. 1996), the Court of
Appeals held that "the [trial court] was required to balance the probative value of the
evidence [of commonality between insurance carriers] . . . against the prejudicial effect it
3 Boyer named two expert witnesses, Bruce D. Janiak, M .D. and James L .
Evans, M .D . Dr. Evans was unable to testify at the trial due to a scheduling conflict,
however Dr. Janiak did testify before the court. Dr. Eiseman did not call any expert
witnesses to testify on his behalf .
may have produced before it permitted the cross-examination proposed by the
plaintiffs ." Id. at 628. The Court of Appeals went on to note:
The mere fact that the two physicians shared a common
insurance carrier-absent a more compelling degree of
connection-does not clearly evince bias by the expert, and
its arguable relevance or probative value is insufficient to
outweigh the well-established rule as to the inadmissibility of
evidence as to the existence of insurance .
Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals . Its holding in Wallace is a sound application of
the balancing test required by KRE 403 as applied to the specific issue of commonality
of insurance carriers .
During Appellants' cross-examination of Dr. Boyer, the trial court summarily
refused to allow this proposed line of questioning without engaging in the balancing test
described in Wallace . The trial court's refusal even to consider admission of this
testimony might constitute error if it could be shown to be prejudicial . However, we
cannot undertake such analysis because there is no evidence in the record, even by
avowal, of commonality of insurance carriers. Appellants' attorney stated he would
proffer evidence as to commonality of malpractice providers later in the trial, but this
never occurred . Having been denied the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Boyer on this
issue, it was incumbent upon Appellants' counsel to at least make an avowal in order to
ensure the issue could be adequately reviewed on appeal. "[W]ithout an avowal to
show what a witness would have said an appellate court has no basis for determining
whether an error in excluding his proffered testimony was prejudicial ." Cain v.
Commonwealth , 554 S .W.2d 369 (Ky. 1977) . In this case, it is not enough that
Appellants have identified the issue because their failure to proffer any evidence of
commonality, much less any improper motive or bias on behalf of those testifying,
precludes any finding of prejudice.
C . Miscellaneous Allegations of Error
Appellants also claim that (1) the trial court erred by finding that the Appellees
were adverse parties and thereby granting them each three peremptory challenges; (2)
the trial court improperly denied Appellants' claim of loss of consortium ; (3) Appellees
and/or their counsel engaged in misconduct ; (4) the jury instructions erroneously
directed the jury to consider Appellants' comparative negligence ; (5) the jury instructions
failed to properly instruct the jury as to the applicable law; (6) the jury's verdict as to Dr.
Boyer's liability was not supported by the evidence ; and (7) the jury engaged in
misconduct. We address each of these issues in turn.
1 . Peremptory Challenges
Appellants claim that it was error for the trial court to allow Dr. Eiseman and Dr.
Boyer three peremptory challenges each during the jury selection process in violation of
CR 47.03 . The rule states, in relevant part: "In civil cases each opposing side shall
have three peremptory challenges, but co-parties having antagonistic interests shall
have three peremptory challenges each ." CR 47 .03(1). The thrust of Appellants'
argument is that Dr. Boyer and Dr. Eiseman were not sufficiently antagonistic to entitle
them to separate peremptory challenges.
The trial court must consider several factors in allocating the appropriate number
of peremptory strikes under CR 47.03 . In a recent unanimous opinion, we held :
Generally, there are three elements to be considered
in determining if coparties have antagonistic interests . They
are 1) whether the coparties are charged with separate acts
of negligence; 2) whether they share a common theory of the
case; and 3) whether they have filed cross-claims . Additional
important factors are whether the defendants are
represented by separate counsel; whether the alleged acts
of negligence occurred at different times; whether the
defendants have individual theories of defense ; and whether
fault will be subject to apportionment. All of these factors are
to be weighed by the trial court in determining if the
defendants have antagonistic interests and thus are entitled
to separate peremptory challenges .
Sommerkamp v. Linton , 114 S.W .3d 811, 815 (Ky. 2003) (internal citations omitted) .
We further stated :
[I]nterests that are antagonistic at the time of jury selection
or when the trial judge makes a determination regarding
entitlement to separate peremptory challenges, do not
necessarily have to remain antagonistic throughout the trial
in order to support the allocation of separate challenges .
There can be no certainty as to what the evidence will
demonstrate or precisely what the claims or defenses will be
during trial.
Id. at 816.
Appellants have provided no specific rationale for reversing the trial court on this
issue and rely instead on a general objection that the Appellees pursued a common
defense strategy throughout the trial . Appellees have each noted several instances
during the trial which demonstrated their antagonistic interests . That being said, there is
no need to recount each of those instances here . As noted above, a trial court's ruling
under CR 47.03 is necessarily made prior to trial and a review of that decision need not
focus on what actually occurred during the proceedings .
In Roberts v. Taylor , 339 S.W .2d 653 (Ky. 1960), a decision discussing an earlier
version of the peremptory challenge rule, our predecessor court stated : "Where the
defendants in a personal injury action are charged with independent acts of
negligence . . . the interests of the defendants are most always antagonistic, because
each may escape liability or reduce his liability by convincing the jury that the other was
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solely or primarily responsible ." Id . at 656. In this case, where two physicians were
alleged to have committed entirely separate acts of negligence, that statement alone
provides sufficient justification for the trial court's decision . This is particularly true given
the jury's ability to consider the comparative negligence of the parties. We cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in granting separate peremptory challenges to
the defending parties.
2. Denial of Appellants' Loss of Consortium Claim
Appellants claim the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on their
claim of loss of consortium . We first note that the only statutory support we can find for
such a claim is limited to cases involving the wrongful death of a minor. See KRS
411 .135 ("In a wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the
surviving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that
would have been derived from such child during its minority, in addition to all other
elements of the damage usually recoverable in a wrongful death action ."). It suffices to
say that Michael Bayless was not killed .
Appellants cite Department of Education v. Blevins , 707 S.W .2d 782 (Ky. 1986),
for the general proposition that a parent may bring a claim for loss of consortium. But
the cause of action in Blevins was premised on KRS 411 .135 and loss of consortium
damages were alleged after the death of a child . Nothing in Blevins supports the
expansion of loss of consortium claims beyond the extreme case of a wrongful death
lawsuit. Even if it did, we would point out that the holding in Blevins is limited to the
context in which it arose, namely as an action against a state entity, and not an
individual tortfeasor, pursuant to the Commonwealth's Board of Claims Act. 4
Furthermore, Blevins 's allowance for parental loss of consortium claims under the act
was abrogated by statute as recognized in Williams v. Kentucky Department of
Education , 113 S .W .3d 145, 156 (Ky. 2003) .
Appellants provide no binding authority suggesting that Kentucky law recognizes
a cause of action for loss of parental consortium in a personal injury case such as this.
Instead Appellants cite an opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals, Rouse v. Riverside
Methodist Hosp. , 459 N.E .2d 593, 600 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983), which they claim as proof
that "other courts have recognized and protected the right of a parent to be
compensated for the interruption of parental rights ." But Appellants' assertion about
Rouse is clearly false. In fact, Rouse does not address the loss of consortium issue at
all ; rather it merely "allow[s] a parent to recover from the wrongdoer the reasonable
value of the care or attendance which he himself renders to his child as the result of a
negligent injury." Id . at 600 .
Having cited no primary or secondary authority supporting their position,
Appellants give us little reason to depart from the holding of the Court of Appeals in
Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. McKee , 834 S .W .2d 711 (Ky. App . 1992). In that case,
despite proof of serious and permanent injury to a child, the Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's denial of an instruction on "the loss of [the child's] companionship, love and
affection," that is, a claim for parental loss of consortium . Id . at 725 . The Court of
Appeals correctly noted that "there is no Kentucky law which authorizes the giving of
such an instruction ." Id.
4 KRS Chapter 44.
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3 . Misconduct of Dr. Eiseman and His Attorney
Appellants argue they are entitled to a new trial because of the "[m]isconduct . . .
of the prevailing party, or of his attorney ." CR 59 .01(b) . Appellants' claim that after
stipulating shortly before the trial that he had deviated from the requisite standard of
care in examining Michael's x-ray, Dr. Eiseman testified and his attorney argued that
this deviation was inconsequential and that he was "sorry" for the mistake . Appellants
argue that Dr. Eiseman and his counsel should not have been permitted to make these
and similar statements to the jury since they had admitted his "liability" for Michael's
injuries . However, Appellants' argument reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of
our tort law in that it assumes Dr. Eiseman's stipulation that he had violated the
standard of care was equivalent to an admission of his liability for Michael's injuries, the
ultimate issue in this case. In light of the foregoing, we have reviewed Dr. Eiseman's
testimony and find no evidence of misconduct .
4. Jury Instructions on Comparative Negligence
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in submitting an instruction to the jury
which permitted a finding of comparative negligence on the part of the Appellants,
"Michael Bayless and/or his parents ." Appellants' primary argument is that it was error
to submit the question of Michael's negligence to the jury because of his relative youth
and inexperience given that he was only 14 years old at the time of the accident . In
support of their claim, Appellants cite Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S .W.2d 426 (Ky. 1959),
which discusses the application of the long-overruled principle of contributory
negligence 5 in cases where a party is a minor. They also claim that Boyer's allegedly
inadequate discharge instructions relieved them of any duty they might have had to
seek follow-up medical care.
Appellants claim there was no factual basis for a jury instruction on the issue of
comparative negligence and such an instruction was therefore impermissible . While it is
true that "an instruction must not be submitted on an issue that is entirely unsupported
by evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom," West Virginia Tractor & Equip. Co. v .
Cain , 487 S .W.2d 910, 911 (Ky. 1972), Appellants have clearly ignored any and all such
evidence in constructing this argument. Instead, Appellants present a litany of reasons
that their liability should be excused or minimized . Such an argument, while appropriate
for a jury at trial, does not address the fundamental error they have alleged here . There
was sufficient evidence in this case to suggest that Appellants bore some responsibility
for the injuries they claimed, not the least of which was the 66 day delay between
Michael's treatment in the emergency room and his decision to seek follow-up
treatment . Therefore the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on the issue of
comparative negligence was not error.
5. General Inadequacy of Jury Instructions
This ground for appeal is, at best, a makeweight argument. Appellants' brief
states that the instructions provided at trial "essentially [gave] the jury no legal direction
at all ." Appellants cite no specific deficiencies or problems with the jury instructions and
instead make only broad assertions of error. They ask that we overrule Cox v. Cooper,
5 The doctrine of pure comparative negligence was adopted in Hilen v. Hayes ,
673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984) .
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510 S .W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974), which held that jury instructions "should provide only the
bare bones , which can be fleshed out by counsel in their closing arguments if they so
desire ." Id . at 535 (emphasis added) . Cox is not alone, however, and is buttressed by a
long line of Kentucky cases which call for a substantially similar approach. See, e .g. ,
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co . , 840 S .W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992) ; Rogers v. Kasdan, 612
S .W .2d 133 (Ky. 1981) ; King v. Grecco , 111 S.W.3d 877 (Ky. App . 2002). The
instructions provided to the jury in this case were clearly adequate under Kentucky's
established standard . Furthermore, Appellants' failure to cite any specific deficiency or
to provide any more than a general objection to the practice of "bare bones" instructions
gives us no reason to depart from our time-tested method of instructing juries.
6. The Jury's Verdict of No Liability for Dr. Boyer
Appellants claim that the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Boyer was not supported by
sufficient evidence and that it was error for the trial court to deny their motion for a new
trial pursuant to CR 59 .01(f). Appellants have identified three independent examples of
what they claim was uncontroverted evidence of Dr. Boyer's negligence. These include
his alleged failures (1) to perform the "Anatomical Snuff-Box Test" during Michael's
emergency room examination, (2) to diagnose Michael's broken wrist through
examination of the x-ray, and (3) to provide adequate discharge instructions upon
Michael's release .
At the outset, we would note that our role as a reviewing court is limited :
The role of the appellate court when deciding
negligence issues of this sort is limited to viewing the
evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the prevailing
party . In negligence cases such as this one the verdict of
the jury resolves any conflicts in the testimony and also any
conflicts in the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
testimony in favor of the prevailing party . . . . In short, an
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appellate court must not substitute its findings of fact for
those of the jury if there is evidence to support them.
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co . , 690 S .W .2d 382, 385 (Ky. 1985) (internal
citations omitted) . As stated above in our discussion of the zero verdict, appellate
review of a trial court ruling on a motion brought pursuant to CR 59 .01 is subject to the
clearly erroneous standard, and requires a great deal of deference to the trial court. See
Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin , 834 S.W .2d 667, 669 (Ky. 1992) .
Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to Dr. Boyer, it is
clear that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict in his favor.
Appellants first contend that it was uncontroverted that Dr. Boyer did not perform an
adequate physical examination of Michael's wrist, namely a palpation known as the
"Anatomic Snuff-Box Test ." Significantly, Dr. Boyer did not remember the details of his
meeting with Michael . However, he did testify that his notes taken during the
examination included the comment "no wrist pain," indicating to him that it was likely he
performed the test because he would have thoroughly examined each of the bones in
the wrist before making such an observation . Further, Michael admitted that Dr. Boyer
had palpated different areas of his wrist, each time asking him if he experienced any
acute pain.
As for the x-rays, Dr. Boyer testified that because his physical examination
revealed no acute pain in Michael's wrist, he did not believe that he would have
ordered, much less examined, x-rays of the joint. Although Appellants contend that he
did in fact examine the x-rays, such inconclusive testimony does not bar an inference by
the jury in favor of the other party. Furthermore, the jury may have concluded that a
failure by Dr. Boyer to properly interpret the x-rays was not a substantial factor in
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causing further injury to Michael due to Dr. Eiseman's subsequent admission that he
had misread Michael's x-ray.
Finally, Appellants argue that Dr. Boyer's discharge instructions to Michael were
inappropriate . Although there was some disputed evidence regarding the verbal
instructions given by Dr. Boyer, the discharge form clearly indicated that Michael should
call his physician or return to the emergency room if his condition worsened or returned .
Because Michael received such notice, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that
Dr. Boyer's instructions were sufficient .
In the end, Appellants' list of "uncontroverted" evidence, though it musters
perhaps the strongest factual arguments from which a jury might infer that Dr. Boyer
was liable, is incomplete in that it avoids any mention of evidence in the record that
might lead a jury to the opposite conclusion . We, however, cannot ignore the existence
of that evidence. Stated simply, Appellants ignored their obligation to show that the
jury's verdict was not based on substantial evidence and instead endeavored to prove
to this Court that they had the "better" case .
7. Juror Misconduct
Finally, Appellants claim it was error to deny their motion for a new trial because
CR 59 .01 (b) permits such relief when there has been "misconduct of the jury."
Specifically, Appellants claim that it was misconduct for one juror to vote against liability
for Dr. Eiseman because the doctor had stipulated that his failure to recognize the
fracture in the x-ray of Michael's wrist fell below the appropriate standard of care and
the jury had been instructed as to that fact. Appellants state, "[t]his illogical vote
demonstrates a clear bias and prejudice which forecloses the ability to achieve a fair
trial when a juror ignores stipulations and a court's directive ." Appellants press this
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claim despite the fact that the jury concluded in their favor that Dr. Eiseman was
partially liable for Michael's injuries, albeit by a vote of 11-1 .
As noted by the Court of Appeals, Appellants cite no legal authority supporting
this claim . They confuse Dr. Eiseman's stipulation that his treatment fell below the
standard of care with an admission that he is liable for Michael's injuries. In so doing,
they ignore the possibility that a party might admit to a deviation from the standard of
care but still avoid liability for an injury because the jury determines that the deviation
was not the cause or proximate cause of the opposing party's injury. The trial court's
instruction to the jury on this issue clearly contemplated just such a scenario . It read :
The Defendant, Walter Eiseman, M.D., has stipulated that he did not meet
his duty of care as a radiologist when he read Michael Bayless' x-ray of
March 12, 1995. Given Walter Eiseman's failure to comply with this duty,
if you believe from the evidence that such failure was a substantial factor
in causing Michael Bayless' injuries; you will find for Michael Bayless
against Walter Eiseman ; otherwise, you will find for Walter Eiseman, M.D.
Bayless et al . v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center et al . , No . 96-Cl- 00438 (Kenton Cir. Ct.
filed Jan . 25, 2001) (Jury Instructions, Instruction No . 4). In light of these facts,
Appellants' statement in their brief that "[t]he [trial court] so instructed the jury that they
should find for plaintiffs on that issue," is clearly inaccurate. Likewise, their claim of
juror misconduct is wholly without merit.
IV . CONCLUSION
Appellants argue that they are entitled to a new trial due to the cumulative effect
of errors alleged to have occurred at trial. Having failed to identify any error in the
proceedings, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Cooper, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur. Graves, J ., dissents
by separate opinion in which Lambert, C .J ., joins .
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
John H. Metz
44t" Floor, Carew Tower
441 Vine Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Kenneth J . Koenig
4400 Carew Tower
441 Vine Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, ROBERT L. BOYER, M.D.
Frank V. Benton
Benton, Benton & Luedeke
East Row Historic District
528 Overton Street
Newport, Kentucky 41071
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, WALTER EISEMAN, M.D.:
Arnold S . Taylor
O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan & Sergent
209-C Thomas More Park
PO Box 17411
Covington, Kentucky 41017-0411
David A. Futscher
128 East Second Street
PO Box 2618
Covington, Kentucky 41012-2618
RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
Auprmt 01ourf of ~mfurkg
2003-SC-0250-DG
MICHAEL J . BAYLESS, II ; MICHAEL
J . BAYLESS ; AND DEBORAH BAYLESS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-1021-MR
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 96-CI-00438
V.
ROBERT L . BOYER, M .D. ; AND
WALTER EISEMAN, M .D .
APPELANTS
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the "zero" verdict for
pain and suffering.
Michael Bayless was improperly diagnosed with a sprained wrist. In this
diagnosis, his doctor told him that the pain from a sprained wrist could be worse than a
broken bone, and could last a long period of time . When a physician examines a
patient and gives an expert diagnosis, the patient naturally trusts this diagnosis . The
fourteen-year-old Bayless, who by all accounts does not seem to be particularly
outspoken, did not have any reason to doubt his doctor. Although the pre-printed
words on his discharge paperwork stated that he should contact his physician if his
condition "worsened" or "returned," his physician directly told him that the pain would
persist for a long period of time. Yet, this minor child and his parents were found to be
contributory negligent for their failure to second-guess his treating physician sooner. As
a result of the improper diagnosis, Michael had an untreated wrist fracture for a twomonth period . He played baseball with a fractured wrist that he believed to be a sprain,
icing it down and taking over-the-counter medication to alleviate the pain. However, he
was ultimately punished for "playing through the pain ."
In affirming the jury's zero verdict for pain and suffering, the majority fails to
adequately address several key points which indicate that Michael necessarily
experienced more pain and suffering as a result of the improper diagnosis than he
would have had his wrist been properly diagnosed as a fracture in the first place.
First, in considering Dr. Wyrick's testimony that there is no significant difference
in pain from casting versus surgery associated with treating a fractured wrist, it is
important to note that this conclusion only refers to the pain associated with healing of
the wrist itself, and does not include the pain associated with the surgical procedure .
The procedure involved placing Michael under general anesthesia, cutting into
Michael's thigh, harvesting a portion of his thighbone, and inserting the bone into his
wrist with a permanent metal screw . Michael would not have undergone this surgery if
the fracture had been diagnosed in a timely manner. The majority dismisses the pain
associated with this procedure because it was "performed under general anesthesia ."
Anesthesia, of course, wears off, and when it does, there undoubtedly is pain
associated when one undergoes such an invasive procedure . There was
uncontroverted testimony from Michael that he was fearful of undergoing the operation,
the anesthesia made him vomit, his hip felt like somebody had stabbed him and twisted
a knife in his bone, and that his wrist felt like someone had "parked a car" on top of it.
By the majority's rationale, any pain associated with invasive surgery is negligible so
long as the surgery itself is preformed under anesthesia (which is the general practice
this day and age).
The majority also ignores the fact that Michael's misdiagnosis resulted in a delay
of treatment, which in turn caused Michael to endure pain and suffering for an additional
two-month period . Although Michael may not have been vocal about his pain, he had a
fractured wrist, and definitely experienced pain as a result of it. He certainly would not
have played an entire baseball season and postponed treatment for two months if he
had known of the fracture from the onset, regardless of whether or not he knew of the
fracture at the end of his season .
Pain and suffering damages are long recognized by our jurisprudence . However,
this case illustrates an unfairness that may arise in calculating these damages. By its
nature, pain and suffering is a subjective experience . In addition, pain and suffering is
an abstract, albeit real, impairment . The award for pain and damages, then, seeks to
measure this abstract harm . It requires jurors to assess the inherently subjective pain
and suffering of another, and then determine the economic value of this noneconomic
harm .
It is difficult for an individual to measure one's own pain, let alone the pain of
another. Yet, jurors are required to measure the pain of another with a dollar amount
without clear guidance from the court. Instead, guidance comes from the attorneys who
have broad latitude to present evidence of pain and suffering, and suggest how these
damages should be calculated .
See Randall R. Bovbjerg et . al., Valuing Life and Limb
in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. U . L. REV. 908, 913-16 (1989) .
As a result, pain and suffering awards are unpredictable and varied . Although
jurors should have discretion to weigh the facts of a particular case, empirical evidence
reveals significant inconsistencies in pain and suffering awards. Bovbierq , supra , at 917
(analyzing the variance of jury findings on damages in Florida and Kansas City from
1973-1987). As many scholars have noted, this variance and lack of predictability in
juror awards runs contrary to the rationality and stability that is a hallmark of the rule of
law. See Paul V . Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering : The Irrational Centerpiece
of Our Tort System, 90 VA . L. REV. 1401 (2004) ; Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering,
Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004) .
There is, of course, no way for jurors to "feel the pain" of a plaintiff, and as a
result, "evidence" of such pain is reduced to factors such as how much an individual
complains of pain, or the kind of physical activities that the individual performs . Plaintiffs
like Michael, who quietly endure pain and persist with their activities, are punished as a
result . I believe that a form of scheduling for noneconomic damages such as pain and
suffering will result in greater predictability and fairness in awards. See e.g., Bovbierq ,
supra .
Pain and suffering was clearly established in this case, thus, I find the "zero"
verdict to be clearly erroneous .
Lambert, C.J ., joins this dissent.
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