COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ET AL V. DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE KENTON CIRCUIT COURT (SECOND DIVISION), ET AL
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RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-1064-MR
APPELLANT
LARRY HOWELL
V
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M . STEPHENS, JUDGE
02-CR-178
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
2003-SC-0219-TG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ;
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE FOR THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT ; AND NORTHERN KENTUCKY
DRUG STRIKE FORCE
V
APPELLEE
APPELLANTS
TRANSFER FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-447
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
02-C R-178
DOUGLAS M . STEPHENS, JUDGE,
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT (SECOND
DIVISION) ; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
ADVOCACY, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY ; LARRY E. HOWELL; AND
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING AS TO 2002-SC-1064-MR
AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING
AS TO 2003-SC-0219-TG
APPELANTS
On October 30, 2002, a Kenton Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Larry
Howell, of trafficking in a controlled substance in or near a school, KRS 218A .1411, and
of unlawful transaction with a minor in the second degree, KRS 530.065, both Class D
felonies, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I), KRS
532 .080(3) . By final judgment of November 13, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to
twenty years imprisonment. On December 11, 2002, Appellant appealed to this court
from that judgment as a matter of right, Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b), asserting reversible error
due to: (1) prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and opening statement; and (2)
failure to dismiss the PFO I count when the Commonwealth failed to prove by
competent evidence that Appellant was over the age of eighteen at the time of his
commission of a prior offense essential to the charge .
Following the conviction, the Commonwealth moved the trial court, pursuant to
KRS 218A.41 0(1)(j), to order the forfeiture of $4,674.00 found in Appellant's possession
during a search of his residence . On January 30, 2003, the trial court entered an order
forfeiting and allocating the disbursement of that money . Appellant Howell asserts that
the order of forfeiture violated his right to due process and his right to be free from
excessive fines . However, he neither appealed from the order of forfeiture nor crossappealed from the Commonwealth's appeal from that order ; thus, we are without
jurisdiction to address whether the forfeiture, itself, was improper . United Bonding Ins .
Co . v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W .2d 535, 536 (Ky. 1970) . We note that other courts
have held in very similar circumstances that the failure to file a notice of appeal from a
post-conviction forfeiture order is fatal. United States v. Casas, 999 F.2d 1225, 1230-32
(8th Cir. 1993) (where forfeiture was ordered after sentence was imposed, and
defendants only appealed from the imposition of the sentence, the court had no
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the forfeiture orders) ; United States v. Kopituk , 690
F.2d 1289, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (where forfeiture was ordered in a RICO action, the
defendants "were required to file a separate notice of appeal from the [post-conviction]
forfeiture judgment") . Thus, we cannot consider Appellant's claims that the forfeiture
order violated his rights under the Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses .
The Commonwealth timely appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of
forfeiture insofar as it allocated portions of the forfeited funds to court costs, to the
Department of Public Advocacy (D .P .A.) for attorney fees, and to the Finance and
Administration Cabinet for reimbursement of expenses ordered for Appellant's defense,
instead of allocating all of the forfeited funds to Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force
and the Commonwealth's attorney for the sixteenth judicial circuit. Inexplicably, the
Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force and the Commonwealth's attorney were named as
additional appellants and the trial judge, the D.P .A., and the Finance and Administration
Cabinet were named as additional appellees . Only parties of record in the underlying
action have standing to appeal, Bartholomew v. Paniello , 287 S.W .2d 616, 617 (Ky.
1956), and an appeal may only be taken against parties of record in the underlying
action . White v. England , 348 S .W .2d 936, 937 (Ky. 1961) . However, the
Commonwealth has standing to contest the allocation of the forfeited money since it
was the party that requested the forfeiture . We granted transfer from the Court of
Appeals and consolidated the Commonwealth's appeal with Appellant Howell's appeal .
We now affirm Appellant's convictions but reverse and remand for a new penalty phase
of his trial because improper evidence was used to prove that he was a PFO I . We also
reverse the trial court's allocation of the forfeited money and remand for allocation
pursuant to KRS 218A .435(12) .
After receiving complaints about Appellant's drug activity, Detective Robert
Scroggins of the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force set up surveillance outside of
Appellant's residence . The surveillance lasted approximately two months and produced
only evidence that many people came and went from the house . Scroggins then
conducted a "trash pull," in which he searched Appellant's garbage for evidence of drug
use. Scroggins found evidence of marijuana use and thereafter obtained a search
warrant to search Appellant's residence . The search led to the discovery of eight plastic
bags of marijuana hidden in a cinder block wall on the side of Appellant's house . The
police also seized $4,674 .00 in cash, which they found in Appellant's wallet.
G .J ., a 17-year-old male, testified that while riding in Appellant's truck to
Covington, Appellant asked him if he was interested in purchasing marijuana . G .J.
responded affirmatively and thereafter purchased a "dime bag"' of marijuana from
Appellant . This occurred again on a separate occasion approximately one year after
the first incident. These incidents were the bases for Appellant's convictions of unlawful
transaction with a minor in the second degree and trafficking in a controlled substance
in or near a school . G .J. further testified that on two other occasions, Appellant gave
him an ounce of marijuana as a free sample .
I . PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Appellant first contends he is entitled to reversal for a new trial because the
prosecutor (1) persistently attempted to define the term "reasonable doubt" during voir
dire and (2) engaged in improper argument during opening statement. When
considering allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must determine whether the
' G .J testified that a "dime bag" is the street term for ten dollars worth of marijuana.
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misconduct was so egregious that it denied the accused his constitutional right to due
process of law. Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 744 S .W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1987) . "The
required analysis . . . must focus on the overall fairness of the trial, and not the
culpability of the prosecutor." Id. at 411-12.
During voir dire, the prosecutor told the prospective jurors a story about a
colleague of hers who had interviewed a juror in a previous case to discover why he had
not returned a verdict of guilty in that case . The juror explained that he had "a doubt"
about the crime . Thereafter, the prosecutor, over several objections, persisted in
distinguishing between "a doubt" and the prosecution's burden of proving a case
"beyond a reasonable doubt."
Kentucky law clearly prohibits courts or attorneys from attempting to define
"reasonable doubt" at any stage in a trial . RCr 9.56(2) ; Commonwealth v. Callahan ,
675 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. 1984) ("trial courts shall prohibit counsel from gny definition
of "reasonable doubt" at any point in the trial"). The Commonwealth's assertion that
Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S . 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed .2d 583 (1994), abrogates this
rule in any way is without merit . Victor merely held that the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard was constitutionally required . Id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. at 1243. The Court
stated that the United States Constitution does not require trial courts to define the term
"reasonable doubt" nor does it prohibit them from doing so. Id. Kentucky law, on the
other hand, specifically prohibits such conduct .
It is doubtful that the prosecutor's conduct here rose to the level of a violation of
Callahan . Compare Simpson v. Commonwealth , 759 S .W .2d 224, 226 (Ky. 1988) ("In
all of those cases [where this Court found an impermissible attempt to define
'reasonable doubt'], some attempt was made to use other words to convey to the jury
the meaning of 'beyond a reasonable doubt .' In this case, there was no such effort.")
But even if a violation occurred, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections
and admonished the jury that the standard was "reasonable doubt ." Appellant never
moved for a mistrial. A party is under a duty to make "known to the court the action [he]
desires the court to take . . . ... RCr 9.22; Jenkins v. Commonwealth , 477 S.W.2d 795,
797-98 (Ky. 1972) . "[F]ailure to move for a mistrial following an objection and an
admonition from the court indicates that satisfactory relief was granted ." West v.
Commonwealth , 780 S.W .2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) .
Appellant also asserts that the prosecutor engaged in inappropriate argument
during the Commonwealth's opening statement . Rather than stating what the evidence
would show, she referred to Appellant as "that man" who "fed on these children's
weaknesses" and "took something away from these children ." While the foregoing
statements are, indeed, more in the form of argument than a statement of the evidence,
the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections and admonished the prosecutor
that "this is opening statement." No further relief was requested; thus, we assume the
relief granted was satisfactory . West, 780 S.W.2d at 602 .
II . PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth attempted to prove that
Appellant was a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I). The PFO I statute
requires the Commonwealth to prove, inter alia, that the offender has committed two
previous felonies and was eighteen years of age or older at the time he committed both
prior offenses . KRS 532.080(3) . The failure to prove the age of the defendant at the
time the previous offenses were committed is fatal . Tyler v. Commonwealth , 805
S .W .2d 126,128 (Ky. 1991) .
Christy Feldman of the Department of Corrections was the witness who
attempted to prove Appellant's status as a PFO I. She testified from Department of
Corrections' records that Appellant's date of birth was March 7, 1961, and from the
certified records of the Campbell Circuit Court, indictment number 80-CR-166, that he
was convicted of burglary in the third degree, a Class D felony, on March 19, 1981 .
However, the Campbell Circuit Court records did not include a copy of the indictment or
any other information identifying the date of the offense . Over Appellant's objection,
Feldman testified that a document "in her file" (not further identified, presumably
Department of Corrections' records), stated that the offense occurred on November 11,
1980 . She then testified that the certified records of the Kenton Circuit Court, indictment
number 84-CR-150, showed that Appellant was convicted on January 28, 1985, of
burglary in the second degree, a Class D felony, and that the date of the offense listed
in the indictment was January 11, 1984, at which time Appellant was prima facie over
the age of eighteen . Appellant's motion to dismiss the persistent felony offender
indictment for insufficiency of the evidence was overruled .
In Montgomery v. Commonwealth , 819 S.W .2d 713 (Ky. 1991), the
Commonwealth attempted to prove the defendant's status as a PFO through the
testimony of a Kentucky State Penitentiary records office supervisor, who testified
directly from the Bureau (now Department) of Corrections' resident record cards .
Montctomerv held that such evidence was insufficient because :
[T]the Bureau of Corrections has no direct or official responsibility in
recording or compiling data regarding the underlying conviction, and there
is no circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness accompanying the
transmittal and recording of such information at the Bureau of Corrections .
On the contrary, the court clerk's file is the official repository of such data .
Id. at 719 . Thus, while the Commonwealth could prove Appellant's date of birth by
extrinsic evidence, id. ; Hayes v. Commonwealth , 698 S .W.2d 827, 831 (Ky. 1985), it
could not prove the date of the commission of the first offense by an unidentified
document contained in the Department of Corrections' file .
We held in Martin v. Commonwealth , 13 S .W.3d 232 (Ky. 1999), that direct proof
of a particular PFO element was not required if there was evidence from which a jury
could reasonably infer the existence of that element, etc . , that the defendant completed
service of the sentence imposed on any of the previous felony convictions within five
years prior to the date of the commission of the felony for which he now stands
convicted . Id. at 235. However, there is no competent evidence in this case creating an
inference that Appellant was at least eighteen years of age when he committed the
offense of which he was convicted on March 19, 1981 . All we know is that the
Campbell Circuit Court file bears a 1980 indictment number (and no explanation was
given as to the significance of that fact) . Appellant turned eighteen on March 7, 1979;
thus, the offense could well have been committed while he was still a juvenile. Hates,
698 S .W .2d at 831 .
The Commonwealth asserts that Appellant should be barred from raising this
issue by the doctrine of collateral estoppel . After the second conviction in 1985,
Appellant's sentence was also subjected to PFO I enhancement. The Commonwealth
presumes that the 1981 conviction was used in that enhancement and, thus, that
Appellant is estopped to now claim that conviction is not available for enhancement.
Howard v. Commonwealth , 777 S .W.2d 888, 889 (1989) . However, Feldman did not
testify that the 1981 conviction was used to enhance the 1985 conviction and did testify
that Appellant had additional prior convictions other than the two relied upon for PFO I
enhancement in this case . The certified copy of the Kenton Circuit Court record was not
filed as an exhibit and is not in this record . Because of the uncertainty as to which
convictions were used to enhance Appellant's 1985 conviction, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not bar Appellant from challenging the use of his 1981 conviction now.
We therefore reverse and remand for a new penalty phase trial, requiring only
that upon retrial the Commonwealth sustain the persistent felony offender charges by
competent evidence, which includes reasonable inferences therefrom . Martin , 13
S .W .3d at 235 ; Montgomery, 819 S .W.2d at 719-20; cf. Osborne v. Commonwealth , 43
S.W.3d 234, 245 (Ky. 2001) (reversal on grounds of inadmissible evidence does not
equate with reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence) .
1111. ALLOCATION OF FORFEITED FUNDS.
The Circuit Court ordered that, from the $4,674 .00 in funds seized from the
Appellant, the statutory court costs first be paid, then $1,500.00 be paid to the D.P .A. as
reimbursement for Appellant's defense, and then $1,500.00 be paid to the Finance and
Administration Cabinet as reimbursement for expenditures ordered for Appellant's
defense . The Court then ordered the remainder of the funds to be paid pursuant to
KRS 218A.410 .
The Commonwealth asserts that this allocation was erroneous, arguing that KRS
218A .435(12) provides for the distribution of all of the money forfeited in this case :
Other provisions of the law notwithstanding , the first fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) of forfeited coin or currency . . . shall not be paid into the [asset
forfeiture trust] fund but ninety percent (90%) shall be paid to the law
enforcement agency or agencies which seized the property to be used for
direct law enforcement purposes and ten percent (10%) to the office of the
Commonwealth's attorney or county attorney who has participated in the
forfeiture proceeding .
(Emphasis added .) Because one hundred percent of the entire $4,674 .00 is earmarked
by KRS 218A.435(12), the Commonwealth argues that there is no basis for
appropriating any amount of the forfeited money to any agency other than those
specified by that statute . We agree.
In disbursing the funds in the manner that it did, the Circuit Court relied on KRS
31 .211(1), which provides :
At arraignment, the court shall conduct a nonadversarial hearing to
determine whether a person who has requested a public defender is able
to pay a partial fee for legal representation, the other necessary services
and facilities of representation, and court costs. . . . This partial fee
determination shall be made at each stage of the proceedings .
In essence, the court attempted to effectuate a partial fee reimbursement . The D.P.A.
argues that the court first made a determination that Appellant Howell had the ability to
pay for his legal representation pursuant to KRS 31 .211 . The court then allotted monies
belonging to Howell first to pay for his legal representation and expenses, then to the
Commonwealth pursuant KRS 218A.410(1)(j). This argument, however, is premised
upon the flawed assumption that illegal drug proceeds are a defendant's property . To
the contrary, title to all property forfeited under KRS 218A.410 vests in the
Commonwealth at the time of the illegal act. As such, KRS 31 .211(1) could not apply.
This concept is known as the "relation-back" doctrine . The seminal case
regarding the relation-back doctrine with respect to forfeitures is United States v.
Stowell , 133 U .S . 1, 10 S .Ct. 244, 33 L.Ed . 555 (1890), in which the United States
Supreme Court addressed when the government's rights would vest under the federal
forfeiture statutes then in effect. The Court held that such rights vest on the date of the
illegal activity:
[T]he forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the
United States at the time the offense is committed ; and the
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condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids
all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good
faith.
Id. at 17, 10 S.Ct. at 247 (emphasis added) .
This common-law doctrine has been codified in Kentucky. KRS 218A .410(2)
provides :
Title to all property, including all interests in the property, forfeit under this
section vests in the Commonwealth on the commission of the act or
omission giving rise to forfeiture . . . together with the proceeds of the
property . . . .
The statute protects only "subsequent bona fide purchaser[s] for value without actual or
constructive notice of the act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture." Id . As such,
other creditors, including state agencies, may not claim any part of the funds if the
government successfully obtains forfeiture . See United States v. Trotter, 912 F.2d 964,
966 (8th Cir . 1990) (criminal fine assessed by the court could not be paid with assets
already involved in a civil forfeiture proceeding) ; Eggleston v. Colorado 873 F .2d 242,
248 (10th Cir. 1989) (sales tax liens could not be paid with forfeiture funds) ; State v.
Freeman , 814 P.2d 147, 153 (Okla . 1991) (criminal fine and court costs could not be
paid with proceeds from civil forfeiture action) .
The Circuit Court expressly found that the $4,674.00 seized from Appellant
Howell's home was the product of his illegal drug activity and was therefore subject to
forfeiture pursuant to KRS 218A.41 0(1)(j) . As such, the circuit court then had a duty to
order forfeiture of all the proceeds. The fact that KRS 218A.410(1) uses the language,
"subject to forfeiture," does not imply that an order of forfeiture is discretionary .
Compare United States v. Currency Totalling $48,318.08 , 609 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir .
1980) (doctrine of relation back did not apply where the statute was found to provide for
only a possibility of subsequent forfeiture) . First, the opening sentence of KRS
-11 -
218.410(2) dictates that a defendant's rights in property "subject to forfeiture" are
divested immediately upon the illegal act or omission, and not at some future time.
Second, the use of the term "shall" in both subsections (2) and (3) of KRS 218A.410
indicates that the legislature intended the statute to be mandatory . KRS 446.010(29) .
Subsection (2) states, "Any property or proceeds subsequently transferred to any
person shall be subject to forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited " (emphasis
added), and subsection (3) states, "If any of the property described in this section
cannot be located . . . the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the
defendant up to the value of any property subject to forfeiture under this section ."
(Emphasis added .) The language "subject to forfeiture" is used in this statute merely to
give notice of the scope of property that shall be forfeited . See Eggleston , 873 F.2d at
246 .
Because the trial court was required to order forfeit all property that it found
"subject to forfeiture" under KRS 218A.410(1), and because the Commonwealth, not
Appellant Howell, had title to the forfeited currency at all relevant times, the court had no
option to use any part of that currency to reimburse the costs of Appellant's defense .
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions but reverse and remand this case
to the Kenton Circuit Court for a new penalty phase trial, and with direction to distribute
the forfeited funds of $4,674.00 in accordance with KRS 218A.435(12) .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT LARRY HOWELL (2002-SC-1064-MR) :
Shelly R . Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (2002-SC-1064-MR) :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT ; AND NORTHERN KENTUCKY DRUG STRIKE FORCE (2003-SC-0219-TG) :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
David A. Smith
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE, KENTON CIRCUIT
COURT (SECOND DIVISION) (2003-SC-0219-TG) :
Douglas Stephens, pro se
Judge, Kenton Circuit Court
502 City-County Building
Covington, KY 41011
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (2003-SC-0219-TG) :
Larry D . Beale
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Dennis Stutsman
1012 Fontaine Road
Lexington, KY 40502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE LARRY E . HOWELL (2003-SC-0219-TG) :
Larry E. Howell, pro se
Luther Luckett Correctional Complex
#162600
Dawkins Road - Box 6
La Grange, KY 40031
COUNSEL FOR APPELEE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (2003-SC-0219-TG) :
M . Holliday Hopkins
Finance and Administration Cabinet
Capitol Annex Building - Room 374
Frankfort, KY 40601
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