APRIL RINE V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND TAMMITHA FUENTES V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
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2002-SC-1079-MR
APRIL RINE
V
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR., JUDGE
2002-CR-0392-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2003-SC-0012-MR
APPELLANT
TAMMITHA FUENTES
V
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR ., JUDGE
2002-CR-0392-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Warren Circuit Court jury convicted April Rine of wanton murder and seconddegree criminal abuse in connection with the drowning death of her three-year-old
granddaughter, D. F. Rine received consecutive sentences of thirty-five years'
imprisonment for the wanton murder conviction and ten years' imprisonment for the
.G
second-degree criminal abuse conviction . Rine's co-defendant and daughter,
Tammitha Fuentes, was convicted of complicity to murder and first-degree criminal
abuse and received a total of thirty-five years' imprisonment . Both appeal to this Court
as a matter of right. The cases have been consolidated for purposes of this opinion .
Finding no error as to either Rine or Fuentes, we affirm all convictions .
Procedural and Factual Background
Following a divorce, Fuentes moved in with Rine in the fall of 2001, along with
her two children, D .F. and L.F . The arrangement, however, was not harmonious. Rine
did not approve of her grandchildren because of their Honduran father, and commonly
referred to them as "half-breeds ." Furthermore, the evidence at trial revealed that both
Rine and Fuentes corporally punished D . F., often striking her with a piece of PVC pipe .
Around the time that D.F . began to be toilet trained, the abuse intensified . Rine
became increasingly insensitive to D .F.'s accidents and complained about her soiled
bedding and clothing . As a result, Rine and Fuentes forced D .F . to sleep in a
cardboard box on the kitchen floor so that she could not dirty bed linens. According to
her own testimony before the grand jury, Fuentes apparently believed that this type of
callous humiliation of a three-year-old child would assist in her toilet training .
On the night of April 21, 2002, Fuentes went to bed at some time between 9 :30
and 11 :00 p .m. Before retiring, she took two Darvocet and three to four Valium pills,
narcotics for which she did not have a valid prescription . Rine's husband had already
gone to bed, and Rine had gone to sleep on the couch, as was her custom . D .F. had
been put to sleep in the cardboard box in the kitchen . During the night, Fuentes
recalled hearing D.F . cry out, "Mommy, Mommy, help me ." However, she was not
certain if the cry was a dream . The drug-induced sleep also made her unable to get out
of bed. After an undetermined period of time, she was able to get out of bed and go to
the bathroom .
Fuentes found D .F. laying face up in the bathtub ; water had been run in it. At
first, Fuentes did not realize anything was wrong with her daughter . She removed D .F.
from the tub and placed her on the hallway floor to change her clothes . At this time,
Fuentes realized that the child was unresponsive . Fuentes woke her mother, who
began performing CPR on D.F . Fuentes then called emergency services .
The responding paramedics found no signs of life in D .F. when they arrived at
Rine's home . She was pronounced dead at the hospital . An autopsy confirmed the
cause of death as drowning . Sadly, the autopsy also revealed that D.F. was a
chronically abused child .
Following a police investigation, a Warren County Grand Jury returned
indictments against both Fuentes and Rine . Both were indicted for murder or criminal
attempt to commit murder and first-degree criminal abuse. A jury trial followed, at which
Fuentes and Rine were tried jointly . Rine was convicted of wanton murder and seconddegree criminal abuse ; Fuentes was convicted of murder by complicity and first-degree
criminal abuse . This appeal followed .
Further facts will be developed as necessary later in this opinion . We turn first to
those allegations of error raised by Rine .
Rine's Allegations of Error
Severance
Rine asserts that the trial court erred by denying a motion to sever the trials.
Defense counsel argued that Rine would likely be prejudiced by her co-defendant's
adverse defense posture . Fuentes opposed the motion, which was denied .
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Joinder is proper if the defendants "are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
offenses ." RCr 6.20. However, "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the Commonwealth
is or will be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants . . . by joinder for trial,
the court shall order separate trials of counts, grant separate trials of defendants or
provide whatever other relief justice requires ." RCr 9.16 .
Rine's primary contention is that the antagonistic defenses presented at trial
unfairly prejudiced her. That co-defendants are asserting antagonistic defenses is a
factor for the trial court to consider, though it does not alone mandate severance :
[N]either antagonistic defenses nor the fact that the
evidence for or against one defendant incriminates the other
amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice . . . . That different
defendants alleged to have been involved in the same
transaction have conflicting versions of what took place, or
the extent to which they participated in it, vel non, is a
reason for rather than against a joint trial. If one is lying, it is
easier for the truth to be determined if all are required to be
tried together .
Ware v. Commonwealth , 537 S .W .2d 174,177 (Ky. 1976) . "Even if the defendants
attempt to cast blame on each other, severance is not required ." Gabow v.
Commonwealth, 34 S .W .3d 63, 71 (Ky. 2000). Therefore, the fact that Rine and
Fuentes merely attempted to implicate each other in D.F .'s abuse does not
demonstrate sufficient prejudice to warrant severance.
We note that the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on
motions for severance . Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 836 S .W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1992) .
Here, the trial court rendered an extremely detailed and thorough order and analysis
denying the severance motion, ultimately concluding that Rine had failed to make a
positive showing that joinder would be unduly prejudicial to her. We find no indication
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Rine's motion for severance .
On appeal, Rine makes the additional argument that, even if severance was not
required despite the antagonistic defenses asserted at trial, actual prejudice warranting
reversal occurred as a result of joinder . Rine points mainly to the testimony of a social
worker and a neighbor, which she argues would not have been admissible against her if
she had been tried alone. Susan Barnett, a social worker, was called by Fuentes and
testified to statements given to Barnett by Fuentes prior to the death of her daughter
about the abuse that D .F. had undergone at the hands of Rine. Fuentes also called
Catherine Walkup, a former neighbor and friend of Rine . Walkup testified that she
knew Rine to have a bad temper, and that Rine had kept a piece of pipe in the shed for
disciplinary use against Fuentes and her brother when they were children . Walkup
further testified that she had seen Rine strike her children with her hand . Defense
counsel for Fuentes did question Walkup regarding Rine's attitudes towards Hispanic
persons, but Walkup was not permitted to respond following an objection by Rine's
counsel .
At the outset, we acknowledge that Barnett's testimony contained hearsay
statements . However, defense counsel for Rine made no contemporaneous objections
to Barnett's testimony . With respect to Walkup's testimony, Rine alleges that it
contained improper character evidence for which the Commonwealth did not provide
notice pursuant to KRE 404(c) . A review of the record, however, reveals that Rine's
defense counsel did object to Walkup's testimony on the grounds that it contained
improper character evidence, and that objection was sustained . Rine alleges in her
appeal that Walkup's testimony should have been prohibited in its entirety as having
been too remote in time ; this objection was never presented to the trial court for
consideration .
It seems that Rine is requesting review by this Court pursuant to RCr 10 .26.
Upon consideration of the entire case, we do not believe that any palpable error
affecting Rine's substantial rights has occurred . The portions of Barnett's testimony
that are hearsay were clearly cumulative; Fuentes herself testified to essentially the
same facts surrounding Rine's abuse of D .F. Furthermore, we find no error in Walkup's
testimony as she was not permitted to testify as to Rine's character or attitude towards
Hispanics . Her testimony with respect to Rine's temper and disciplinary tactics, though
remote in time, was relevant and highly probative of a central issue in the case. Upon
review of the entire record, we do not believe that a substantial possibility exists that the
result would have been any different absent the errors with respect to either witness'
testimony . Jackson v. Commonwealth , 717 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. App . 1986).
Evidence of Suicide Attempts
Rine asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of two alleged suicide
attempts . The first occurred prior to her arrest, though Rine was aware that a warrant
for her arrest had been obtained, and the second occurred after her arrest, while she
was in jail. The Commonwealth argues that evidence of Rine's suicide attempts is
highly probative of her consciousness of guilt. Rine counters that numerous plausible
explanations for her suicide attempts exist, so that any probative value is outweighed by
the danger of confusion of the issues within the meaning of KRE 403 .
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence ." KRE 401 . Relevancy is established by even a
slight showing of probative value . Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W .2d 439, 449
(Ky. 1999). A trial court's decision concerning evidentiary issues will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion . Brown v. Commonwealth , 983 S .W.2d 513
(Ky. 1999).
Whether evidence of attempted suicide is probative of the accused's
consciousness of guilt is an issue of first impression in Kentucky. The question,
however, is not complex and is easily analogized to other types of circumstantial
evidence of guilt based on the accused's behavior after the crime . It has long been the
rule in Kentucky that evidence of attempted flight, resisting arrest or escape from
capture is probative of the accused's guilt. Commonwealth v. Howard, 287 S .W .2d
926, 927 (Ky. 1956). Likewise, giving a false name and address to an arresting officer
is admissible. Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W .3d 779 (Ky. 2003). We also note that
the overwhelming majority of states considering this issue have determined that
evidence of attempted suicide is admissible to establish consciousness of guilt. See
Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Relating to Accused's
Attempt to Commit Suicide, 73 A.L .R . 5th 615 (2004). ("With a single exception, courts
have unanimously held that an accused's attempt to commit suicide is probative of a
consciousness of guilt and is therefore admissible .")
We agree that evidence of a suicide attempt is probative of a defendant's
consciousness of guilt. Though other plausible reasons for Rine's actions may exist for example, grief over her granddaughter's death - the existence of these alternative
explanations does not diminish the probative value of the evidence . Nor are we
persuaded that the admission of this evidence was overly prejudicial or confusing for
the jury, as Rine asserts . Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
the introduction of evidence of Rine's two suicide attempts .
Impeachment of Prior Convicted Felon
Rine argues that Fuentes' defense counsel improperly impeached her defense
witness by asking the witness if he was a convicted felon . In fact, at the time of trial,
the witness was participating in a pretrial diversion program for a felony charge. The
witness ultimately testified that he had seen Fuentes strike D.F . on one occasion . The
issue for our consideration is whether a defendant participating in a pretrial diversion
program is a convicted felon for purposes of impeachment.
KRE 609(a) allows "evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime . . .
if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for one (1) year or more under
the law under which the witness was convicted ." Rine contends that this language
clearly requires that the witness have been convicted of a felony, and that participation
in the pretrial diversion program does not constitute a conviction . RCr 8.04 governs
pretrial diversion programs . The Commonwealth and the defendant may enter into a
pretrial diversion agreement, which suspends the prosecution for a specified period
"after which it will be dismissed on the condition that the defendant not commit a crime
during that period . . . . .. Id . KRS 533.250(e) requires that a condition of pretrial
diversion is the entry of a guilty plea or Alford plea of guilty . If the defendant
subsequently fails to complete the diversion program, the agreement may be voided
and the court may proceed on the defendant's guilty plea. KRS 533.256(1). If the
diversion program is successfully completed, the charges are listed as "dismisseddiverted" and "shall not constitute a criminal conviction ." KRS 533 .258(1) .
Furthermore, pretrial diversion records "shall not be introduced as evidence in any court
in a civil, criminal, or other matter without the consent of the defendant." KRS
533.258(3) .
Relying on Thomas v. Commonwealth , 95 S .W .3d 828 (Ky. 2003), the
Commonwealth argues that a defendant is considered a convicted felon until successful
completion of the diversion program . Therefore, as the defense witness here had not
yet completed the program, impeachment was proper. In Thomas , the defendant had
pled guilty to a drug charge and was being considered for a drug court diversion
program when he was subsequently arrested for possession of a firearm. The central
issue was whether the defendant's pending drug charge constituted a "prior conviction"
within the meaning of KRS 527.040 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). This
Court discussed the pretrial diversion program statute :
[T]he entry of a guilty plea and the language of KRS
533 .258(1), lead to the logical conclusion that a convicted
felon status would remain from the date of Appellant's guilty
plea . . . until such time, if ever, that he would successfully
complete the Drug Court Diversion Program . Until such
time, the conviction remains and Appellant does not qualify
for the other benefits of the pretrial diversion statute .
Thomas, 95 S .W .3d at 830. We believe Thomas controls the case at bar. As in
Thomas , the defense witness here had pled guilty to a felony, but had not yet
completed the pretrial diversion program at the time of his testimony . Therefore, at the
time of his testimony during Rine's trial, his status remained that of a convicted felon
and it was not improper for the Commonwealth to impeach him.
Use of Aud iotaped Statements
Rine next contends that the Commonwealth did not use the correct procedure in
attempting to impeach her testimony through the use of recorded statements made by
Rine to the police immediately following D.F .'s death . The tape had previously been
played in its entirety before the jury during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief. Rine
concedes that the taped statements were admissible pursuant to KRE 801 A as prior
inconsistent statements or as statements of a party opponent. Rather, Rine finds fault
with the manner in which the Commonwealth was permitted to use the statements .
During cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Rine if she remembered making
certain statements to police shortly after D .F.'s death . Rine stated that she
remembered speaking with the officer, but not exactly what she had said. The
Commonwealth then proceeded to play the recording, pausing after every couple of
statements and asking Rine to explain what she meant, or why her testimony at trial
differed with certain portions of the recorded responses. Rine's legal assertion is that
this method of impeachment violated KRE 801 A and her right to a fair trial.
KRE 801A does not specify the procedure to be used when introducing prior
statements or admissions of witnesses, except to say that a foundation must be laid
before admission pursuant to KRE 613. KRE 613 requires : "Before other evidence can
be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be
inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as
correctly as the examining party can present them ." Rine refers us to no other rule or
case law specifying the particular manner in which one should be impeached with a
prior recorded statement. The Commonwealth fulfilled the foundational requirements of
KRE 613 by asking Rine if she remembered having a taped interview with police
detectives at the hospital on April 22, 2002 . Furthermore, Rine was given an
opportunity to explain her taped statements to the jury. We find no error.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Rine argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by violating a prior
agreement with the trial court and defense counsel to refrain from mentioning the
circumstances surrounding D .F.'s sibling, L.F. During recross-examination of Rine, the
Commonwealth's Attorney asked Rine if she intended to seek custody of L .F . if she
were found not guilty . Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the
objection and admonished the jury. However, defense counsel did not request any
further relief from the court . Rine now argues that the trial court should have declared a
mistrial .
"If a party claims entitlement to a mistrial, he must timely ask the court to grant
him such relief." West v. Commonwealth , 780 S.W . 2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) . "[I]t is
clear that a party must timely inform the court of the error and request the relief to which
he considers himself entitled . Otherwise, the issue may not be raised on appeal." Id .
After the trial court sustained the objection, Rine's defense counsel requested no
further relief. As such, we must assume that defense counsel was satisfied with the
relief granted . Id . We do not find that manifest injustice resulted from this purported
error; therefore, reversal on this issue is unwarranted . RCr 10.26 .
Excusal of Juror for Cause
Both Rine and Fuentes raise the following issue. The Appellants argue that the
trial court committed reversible error by refusing to strike for cause a juror who worked
for the Cabinet for Families and Children (CFC). During voir dire, Juror W revealed that
she worked at the CFC office that investigated D .F .'s death, though she did not transfer
to that office until after the investigation had concluded. Juror W also stated that she
was on the same team as the man who had personally investigated D.F.'s death and
assumed similar job duties, but explained that she had not discussed the case with him
or anyone else. She went on to assure the trial court that she could weigh all evidence
fairly and impartially, without giving greater weight to the testimony of CFC employees .
Rine and Fuentes contend that reversible error occurred when they were
compelled to exercise a peremptory strike to remove Juror W, who should have
properly been removed for cause. Thomas v. Commonwealth , 864 S .W.2d 252 (Ky.
1993) . Rine's assertion, however, is without merit as the strike sheets of Rine, Fuentes,
and the trial court show only Fuentes as using a peremptory challenge on Juror W .
Therefore, Rine cannot claim that prejudice resulted, because she was not forced to
use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror from the venire panel .
Fuentes' claim of error must also fail . The record reveals that both Rine and
Fuentes each struck nine jurors, for a total of eighteen peremptory challenges . RCr
9 .40 entitles jointly-tried defendants with an alternate juror to a total of thirteen
peremptory challenges: eight to be used jointly pursuant to subsection (1) of the rule,
an additional challenge to each defendant if tried jointly, another additional challenge to
each defendant if an alternate juror was called, and one more to the defendants to
share pursuant to subsection (2). See Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439,
444 (Ky. 1999) . Here, the defendants each struck nine jurors, for a total of eighteen
peremptory challenges . In other words, both Rine and Fuentes were granted more
peremptory challenges than required by the rule. Accordingly, neither can claim that
they were prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to strike Juror W for cause .
Fuentes' Allegations of Error
Amendment of the Indictment
Fuentes raises two additional issues on appeal . The first is that the
Commonwealth improperly amended the indictment to conform to the proof at the close
of its case-in-chief. Fuentes was initially indicted on one count of murder (KRS
507.020), one count of criminal attempt to commit murder by complicity (KRS 506.010,
KRS 502 .020), and one count of criminal abuse in the first degree (KRS 508 .100).
Count Two of the indictment initially read as follows :
That on or about the 22 nd day of April, 2002, in Warren
County, Kentucky, the above-named defendant committed
the crime of Criminal Attempt to Commit Murder By
Complicity when with the intention of promoting or facilitating
the commission of Criminal Attempt to Commit Murder First
Degree, she solicited, commanded or engaged in a
conspiracy with April Rine or any other unnamed persons to
commit the offense or aided, counseled or attempted to aid
them in the offense of an attempted murder of D---- F------,
Bowling Green, Kentucky. Contrary [to] KRS 506.010[,]
507.020[,] 502.020 .
After defense counsels' motions for directed verdicts were denied, the Commonwealth
moved to amend count two of the indictment to charge complicity to commit murder,
rather than attempted murder . Fuentes' attorney did not object to the amendment and
did not request a continuance even after the trial court asked if the parties wanted to be
heard on the matter . Nor did Rine's attorney object. The trial court stated that it was
his understanding that no one was ever being tried for attempted murder, as all
conceded that the child clearly died .
Fuentes' argument on appeal is that it was error to amend the indictment
because changing the charge from complicity to commit attempted murder to complicity
to commit murder charged a different offense and increased the required penalty .
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Fuentes also alleges that the Commonwealth changed its theory of the case that
Fuentes aided and abetted Rine in the murder, to a theory that Fuentes failed to protect
her child from Rine.
We first note that this issue is not preserved by Fuentes, and we therefore may
reverse only if the amendment to the indictment resulted in palpable error. RCr 10.26.
The court may permit an indictment to be amended any time before the verdict
or finding if "no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced ." RCr 6.16 . Both theories offered by the Commonwealth
as to Fuentes' complicity in the murder were pursuant to KRS 502 .020 :
(1)
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another
person when, with the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, he:
(a)
Solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to commit
the offense ; or
(b)
Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person
in planning or committing the offense ; or
(c)
Having a legal duty to prevent the commission
of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to
do so.
Only subsections (a) and (b) were delineated in the indictment. The jury was instructed
on, and Fuentes was eventually convicted under, the theory espoused in subsection (c).
This alleged change in theory did not result in Fuentes being charged with a different
offense. We have held that merely altering the subsection of the statute under which a
defendant is charged does not result in the charge of a different offense . Schambon v.
Commonwealth , 821 S.W .2d 804, 810 (Ky. 1991) . Accordingly, Fuentes was not
prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment.
The amendment of the charge from complicity to commit attempted murder to
complicity to commit murder does, however, result in the charge of a different offense .
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It is not clear why Fuentes was initially indicted on complicity to commit attempted
murder . The only additional evidence required to prove the amended offense was the
death of the child, which was never in dispute . Moreover, Fuentes was, in fact, charged
with murder pursuant to KRS 507.020 in addition to the complicity and abuse charges.
"[O]ur courts have consistently held that an indictment is sufficient if it fairly
informs the accused of the nature of the charged offense and is not misleading ."
Varble v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Ky. 2004) . We cannot conclude that
Fuentes was misled by the initial indictment, as she was at all times aware that D.F.
had died and that she was being charged with murder and complicity . Therefore, we
are unable to conclude that the trial court's amendment of the indictment affected
Fuentes' substantial rights resulting in manifest injustice . RCr 10.26 .
Suffi ciency of the Evidence
Lastly, Fuentes argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of
complicity to commit murder and first-degree criminal abuse and therefore, she was
entitled to a directed verdict. We do not agree.
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W.2d 186,
187 (Ky. 1991).
Sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable jury to find Fuentes guilty of
complicity to commit murder. The record reveals that on the night of D.F .'s death,
Fuentes had taken numerous unprescribed narcotics before retiring to bed . As a result,
she was unable to respond when she heard her child screaming for help from the
bathroom . Moreover, Fuentes was aware of Rine's attitude and behavior towards D.F .
- 1 5-
Fuentes knew her mother seriously disapproved of the child's ethnicity. Fuentes was
aware of Rine's physically abusive behavior: she had observed her mother strike D.F.
on one occasion, bloodying her mouth. Fuentes also was aware that her mother was
using a piece of PVC pipe on D.F . as a form of physical punishment. As D.F.'s mother,
Fuentes had a legal duty to protect D .F. from Rine and in failing to do so, wantonly
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to D .F. under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. KRS 502 .020(1)(c); KRS 507.020.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the
complicity to commit murder charge .
There was also sufficient evidence to convict Fuentes of first-degree criminal
abuse . Evidence in the record revealed that Fuentes struck D.F. on the head with a
ceramic spoon and with the PVC pipe at least once in the presence of others . The
autopsy report revealed a litany of chronic abuse to the child: multiple marks on the
fronts and backs of her legs, marks on her back, a scar on her left cheek under the eye,
bruises, internal hemorrhages in the pancreas and the lining of the stomach, abrasions
to the lip, a hemorrhage at the lip, bruises on the inside of her scalp, abrasions to the
vaginal area, arms, and feet, and multiple remote pattern injuries consistent with being
beaten with a piece of PVC pipe. D .F.'s thymus was markedly diminished, a finding
often seen in chronically stressed children . The evidence also revealed that Fuentes
had D.F . sleep in a cardboard box on the kitchen floor when she had toilet training
accidents . Without doubt, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find
Fuentes guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. We find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Warren Circuit Court are hereby
affirmed .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, APRIL RINE:
W . Ralph Beck
625 East Tenth Avenue
P . O . Box 1844
Bowling Green, KY 42102-1844
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, TAMMITHA FUENTES :
Donna L . Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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