CITY OF MURRAY V ROBERT LARRY BILLINGTON ; HON . KRISTI SALADINO SCHAAF ; HON . JAMES L . KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : September 23, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0840-WC
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CITY OF MURRAY
V
_-APELNT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1657-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 97-94011
ROBERT LARRY BILLINGTON; HON . KRISTI SALADINO
SCHAAF ; HON. JAMES L . KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On January 2, 2002, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered the defendantemployer to cease recouping from the claimant's benefits a $5,000.00 attorney fee that
was awarded under KRS 342 .320(2)(c) . Affirming a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board), the Court of Appeals rejected the employer's argument
that the fee was not awarded until January, 2, 2002, and that the ALJ had erred by
ordering it to pay a fee that had been found to be unconstitutional . City of Louisville v.
Slack, Ky ., 39 S .W.3d 809 (2001) . The Court of Appeals based its decision on the
employer's failure to name the claimant's attorney as a party to its 2001 appeal, causing
it to be dismissed and the award to become the law of the case. We affirm .
The claimant sustained a work-related injury on February 17, 1997. He retained
counsel and filed a workers' compensation claim, after which an Arbitrator awarded him
a permanent total disability . His employer sought de novo review by an ALJ but did not
prevail . The claimant's attorney then filed a motion requesting a $17,000 .00 fee. The
motion explained that KRS 342 .320(2)(a) and (b) authorized a fee of $12,000.00, to be
deducted from the claimant's award . It also explained that based on the employer's
failure to prevail before the ALJ, KRS 342 .320(2)(c) authorized a fee of $5,000.00, to be
paid by the employer.
On December 21, 2000, the ALJ approved the request for a $17,000.00 attorney
fee but failed to state that $12,000.00 was to be deducted from the claimant's award,
and $5,000.00 was to be paid by the employer. In a petition for reconsideration, the
employer asserted that the maximum attorney fee should be $7,000 .00, under KRS
342 .320(2)(a) and (c), because the claimant did not receive a greater award before the
ALJ than he did before the Arbitrator and, therefore, was not entitled to an additional fee
under KRS 342.320(2)(b) .' In an order dated February 14, 2001, the AU noted that the
employer contested only the fees awarded under KRS 342 .320(2)(a) and (b) and "[d]id
not contest the award of a $5,000 .00 fee pursuant to KRS 342 .320(2)(c)." On that
basis, the ALJ determined that the employer lacked standing . Noting that the claimant
was the only party with standing to contest that portion of his attorney's fee and that he
had not done so, the AU denied the motion .
On March 16, 2001, the employer filed a notice of appeal, listing only the
claimant and ALJ as respondents . Shortly thereafter, on March 22, 2001, this Court
rendered City of Louisville v. Slack , supra, which determined that KRS 342 .320(2)(c)
was unconstitutional . On April 13, 2001, approximately 24 days after the time for filing a
notice of appeal expired, the employer moved to amend its notice of appeal to include
the claimant's counsel as a party . The Board passed the motion to a consideration of
KRS 342 .320(2)(a) permitted a maximum fee of $2,000 .00 up to and including the date of a written
determination of an arbitrator. KRS 342 .320(2)(b) authorized an additional fee based upon an increase in
income benefits awarded upon a worker's successful appeal of an arbitrator's decision.
2
the merits . The employer's arguments on appeal were that the award of an attorney fee
under KRS 342 .320(2)(b) was erroneous on these facts and also that the $5,000.00
attorney fee under KRS 342 .320(2)(c) was unconstitutional under City of Louisville v.
Slack. Concluding that the claimant's counsel was an indispensable party to an appeal
concerning the amount of the attorney's fee, the Board dismissed the appeal without
making a decision on the merits . See Peabody Coal Co. v. Goforth , Ky., 857 S .W .2d
167 (1993); City of Devondale v. Stallings , Ky., 795 S .W .2d 954 (1990) . No appeal was
taken from the decision .
On December 7, 2001, the claimant moved for a corrected attorney fee order that
delineated the amounts to be paid from the claimant's future benefits and to be paid
from the employer's own funds . The motion noted that the ALJ had previously awarded
the attorney the $17,000 .00 fee as requested under KRS 342 .320(a), (b), and (c), and
the award became final . Nonetheless, having paid the attorney, the employer began
recouping from the claimant's future benefits the $5,000 .00 that was awarded under
KRS 342.320(2)(c) in addition to the $12,000 .00 that it was entitled to recoup .
The employer asserted that it had paid the $17,000.00 as ordered ; admitted that
it was recouping the entire amount from future benefits; and admitted that it had failed to
notify the claimant, his counsel, or the ALJ that it was doing so. Its justification was that
the December 21, 2000, order awarded a $17,000 .00 fee but did not indicate that
$5,000 .00 was awarded under KRS 342 .320(2)(c) or direct the employer to pay that
amount from its own funds . The order did indicate, however, that the fee was to be paid
according to the claimant's election, and the claimant's Form 109 indicated that he
wished to have his attorney's fee deducted from future benefits. Noting that City of
Louisville v. Slack , supra, had subsequently found KRS 342 .320(2)(c) to be
unconstitutional, the employer asserted that the ALJ lacked the authority to modify the
attorney fee order and impose liability on the employer for $5,000.00 of the attorney fee.
On January 2, 2002, the ALJ sustained the claimant's motion and ordered the
employer to cease recouping the entire attorney fee from the claimant's future benefits.
Correcting the order of December 21, 2000, the ALJ indicated that the employer was
liable for $5,000.00 of the fee under KRS 342 .320(2)(c) and that the amount was not
subject to recoupment. After its petition for reconsideration was denied, the employer
appealed, arguing that the $5,000 .00 fee was not awarded until January 2, 2002, at
which point the award was erroneous under City of Louisville v. Slack , supra .
Rejecting the employer's argument, the Board dismissed the appeal . The Board
noted that the ALJ's order of February 14, 2001, denied the employer's petition for
reconsideration of the December 21, 2000, order but also specified that $5,000.00 of
the attorney fee was awarded under KRS 342 .320(2)(c). The employer's subsequent
failure to name the claimant's counsel as a party to its initial appeal and the resulting
dismissal of the appeal rendered the ALJ's orders final . Therefore, the fully litigated
award became the law of the case, a status that was unaffected by the subsequent
order directing the employer to cease its unauthorized recoupment of the $5,000 .00.
On its own motion, the Board referred the matter to the Commissioner under KRS
342.267 and 803 KAR 25:240 for an investigation regarding unfair claims settlement
practice .
It is apparent from the ALJ's orders of December 21, 2000, and February 14,
2001, that the ALJ awarded $5,000.00 of the $17,000 .00 attorney fee under KRS
342 .320(2)(c). Furthermore, the employer's initial appeal to the Board asserted that the
ALJ erred by awarding a $10,000 .00 attorney fee under KRS 342.320(2)(b)and a
$5,000 .00 fee under KRS 342 .320(2)(c). Therefore, we reject the employer's assertion
that the $5,000 .00 fee was not awarded until the order that is the subject of this appeal.
The claimant's attorney is an indispensable party to an appeal concerning the
amount of the attorney's fee. Peabody Coal Co. v. Goforth , supra . Furthermore, an
appellant's failure to name an indispensable party within the time for filing a timely
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be remedied. City of Devondale v.
Stallings , supra . Although the employer sought to challenge the fees that were awarded
under KRS 342 .320(2)(b) and (c) in its initial appeal to the Board, its failure to name the
claimant's attorney as a party caused the award to become the law of the case,
regardless of whether it was correct . Therefore, when the Board was confronted with
the second appeal, the principle of res iudicata prohibited it from considering questions
concerning whether the award was erroneous. Under the circumstances, the Board did
not err in refusing to do so and dismissing the second appeal .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J., and Johnstone, Cooper, Keller, Stumbo, Wintersheimer, JJ .,
concur. Graves, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John C . Morton
Morton & Bach
126 N . Main Street
P .O. Box 883
Henderson, KY 42419
Samuel J . Bach
Allison Bowers Rust
Bach Hamilton, LLP
215 First Street
P.O. Box 881
Henderson, KY 42419
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES,
ROBERT LARRY BILLINGTON &
KRISTI SALADINO SCHAAF:
Kristi Saladino Schaaf
700 Clark Street
P.O . Box 1246
Paducah, KY 42002-1246
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