WANDA WILSON V. THE ANTHEM COMPANIES, INC . ; HON . LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED: September 23, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
'Sixprentr Gaurf of '41
2003-SC-0738-WC
WANDA WILSON
V.
V 4 ~
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0786-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 00-61594
THE ANTHEM COMPANIES, INC . ; HON. LLOYD
R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In its initial consideration of this matter, the Workers' Compensation Board
(Board), determined as a matter of law that the claimant's ignorance of the notice
requirement together with the employer's failure to comply with KRS 342.610(6) would
not excuse her failure to give notice of the work-related accident as soon as practicable .
Reversing an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) decision to the contrary, the Board
remanded the claim for further consideration . On remand, the ALJ determined that
there was no reasonable excuse for the delay in giving notice of the accident and
dismissed the claim . The Board affirmed the decision and refused to reconsider its
previous legal conclusion, citing the law of the case doctrine. Affirming, the Court of
Appeals explained that the claimant's failure to appeal the Board's initial decision
prevented her from raising the issue again after the remand . Furthermore, the Court
found no error in the decision that would warrant disturbing it. We affirm .
The claimant worked as a sales representative at the defendant-employer's
satellite office in Pikeville . Her job included state-wide travel to meet with clients, office
duties, and customer service . She testified that her injury occurred on August 20, 1999,
when the telephone rang while she was attempting to open a file cabinet drawer that
often malfunctioned . As she twisted to answer the phone, she experienced pain in her
back, right hip, and leg. At the time, she thought her symptoms would go away. She
testified that approximately two months later, she had difficulty sitting and standing and
mentioned the August, 1999, incident to Sharon Justice, a co-worker. Five to six
months after the incident, she was still in pain and having difficulty walking up the steps
to her office . At that point, in January or February of 2000, she phoned her supervisor,
Mr. Paul Anderson, who worked in the Lexington office . She informed him of her hip
and leg pain and of the August, 1999, incident. She testified that, at the time, she was
not certain her symptoms were work-related because she had a history of cervical
cancer and feared that it might have returned . She testified that she did not know she
was required to report a work-related injury immediately .
The claimant did not seek medical treatment until about March 23, 2000, after
which she underwent multiple tests and referrals to specialists to rule out everything
from a reoccurrence of the cancer to lupus. She testified that she referred the expenses
to her major medical insurance carrier for payment . When she sought to pre-certify an
MRI, the carrier asked her if her symptoms could be associated with her work. At that
point, she mentioned the work-related incident and was instructed to contact the
employer's human resources department, which she did . On May 7, 2001, Dr. King
diagnosed a soft tissue injury of the lower back and S-1 joint as well as the arousal of
degenerative disc disease . He took the claimant off work, and she did not work again .
Ms. Robyn Clark was team leader of the employer's human resources
department and worked in Louisville. She testified that the claimant notified the
department of the work-related incident and her symptoms in March, 2000 . She stated
that all employees received a handbook that explained benefits, including workers'
compensation . Page 45 of the February, 1997, edition of the handbook informed
workers that they must report the details of a work-related illness or injury to
management or human resources immediately. Ms . Clark testified that Paul Anderson
was a member of management and that the staff of the satellite office included only a
couple of sales associates and an administrative support person. She stated that
human resources provided a workers' compensation poster to each of the company's
offices, but she did not know whether the Pikeville office's copy was posted in August,
1999 .
In an affidavit that was filed by agreement of the parties, the claimant stated that
the employee handbook contained several hundred pages. She stated that she also
received other information and numerous other handbooks from the employer. Finally,
she stated that a workers' compensation poster was not displayed in the Pikeville office .
Noting that KRS 342.610(6) required the employer to post a notice stating,
among other things, that an employee is obliged to give notice of accidents, the AU
determined that the defendant-employer failed to do so. Furthermore, the AU was
persuaded by the claimant's testimony that, despite receiving an employee handbook,
she was unaware of the requirement that an injury be reported immediately . On that
basis, the ALJ determined that a reasonable cause existed for the claimant's delay in
giving notice. The claimant received an award of income benefits for both temporary
total and permanent partial disability, after which the employer appealed .
The Board determined as a matter of law that the claimant's professed ignorance
of the notice requirement was not an excuse for her failure to provide notice of the workrelated accident as soon as practicable . Likewise, noting that 803 KAR 25 :240, ยง 3(2)
considered a violation of KRS 342 .610(6) to be no more than an unfair claims
settlement practice, the Board was not convinced that the legislature intended for a
violation of the statute to create an estoppel defense for a worker's failure to provide
timely notice . Concluding that the basis for excusing the delay in giving notice was
erroneous as a matter of law, the Board reversed, in part, and remanded for further
consideration of the evidence. No appeal was taken from the decision .
On remand, the ALJ noted the claimant's testimony that she suspected her
symptoms were due to the work-related incident from the outset . The ALJ also noted
her testimony that her condition worsened about two months later, at which time she
told a co-worker that she had injured herself. On that basis, the ALJ concluded that
notice given to Mr. Anderson "approximately 5 to 6 months following the accident was
not 'as soon as practicable' as required by KRS 342 .185(1) ." Concluding that the delay
in giving notice was not occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause, the ALJ
dismissed the claim.
Appealing, the claimant argued that the delay in giving notice was excusable
because she was unaware of the legal requirement to give notice "as soon as
practicable ;" because the employer failed to comply with KRS 342 .610(6) ; and because
she was unsure of the cause of her symptoms . She also asserted that the ALJ failed to
comply with the order of remand . The Board determined, however, that the law of the
case doctrine barred further consideration of the first two arguments . Furthermore, it
reaffirmed its previous decision . With respect to the third and fourth arguments, the
Board noted that the AU considered and rejected the argument that the claimant
delayed in giving notice because she sought to confirm that her symptoms were not due
to a reoccurrence of cancer. Furthermore, the Board determined that there was an
adequate factual basis to support the ALJ's conclusion that the delay in giving notice
was not occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause.
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed, the claimant continues to maintain that
the ALJ's decision on remand was erroneous and failed to take into account all of the
evidence. She also asserts that Court of Appeals has misconstrued KRS 342.610(6);
that the law of the case doctrine did not bar further review of matters decided in the
initial appeal to the Board; and that the Board erred in relying upon the doctrine
because the employer did not raise its applicability.
KRS 342 .0011(1) defines an "injury" as a work-related traumatic event that
causes a harmful change in the human organism . KRS 342 .185(1) requires that notice
of an "accident" be given to an employer "as soon as practicable after the happening
thereof." KRS 342 .190 indicates that the notice requirement includes, among other
things, a description of the "nature and cause of the accident" as well as the "nature and
extent of the injury sustained ." Hence, the worker must give timely notice not only of the
traumatic event or "accident" but also of any harmful changes that result from it. See
Smith v. Cardinal Construction Co. , Ky., 13 S .W.3d 623, 627-28 (2000). KRS 342 .200
excuses a delay in giving notice if the employer has actual knowledge
of
the injury or if
the delay is due to mistake or other reasonable cause.
In its initial consideration of this claim, the Board determined as a matter of law
that a lack of awareness of the notice requirement together with an employer's failure to
comply with KRS 342 .610(6) did not constitute a mistake or reasonable cause for failing
to give timely notice . Hence the Board reversed the ALJ's decision to the contrary and
remanded the claim, directing the AU to consider the remaining evidence and to
determine whether the claimant's delay in giving notice was excused by mistake or
other reasonable cause . The Board's decision was final and appealable because it
divested the claimant of a decision in her favor and authorized the entry of a different
decision on remand . Whittaker v. Morgan, Ky., 52 S .W .3d 567 (2001) ; Davis v . Island
Creek Coal Co. , Ky., 969 S.W .2d 712, 714 (1998) . For that reason, the claimant's
failure to appeal the decision caused it to become the law of the case. Id . As such, the
decision was controlling at all subsequent stages of the litigation, and the questions to
be considered following the remand were limited to whether the AU properly construed
and applied the Board's mandate. Inman v. Inman , Ky., 648 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1982).
As the claimant points out, The Union Light Heat & Power Co . v. Blackwell's
Administrator, Ky., 291 S .W .2d 539 (1956), and subsequent authority indicate that an
appellate tribunal has the power to change its previous decision of law following a retrial
upon the same evidence if it finds the decision to have been clearly and palpably
erroneous . The fact remains, however, that what an appellate tribunal may do in
exceptional circumstances and what it must do are two separate matters . See Inman v.
Inman, supra ; Newman v. Newman , Ky., 451 S .W .2d 417, 420 (1970) .
Contrary to the claimant's argument that the employer was required to raise the
law of the case as an affirmative defense on remand, this was not a case where the
Board permitted additional arguments or evidence . The matter was simply remanded
for the ALJ to reconsider the same evidence under what the Board determined was a
correct interpretation of the law, and the AU did so . In responding to the claimant's
arguments on the second appeal, the employer noted the Board's previous decision and
explained why it considered the decision to be correct . In any event, the Board's
authority to refuse to address matters that were finally decided in the first appeal was
not subject to the actions or the arguments of the parties. When considering the second
appeal, the Board remained convinced that a violation of KRS 342.610(6) constituted no
more than an unfair claims settlement practice and refused to reconsider the matter,
citing the law of the case doctrine . Inman v. Inman , supra , at 850-52 . Under the
circumstances, whether the claimant's lack of knowledge of the notice requirement
together with the employer's failure to comply with KRS 342 .610(6) constituted a
reasonable cause for her delay in giving notice of the accident is not a question that is
properly before this Court.
Relying on a non-final decision of the Court of Appeals concerning notice of a
gradual injury, the claimant argues that she did not receive a medical diagnosis linking
her symptoms to the August, 1999, incident until several months after she informed Mr.
Anderson . She complains that the ALJ failed to consider that fact. We find no merit in
the argument because even if non-final authority were properly relied upon, the claimant
alleged an injury that was due to a single traumatic event in August, 1999. Authority
concerning notice of a gradual injury is inapplicable to such a claim. The claimant was
required to give notice of both the August, 1999, accident and the harmful changes that
it caused "as soon as practicable ."
There was substantial evidence to support the finding that the claimant failed to
give notice of the accident as soon as practicable . When determining that the claimant
failed to do so, the ALJ relied upon the claimant's own testimony, including her
testimony that she had symptoms from the outset ; "complained to everybody ;" told a coworker of the incident when her symptoms worsened about two months after it
occurred ; and informed her supervisor of the accident and possible injury in January or
February, 2000 . Under the circumstances, evidence that she had not yet sought
medical treatment or obtained a diagnosis of the cause of her symptoms could not
reasonably be viewed as excusing her delay in reporting the accident . The finding that
she failed to give timely notice was properly affirmed on appeal .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Michael Fleet Johnson
Clark & Johnson
P.O. Drawer 1529
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Ronald J . Pohl
Picklesimer, Pohl & Kiser, P.S .C .
167 West Main Street, Suite 1500
Lexington, KY 40507
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