NATHON DONAHOO V. RONNIE G . DORTCH, JUDGE, OHIO CIRCUIT COURT, AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : MARCH 26, 2004
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
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NATHON DONAHOO
V.
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0939-OA
OHIO CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2002-CR-100
RONNIE G. DORTCH, JUDGE,
OHIO CIRCUIT COURT,
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Nathon' Donahoo, appeals as a matter-of-right 2 from an order
of the Court of Appeals that denied his petition for extraordinary relief in which he
sought a writ prohibiting his trial on a pending felony indictment . Appellant, who
was serving a prison term at the time of the indictment, alleged that he was not
brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he filed a request
pursuant to KRS 500 .110 for trial on the indictment, and therefore, he asserts
' Appellant's first name is also spelled "Nathan" in the record .
2 CR 76 .36(7)(a) .
that he was entitled to a dismissal of the indictment. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition finding (1) that Appellant failed to demonstrate that a detainer
was lodged against him, and (2) that the purported detainer was not lodged by
the Commonwealth's Attorney as required by KRS 500.110. Although we
disagree with the Court of Appeals's conclusion that only a prosecutorial
authority can file a detainer, we hold that Appellant's petition failed to
demonstrate his entitlement to the relief sought because the evidence in the
record does not conclusively show either that a detainer was ever filed as to
Appellant or that Appellant complied with the notice requirements of KRS
500 .110 . Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals's denial of Appellant's
petition .
II. BACKGROUND
While incarcerated in the Roederer Correctional Complex (Roederer),
Appellant was indicted in the Ohio Circuit Court on charges of First-Degree
Escape, Third-Degree Assault, and for being a Second Degree Persistent Felony
Offender (PFO). The indictment was returned on July 10, 2002, and a copy was
sent to Roederer. Appellant was arraigned on the indictment on July 25, 2002,
and his case was assigned for a pretrial conference on May 9, 2003 and for trial
on May 14, 2003. On July 24, 2002, Roederer sent an acknowledgement to the
trial court that it had "received your ORDER FOR APPEARANCE which we are
using as a hold" but further stated, "[i]f you wish to file a detainer, please forward
appropriate documents ." Later, by undated notice, Green River Correctional
Complex notified the trial court that Appellant "who is to appear in your court on
May 9, 2003 . . . [h]as a detainer and a court appearance" on the pending
indictment.
On September 27, 2002, Appellant filed a pro se "MOTION FOR FINAL
DISPOSITION OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT(S) PURSUANT TO KRS 500 .110'
,
wherein he requested "Final Disposition " of the pending indictment. Although no
written order was entered by the trial court, Appellant claimed in his supplemental
memorandum filed in the Court of Appeals that the trial court heard the motion on
October 24, 2002 and overruled it on the record . He states that the trial court
cited its crowded docket as the reason for its ruling . A copy of the record of the
October 24, 2002 hearing was not included in the record before the Court of
Appeals.
On April 8, 2003, Appellant's appointed lawyer filed a "MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO BRING TO TRIAL UNDER KRS 500.110" and as
grounds for the motion, Appellant asserted that he had not been brought to trial
within one hundred and eighty (180) days of his KRS 500.110 request filed on
September 27, 2002. By order entered May 12, 2003, the trial court overruled
Appellant's motion to dismiss stating, "[t]his Court has a large backlog of criminal
cases in this county, and has routinely been setting said criminal cases for trial
almost one year in advance in order to accommodate that backlog ."
Appellant then filed a "PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION
AND/OR MANDAMUS" in which he asked the Court of Appeals for extraordinary
relief to prevent his trial in the Ohio Circuit Court on the pending indictment . With
his petition for a writ, Appellant filed a motion for intermediate relief, which was
granted pending resolution of Appellant's petition . In its response to Appellant's
-3-
motion for intermediate relief, the Commonwealth did not contest Appellant's
claim that a detainer had been lodged against Appellant and instead asserted
"that the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office did not file a detainer against
[Appellant], but another agency might have done so ." Later, however, in its
response to Appellant's petition, the Commonwealth raised the issue of whether
a detainer had actually been filed against Appellant . The Court of Appeals denied
Appellant's petition finding that "based upon the record in this original action, we
must find that [Appellant] has failed to demonstrate that a proper detainer was
lodged against him at the institution where he was confined ." The Court also
ruled that the circuit court was not authorized to file a detainer because "[i]n a
criminal prosecution, those officials charged by the Constitution and by statute
with conducting the prosecution should be the ones to bind the Commonwealth ."
Appellant appealed the denial to this Court.
III. ANALYSIS
A. WAS A DETAINER LODGED AGAINST APPELLANT?
To answer the question of whether Appellant has demonstrated that a
detainer was filed, we must first determine what constitutes a "detainer ." Our
research has failed to find a definition for "detainer," as used in the context of
KRS 500.110, in either Kentucky's statutory or case law. Interestingly, neither
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter IAD) nor the Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (hereinafter UMDDA) contain a definition
for detainer . For the purpose of establishing a procedure to carry out the
provisions of the IAD, however, the Kentucky Department of Corrections has
adopted a definition for detainer :
"Detainer" means a written notification filed by a
criminal justice or law enforcement agency with the
institution where an inmate is serving a sentence,
advising that the inmate is wanted in connection with
a criminal offense, and requesting the institution to
hold the inmate or to notify the agency when the
inmate is about to be released . The detainer may
have documents attached in support, such as an
indictment or other charging instruments, a court
bench warrant, a parole violation warrant, or an
escape warrant. A Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosecundum or a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Testificundum issued by a Federal Court is not a
detainer .3
And, in Fex v. Michigan , the United States Supreme Court, in an IAD case,
described a "detainer" as "a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for
the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner's release is
imminent."5 In Tucker v. United States
,6
the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals offered further guidance as to the nature of a detainer :
[A]n arrest warrant will serve as a detainer within
the purview of the IAD if: 1) it is based on an untried
information, indictment, or complaint; 2) it is filed by a
criminal justice agency; 3) it is filed directly with the
facility where a prisoner is incarcerated ; 4) it notifies
prison officials that a prisoner is wanted to face
pending charges; and 5) it asks the institution where
the prisoner is incarcerated either to hold the prisoner
3 Kentucky Corrections, Policies and Procedures, Policy Number 18 .17
(eff. February 17, 1995).
4 507 U .S . 43, 113 S .Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed .2d 406 (1993).
5 Fex , 507 U.S . at 44 . Accord Carchman v. Nash , 473 U .S . 716, 719, 105
S .Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) ("A detainer is a request filed by a
criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated,
asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the
agency when release of the prisoner is imminent .").
6 569 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1990).
at the conclusion of the prisoner's sentence, or to
notify agency officials when the prisoner's release is
imminent. Where all five of these criteria are
satisfied, an arrest warrant is plainly "lodged" as a
detainer, and the provisions of the IAD come into
play.
Although each of the above authorities address the definition of "detainee' in the
context of the [AD, we find those definitions well-suited for application to KRS
500 .110.
The limited record before us demonstrates only that Roederer received
from the circuit court a copy of the felony indictment against Appellant, one of its
inmates . In particular, there is no evidence in this record that any criminal justice
agency ever asked a Kentucky correctional institution where Appellant was
incarcerated to hold Appellant at the conclusion of his sentence and/or to notify it
when Appellant's release was imminent. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of
Appeals's conclusion that Appellant has failed to prove that a detainer was
lodged against him, and thus has not demonstrated his entitlement to the relief
he seeks.
B. MAY A COURT PLACE A DETAINER?
Under the definitions of "detainee' set forth in this opinion, it is clear that
either the district or circuit court may file a detainer against an inmate. Although
the judicial system is an independent branch of government, the courts are part
of the larger criminal justice system, which includes both executive and judicial
agencies. And, in fact, most intrastate detainers are placed by clerks and sheriffs
without the intervention of Commonwealth's Attorneys . Our observation in that
regard is not intended as criticism of Commonwealth's Attorneys, but as an
Id . at 165.
acknowledgment of how the criminal justice system works in the placing of
detainers . Recently, in Rosen v . Watson,8 this Court noted that the detainer
there was placed by the district court .9 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the court could not lodge a detainer against
Appellant .
C . NOTICE OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST
Both in its response to Appellant's motion for intermediate relief and in its
response to the petition itself, the Commonwealth asserted that Appellant had
failed to serve notice upon the Commonwealth's Attorney of his request for final
disposition under KRS 500.110. The statute clearly requires that written notice
be served on the Commonwealth's Attorney :
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of
this state, and whenever during the continuance of
the term of imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he
shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty
(180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of
the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a
final disposition to be made of the indictment ,
information or complaint ; provided that for good cause
shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter
may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance .' °
8 Ky., 103 S.W .3d 25 (2003).
9 _Id . at 28 ("The detainer was lodged against Appellee by the Boyd District
Court .").
° KRS 500 .110 (emphasis added) .
7
No certificate of service of Appellant's petition is contained in the record,
and the Commonwealth's Attorney filed an affidavit in support of the
Commonwealth's claim that Appellant failed to serve the Commonwealth's
Attorney with the request. In his affidavit, the Commonwealth's Attorney states : "I
have reviewed my file in the underlying felony case . . . . 1 find no record in my file
of receiving service of the pro se motion of the defendant for disposition of his
case in Ohio County . It is the regular practice and procedure of my office to fld
pleadings in the appropriate file and the only copy in the file ia- that provided by
the petitioner as an exhibit in the Court of Appeals pleadings ."
Under KRS 500.110, Appellant had the burden of establishing service on
the Commonwealth's Attorney of his request for final disposition," and he has
failed to meet that burden . Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate his
entitlement to the relief he seeks, and the Court of Appeals thus correctly denied
Appellant's petition for extraordinary relief.
IV . CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals's order denying
Appellant's petition and dissolving the temporary stay of Appellant's trial.
All concur.
11
CR 43.01(1) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
APPELLEE :
Hon . Ronnie C . Dortch
Judge, Ohio Circuit Court
PO Box 169
Hartford, Kentucky 42347
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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2003-SC-0542-MR
NATHON DONAHOO
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0939-OA
OHIO CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2002-CR-100
RONNIE G . DORTCH, JUDGE,
OHIO CIRCUIT COURT,
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court by Justice Keller rendered
February 19, 2004 shall be modified on pages 4 and 8 by changing roman numeral
section numbers, as attached hereto . Said modification does not affect the holding .
Entered : March 26, 2004 .
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