DEBBIE ELLEN REHM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES DAVID REHM DQ4 AND NICHOLAS JAMES REHM and CHRISTINA MARIE REHM, by and Friend, DEBBIE ELLEN REHM V. JEFFERSON HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT AND CARDINAL INSULATION ; GARLOCK; AJAX MAGNATHEMIC ; GENERAL ELECTRIC AND FORMER DEFENDANTS ; FORD MOTOR COMPANY ; PHILIP MORRIS ; and AMERICAN STANDARD
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2003-SC-0533-MR
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DEBBIE ELLEN REHM, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF JAMES DAVID REHM
AND
NICHOLAS JAMES REHM and
CHRISTINA MARIE REHM, by and
through their Parent, Guardian, and Next
Friend, DEBBIE ELLEN REHM
V.
DQ4
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0712-OA
CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-1344
JEFFERSON
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON,
JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
CARDINAL INSULATION ; GARLOCK;
AJAX MAGNATHEMIC ; GENERAL
ELECTRIC AND FORMER
DEFENDANTS ; FORD MOTOR
COMPANY; PHILIP MORRIS ; and
AMERICAN STANDARD
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellants appeal as a matter-of-right' from a Court of Appeals's order that
denied their petition for a writ prohibiting the trial court from staying discovery in a civil
action pending the outcome of the appeal of summary judgments, which had dismissed
some of the defendants in the case . Appellants alleged that the discovery stay "causes
irreparable injury to [Appellants] and [their] ability to properly prepare [their] case." The
Court of Appeals denied the petition after finding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in staying discovery . We hold that the trial court's denial of discovery was an
abuse of its discretion, and therefore, we reverse and remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for it to issue a writ directing the trial court to permit discovery in the underlying
case .
II . BACKGROUND
In February 2001, the Appellant Debbie Ellen Rehm and her now-deceased
husband, James David Rehm, ("James Rehm") 3 both individually and on behalf of their
two minor children, filed an action against numerous defendants alleging that James
Rehm had been injured by his exposure to asbestos-containing products at multiple job
sites where he had worked while in the employment of Rapid Installation, which was in
the business of manufacturing, selling, installing, and maintaining industrial conveyor
' CR 76.36(7)(a).
2 Although the Court of Appeals stated that "the Court is not persuaded that
petitioners have demonstrated with reasonable specificity any harm of an irreparable
nature they would suffer through the delay, the Court proceed[ed] to consider the merits
of [the] original action ."
3 Mr. Rehm died on July 25, 2002, and by amended complaint, Debbie Ellen
Rehm, as executrix of his estate, was substituted as a party and thereby revived the
action asserted by him . CR 25 .01 . Debbie Ellen Rehm, alone, maintains the action on
behalf of the minor children .
systems . The complaint and a subsequent amended complaint asserted both product
liability and premises liability claims against one defendant, General Electric Company
("GE"), and either, but not both, product liability or premises liability claims against the
other defendants . The product liability claims were based generally on allegations that
the asbestos-containing products were designed, manufactured, distributed, sold, or
installed by the product liability defendants on the premises liability defendants' property
where James Rehm had worked as a Rapid Installation employee.
In May 2002, the trial court granted summary judgments, which were made final
and appealable, to the premises liability defendants, including GE (but only as to the
premises liability claim against it), on the basis of their "up-the-ladder" worker's
compensation defenses 4 and, accordingly, dismissed Appellant's premise liability
claims. Appellants appealed the summary judgments and that appeal remains pending
in the Court of Appeals.
Appellants' product liability claims against the remaining defendants, including
GE, were scheduled for trial in August 2003; however, in March of that year, on the
motion of GE, the trial court stayed both the scheduled trial and all discovery "pending
the outcome of the appeal of the dismissal of the premises liability defendants ."
Appellant then filed an original action in the Court of Appeals requesting a writ
prohibiting the trial court from staying discovery . Appellants did not, however, request
relief from the trial stay. The Court of Appeals denied Appellants' petition for a writ, and
the Appellants appealed the denial to this Court . After reviewing the record and briefs
4 KRS 342 .690(1).
filed by Appellants and the real parties in interest, we reverse and remand to the Court
of Appeals for it to issue a writ vacating the trial court's stay of discovery .
III . ANALYSIS
"Due to the extraordinary nature of its relief - interlocutory intervention by an
appellate court, the writ of prohibition remedy is reserved for exceptional circumstances
and therefore should be granted only upon a showing that ' . . . the lower court is about
to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy
by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury would result ."'6 'If
[these] procedural prerequisites for a writ are satisfied, `whether to grant or deny a
petition for a writ is within the appellate court's discretion.And, appellate review of
that decision is limited to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry, except for issues of law which
are reviewed de novo . 8
In the present case, although the Court of Appeals stated that it "[was] not
persuaded that [Appellants] [had] demonstrated with reasonable specificity any harm of
an irreparable nature they would suffer through the delay," it elected "to consider the
merits of [the] original action." The Court then correctly noted that "[w]hether to
5 GE, Phillip Morris USA, Inc ., American Standard, Inc., and Ford Motor
Company filed briefs as real parties in interest. CR 76.36(8) .
6 Lewis LP Gas, Inc. v. Lambert , Ky., 113 S .W.3d 171, 175 (2003) (footnotes
omitted) .
Peterson v. Shake , Ky., 120 S .W .3d 707, 711 (2003) (Keller, J ., concurring) .
8 Kentucky Labor Cabinet v. Graham , Ky., 43 S .W.3d 247, 251 (2001) ("As the
issues on this appeal are to be decided as a matter of law, our review of the Court of
Appeals decision is not confined to an abuse of discretion inquiry .") ; Southeastern
United Medigroup, Inc. v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 195, 199-200 (1997). Accord 63C
AM JUR 2D Prohibition § 88 (1997) ("It has been held that the denial of a writ of
prohibition will not be overturned unless it is shown that the lower court abused its
discretion or acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner in refusing
to issue the writ." (footnotes omitted)).
postpone proceedings in an action rests within the sound discretion of a trial court." But,
without any recitation of the trial court's findings or description of its rationale, the Court
of Appeals concluded that "the trial court thoroughly analyzed the pros and cons of
staying all proceedings, balanced the interests of all parties involved, and clearly
articulated the rationale for its decision ." It then held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to stay discovery, stating "the trial court is the tribunal that is the
most intimately familiar with the complexities and the ramifications of this large asbestos
case and we shall not substitute our own judgment for it." Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition.
Because the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court's rationale in its denial of
Appellants' petition, our inquiry must, therefore, focus on the trial court's rationale in
staying discovery . The trial court "recognize[d] that going forward with discovery in the
products liability action while the premises liability action is on appeal could result in an
additional burden on witnesses and defendants, especially GE, if the dismissal is
reversed ." But, the trial court further recognized that "this burden alone is not undue
when considering the speculative nature of the appeal and when weighed against the
risks of losing evidence and the financial and emotional hardships that a long,
indeterminate delay would cause [Appellants] to endure[,]" and found - based on the
parties' financial positions - that "under normal circumstances , . . . GE is in a better
position to absorb the burden and risks associated with going forward with discovery ."
Apparently, the trial court did not consider the circumstances before it to be normal
because of the problems associated with the "application of apportionment principles"
that it conceived would be created by a trial of Appellants' claims against the product
liability defendants and a subsequent reversal of the summary judgments that had been
granted in favor of the premises liability defendants . The trial court believed that "[t]he
application of the principles of apportionment in this case creates substantial and
unmanageable complications ." It found that "[t]o hold this case in abeyance would
cause a great and undue hardship on [Appellants]" ; however, it also found that "going
forward with the trial would create an undue burden on the numerous dismissed
defendants, forcing them to defend themselves in a case in which they have been
dismissed and essentially denying them [the] value of their summary judgments ."
Finding "no workable solution," the trial court reasoned that "[t]he only way for this case
to be fairly resolved as to all parties is to hold it in abeyance pending the Court of
Appeals decision ." Thus, both discovery and trial were ordered stayed pending the
outcome of the appeal . We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that a stay of
discovery fairly resolved the matter .
First, we would note that although the Court of Appeals apparently assumed
irreparable injury but nevertheless denied the petition on other grounds, a discovery
stay as extensive as the one ordered by the trial court is likely to cause irreparable
injury to the Appellants for which no adequate remedy by appeal exists. As this Court
stated in Alvey v. Commonwealth , 9 "[i]t is an unavoidable fact that, as time passes on,
memories fade and witnesses become unavailable ." And, we would add that, as time
passes, evidence is destroyed or lost and physical conditions may change.
Two Kentucky cases are relevant to the issue in the present case. In Meredith v.
Wilson , ° an action filed in the Boyle Circuit Court was dismissed for lack of proper
venue, and the dismissal order was appealed by the plaintiffs . The plaintiffs in the
9 Ky., 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (1983) .
10 Ky., 423 S .W .2d 519 (1968).
Boyle Circuit Court action then filed an identical action against the same defendants in
the Mercer Circuit Court . On the defendants' motion, the Mercer Circuit Court "entered
an order prohibiting the taking of the depositions and substantially suspending any
proceedings in the Mercer County litigation until after the disposition of the appeal in the
Boyle County case."" The plaintiffs filed an original action with this Court's predecessor
seeking to lift the discovery stay, and the Meredith Court, after noting that "[t]he right of
discovery deposition is an important one vouchsafed by the civil rules[,] "12 noted that
"[t]he petitioners alleged without contradiction that important matters involved in the
litigation need to be developed by the sought discovery depositions and that the
information and evidence now available may be lost in the event of the death of either of
the witnesses sought to be interrogated . "13 It then stated "[i]t seems to us that there is
no valid basis for denying the right to take the discovery depositions and that failure to
grant relief may well subject petitioners to irreparable injury .
Accordingly, it ordered
the trial court to "permit[] the plaintiffs to proceed to take depositions for discovery, as
prescribed by CR 26." 15 In the case at bar, the real parties in interest attempt to
distinguish this case from Meredith by stating that the harm was more specific in
Meredith because the two witnesses were known to the petitioner. Because Appellants
have not produced a list of witnesses that they would like to depose, the real parties in
interest claim that here the alleged harm is purely speculative . We disagree . Although
11
Id. at 520 .
12
Id .
13
Id .
14
Id . at 521 .
15
Meredith , 423 S .W.2d at 521 .
Appellants cannot identify specific persons' testimony that will be lost or the evidence
that will disappear, they are not required to do so. "[I]nformation and evidence now
available" may be lost as a result of the discovery stay, and that is sufficient . We would
add that the purpose of discovery is to uncover witnesses and evidence and secure it
for trial . Furthermore, it is only through hindsight that the Appellants will, possibly, be
able to identify any witnesses and evidence that it lost, and by then it will be too late.
In Volvo Car Corp. v. Hopkins, 16 the trial court entered an order that barred the
plaintiffs from contacting potential nonparty witnesses. The plaintiffs filed an original
action in the Court of Appeals, which granted the plaintiffs' petition for mandamus and
directed the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to contact the witnesses in any manner
consistent with the rules of discovery . The Court of Appeals found "'irreparable harm for
which they [the petitioners] have no adequate remedy by appeal' in the fact `that, if they
[the plaintiffs below] were required to await the outcome of a trial before an appellate
court could resolve the issue, the delay could result in the loss of information now
available due to fading memories, death or other unavailability of the witnesses ."'17 This
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and noted approvingly that "[t]he Court of Appeals
acted because the delay involved in awaiting final disposition of the case below before
addressing the erroneous discovery ruling would likely result in losing discoverable
information from witnesses who may have died, or moved, or whose memories might be
dimmed by time . "18 The real parties in interest attempt to distinguish Volvo from the
instant case, stating that the Volvo trial court limited and denied discovery while the trial
16
Ky ., 860 S.W.2d 777 (1993) .
17
Id . at 778 .
18
Id . at 779 .
court in this case has merely postponed discovery . Further, the real parties in interest
state that Volvo involved the quest to keep plaintiffs from contacting people with
knowledge of discoverable information ; whereas in this case only formal discovery has
been held in abeyance and there are no restrictions regarding informal discovery . We
fail to see a distinguishing difference between limiting discovery and postponing it, both
have the same effect, i.e. , a party is prohibited from obtaining discovery not otherwise
prohibited by the rules of discovery. And, informal discovery is not a substitute for
formal discovery .
In Landis v. North American Co. ,'9 "[t]he controversy hinge[d] upon the power of
a court to stay proceedings in one suit until the decision of another, and upon the
propriety of using such a power in a given situation ." 2° The Supreme Court held that
"the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants." 21 But, the Court stated that "[h]ow this can best be
done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and
maintain an even balance ."22 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, then stated "the
suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required
to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work
damage to some one else[,], 23 and pointed out that "[o]nly in rare circumstances will a
19 299 U .S . 248, 57 S .Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) .
2°
Id ., 299 U .S . at 249, 57 S .Ct. at 163.
21
Id ., 299 U.S . at 254, 57 S .Ct. at 166 .
22
Id ., 299 U.S. at 254-255, 57 S.Ct. at 166.
23
Id ., 299 U .S. at 255, 57 S .Ct. at 166.
-9-
litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the
rule of law that will define the rights of both ."24 And while an "individual may be required
to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if
the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted," 25 the Landis Court warned
that a "stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception that its
force will be spent within reasonable limits[,]" 26 and that a trial court abuses its discretion
by ordering "a stay of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need . ,27
In Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. U .S., 28 the trial court stayed cases
indefinitely pending the outcome of other cases. The federal appellate court cautioned
that "[t]he trial court's discretion is not, however, without bounds[,], 29 and instructed trial
courts that after identifying a pressing need for a stay, "[t]he court must then balance
interests favoring a stay against interests frustrated by the action .,,30 And, the appellate
court pointed out that "[o]verarching this balancing is the court's paramount obligation to
exercise jurisdiction timely in cases properly before it." 31 The trial court had "opined that
its order would avoid duplicative litigation and conserve judicial resources ." 32 The
24
Landis, 299 U .S . at 255, 57 S .Ct. at 166 .
25
Id., 299 U .S . at 256, 57 S .Ct. at 166.
26
Id., 299 U.S . at 257, 57 S .Ct. at 167.
2'
Id ., 299 U .S . at 255, 57 S.Ct. at 166.
28 124 F .3d 1413 (C.A .Fed .,1997) .
29 Id . at 1416.
30
Id.
31
Id .
32
Id .
-1 0-
federal circuit court, however, "conclude[d] that this concern falls short of the "pressing
need" required when a trial court seeks to suspend its proceedings indefinitely .
,33
Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by indefinitely
staying its proceedings .
In the present case, the trial court appears to have stayed discovery because of
its concern that, if the summary judgments for the premises liability defendants were
reversed on appeal, the premises liability defendants would be required to repeat much
of the discovery process and to re-depose most of the same witnesses. The trial court
reasoned that this scenario "could result in an additional burden on witnesses and
defendants, especially GE, if the dismissal is reversed ." We conclude that, when
weighed against the potential harm to Appellants, this reason does not justify the
ordered discovery stay. As we previously pointed out, a delay as extensive as that
imposed here may reasonably be expected to result in dimmed memories, unavailability
of witnesses, loss or destruction of evidence, and the changing of physical conditions .
The cost and inconvenience associated with the repetition of discovery is insignificant
when compared to the harm that may befall Appellants . Additionally, there is a
presumption that the summary judgments are valid and will be upheld on appeal; so, the
risk is slight that any harm will result from allowing discovery to continue . Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in staying discovery and the Court of
Appeals abused its discretion in denying Appellants' petition .
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals's order and remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for it to issue a writ vacating the trial court's discovery stay.
33
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 124 F.3d at 1416 .
-11-
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
Kenneth L . Sales
Sales, Tillman & Wallbaum
1900 Waterfront Plaza
325 West Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-4251
Joseph D. Satterley
Sales, Tillman & Wallbaum
1900 Waterfront Plaza
325 West Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-4251
APPELLEE :
Hon . Denise Clayton
Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court
600 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, CARDINAL INSULATION :
Armer H . Mahan, Jr.
Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Mahan, PSC
400 West Market Street
Suite 2200
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Joseph P . Hummel
Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Mahan, PSC
400 West Market Street
Suite 2200
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, GARLOCK :
John K. Gordinier
Pedley, Zielke & Gordinier, PLLC
2000 Meidinger Tower
462 South Fourth Avenue
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-2555
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, AJAX MAGNATHEMIC :
James M. Gary
Weber & Rose, PSC
2700 Providian Center
400 West Market Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, GENERAL ELECTRIC AND FORMER
DEFENDANTS :
Scott T. Dickens
Tachau, Maddox, Hovious & Dickens, PLC
2700 National City Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3116
John David Dyche
Tachau, Maddox, Hovious & Dickens, PLC
2700 National City Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3116
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, FORD MOTOR COMPANY:
Byron N . Miller
Thompson & Miller, PLC
Suite 500
600 West Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-4251
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, PHILIP MORRIS :
William D. Grubbs
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, LLP
2500 First National Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3175
David T. Schaefer
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, LLP
2500 First National Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3175
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, AMERICAN STANDARD :
J. Mark Grundy
Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald
3300 National City Tower
101 South Fifth Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Melissa Norman Bork
Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald
3300 National City Tower
101 South Fifth Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
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