FRANKIE LEWIS V. LANTECH, INC. ; HON. DONNA H . TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT T BE PUBLISHED PINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : June 17, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0431-WC
FRANKIE LEWIS
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-0390-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 96-08085
LANTECH, INC. ; HON. DONNA H . TERRY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The claimant quit working on May 13, 1996, and on October 20, 1997, he was
awarded benefits for cumulative trauma injuries to his shoulders . On January 22, 1998,
he was informed that a cervical condition, which had been diagnosed shortly after he
quit working, also was probably work-related . On January 11, 2001, he moved to
reopen the initial claim, asserting that the shoulder condition had worsened and that the
cervical condition had developed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded an
increase in benefits for the shoulder injuries but determined that a claim for the cervical
condition was barred by KRS 342.185. Although the claimant maintained that he could
raise the cervical condition within the four-year period for reopening, the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals affirmed . Likewise, we affirm .
The claimant worked as a material handler . He described the work as being very
physically demanding and as requiring repetitive lifting, carrying, and bending while
supplying assembly line workers with parts that were often bulky and as much as 70
pounds in weight . After a year of experiencing increasingly severe shoulder discomfort,
he quit working on May 13, 1996. At about that time, he began to experience neck pain
and headaches . On May 31, 1996, Dr. Makk, the orthopedic surgeon who was treating
the claimant's shoulder problems, also diagnosed degenerative changes in his neck and
"possible cervical radiculitis."
On December 2, 1996, the claimant filed an application for benefits for
cumulative trauma injuries to his shoulders . The cervical symptoms worsened, and by
February 17, 1997, he complained to Dr. Makk of cervical spasms and headaches .
When deposed on March 17, 1997, Dr. Makk indicated that the cervical condition was
separate from the claimant's shoulder conditions and expressed no opinion concerning
its cause .
In August, 1997, the claimant sought treatment for the cervical condition from Dr.
Petruska, a neurosurgeon . At that time, he complained of increasing neck pain,
frequent headaches in the back of his head, paravertebral muscle spasm, inability to
rotate his neck, and intermittent numbness in both arms, and he indicated that he
dropped objects . Although previous diagnostic testing had been unremarkable, Dr.
Petruska ordered another MRI, which revealed spinal stenosis at C3-4 and C4-5. Due
to the severity of the symptoms, Dr. Petruska performed a cervical diskectomy and
fused the C3-C5 vertebrae on September 17, 1997. The related medical bills were
tendered to the claimant's health insurance carrier .
On October 20, 1997, the claimant received a partial disability award for the left
shoulder injury and an award of medical benefits for the right shoulder injury. Despite
the surgery, his headaches and cervical symptoms continued . Treatment notes
indicated that as of January 22, 1998, Dr. Petruska would support an application for
disability with a statement that the neck injury was probably related to the nature of his
work. Approximately three years later, on January 11, 2001, the claimant moved to
reopen the shoulder claim and alleged the development of a cervical injury as well .
Dr. Patrick examined the claimant on April 17, 1997, during litigation of the initial
claim, and again on June 2, 2001 . Although the claimant had been experiencing
cervical problems for nearly a year at that time, the 1997 testimony concerned only the
shoulder complaints. In 2001, Dr. Patrick testified that he thought the cervical condition
was present but overshadowed by the left shoulder injury in 1997. He stated that the
cervical fusion warranted a 25% impairment and attributed half of the impairment to the
claimant's repetitive work. When deposed, he testified that although both the shoulder
and cervical conditions resulted from the repetitive nature of the claimant's work, the
cervical injury was "separate and apart" from the shoulder condition and did not result
from it.
In addition to the cervical surgery, the claimant underwent right shoulder surgery
in March, 1998. He was also involved in more than one motor vehicle accident . In
November, 1997, his head hit the top of a truck cab . Medical records from Dr. Harpring
indicated that there was an aggravation of the cervical problems due to a July, 1999,
motor vehicle accident .
Dr. Makk reviewed the medical records and examined the claimant on December
4, 2000, for the purpose of assigning a permanent impairment rating . He assigned a
10% impairment for reduced range of motion in each shoulder and a 29% impairment
for a reduced cervical range of motion, for a combined impairment of 49% . He did not
express an opinion regarding causation .
Dr. Wood, an orthopedic surgeon, performed an independent medical
examination and reviewed the medical records . He noted evidence of symptom
magnification that interfered with an accurate measure of cervical range of motion . Dr.
Wood noted that the cervical symptoms did not begin until after the claimant quit
working and concluded that the cervical problem was not work-related .
After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ noted that the cervical symptoms and
headaches began at the very end of the employment. There was no indication that
either the claimant or his treating physicians gave any serious consideration to whether
they were work-related at that time . The first indication of such a relationship was found
in Dr. Petruska's note of January 22, 1998, and the relationship was supported by Dr .
Patrick's testimony. The ALJ determined that the claimant sustained a work-related
cervical injury but that a claim for the injury was barred by KRS 342 .185.
The claimant asserts that he could not have filed a new claim for the cervical
injury when he discovered it because it was due to the same trauma that formed the
basis for the original claim . He argues that the cervical condition resulted from the
same repetitive activity that caused the shoulder injuries but was latent at the time of the
initial claim and also argues that such a condition may be raised for the first time at
reopening. Relying upon Fischer Packing Co . v. Lanham , Ky., 804 S.W.2d 4 (1991)
and Mays v. Potter and Brumfield, Inc., Ky., 427 S .W.2d 567 (1968), he asserts that the
cervical condition could be raised within the four-year period for reopening, as set forth
in KRS 342.125(3), rather than the two-year period for filing a claim, as set forth in KRS
342.185 . Since the period for reopening had not expired, he concludes that
compensation for the cervical condition was not barred .
Like the present claim, Fischer Packing Co . v. Lanham , supra, and Mays v.
Potter and Brumfield , supra, involved injuries due to trauma that occurred before
December 12, 1996. At that time, the term "injury" was defined as a harmful change in
the human organism, and KRS 342 .185 required that a claim for an injury must be filed
within two years of the "date of accident ." When the claims were reopened, KRS
342.125 permitted reopening "at any time," upon proof of a change of condition, fraud,
mistake, or newly-discovered evidence ; whereas, KRS 342 .125(3) imposed a four-year
limitation on the period for reopening the claimant's award . Lanham and Mays are
distinguishable from the present case in ways that are significant to the outcome .
In Mays v. Potter and Brumfield , supra , the worker alleged a nervous condition in
her initial claim, but the fact-finder determined that she failed to prove a work-related
neurosis . At reopening, she alleged that the condition had become totally disabling and
prevailed before the fact-finder. Upholding the award, the court determined that the
rationale of Messer v. Drees, Ky., 382 S .W .2d 209 (1964), governed the reopening and
that she had proved a substantial post-award change of condition . Id. at 568. Unlike
Ms. Mays, the claimant did not raise his cervical condition in the initial claim .
In Fischer Packing Co . v. Lanham , supra, the worker was awarded benefits for a
work-related back injury . At reopening, he alleged that he had developed severe
depression as a result of the back injury, and the ALJ increased the award . Upholding
the decision, the court noted that either a worsening of the back injury or the
appearance of a new condition as a result of the back injury would support reopening
the award . Id. at 5. Lanham is not authority for the proposition that a new condition
may be raised for the first time at reopening simply because it is due to the same
trauma that caused an injury for which the worker was previously awarded
compensation .
Dr. Patrick testified that the claimant's cervical condition was due to the same
trauma that caused the shoulder condition. Unlike the situation in Lanham , he also
testified that it was a separate condition and did not result from the shoulder injury .
Therefore, Lanham is not authority for permitting the claimant to raise the cervical
condition for the first time via a reopening .
The present case is more akin to Slone v. Jason Coal Co., Ky., 902 S.W.2d 820,
821 (1995), in which the worker was awarded benefits for a back injury in a pre-1996
Act claim. In a subsequent motion to reopen, he alleged that a disabling psychological
condition had become manifest since the award and was due to the injury . The court
noted, however, that medical evidence established the presence of the psychological
condition at the time of the initial claim and determined that the worker's failure to
present the condition at that time could not be cured by a motion to reopen more than
two years later. The court noted the prohibition against piecemeal litigation and also
distinguished Fischer Packing Co . v. Lanham , supra, and Messer v. Drees , supra , on
the ground that the psychological condition was not newly discovered but was present
at the time of Slone's initial award. Although he argued that he did not know the
psychological condition was work-related when litigating the initial claim, the court
characterized a failure to obtain such knowledge as being due to a lack of diligence. Id .
at 822.
Contrary to the claimant's assertion that the cervical injury was latent at the time
of the initial award, the injury was diagnosed at about the time he quit work and nearly a
year and a half before the initial award. Dr. Makk was questioned about the condition
when deposed on March 17, 1997, in the initial proceeding but expressed no opinion
concerning its cause . Although the condition became severe enough to warrant fusion
surgery, the matter of causation was not pursued until after an award was rendered .
Under the circumstances, the condition was not properly the subject of a reopening and
was barred by KRS 342 .185 .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
George M. Streckfus
Jeffrey Judge Paige
Howes Paige PLLC
Watterson City West, Suite 1020
1941 Bishop Lane
Louisville, KY 40218
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Laurie Goetz Kemp
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton
2500 National City Tower
Louisville, KY 40202
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