HAROLD HICKS V. ECK MILLER TRANPORTATION ; HON. J . KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : April 22, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
uyrrmr Courf of
2003-SC-0272-WC
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LOA7F
-13-04
APPELLANT
HAROLD HICKS
V.
5
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-2194-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 01-1397
ECK MILLER TRANPORTATION ;
HON. J . KEVIN KING, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
The claimant was a truck driver who owned his rig and worked under a lease
arrangement with Eck Miller Transportation . He was injured while delivering a load and
filed a workers' compensation claim . Reversing a finding that he was an employee, the
Workers' Compensation Board (Board) determined that the evidence compelled a
finding that he was an independent contractor and that the claim must be dismissed .
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a two-to-one decision .
The claimant was born in 1951, completed the eighth grade, and had a
commercial drivers' license . He testified that although he did construction and railroad
work when he was young, most of his work history involved driving semi trucks . After
working for another trucking company from 1985-1998, he began leasing his truck to
Eck Miller and hauling loads of coil steel for five to seven days per week. On October
27, 1999, he was injured when he lost his balance while stepping off the back of his
trailer as he was making a delivery . He later testified to experiencing immediate lower
back pain that radiated into his left leg to the knee . He drove to Eck Miller's
headquarters in Rockport, Indiana, and returned to his home in London, Kentucky, the
next day. He did not drive for Eck Miller thereafter.
In January, 2000, Dr. Kiefer performed a laminectomy at L3-4 . In March, 2000,
the claimant was released to return to work as a truck driver with restrictions against
heavy lifting that precluded him from dragging chains, ropes, and binders to tie down
loads of coil steel. He returned to work under a lease arrangement with KC
Transportation . It required him to do nothing but drive and paid $1,500.00 to $1,800.00
per week. In November, 2001, he began working under a lease arrangement with TriLex, driving five days per week and earning $1,400.00 to $1,500.00 .
The claimant testified that he owned his truck and trailer. He leased the rig to
Eck Miller and drove it in exchange for 75% of the gross receipts for each load . The
lease had no definite term . He stated that he was responsible for the cost of purchasing
fuel and maintaining the truck, which amounted to about half of what he received .
Under the arrangement, he grossed $2,300.00 to $2,400 .00 per week. He stated that
either he called the dispatcher or the dispatcher would contact him at his home, and he
would be offered a choice of the available loads to haul . He was not obliged to accept
every load and was paid only for the hauls that he made . If he declined a load, he
would still be called when another one became available . He stated that he was
required to keep the vehicle ready for use and did not haul freight for others while
working for Eck Miller . He also testified that he did not receive payment from Eck Miller
for the use of his vehicle by another driver.
The claimant's 1999 tax return reported no wages but did report $10,618 .00 in
business income on which he paid self-employment tax. His Schedule C for Harold
Hicks Trucking reported gross receipts of $93,263.00 . A Form 1099 indicated that Eck
Miller paid Hicks $44,341 .12 in non-employee compensation . No evidence explained
the source of the remaining $48,921 .88 in receipts, and he was not questioned about
the discrepancy when testifying at the deposition or hearing . The Schedule C indicated
that after depreciation and expenses, he netted $10,618 .00.
Eck Miller Transportation was no longer operating when the claim was heard but
was represented by counsel . It presented no evidence concerning the relationship of
the parties . Although the business was an Indiana corporation, it carried workers'
compensation coverage in Kentucky. There was no evidence to establish whether the
business owned some trucks, itself, and used employee drivers as well as owneroperators such as the claimant .
Relying on Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland , Ky., 805 S .W .2d 116 (1991),
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that the shipping of goods by truck was
related to Eck Miller's business . Although the claimant could choose which loads to
haul and could refuse a load, Eck Miller procured the loads, and he did not haul freight
for others while working for Eck Miller or have others drive his truck. The ALJ
concluded, therefore, that Eck Miller exercised a great deal of control over the
claimant's work . Although noting that the claimant had a commercial drivers' license
and that skill is required to operate a large truck, the ALJ was not persuaded that those
factors necessarily indicated that the claimant was an independent contractor.
Likewise, noting that the claimant may have filed his income taxes on a self-employed
basis for tax reasons, the ALJ was not persuaded that his tax return necessarily
indicated that the parties intended an independent contractor relationship . Noting that
Eck Miller had Kentucky workers' compensation insurance coverage at the time of the
claimant's injury, the ALJ concluded that he was an employee for the purposes of
Chapter 342 . The claimant was awarded temporary total disability benefits from
October 28, 1999, through March 8, 2000, followed by permanent partial disability
benefits that were based upon a 17% impairment and enhanced under KRS
342 .730(1)(c)1 .
In Ratliff v. Redmon, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 320 (1965), the owners of a scrap metal
business paid Redmon by the pound for copper and brass that he separated from other
metals . He was paid in cash or by checks that were made payable to "Redmon Metal
Cleaning Service ." Redmon was 52 years old, illiterate, worked for no one else, and
testified that he first learned of Redmon Metal Cleaning Service when he cashed a
check. Rodney Ratliff, the alleged employer, testified that he was a college graduate in
accounting and had done graduate work in accounting and economics . He maintained
that Redmon was an independent contractor, asserting that he refused regular
employment and that he worked when he wished and at the rate he wished . The court
analyzed the evidence under each of nine factors, concluding that only the method of
payment favored classifying Redmon as an independent contractor and that the chosen
method was no more than a device to circumvent the Act.'
In resolving the extent of control over the details of work factor, the court
observed that the work required little, if any, supervision ; that distinguishing copper and
The nine Ratliff v. Redmon factors were : 1 .) the extent of control that the alleged employer may exercise
over the details of the work ; 2.) whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation or business ; 3.)
whether the type of work is usually done in that locality under the supervision of an employer or by a
specialist, without supervision ; 4.) the degree of skill required by the work ; 5.) whether the worker or
alleged employer supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work ; 6.) the length of the
employment ; 7 .) the method of payment, whether by the time or the job; 8.) whether the work is a part of
the regular business of the employer ; and 9.) the intent of the parties.
4
brass from other metals was a matter of common knowledge ; and that by controlling the
amount of metal to be separated, the employer had automatic control over the period of
time that Redmon worked . Furthermore, the court noted Professor Larson's opinion
that although employer control over the details of work was required for vicarious
liability, "the nature of the claimant's work in relation to the regular business of the
employer" was truly the most relevant factor for compensation purposes. Id. at 325 ; see
also Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §§ 60.03
and 60 .05 (2002). Emphasizing the quoted language, the court concluded that the
extent of control factor favored an employee relationship .
After analyzing the remaining factors, the court noted Professor Larson's
acknowledgement that the only accepted rule of law concerning the relative weight of
the nine factors was that the right to control the details of the work was the primary test.
Id . at 327. Concluding that Redmon was an employee, the court emphasized that he
had no investment in the metal separation business, that he was not listed in the yellow
pages of the telephone directory or otherwise advertised as a specialist or independent
contractor, and that the first time he was designated as such was when checks were
made payable to Redmon Metal Cleaners .
The Ratliff v. Redmon test was later refined, in Chambers v. Wooten's IGA
Foodliner , Ky., 436 S .W.2d 265, 266 (1969), to focus primarily on four factors : 1 .) the
nature of the work as related to the business generally carried on by the alleged
employer; 2 .) the extent of control exercised by the alleged employer; 3.) the
professional skill of the alleged employee ; and 4.) the true intentions of the parties.
Chambers, a professional roofer, was injured while repairing the roof of a grocery store .
His claim alleged that he was the store's employee. Rejecting the argument, the court
noted that although the business's lease required it to repair the building, the roofing
enterprise could not realistically be viewed as part of its customary business .
In a subsequent case, the court again noted that all of the Ratliff v. Redmon ,
supra , factors must be considered and that treating the role of the alleged employee's
work in relation to the regular business of the employer as the predominant factor in the
analysis fulfills the theory of risk spreading upon which workers' compensation is based .
Husman Snack Foods v. Dillon, Ky.App ., 591 S .W.2d 701, 703 (1979), citing Larson,
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 43.51 (1978) . Under the theory, the cost of
industrial accidents is viewed as a cost of production that is factored into the price of the
product. Therefore, a worker whose services are a regular and recurrent cost of a
product and who has no independent route for channeling the costs of an accident to
the consumer is part of the group that the Act is intended to protect . Id . The court
concluded, therefore, that a route salesman who supplied stores along his route with
Husman products was Husman's employee although he was paid on commission, could
solicit new clients, purchased the products from Husman, sold them to stores, filed tax
returns on a self-employed basis, and purchased his truck from Husman . Its rationale
was that the salesman's work was "an inseparable part of the regular business of
Husman" and that because Husman fixed the price of all its products, it was able to
include the costs of production, including the costs of its salesmen's workers'
compensation insurance . Id.
Most recently, in Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland , supra , the court
addressed the issue of control over the details of work, noting that in Ratliff v. Redmon,
supra, the court had relied upon Professor Larson's treatise for the principle "that the
control of the details of work factor can be provided by analysis of the `nature of the
claimant's work in relation to the regular business of the employer."' (Emphasis original) .
Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland , supra, at 118, citing Ratliff v. Redmon, supra at
325. Furthermore, citing to the decisions in Chambers v. Wooten's IGA Foodliner ,
supra, and Husman Snack Foods v. Dillon, supra, the court emphasized that at least the
four primary factors must be considered and that a proper legal conclusion could not be
drawn from only one or two factors . Id . at 119 .
In summary, since Ratliff v. Redmon, supra, the employer/independent contractor
analysis has evolved into three major principles : 1 .) that all relevant factors must be
considered, particularly the four that were set forth in Chambers v. Wooten's IGA
Foodliner , supra ; 2 .) that the alleged employer's right to control the details of work is the
predominant factor in the analysis ; and 3.) that the control factor may be analyzed by
looking to the nature of the work in relation to the regular business of the employer.
UEF v. Garland , supra ; Husman Snack Foods v. Dillon, supra . After analyzing the
evidence under those principles, the AU determined that the claimant met his burden of
proving that he was an employee. Therefore, the question on appeal was whether
substantial evidence supported the finding under the standard set forth in Ratliff v.
Redmon and its progeny or whether the evidence to the contrary was so overwhelming
that the finding was unreasonable . Special Fund v. Francis , Ky., 708 S .W .2d 641, 643
(1986) .
To support their conclusion that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was
Eck Miller's employee, the Board and the Court of Appeals' majority relied upon
Reardon v. Southern Tank Lines. Inc. , Ky., 346 S.W .2d 527 (1961) . Reardon and
Bratcher, the injured workers, were freight haulers who owned and paid all costs of
operating their vehicles . They leased the vehicles to a company that solicited goods to
be hauled, and they provided a driver. In return, they were paid a percentage of the
revenue from each shipment. They had the option to accept or reject a particular load,
to choose the route to take, and to drive the truck or hire other drivers . They agreed to
pay unemployment and workers' compensation insurance premiums on their own
employees and to indemnify Southern Tank Lines (Southern) against claims by their
employees . A jointly executed letter of the parties expressed their interpretation of the
lease contract "as not creating any relationship of master and servant or employer and
employee ." Noting that the workers had the right to accept or reject any load, that they
had the right to furnish drivers other than themselves to operate Southern's equipment,
and that they were paid a certain rate for a completed job, the court concluded as a
matter of law that the workers were independent contractors . Id . a t 529 . The case was
decided before Ratliff v. Redmon, supra, and also before Special Fund v. Francis ,
supra . Under the present state of the law, it is not authority for the principle that a
trucker who leases a vehicle for a percentage of the gross receipts and who can choose
among the loads that are offered must always be viewed as being an independent
contractor.
The sole evidence of the claimant's arrangement with Eck Miller was his
testimony and the copy of his 1999 tax return . Before concluding that the claimant met
his burden of proof, the ALJ analyzed the evidence under each of the four essential
factors that were addressed in UEF v. Garland , supra . The control factor was decided
in the claimant's favor, with the ALJ noting that the shipping of goods by truck was Eck
Miller's business ; that the claimant did not haul freight for others while working for Eck
Miller; and that although the claimant could refuse a load and pick among loads, it was
Eck Miller who procured and offered them . Although acknowledging that driving a semi
truck required some degree of skill and that for tax purposes the claimant's income was
reported on a Form 1099, the ALJ did not find those factors to be dispositive of the
parties' relationship, particularly in view of the fact that the employer carried workers'
compensation insurance in Kentucky. We conclude, therefore, that the ALJ's decision
was reasonable under the evidence and should not have been reversed on appeal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the claimant's award is
reinstated .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
McKinnley Morgan
250 Richmond Road
Manchester, KY 40962
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Marcus Anthony Roland
500 Quality Place
300 East Main Street
Lexington, KY 40507
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