DECCOURSEY BANKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPOR~'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CITAIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0064-MR
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DECCOURSEY BANKS
V.
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
2001-CR-0180
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Deccoursey Banks, was convicted of first-degree sodomy in
Montgomery Circuit Court and received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment . He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง110(2)(b) . Appellant asserts the
following errors: 1) the introduction of hearsay testimony by the victim's mother, 2) the
introduction of the victim's testimony via closed circuit television, 3) the failure to
suppress Appellant's confession to police, and 4) the failure to grant a directed verdict.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
In late July 2001, the four-year-ofd victim, M.M., and her mother, Amy Johnson,
visited Appellant at his residence in Jeffersonville, Kentucky. While Johnson was inside
visiting with relatives, M.M. was playing in the yard near Appellant's storage shed . At
trial, M .M. testified that she wandered into the shed, whereupon Appellant performed an
act of oral sodomy upon her. M . M. then reported the incident to her mother . The two
promptly left Appellant's residence, but did not notify the police until a couple of months
later at the insistence of the victim's grandmother. Appellant was interviewed twice by
police and on the second occasion admitted the act of oral sodomy . Additional facts will
be developed as necessary.
EXCITED UTTERANCE
Appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements
made by M .M . as an excited utterance under KRE 803(2). Johnson was permitted to
testify over defense objection that, while she was inside Appellant's home, M .M. ran to
her suddenly and said, "Papaw licked my coochie," indicating that Appellant had licked
her vagina . There was no error.
KRE 803(2) provides that hearsay statements are admissible if the statement
relates to a startling event or condition and was made under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition. In Jarvis v. Commonwealth , Ky., 960 S .W.2d 466,
470 (1998), we listed several factors used to determine whether a statement is
admissible under KRE 803(2):
(i)
lapse of time between the main act and the declaration,
(ii)
the opportunity or likelihood of fabrication,
(iii)
the inducement to fabrication,
(iv)
the actual excitement of the declarant,
(v)
the place of the declaration,
(vi)
the presence there of visible results of the act or occurrence to
which the utterance relates,
(vii)
whether the utterance was made in response to a question, and
(viii)
whether the declaration was against interest or self-serving .
-2-
These factors are to be used as a guideline for determining admissibility rather than a
true/false test . Id. The trial court's finding is entitled to deference and will only be
overturned for clear error. Young v. Commonwealth , Ky., 50 S .W.3d 148, 167 (2001).
The trial court properly admitted the statement as an excited utterance . The
statement was made within five to ten minutes after the startling event . M .M. rushed
into the house and made the statement to her mother in the presence of several people
without hesitation or prompting . There was further testimony that M.M . appeared
embarrassed and that her normal demeanor and tone of voice had changed . The trial
court's finding was based on substantial evidence and, therefore, will not be disturbed
by this Court.
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION TESTIMONY
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify
via closed circuit television pursuant to KRS 421 .350, thus denying Appellant his right of
confrontation . Specifically, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the
trial court to make a finding of necessity for the closed circuit testimony and that
Appellant was denied constant communication with counsel .
In Danner v. Commonwealth , Ky., 963 S .W.2d 632 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U .S .
1010, 119 S . Ct . 529, 142 L. Ed . 2d 439 (1998), this Court reiterated the factors that a
trial court should consider when determining whether compelling need exists under KRS
421 .350 . Trial courts should consider the age and demeanor of the witness as well as
the nature of the offense, the impact of the testimony in court, and the impact of facing
the defendant. Id . at 634 (quoting Commonwealth v. Willis , Ky., 716 S .W.2d 224, 230
(1986)). This determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion . Id.
The trial court properly determined a compelling need for the victim's testimony
to be given via closed circuit television . After an in-camera hearing with a child
therapist, the court determined that there was a necessity for the KRS 421 .350
procedures because testifying in open court would emotionally harm M .M. The record
also indicates that the trial court took into account M.M .'s age (four years) and the
impact of facing Appellant considering both her testimony and emotional state. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion .
Appellant also argues that the testimony via closed circuit television violated his
confrontation rights because he was not allowed to be in continuous audio contact with
counsel during the questioning of the victim .
KRS 421 .350 does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation provided that:
1) the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving that the procedure is reasonably
necessary to obtain the child's testimony, and 2) the Commonwealth provides the
technical details such that the child's testimony is taken outside the sight and hearing of
the defendant while at the same time the defendant can see and hear the child and
maintain continuous audio contact with counsel. Price v. Commonwealth , Ky., 31
S .W.3d 885, 893 (2000) (citing Willis, supra) . The failure to provide the defendant with
continuous audio contact with counsel throughout the victim's testimony has been held
to be error. Id . at 894.
However, the rights of a criminal defendant are subject to waiver, either by
counsel or the defendant. Fugate v. Commonwealth , Ky., 62 S .W.3d 15 (2001). The
violation of constitutional rights may be waived by the failure to make timely and
appropriate objections just like other rights . Futrell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 437 S .W.2d
487, 488 (1969) . If an attorney is aware of an issue and makes no objection, the failure
to object may constitute a waiver of an error having constitutional implications .
Salisbury v . Commonwealth , Ky. App., 556 S .W .2d 922, 927 (1977) .
Upon review of the record, we find that the issue of continuous audio contact with
counsel was waived . At an in-camera hearing, defense counsel objected to the use of
closed circuit television based on the lack of necessity . After the court decided to allow
the victim's testimony via closed circuit television, the prosecution and defense counsel
discussed the procedures that were eventually used at trial. It was apparently agreed
that Appellant would remain in the courtroom and take notes while M .M.'s testimony
was broadcast from an adjacent room . After direct examination by the prosecution, a
break was taken to enable Appellant to privately confer with counsel . Another break
was taken after cross-examination, and so on . Appellant did not object to this aspect of
the procedure at either the in-camera hearing or trial; thus, the issue was waived .
CONFESSION
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his confession to
the police. Appellant claims that his confession was the product of police coercion and
trickery. At the outset of the interview, Appellant told police that he had some health
problems and was under emotional stress because of recent deaths in his family.
Appellant argues that the police manipulated their knowledge of his emotional condition
in order to obtain the confession .
The test for determining whether a confession was the product of police coercion
and, thus, involuntary is three part: 1) whether the police activity was "objectively
coercive," 2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the defendant, and 3) whether
the defendant showed that the coercive police activity was the "crucial motivating factor"
behind the defendant's confession . Morgan v. Commonwealth , Ky., 809 S.W.2d 704,
707 (1991) (adopting federal due process standards of McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454
(6th Cir. 1988)) . Coercion should be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession . Allee v. Commonwealth , Ky., 454 S.W .2d 336, 341 (1970),
cert. granted, 400 U .S. 990, 91 S . Ct. 454, 27 L . Ed . 2d 438 (1971), case dismissed ,
401 U .S. 950, 91 S. Ct. 1186, 28 L . Ed . 2d 234 (1971) . Although mental state is a
relevant factor in determining voluntariness, "this fact does not justify a conclusion that a
defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion,
should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional voluntariness ." Price, supra, at 890
(quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522, 93 L. Ed . 2d 473
(1986)) . The trial court's determination of the voluntariness of a confession is reviewed
according to the abuse of discretion standard . Henson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 20
S .W.3d 466, 470 (2000).
The trial court properly admitted Appellant's recorded confession . At the
suppression hearing, the trial judge determined that Appellant was not under arrest at
the time of the confession and that he met with police voluntarily. Appellant was asked
to submit to a polygraph examination and was informed of his Miranda rights . Appellant
was advised of his right to stop the questioning at any time. The interviewing officer
made sure Appellant understood his rights and obtained a written waiver. After
Appellant failed the polygraph test, the officer continued to interrogate Appellant using
standard police techniques such as minimizing the seriousness of the offense and
offering the suspect excuses for committing the act. After several minutes Appellant
confessed. There was no physical abuse, intimidation, or deprivation of food or sleep .
Appellant was not induced into the confession by trickery or false promises . The total
interrogation lasted about two and a half hours and Appellant was advised of his right to
leave. We cannot conclude that the police activity in this case was "objectively
coercive" despite Appellant's statements regarding his mental state. The failure to
satisfy this preliminary hurdle precludes analysis of the other two factors . McCall ,
supra. There was no abuse of discretion .
DIRECTED VERDICT
Finally, Appellant argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict because of
insufficient evidence . This claim is without merit.
In Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S .W .2d 186,187 (1991), we stated the
rule for a directed verdict as follows :
[T]he trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the
purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions
as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony .
On appellate review, a defendant is only entitled to a directed verdict if it would be
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt. Id .
The directed verdict standard is far from satisfied in this case. Notwithstanding
Appellant's confession, the Commonwealth also presented the testimony of M.M . and
her mother. This case was properly submitted to the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court is
affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Misty Dugger
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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