HAZARD ARH V BRENDA STIDHAM ; WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND, SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND ; HON . RONALD W . MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
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CIVIL PROCED URE PROM ULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0049-WC
HAZARD ARH
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1061-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 1997-WC-02667
BRENDA STIDHAM ; WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FUND, SUCCESSOR
TO SPECIAL FUND; HON. RONALD W .
MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming an opinion of the
Workers' Compensation Board which affirmed an opinion and award of the
Administrative Law Judge . Originally, the ALJ entered a decision dismissing the claim
in 1999 based solely on the question of notice . That decision was ultimately reversed
by this Court and remanded to the ALJ for a decision on all issues . On remand, the
ALJ rendered his opinion and award which found Stidham to be permanently and totally
occupationally disabled as a result of the work-related heart attack.
Hazard ARH presents three issues on appeal . First, it charges reversible error to
the ALJ for not making a specific finding as to whether the "garbage lifting" events truly
occurred . Second, Hazard ARH believes it was incorrect for the ALJ to rely on medical
evidence contradicting the University Evaluator's opinion regarding causation of the
second operation and total disability . Third, they contest that the error of the ALJ to rely
on evidence contradicting the University Evaluator's opinion on total disability demands
a reversal of the award of total temporary disability.
Counsel for Stidham frames the issue as to whether the award by the ALJ is
supported by substantial evidence, and thus not reversible.
Stidham testified that on May 6, 1996, while she was emptying heavy garbage,
she began to experience chest and arm pains and began sweating . Her coworkers
took her to the emergency room where she was initially diagnosed as having muscle
spasms and sent home with a prescription for pain medication . Upon leaving the
hospital, she again experienced pain in her arm and her sister took her to see Dr.
George Chaney, who admitted her to the hospital where she was diagnosed as having
a myocardial infarction . She eventually underwent cardiac cauterization and
angioplasty and returned to work in the fall of 1996 . Thereafter, she continued to
experience additional pains in the chest and arm and eventually repeated the cardiac
cauterization and underwent coronary bypass surgery in April of 1997. She did not
return to work.
Stidham admitted in her testimony that she had previously experienced arm
pains while at home putting away some soup cans but that the pain was not as severe
as that she experienced on May 6, 1996 . She filed her claim against Hazard ARH for
workers' compensation benefits in December of 1997, alleging that her disability was a
result of the work-related injury sustained on May 6, 1996 . Initially, the ALJ dismissed
the claim on the basis that she failed to give her employer due and timely notice of the
work-related injury . The Board reversed the decision of the ALJ as to failure to give
notice and the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the Board and remanded
the case to the ALJ . On remand, the ALJ essentially adopted the findings of his earlier
decision with the exception of the findings about notice . On the issue of work-related
injury, he relied on the opinion of Dr. Stephen Wagner, the university evaluator, in
finding that the heart attack was caused by the work she was performing for her
employer on May 6, 1996, which aroused a preexisting condition into a disabling reality .
The ALJ disregarded the opinion of the evaluator as to the work related nature of the
claimant's ongoing medical problems and the extent and duration of her disability . The
ALJ did rely on the claimant's treating physician as to these matters, and found Stidham
totally and permanently disabled . On appeal, the Board and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ALJ. This appeal followed .
I. Work-related Lifting
Hazard ARH argues that the ALJ made a finding of causation without first finding
that the alleged work-related incident occurred . The employer maintains that the
incident in question did not occur and that it was actually the lifting of groceries at home
which precipitated the heart attack . In support of their argument, Hazard ARH contends
that medical records from May 6, 7 and 10, 1996 do not show any "garbage lifting"
incident, and where it is noted that Stidham had a two-day history of chest pains which
began when she was carrying groceries .
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the opinion of the ALJ of
November 28, 2001 found that the garbage-lifting incident did occur . "The ALJ is
further persuaded by the view of the university evaluator that the acute myocardial
infarction plaintiff suffered on May 6, 1996, was precipitated by the physical efforts she
was performing in her job related duties ." The phrase "job-related duties" was a
sufficient reference to the garbage lifting incident because that was the only evidence of
work-related duties that Stidham had performed on that day prior to being taken to the
hospital .
It is the responsibility of the AU to determine the quality, character and
substance of the evidence presented . Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt , Ky., 695
S.W .2d 418 (1985). When the AU rules in favor of a claimant, so long as the findings
are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court will not disturb its ruling .
Smvzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co . , Ky., 474 S .W.2d 367 (1971) . The same
opinion defines substantial evidence as being evidence of substance and relevant
consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.
Smvzer, supra , at 369.
In this case, the ALJ recognized the conflicting evidence on the question of
whether the work-related incident caused the heart attack. He acknowledged that the
hospital records from the admission of Stidham and the follow up by Dr. Chaney did not
mention any work injury or that her symptoms started at work. The ALJ also considered
the testimony of the claimant that, although she had experienced some arm pain in the
past, she began to sweat and have severe pains in her chest and arm which caused
her to call for help when she was emptying the garbage cans. There was also
testimony from the claimant's work supervisor that she called him at home to tell him
about the chest pains. The supervisor testified that the job sometimes required fairly
heavy lifting . The AU determined that the report of the university evaluator was most
persuasive. He rendered an opinion that the heart attack was caused by her
performance of work-related duties . It is well settled that the ALJ has the right to
believe part of the evidence and disbelieve other parts . See Caudill v. Maloney's
Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S .W .2d 15 (1977).
Here, the testimony of the claimant and her supervisor, as well as the report of
the university evaluator was substantial evidence to support the findings of the AU that
the heart attack was work related .
II. Subsequent Medical Problems
Hazard ARH contends that the AU failed to accord presumptive weight to the
opinion of the university evaluator regarding the cause of Stidham's medical problems
subsequent to the heart attack . It was the evaluator's opinion that although the initial
heart attack was caused by work-related activities, the subsequent progression of her
coronary problems were related to her underlying risk factors such as cigarette smoking
and diabetes and not her work-related activities. Hazard ARH asserts that the ALJ was
in error when he disagreed with these findings of the evaluator .
KRS 342.315 provides for the appointment of a university evaluator to assess
workers who have sustained occupational injuries or diseases . The statute has been
interpreted so as to permit the ALJ to disregard the opinion of the evaluator when
evidence is introduced in rebuttal. Magic Coal Co . v. Fox, Ky., 19 S .W .3d 88 (2000) . In
choosing to disregard part of the opinion of the evaluator, the AU stated in part:
As respects the other findings of the university evaluator the AU is
persuaded that such other findings have been appropriately rebutted by
those physicians who saw and treated plaintiff on more than one
occasion . Accordingly, the AU is persuaded that the plaintiff's bypass
surgery and subsequent development of neuropathic pain with RSD are
incidences that flowed naturally and as incident of the initial work injury .
Dr. Robert Hoskins, who examined Stidham in 1998 was of the opinion that her
continuing heart problems were the result of the rupture of the atherosclerotic plaque
during the 1996 heart attack which was caused by work-related activity. Accordingly,
there was competent medical evidence which rebutted the opinion of the university
evaluator .
Ill. Extent and Duration of the Injury
Finally, Hazard ARH maintains it was error for the AU to disagree with the
university evaluator as to the extent and duration of the injury . The evaluator agreed
with Dr. Chaney that the 1996 heart attack did not result in permanent damage,
however, the evaluator believed that restrictions should be placed on the claimant's
activity and that she did not have the physical capacity to continue working at Hazard
ARH. Dr. Hoskins disagreed with the conclusion of the evaluator that the claimant
suffered a small amount of myocardial damage . In addition, Dr. Hoskins stated that
Stidham could not return to her job at the hospital, or any job that required strenuous
work, especially heavy lifting.
Dr. Agtarap, who examined Stidham in 1997, believed that her heart problems at
that time were severe enough to produce restrictions . He stated that she could not
return to work at the hospital. Essentially, he concluded that she was unemployable for
any type of sustained work activities .
Thus there was sufficient evidence to rebut the opinion of the university evaluator
that the 1996 heart attack did not cause permanent damage . It is the duty of the AU to
determine the degree of functional disability when there is conflicting medical evidence
and to translate functional impairment into occupational disability. With regard to the
duration and extent of the injury, the opinions of Drs. Hoskins and Agtarap were
substantial evidence of probative value which support the findings by the ALJ that
Stidham was permanently and totally disabled . KRS 342 .730(1)(a) and KRS
342 .740(1). Cf. Magic Coal Co . , supra, at 96 .
The opinion of the Court of Appeals and the Workers' Compensation Board is
affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
H . Brett Stonecipher
Ferreri & Fogle
300 East Main Street, Suite 500
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Monica J. Rice-Smith
Edmond Collett
John Hunt Morgan
P.O. Box 1810
Hyden, KY 41749
David W . Barr
Workers' Compensation Funds
1047 US Hwy 127 S Ste 4
Frankfort, KY 40601
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