ROBERT POLK V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCEDURE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprmctt (ifourf of '~K
2002-SC-1073-MR
DD&TE 5-~3-tit ~~.
ROBERT POLK
V.
Gc
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE
02-CR-00023
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
Appellant, Robert Polk, was convicted in the Fulton Circuit Court of receiving
stolen property over $300, fleeing and evading a police officer, and of being a firstdegree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and
appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Finding no error, we affirm .
On March 9, 2002, an African-American male forced his way into Mary Tanner's
Union City, Tennessee, home . The man held Ms . Tanner at knife point and demanded
money. After taking $190, Ms . Tanner's purse and an identification card from her
deceased husband's billfold that had been sitting on a dresser, Appellant forced Ms.
Tanner outside and into her minivan . Once she started the van, Appellant ordered Ms.
Tanner to get out and he drove away. Ms. Tanner thereafter called 911 and reported
the incident .
Later that morning, a police officer noticed the van in the parking lot of a local
liquor store in Fulton, Kentucky. Officer Townsend testified at trial that the Fulton City
Police Department had recently received a stolen vehicle report regarding a similar van
from Tennessee. Officer Townsend pursued the van as it left the liquor store, and
confirmed from the license plate that it was, in fact, the stolen vehicle. When he
engaged the flashing lights and siren, the van's driver accelerated in an attempt to
evade Officer Townsend . Ultimately, the van slid on wet pavement during a turn and
crashed . Appellant exited the van and fled on foot. Officer Townsend radioed for
assistance and Appellant was apprehended following a foot chase by another police
officer, Officer Buckingham, who noted Appellant smelled strongly of alcohol . A
breathalyzer test administered at the police station registered a BA level of .112 . A
subsequent search of Appellant and the van revealed the identification card belonging
to Ms. Tanner's husband, Ms. Tanner's purse, as well as the leather jacket and knife
that Ms . Tanner had described her assailant as having had during the robbery.
Although the Fulton County Grand Jury issued a ten-count indictment against
Appellant, the Commonwealth elected to proceed only on the counts that occurred on
March 9, 2002, namely, two counts of receiving stolen property over $300, 1 operating a
motor vehicle under the influence, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and one count
of being a first-degree persistent felony offender . The remaining unrelated counts of the
indictment were continued for a separate trial .
At the close of trial, the trial court
' The second receiving stolen property count pertained to another vehicle that had been
reported stolen on March 8, 2002. That vehicle was found in an open field directly
across from Ms. Tanner's residence on the day Ms . Tanner's van was stolen.
Footprints at the scene led from the vehicle to Ms . Tanner's residence .
2
granted a directed verdict on the charge of operating a vehicle under the influence . The
jury found Appellant guilty of one count of receiving stolen property over $300 (Tanner
vehicle), first-degree fleeing or evading police, and of being a first-degree persistent
felony offender . Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty years imprisonment and
this appeal ensued . Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
I.
Appellant first argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the receiving
stolen property charge pertaining to the Tanner vehicle because the Commonwealth
failed to prove every element of the offense . Specifically, Appellant contends that the
evidence did not establish either that he possessed the Tanner vehicle with knowledge
that it was stolen, or that the value of the van was over $300. We find that Appellant's
arguments are not only unpreserved, but also unpersuasive .
In moving for a directed verdict on the receiving stolen property charge, Appellant
argued that the NADA2 blue book value of Ms . Tanner's van was inadmissible, and, as
such, the Commonwealth had failed to introduce any evidence to prove that the van
was valued at over $300. Appellant did not argue that the NADA book value was
insufficient, or that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant had knowledge that
the van was stolen. Thus, Appellant's current claims were clearly not preserved for
review.
We are of the opinion that the Commonwealth's evidence was more than
sufficient to prove that Appellant had knowledge the van was stolen . Appellant seizes
on the fact that Ms . Tanner was unable to identify him at trial, since she had undergone
brain surgery in the interim that had left her memory somewhat impaired . As such,
Z National Automobile Dealers Association .
3
Appellant contends that it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth to establish
Appellant's state of mind, namely that he had specific knowledge that the van he
possessed was stolen .
However, KRS 514.110(2) provides, "The possession of any recently stolen
movable property shall be prima facie evidence that such person knew it was stolen ."
Appellant was found in possession of not only Ms. Tanner's van, but also several
personal items, only ninety minutes after the van was reported stolen . Further,
Appellant fled from police after an attempted stop . As such, and in light of the fact that
Appellant offered no proof to rebut the presumption found in KRS 514 .110(2), the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict.
Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991) .
We likewise find no merit in Appellant's unpreserved claim that the NADA blue
book was insufficient to establish the value of the Tanner van . At trial, the Fulton
County Clerk testified that she utilized the NADA blue books supplied by the state to
assess the value of vehicles for tax purposes as required by law. The clerk testified that
the lowest listed value for a 1995 Mercury Villager van, with no extra equipment, was
$6,275 . Nonetheless, Appellant asserts that since the Commonwealth failed to inquire
about items such as the mileage, repair history, and additional equipment of the van, it
was impossible for the jury to arrive at a true valuation of the vehicle . We disagree .
Appellant ignores the fact that the County Clerk testified that the $6,275 value
was the lowest base line value given for the vehicle. Further, several witnesses testified
that the van was in good working order on the day it was stolen . To establish value,
there need only be "sufficient detail for the jury to make a value determination ."
Commonwealth v . Reed , Ky., 57 S .W.3d 269, 271 (2001). Here, the jury could have
reasonably concluded from the evidence presented that even if the van was not worth
the NADA estimate, it was certainly worth more than $300 . Appellant offered absolutely
no evidence to the contrary . Thus, the Commonwealth met its burden in establishing
that the stolen property was valued at over $300 . Again, even if Appellant had
preserved the issue, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a directed verdict.
Benham, supra ; Commonwealth v. Sawhill , Ky., 660 S .W.2d 3 (1983).
II .
Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory challenges
to remove six African-American jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct . 1712, 90 L .Ed.2d 69 (1986) . In fact, the record reveals that the
Commonwealth exercised six strikes and defense counsel exercised three strikes on
African-American jurors . The jury panel ultimately included only one African-American
juror.
In response to defense counsel's Batson objection, the Commonwealth asserted
that it struck Jurors #4, #5 and #6 because they were related to individuals who were
either currently being prosecuted or had recently been prosecuted in the same court.
Juror #27 was struck because she knew Appellant and was also related to an individual
with an extensive criminal history . With respect to Juror #35, the Commonwealth
responded that it had discovered during a recent trial that she suffered from mental
difficulties . Finally, the Commonwealth stated that it struck Juror #33 because she
knew Appellant and had read about the case, as well as because she had been late to
court and had slept during voir dire . The trial court found that the Commonwealth had
proffered race-neutral reasons for all six strikes .
Batson , supra, sets forth the three-step process for evaluating claims that
peremptory challenges have been used to remove jurors on the basis of race in a
manner violating the Equal Protection Clause : (1) the defendant must make a prima
facie showing that the peremptory challenges are based on race ; (2) if the requisite
showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a clear and
reasonably specific race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question ; and (3)
the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of
establishing purposeful discrimination . This Court has held that the trial court may
accept at face value the explanation offered by the Commonwealth depending upon the
demeanor and credibility of the prosecutor . Commonwealth v. Snodgrass , Ky., 831
S .W.2d 176, 179 (1992) . Further, evaluation of the proffered explanation as well as the
prosecutor's state of mind lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province [,]" and its
findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Id . ; Stanford v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
793 S.W .2d 112 (1990) .
Appellant relies heavily on this Court's opinion in Washington v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 34 S.W.3d 376 (2000), wherein we held that the trial court erred in finding that the
Commonwealth had offered sufficient race-neutral reasons for striking an African
American juror. However, Washington is factually distinguishable from this case . When
the issue of racial bias was first raised in Washington , the prosecutor denied having
removed the only African-American juror. After it was shown that the prosecutor had,
indeed, struck the juror, the trial court specifically found that the prosecutor's
subsequent explanations were insufficient, and yet, later accepted those same reasons
as being race-neutral . In reversing the trial court, we held that, "the Commonwealth's
strike of Mr . Newberry was, at best, inadvertent, and at worst, based on something
other than a race-neutral reason ." Id . at 381 .
We find this case much more closely analogous to the facts presented in Gamble
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S .W .3d 367 (2002), wherein the Commonwealth used
peremptory challenges to strike three of the four African-Americans from the jury. The
Commonwealth explained that Juror #52 had been struck because her son had been
prosecuted for another crime in the same court; Juror #40 was struck because her
brother had sued and recovered a judgment against a police officer for false arrest; and
Juror #66 had been struck, in part, because she had recently been cited for a series of
traffic offenses . Id . at 370. The defendant asserted that the Commonwealth's
explanation was merely pretextual and that none of the reasons articulated by the
prosecutor had been brought out during voir dire. The trial court ruled, however, that
the Commonwealth had articulated clear and reasonably specific race-neutral reasons
for the use of its peremptory challenges, and that Appellant had not shown purposeful
discrimination . We affirmed the trial court's decision in that respect . Id . at 371-72 .
Here, the Commonwealth articulated clear and reasonably specific race-neutral
explanations for each of its peremptory challenges . Furthermore, we disagree with
Appellant's argument that the Commonwealth's reasons were improper merely because
they were based on information obtained outside of voir dire and not verified by the trial
court. Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the Commonwealth should have inquired
into its reasons with each potential juror, we have held that such inquiry is not required
before exercising a peremptory challenge :
We find no fault with the prosecutor for exercising a peremptory
challenge against a juror where the decision to strike is based upon
information which the prosecutor received from a source other than
information received from voir dire. Batson does not require the
7
neutral explanation for peremptory striking a potential juror to be
derived from voir dire. Neither does the explanation have to rise to
the level sufficient to satisfy a strike for cause. A prosecutor may
utilize his own personal knowledge concerning a juror and
information supplied from outside sources . Whether the
information is true or false is not the test. The test is whether the
prosecutor has a good-faith belief in the information .
Snodgrass , supra , at 179 ; see also Gamble , supra .
Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an on-therecord inquiry after defense counsel admitted during closing argument that Appellant
was in possession of the Tanner vehicle and had fled from the police. Appellant
construes counsel's statement as a concession of Appellant's guilt and thus, contends
the trial court had a duty pursuant to Wiley v. Sowders , 647 F .2d 642 (6 th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied , 454 U .S. 1091 (1981), to conduct a sua sponte inquiry to determine
whether Appellant consented to counsel's strategy .
We recently addressed this issue in Furnish v. Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S.W.3d
34 (2003), cert. denied ,
U .S .
, 124 S .Ct. 115 (2003), wherein the defendant
raised the same argument following his counsel's comments during opening and closing
arguments that while the defendant was a "thief and burglar" he had not committed the
crime of murder. Id . at 52 . We noted that although the Sixth Circuit had held in the
Wilpy case that a client's consent to such a strategy must appear on the record, in a
subsequent companion case the Court clarified its prior holding by stating that while an
on-the-record inquiry is the preferred practice, due process does not require it. Wiley v .
Sowders , 669 F .2d 386 (6 th Cir. 1982) . We further stated in Furnish :
More importantly, while Appellant couches this issue in
terms of the trial court's duty, this is essentially an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim . This Court has held as a general rule
that claims of ineffective assistance are not properly raised on
8
direct appeal, but rather must proceed by way of post-trial motion
under RCr 11 .42 to allow the trial court the opportunity to review the
issues . (Citation omitted) .
Furnish , supra .
Although Appellant acknowledges that Furnish is dispositive, he urges that we
revisit the issue and overrule Furnish . We decline the invitation to do so, and find that
the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a sua sponte inquiry .
The judgment and sentence of the Fulton Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Lisa Bridges Clare
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, 3rd Floor
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Carlton S . Shier
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.