DANTE LAMONT MORTON V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 26, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0998-MR
DANTE LAMONT MORTON
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
02-CR-349
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Fayette Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Dante Morton, of two counts of
robbery in the first degree . The jury recommended that Appellant serve twenty years in
prison for each count, to run consecutively for a total of forty years ; the judge modified
the recommended sentence to thirty years imprisonment, ordering ten years of one of
the twenty-year terms to run concurrently . Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of
right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b), arguing that the trial court made three prejudicial errors:
(1) overruling Appellant's motion for a new trial based on the admission of impermissible
hearsay statements from two witnesses ; (2) overruling Appellant's motion for a mistrial
after the Commonwealth's opening statement discussed anticipated testimony from a
witness who later refused to testify ; and (3) overruling Appellant's motions for a mistrial
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and a new trial based on KRE 404(b), when a police witness stated that he located
Appellant in prison . Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm .
I. FACTS .
On November 25, 2002, a few minutes past 10 :00 p.m ., Brooke Grow and Cary
Bacon, employees at the Long John Silver's restaurant located in the Tates Creek
Center in Lexington, went outside after the restaurant had closed to dispose of the
garbage and smoke cigarettes. As Grow walked to her car to get her cigarettes, a man
approached her, waving a black gun in her face. He told Bacon and Grow to reenter the
restaurant ; once inside, he ordered all of the employees to the floor. Brandishing the
gun, he asked who was in charge . Shannon Penman, the team leader that night,
responded . The robber then ordered everyone to the front of the restaurant and
instructed Penman to get a bag and to make the employees lie down in front of the
counter. After Penman procured a bag, he asked her where the safe was located . She
proceeded to the safe and unlocked it as demanded . The top portion of the safe was
programmed for a one-minute opening delay, and the robber became agitated when it
did not immediately open. After taking a total of $1,763.00 from the safe and the money
allotted for deposit, the robber departed the premises, leaving behind no fingerprints or
physical evidence . Because he had worn a bandana over his face, none of the
employees were able to give a thorough description of him. They later described him as
a young, thin, dark-complected black male, about 5'9" to 5'10" tall, wearing dark clothes
and black and white tennis shoes.
An almost identical incident occurred at the same Long John Silver's restaurant
less than one month later on December 20, 2002, between 10 :15 and 10:30 p.m . This
time, Jerad Moreland, Reggie Moore, and two other employees, intended to go outside
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to empty a vacuum cleaner and dispose of the trash. When they opened the door, a
man emerged from around the corner of the building and pointed a gun at Moore's face.
He entered the restaurant, ordered the employees to the front, and instructed them to lie
on the floor . He asked who had the keys to the safe. Angela Turner responded and
then acceded to his demands to open the safe and put money from the bottom portion
of the safe into a bag. The robber became impatient when the top part of the safe failed
to open . Turner explained that it would take ten minutes for the safe to open, and the
robber responded, "It'll only take a minute." (As a security precaution taken in reaction
to the November robbery, the safe had been programmed for a ten-minute opening
delay.) Having lost patience, the robber emptied the cash drawers and left without
taking any money from the top part of the safe. Similar to the previous robbery, the
perpetrator did not leave any evidence behind and had concealed his face, this time
with a ski mask. The descriptions of the December robber resembled those given of the
November robber, i .e. , a thin, black male in his teens to early twenties, 5'9" to 5'10", and
wearing black and white tennis shoes. Moore, who was present for both robberies,
testified that the December robber appeared thinner than the November robber, but that
he could have been the same person . None of the witnesses were able to positively
identify Appellant as the robber on either occasion .
The police soon focused on Appellant as the prime suspect for both robberies .
Detective Robert Sarrantonio of the Lexington Police Department received a tip from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") that came from a suspect in another
case. The suspect informant revealed that the robber's first name was Dante . The tip
prompted the police to re-interview employees at Long John Silver's. From the
interviews, the police learned that the suspect's last name was possibly Morton . Later,
after speaking with Moore and Derek Leavell, one of Appellant's street acquaintances
who supplied information on the robberies after being arrested, himself, the police
arrested Appellant .
Leavell testified that Appellant had told him that he robbed Long John Silver's
twice to get money to buy a car. Leavell also testified that Appellant had first told him of
his plans to commit the robbery and then showed him the money he had stolen .
Paul Love, a friend of Appellant, reluctantly testified that Appellant had told him
that he needed money to buy a car and that he would get the money "just like wait and
see ." Appellant later bought a car, which was subsequently stolen from a mail parking
lot. Appellant then stated that he was "thinking about hitting it again," to obtain money
to purchase another car. Love testified that he knew about the first robbery and had
spoken to Sarrantonio about it .
Richard Deener, a jailhouse informant, testified similarly to Leavell and Love . He
testified that Appellant told him that he had gotten away "clean" with the first robbery, so
he "hit it again ." Deener stated that Appellant had also told him that the police had no
evidence - only two witnesses who lacked credibility.
II . HEARSAY .
Appellant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by overruling
his motion for a new trial because two witnesses gave impermissible hearsay testimony .
We disagree .
A. Mark Gibson .
On cross-examination by Appellant, Mark Gibson, a manager at Long John
Silver's, testified that another employee told him that the robber's name was Dante.
Gibson made this statement twice, almost contemporaneously . Appellant objected after
the second statement. The trial judge sustained his objection and admonished the jury
to disregard Gibson's testimony as to what other employees had told him.
The Commonwealth claims that Gibson's statement was admissible pursuant to
KRE 801A(a)(1), as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach Reggie Moore's
testimony that he did not know who committed the robberies and that he did not tell
anyone who did it. This argument fails. Gibson's testimony was not a prior inconsistent
statement made by Moore, the declarant ; rather, it was a statement from another
employee . In fact, Gibson testified that while Moore told him that he knew who
committed the robberies, he refused to reveal the robber's name . Thus, Gibson's
statement naming Appellant was impermissible hearsay.
However, no error occurred because the trial judge admonished the jury to
disregard the statement. It is presumed that the jury will follow a curative admonition .
Alexander v. Commonwealth , Ky., 862 S .W.2d 856, 859 (1993), overruled on other
grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S.W .2d 883, 891 (1997). This
presumption is overcome only: (1) when there is an overwhelming likelihood that the
jury will be incapable of following the admonition and the impermissible testimony would
be devastating to the appellant ; or (2) "when the question was asked without a factual
basis and was inflammatory or highly prejudicial ." Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 105
S .W .3d 430, 441 (2003) (citations omitted) . Neither exception applies here . Because
the impermissible hearsay amounted to a mere reference to Appellant's first name, and
multiple other witnesses (Leavell, Deener, and Love) testified that Appellant had
confessed the robberies to them, the evidence was neither devastating nor
inflammatory . Additionally, the impermissible testimony was unsolicited, not resulting
from any question, much less one lacking a factual basis; notably, Gibson gave the
testimony at issue on cross-examination by Appellant . Thus, the admonition cured any
possible prejudice .
B . Sarrantonio .
Sarrantonio's alleged hearsay testimony was elicited on direct examination by the
Commonwealth regarding the steps in his investigation that led him to suspect Appellant
as the robber. Sarrantonio testified that he had received a tip from the ATF that
someone had revealed that an individual named Dante committed the robberies .'
A: At that time . . . myself and Detective Johnson received information
from the ATF that they had a person that was giving them information
in reference to the Long John Silver's robbery, and that they were
aware of who it was .
Q: And did you receive a name at that time?
A: Yes. We received a first name of Dante.
Q : And at that point, was Dante Morton a suspect?
A : At that time, we did not know his last name . All we knew was that it
was a person by the name of Dante.
Q : So what did you do next?
A: We continued on with the investigation . We went back and reinterviewed managers.
Appellant then objected and requested that the judge admonish the jury not to consider
Sarrantonio's testimony about the ATF tip for its truth, but only as an explanation of the
officers' actions . The trial judge refused his request when the Commonwealth stipulated
that it would not attempt to elicit testimony from Sarrantonio about what other
interviewees had told him . Shortly thereafter, Sarrantonio stated that as a result of re-
' Presumably, this individual was Ira Robinson, who later refused to testify, as he was
the only individual in this case who had any connection with the ATF .
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interviewing some of the Long John Silver's employees, he learned that Appellant was a
possible suspect . Appellant did not object .
Appellant argues that Sarrantonio's testimony about the tip from the ATF as well
as his statement that his interviews yielded Appellant's name as a possible suspect
should have been excluded as investigative hearsay . (He does not argue on appeal
that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested admonition .) Both challenges to
Sarrantonio's testimony are unpreserved . First, when a party states grounds for an
objection, the party is limited to the grounds stated ; all other grounds are deemed
waived . Harris v. Commonwealth , Ky., 342 S .W.2d 535, 539 (1960) . The admonition
Appellant requested regarding the ATF tip reveals that his objection was based on how
the testimony was used ; he did not request an admonition that the jury disregard the
testimony altogether, but merely that the jury consider it only to explain the officer's
actions . Indeed, the request for the admonition expressly conceded that the ATF tip
was admissible, just not for the reason that Appellant challenges it on appeal . He
cannot now argue that the trial court should have excluded the testimony altogether.
Second, preservation requires that the opposing party state any grievances by
contemporaneous objection . KRE 103(a)(1) . Because Appellant failed to object to
Sarrantonio's testimony that he learned from his interviews that the suspect's name was
Dante Morton, he failed to preserve the issue for our review. Thus, we review this
issue for palpable error. RCr 10.26 ; KRE 103(e) .
Both of Appellant's challenges to Sarrantonio's testimony are substantively valid.
We condemned the admissibility of investigative hearsay in Sanborn v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 754 S .W .2d 534 (1988) :
Prosecutors should, once and for all, abandon the term
"investigative hearsay" as a misnomer, an oxymoron . The rule is that a
police officer may testify about information furnished to him only where it
tends to explain the action that was taken by the police officer as a result
of this information and the taking of that action is an issue in the case .
Id . at 541 . Thus, "investigative hearsay" is admissible only to explain police action
where it is at issue. See id . at 541-42 (police testimony discussing telephone call made
during investigation of suspect's whereabouts and conclusions from witness interviews
was impermissible hearsay) ; Daniel v. Commonwealth , Ky., 905 S.W.2d 76, 79 (1995)
(out-of-court statement explaining why police took victim into protective custody deemed
inadmissible investigative hearsay because the officer's motive for doing so was not in
issue) . None of the challenged testimony falls under the exception set forth in Sanborn .
While Sarrantonio's statement about the ATF tip and his summation of the employee
interviews may have explained how the police came to suspect Appellant, it was
nonetheless inadmissible, because the investigation was not in issue. In fact, the
Commonwealth makes no attempt to argue that it was . It merely makes the mistaken
assertion that the testimony was admissible to explain how Sarrantonio conducted the
investigation .
However, the admission of the testimony does not rise to the level of palpable
error. Palpable error requires a showing of manifest injustice, RCr 10 .26, which
Appellant has not made here . Where impermissible testimony is cumulative of other
testimony, its admission is harmless error. White v. Commonwealth , Ky., 5 S .W.3d 140,
142 (1999) (admission of hearsay testimony rendered cumulative and harmless by
nearly identical testimony of two other witnesses) ; Patterson v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App., 555 S .W .2d 607, 609 (1977) (same). While Sarrantonio's impermissible
statements identified Appellant as the robber, the testimony of Leavell, Love, and
Deener, did so as well. Thus, even if Appellant had preserved these issues, the
outcome would have been the same .
III . ROBINSON'S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY .
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial
because the Commonwealth's opening statement described the testimony it anticipated
from Ira Robinson, who later refused to testify . Appellant claims that this deprived him
of the opportunity to confront a witness whose "testimony" was communicated by the
Commonwealth, and to challenge that testimony .
In her opening statement, the prosecutor described Robinson's anticipated
testimony as follows :
The first person to share this information with the police was
someone who admittedly didn't want to and probably never would have,
but he got into trouble himself. Ira Robinson. Ira Robinson was arrested
on other charges on December 22. He told an officer that he knew who
was robbing the Long John Silver's, and his name was Dante . . . . When
Ira was interviewed by the detectives, he gave more details than that.
Dante had told Ira he was going to rob Long John Silver's. A few days
later, Dante told Ira that he did it and bragged he got about $3,000 .00 from
the robbery. But sadly, Dante explained to him, he had bought a car with
his free money . . . but his car had already been stolen . Then, a few
weeks later, right before Ira got locked up on December 22, Dante
bragged to him, "I hit it again ." But Dante explained to Ira that he didn't
get as much money because they had changed the timer on the safe.
Robinson was arrested for a federal offense while on probation for a state
offense . After his arrest, he gave the police information on the robberies pursuant to a
plea agreement in which he agreed to testify truthfully in any action on behalf of the
government . He was sentenced for the federal offense one week prior to Appellant's
trial. On the first day of trial after the parties had given opening statements, Robinson
was transported to the courthouse to testify . The transporting jailer, who had spoken
with Robinson that day, informed the prosecutor that Robinson had said that he was not
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going to testify . Doubting that he would testify truthfully if he testified at all, the
prosecutor requested a hearing outside of the jury's presence . Robinson appeared
before the court, and after being informed of the possible consequences of refusing to
testify, still declined to testify. The prosecutor stated that she did not have notice of
Robinson's refusal until the hearing and requested that he be held in contempt of court .
Later that day, after the court had procured an attorney for Robinson, he was held in
contempt of court and sentenced to six months imprisonment to run consecutive to the
term that he was then serving.
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Appellant moved for a mistrial on
grounds that the prosecutor's description of the testimony she anticipated from
Robinson prejudiced him because Robinson did not testify, thus was not subject to
cross-examination . The prosecutor reiterated that she was unaware when she made
her opening statement that Robinson would refuse to testify . The trial judge overruled
the motion for a mistrial finding that the prosecutor had made her opening statement in
good faith . Appellant did not request an admonition to the jury to disregard that portion
of the prosecutor's opening statement.
Before the jury retired to deliberate, the court gave admonitions regarding the
permissible usage and scope of a closing argument and that the attorneys' arguments
were not evidence. Similarly, Appellant's attorney had cautioned the jury during his
opening remarks that opening statements only describe the evidence that the parties
expect to produce and do not constitute evidence, themselves .
The trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial . Where a
prosecutor states that she will produce evidence or prove certain facts and fails to do
so, the court must consider whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith and whether
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prejudice resulted to the substantial rights of the defendant. Freeman v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 425 S .W .2d 575, 578 (1967) (citations omitted) ("Counsel has the
right to direct the attention of the jury to all facts and circumstances that he in good faith
believes will be allowed to develop in the evidence ."); Decker v. Commonwealth , 303
Ky . 511, 198 S .W .2d 212, 214 (1946) (no reversal because of inappropriate opening
statement unless prejudice results); Mullins v. Commonwealth , Ky., 79 S .W . 258, 25859 (1904) (no grounds for reversal where Commonwealth failed to produce evidence to
support its claim in opening statement that defendant killed victim to prevent him from
testifying against him in another trial because there was no proof of misconduct on the
part of the prosecutor that affected the substantial rights of the defendant).
Nothing indicates that the prosecutor here acted in bad faith during her opening
statement . The trial court made a finding of fact to that effect, and findings of fact are
not disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous, i.e. , unsupported by substantial
evidence. Commonwealth v. Deloney , Ky., 20 S.W.3d 471, 473 (2000). The record
supports the judge's factual finding . The prosecutor stated that she had no reason to
believe that Robinson would refuse to testify until after opening statements were
completed . Additionally, the prosecutor knew of Robinson's plea agreement in which he
promised to testify for the state. Robinson had also spoken to the police regarding the
robberies on two prior occasions . Thus, it was reasonable and in good faith for the
prosecutor to describe his anticipated testimony in her opening statement .
We now turn our inquiry to whether the prosecutor's opening statement
prejudiced Appellant's substantial rights . No prejudice occurred because the facts
contained in the prosecutor's description of Robinson's anticipated testimony were
cumulative of the testimony of numerous other witnesses . People v. Coleman , 543
N.E .2d 555, 561 (III . App. Ct . 1989) (prosecutor's opening statement describing
anticipated testimony from a non-testifying witness that defendant bought murder
weapon was not prejudicial because three other witnesses testified that he did) ; State v .
Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 36-37 (Utah 1984) (opening statement describing anticipated
testimony that defendant threatened victim was not prejudicial because it was
cumulative of other testimony) ; cf. Chumbler v. Commonwealth , Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488,
494 (1995) (although erroneous, testimony was harmless error because it had been
previously elicited) . The Commonwealth stated that Robinson would testify to the
following : (1) that Appellant was the robber; (2) that Appellant stole approximately
$3,000 .00; and (3) that the car he bought with the robbery money was stolen so he
robbed Long John Silver's again to get more money to buy another one. Because the
testimony of Leavell, Love, and Deener, established these same facts, Appellant was
not prejudiced . Additionally, Sarrantonio's testimony recounting Appellant's statement
to the police established that Appellant's car had been stolen .
Furthermore, admonitions to the jury that attorney statements do not constitute
evidence cured any prejudice . The jury received two such admonitions ; one from
defense counsel during his opening statement, which immediately followed the
Commonwealth's, and one from the court before closing arguments . It is well-settled
that admonitions can rectify a situation such as this.
It may be that some remarks included in an opening or closing statement
could be so prejudicial that a finding of error, or even constitutional error,
would be unavoidable . But here we have no more than an objective
summary of evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to
produce . Many things might happen during the course of the trial which
would prevent the presentation of all the evidence described in advance .
Certainly not every variance between the advance description and the
actual presentation constitutes reversible error, when a proper limiting
instruction has been given .
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Frazier v. Cupp , 394 U .S . 731, 735-36, 89 S .Ct. 1420, 1423, 22 L .Ed .2d 684 (1969)
(court's admonition that attorney statements are not evidence cured prejudice) ; United
States v. Dunlap , 28 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1994) (no prejudice where court and
prosecutor stated that attorney statements are not evidence) ; Crane v. Sowders , 708
F.Supp . 163, 165 (W .D. Ky. 1989) (same) ; People v. Maese , 164 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489-90
(Cal. Ct . App. 1980) (admonitions that attorney statements are not evidence and to
ignore attorney statements unsupported by evidence cured prejudice) ; People v.
Lampton , 438 N.E .2d 915, 917-19 (III. App. Ct. 1982) (same); cf. Price v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 59 S.W.3d 878, 880-81 (2001) (admonition cured prejudice where
prosecutor, in closing argument, performed an impermissible demonstrative
reconstruction of the crime) . Nor can Appellant complain that the admonitions were
deficient for lack of specificity as he failed to request one. See Frazier , supra , at 736 n*,
89 S .Ct. at 1423 n* ("A more specific limiting instruction might have been desirable, but
none was requested."). Because the Commonwealth acted in good faith and the jury
was admonished, the Commonwealth's opening statement is not grounds for reversal .
IV. PRIOR BAD ACTS.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial or a new
trial when Sarrantonio stated that he located Appellant at the Fayette County Detention
Center. Appellant contends that his testimony contravened the prohibition in KRE
404(b) against evidence of a witness's prior bad acts to prove only that he was a person
of bad character . The testimony in question was elicited when Sarrantonio was
describing his investigation .
Q : What did you do in regards to Mr. Morton?
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A: Then we located him at the Fayette County Detention Center and
placed charges on him.
Appellant then moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the testimony informed the jury
that Appellant had a criminal record . He argued that an admonition would not cure the
impermissible testimony . In response, the prosecutor stated that she did not expect
Sarrantonio to testify that Appellant was in jail at the time of his arrest for the robberies .
The trial judge overruled Appellant's motion. Later, Appellant made an unsuccessful
motion for a new trial on the same grounds .
Appellant was not prejudiced because it is presumed that juries generally
follow admonitions . Grundy v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 25 S.W .3d 76, 82-83 (2000)
(admonition rendered mistrial unnecessary where inappropriate comments were brief
and undetailed) ; Johnson , 105 S .W.3d at 440-41 (denying new trial because admonition
cured error) . It is irrelevant that the jury in the case sub iudice did not receive an
admonition . Because Appellant failed to request one, the only issue on appeal is
whether an admonition would have cured the error. See Graves v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
17 S .W.3d 858, 865 (2000) (no error where further admonition or remedial action, which
appellant did not request, would have cured evidence of prior bad acts) .
As stated supra, the presumption in favor of an admonition's effectiveness is
overcome only (1) when there is an overwhelming likelihood that the jury will be
incapable of following the admonition and the impermissible testimony would be
devastating to the appellant ; or (2) "when the question was asked without a factual
basis and was inflammatory or highly prejudicial ." Johnson , supra , at 441 (citations
omitted) . Neither exception applies. Sarrantonio's statement was brief and did not
reveal why Appellant was incarcerated or for how long . See id. (testimony that
defendant previously pled guilty to a criminal offense not prejudicial because underlying
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offense was not discussed and could have been something as minor as a speeding
violation) . See also Bledsoe v. State , 21 S .W.3d 615, 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (no
prejudice where police officer testified that he served warrant on defendant at jail
because admonition was given, the reasons for incarceration were not stated, the
prosecutor did not dwell on the statement, and the prosecutor did not act in bad faith) .
Nor was it elicited by an improper question; Sarrantonio stated that he located Appellant
in prison only when asked what he "did in regards to" Appellant.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the sentences imposed by the
Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
George Scott Hayworth
Suite 510
271 West Short Street
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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