ALLAN DAVID GRUNDY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
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Sixptnte (90urf of ~r
2002-SC-0921-MR
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ALLAN DAVID GRUNDY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
01-CR-1743 AND 02-CR-1479
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
FACTS
Appellant, Allan David Grundy, was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of two
counts of second-degree rape and being a second-degree persistent felony offender .
Appellant was sentenced to nine years on each of the two counts of second-degree
rape, enhanced to twenty years on each due to being found a persistent felony offender
in the second degree. The trial court ordered that these sentences run concurrently .
Appellant appeals as a matter of right.
When the victim, P .U ., was thirteen years old, Appellant raped her twice, once in
early February 2001 and again in April 2001 . As a result of intercourse with Appellant,
P . U. became pregnant and had an abortion . The tissue from the aborted fetus
underwent DNA testing to determine paternity . The results of the DNA testing
evidenced a combined paternity index of 406 to 1 which translated to a probability of
paternity of 99.75% by Appellant .
On July 19, 2001, Appellant was indicted on two counts of rape in the second
degree . On July 23, 2002, Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of two counts
of rape in the second degree and being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree .
Appellant raises the following four issues on appeal : (1) prejudice by denial of a
continuance ; (2) admissibility of opinions concerning combined paternity index and
probability of paternity based on DNA testing of a mixed sample containing both fetal
and maternal tissue; (3) introduction of evidence from pre arrest questioning ; and (4)
denial of a mistrial because the victim gave an avowal inconsistent with her trial
testimony .
I. DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE
On the day of trial, after both sides announced they were ready for trial and the
trial court had ruled on pre-trial motions, Appellant moved for a continuance because he
wanted to dismiss his counsel and hire a new attorney . At the hearing on this motion,
the trial court asked for an explanation of the problem with his current counsel .
Appellant advised the trial court that his complaint was his counsel's handling of the
DNA issue because the defense did not have an expert in opposition to the
Commonwealth . Counsel for Appellant informed the trial court that the physician he had
consulted at DNA Diagnostics could not give testimony that would help Appellant
because in his professional opinion the Commonwealth's DNA testing was probably
more accurate . During a hearing on the admissibility of the results of the DNA testing,
Appellant indicated to his counsel that he preferred to defend by challenging the chain
of custody rather than having the DNA material reevaluated .
RCr 9.04 states that:
The court, upon motion and sufficient cause shown by either party, may
grant a postponement of the hearing or trial . A motion by the defendant
for a postponement on account of the absence of evidence may be made
only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the motion
is based on the absence of a witness, the affidavit must show what facts
the affiant believes the witness will prove, and not merely the effect of
such facts in evidence, and that the affiant believes them to be true .
Appellant failed to meet the requirements of RCr 9.04 because he did not file an
affidavit stating the facts and materiality of the evidence he expected to obtain of the
witnesses who were not present .
The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a
continuance . Woodall v. Commonwealth , Ky., 63 S .W.3d 104, 128 (2001), cert. denied ,
537 U .S . 835 (2002), (citing Dishman v. Commonwealth , Ky., 906 S.W.2d 335, 339
(1995)) . The factors to be considered are the following :
[L]ength of delay ; previous continuances ; inconvenience to litigants,
witnesses, counsel and the court; whether the delay is purposeful or
caused by the accused ; availability of other competent counsel;
complexity of the case; and whether denying the continuance will lead to
identifiable prejudice .
Woodall , supra , at 129. The trial court was correct in finding there was no justifiable
basis for Appellant's request for a continuance .
II . ADMISSIBILITY OF RESULTS OF DNA TESTING
Appellant argues error in the admission of opinion evidence of the combined
paternity index and probability of paternity based on DNA testing on the mixed sample
of fetal and maternal tissue. Appellant does not challenge the DNA testing procedure
but only the calculations of the odds and percentages used to obtain paternity index and
probability of paternity based on DNA testing of a mixed sample.
Trial courts in Kentucky can take judicial notice of scientific evidence that is
reliable and no longer require a Daubert hearing . Johnson v . Commonwealth , Ky., 12
S.W .3d 258, 261-62 (1999). The issue of scientific reliability goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than admissibility. Id.
The trial court determines relevancy and admissibility of evidence . With respect
to evidentiary issues, "[a] decision of a trial court will not be disturbed in the absence of
an abuse of discretion ." Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S .W.2d 219, 222 (1996) .
The standard for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Commonwealth v.
English , Ky., 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (1999) . While DNA evidence does not require a
Daubert hearing and is admissible, DNA evidence is still subject to challenge at trial
regarding the handling of the samples, the chain of custody, the accuracy of the
procedures, and the quality of the training of persons performing actual tests and any
other challenges as to the credibility of the evidence . Fugate v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
993 S.W. 2d 931, 938 (1999) . However, such challenges go to the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility. Id .
Appellant challenges the reliability of the calculations of the paternity index and
probability of paternity. In Butcher v. Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S .W.3d 3 (2002), cert.
denied , -U .S .-, 124 S .Ct. 174 (2003), we held paternity test results are admissible in
a criminal trial . Because the Commonwealth's expert admitted there was no standard
protocol for establishing paternity of fetal tissue, Appellant challenged the calculations of
the probability of paternity and combined paternity index. However, Appellant failed to
put forth any evidence that the calculations were unreliable . We held in Butcher, su ra,
that there is ample opportunity to question the use of the prior probability and that the
jury was free to believe or disbelieve the expert's opinion . Id . at 8. No error occurred in
admitting the paternity test results .
The fact there is not a national standard for indexing in mixed tissue situations
does not mean that there are no scientifically acceptable procedures . The trial court
was correct in ruling that a Daubert hearing on the calculations of probability of paternity
was not necessary because it was an issue of weight, and Appellant was entitled to
obtain the tissue to do his own testing.
Based on the record in the current case, there is more than sufficient evidence to
convict Appellant even if the chain of custody was found to be deficient and the DNA
results were not introduced . P .U . testified that Appellant was physically abusive and
engaged in other sexual touching . P. U . testified that Appellant forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him on two occasions as well as the sexual contact that
Appellant subjected her to as a girl, which resulted in a pregnancy with an abortion .
The victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction .
Kentucky law states that uncorroborated rape victim testimony "if not
contradictory or incredible, or inherently improbable" is sufficient to sustain a conviction .
Dyer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 816 S.W .2d 647, 651 (1991), overruled on other g rounds ,
Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S .W.2d 54 (1998) . See also Garrett v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 48 S .W.3d 6,10 (2001) ; Commonwealth v. Cox, Ky., 837 S .W.2d
898, 900 (1992) . The jury shall decide the weight and the credibility of the evidence,
and the decision of the jury shall not be disturbed by the trial court . Partin , supra , at
220. See also Estep v. Commonwealth , Ky., 957 S .W. 2d 191, 193 (1997) .
Ill. PRE-ARREST QUESTIONING
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of Detective
Newton's testimony regarding Appellant's pre-arrest statements made while interviewing
Appellant in his home . Appellant was not in custody during the interview in his home .
Appellant filed a pretrial motion requesting the trial court to exclude any mention of
Appellant's invocation of his right to remain silent and/or statements that he would wait
until he had an opportunity to review the DNA results .
Since Appellant was not in custody during the interview, Miranda warnings were
not required, and any statements made by Appellant to Detective Newton were
voluntary statements and could be used at trial . Any invocation of the constitutional
right to remain silent must be made clearly and unequivocally or evidence will not be
excluded . Appellant's statement that he would wait to see what the DNA results
showed was not a clear indication that he did not want to answer any more questions
from Detective Newton.
The United States Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are only
required when the suspect being interrogated is "in custody ." Thompson v. Keohane ,
516 U .S . 99, 102, 116 S .Ct. 457, 460, 133 L.Ed .2d 383, 388 (1995) . "Custodial
interrogation" is defined in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S . 436, 444-45, 86 S .Ct. 1602,
1612, 16 L.Ed .2d 694 (1966), as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." See also Thompson , supra at 107, 116 S.Ct. at 462 . Miranda
warnings are only required where there has been "such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him 'in custody ."' Id . (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S .
318, 322, 114 S .Ct. 1526, 1528, 128 L.Ed .2d 293 (1994) (per curiam)) . The ultimate
inquiry for making an "in custody" determination is whether the person was under formal
arrest or whether there was a restraint on his freedom of movement to the degree
associated with a formal arrest . Thompson , supra , at 112, 116 S.Ct . at 456 ; United
States v. Mahan, 190 F .3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1999).
Custody or seizure has not occurred until the police, by some form of physical
force or show of authority, have restrained the person's liberty. Baker v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 5 S .W.3d 142, 145 (1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U .S . 1, 88
S .Ct. 1868, 20 L .Ed .2d 889 (1968)) . The test is whether, looking at the surrounding
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave.
Id . (citing United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U .S . 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L .Ed . 2d 497
(1980)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that one factor to
consider in determining whether someone is in custody is whether a reasonable person
believed that he was free to end the interrogation and leave. United States v. Crossley ,
224 F.3d 847, 861 (6th Cir. 2000) . See Mason v. Mitchell , 320 F .3d 604, 631 (6th Cir.
2003) . Other factors to be considered are the following:
(1) the purpose of the questioning ; (2) whether the place of the
questioning was hostile or coercive; (3) the length of the questioning ; and
(4) other indicia of custody such as whether the suspect was informed at
the time that the questioning was voluntary or that the suspect was free to
leave or to request the officers to do so; whether the suspect possessed
unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning ; and whether the
suspect initiated contact with the police or voluntarily admitted the officers
to the residence and acquiesced to their requests to answer some
questions .
Id . (uotin
United States v . Salvo, 133 F .3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998), cert . denied , 523
U .S . 1122 (1998)) .
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including Appellant's own testimony,
Appellant was not in custody when his statements were made during the interview with
Detective Newton . Custody requires a restraint on Appellant's freedom or a coercive
environment. Farler v. Commonwealth , Ky., 880 S .W.2d 882, 885 (1994) . "Coercive
environments not rising to the level of formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement
do not constitute custody within the meaning of Miranda ." United States v. Phillip , 948
F.2d 241, 247 (6th Cir . 1991), cert. denied , 504 U .S . 930 (1992) .
I n Davis v. United States, 512 U .S . 452, 459, 114 S . Ct . 2350, 129 L. Ed .2d 362
(1994), the United States Supreme Court held that "ambiguous or equivocal"
statements do not sufficiently invoke Fifth Amendment rights . In the current case,
Appellant never mentioned his right to remain silent and continued to voluntarily talk
with Detective Newton. Objectively, none of Appellant's statements could be construed
as an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent . Therefore, Detective Newton's comment did not go to Appellant's silence, but
could equally be construed as a comment on Appellant's statement that the results of
the DNA test would exonerate him . Whether Detective Newton actually believed he
was guilty did not prejudice Appellant as the jury would conclude Detective Newton
sought an indictment because she thought Appellant was guilty.
The trial court determines relevancy and admissibility of evidence . With respect
to evidentiary issues, "[a] decision of a trial court will not be disturbed in the absence of
an abuse of discretion." Partin , supra , at 222 . See English , supra , at 945. The
standard for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles ." Id .
All of Appellant's statements made to Detective Newton were clearly voluntary
and were not made during custodial interrogation . Additionally, Appellant did not invoke
his constitutional right to remain silent . The trial court was correct in finding that the
interview in Appellant's home did not amount to an interrogation requiring that Appellant
be Mirandized .
IV. MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
On direct examination, P .U. testified that she had sex with Appellant on two
occasions. Then on cross examination, P .U. admitted that she told her counselor it was
twenty times . The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court sustained the objection
because Appellant's counsel was using a confidential document, which was
inadmissible evidence, to impeach P .U . Then Appellant was allowed to introduce by
way of avowal testimony about P .U . having said she had sex with Appellant twenty
times . The trial court ruled that the document from P .U .'s counselor was confidential
and not admissible and therefore the avowal testimony was not grounds for a mistrial .
"A trial court has broad discretion in determining when a mistrial is necessary."
Gosser v. Commonwealth , Ky., 31 S.W.3d 897, 906 (2000) . The trial court's decision in
determining whether to grant a mistrial should not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion . Clay v . Commonwealth , Ky.App ., 867 S .W.2d 200, 204 (1993) . A trial judge
is best situated to intelligently decide if a mistrial is necessary, but the reasons must be
compelling . Gosser, supra . A motion for mistrial should only be granted if the court
decides a "manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity ." Id.
Since the jury heard P .U .'s prior inconsistent statement about the number of
times of sexual intercourse, the trial court's denial of further questioning of P .U . was
correct and there was no prejudice to Appellant . The jurors knew that P.U . made the
inconsistent statement that she had sexual intercourse with Appellant twenty times as
opposed to her direct testimony that she had sexual intercourse on two occasions. The
trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for mistrial.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., Graves, Johnstone, and Wintersheimer, J .J ., concur.
Cooper, J ., dissents in a separate opinion in which Stumbo, J ., joins.
Keller, J ., dissents in a separate opinion in which Cooper and Stumbo, J .J ., join .
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Franklin P. Jewell
517 West Ormsby Ave .
Louisville, KY 40203
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprnar Courf of ~mfurhV
2002-SC-0921-MR
ALLAN DAVID GRUNDY
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
01-CR-1743 AND 02-CR-1479
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
I fully concur with Justice Keller's separate dissenting opinion that the trial judge's
failure to hold a Daubert hearing before admitting the results of DNA testing that used
"modified" formulae without any established protocol requires reversal for a new trial .
However, I believe the trial judge committed two additional reversible errors by (1)
permitting the investigating officer to testify to her opinion that Appellant was guilty, and
(2) not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim with respect to the two prior
inconsistent statements she made, one to a counselor and the other during a
confidential family court custody hearing .
I. OPINION AS TO GUILT .
Officer Jeri Newton testified that she interviewed Appellant at his home on June
4, 2001, and asked him whether he had subjected the victim to sexual intercourse . She
further testified that she informed him that she believed his equivocal response was
an indication of guilt . We have long held that a witness may not express an opinion to
the jury as to the defendant's guilt. Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S .W.2d 883,
889-90 (1997) (expert witness may not express opinion as to defendant's guilt or
innocence) ; Meredith v. Commonwealth , Ky., 959 S .W .2d 87, 91-92 (1997) (placing
contents of letter before jury improper because it contained author's opinion that
defendant was guilty) ; Nugent v. Commonwealth , Ky., 639 S .W.2d 761, 764-65 (1982) .
See also Cooper v. Sowders , 837 F .2d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1988) . We have further held
that a witness should not be permitted to interpret what another person meant by his
statements . Tamme v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 973 S.W.2d 13, 33-34 (1998); Adcock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W .2d 440, 442 (1986). It is immaterial that Newton's
opinion was stated indirectly, i .e. , that she told Appellant she believed he was guilty, as
opposed to directly. The result was the same .
II. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
The victim testified that Appellant had sexual intercourse with her on only two
occasions, once in February 2001 and again in April 2001 . Defense counsel sought to
impeach the victim's credibility by eliciting on cross-examination statements made to her
school counselor and father that Appellant had subjected her to sexual intercourse on
twenty occasions. Defense counsel had obtained this information from allegedly
confidential records of a family court custody hearing . The trial court refused to allow
the cross-examination, citing the counselor-client privilege, KRE 506(b), and the
confidentiality of the family court records . On avowal, the victim admitted that she made
the statements.
As noted in Commonwealth v. Barroso , Ky., 122 S .W.3d 554, 558 (2003), KRE
506(b) is a qualified privilege that does not apply "if the judge finds: (A) [T]hat the
substance of the communication is relevant to an essential issue in the case; (B) [T]hat
there are no available alternate means to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
communication ; and (C) [T]hat the need for the information outweighs the interest
protected by the privilege ." Id . (citing KRE 506(d)(2)) . The trial court made no findings
on these issues . Even so, any findings that would have excluded the prior inconsistent
statement made to the counselor would have been clearly erroneous. First, it was not
shown that the counselor to whom the statement was made was a "counselor' within
the meaning of the privilege . KRE 506(a)(1)(A) . Second, any evidence that impugns
the credibility of the prosecuting witness is relevant to an essential issue in the case.
Third, there was no alternate means available to obtain this information . Finally, there is
no confidentially interest in this information . Appellant was accused of sexually
assaulting the victim on two separate occasions . There is no need to protect the
victim's earlier statements that she had been assaulted by him twenty times.
The holding that the confidentiality of family court records somehow warrants
suppression of these statements is specifically belied by the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Davis v. Alaska , 415 U .S . 308, 94 S .Ct . 1105, 39 L .Ed .2d 347 (1974).
Davis held that a state's interest in the confidentiality of certain court proceedings must
yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him. Id . at 320, 94 S .Ct. at 1112. In Davis, the defendant was precluded from proving
the bias of an adverse witness by showing that the witness was on probation for a
juvenile adjudication . This decision was based on the confidentiality afforded to state
juvenile court records . Id . at 312-14, 94 S .Ct. at 1108-09. Holding otherwise, the
Supreme Court noted :
Mhe jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before
them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to
place on Green's testimony which provided a crucial link in the proof . . . of
petitioner's act. The accuracy and truthfulness of Green's testimony were
key elements in the State's case against petitioner.
Id. a t 317, 94 S.Ct . at 1111 (citations and quotations omitted) .
Likewise, I believe that the jurors in Appellant's case were entitled to know that
his accuser had made two prior inconsistent and apparently exaggerated accusations of
sexual assault against him so that they could properly evaluate the credibility of her
present accusations.
Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse for a new trial .
Stumbo, J ., joins this dissenting opinion .
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprttte Courf of ~rttfurkg
2002-SC-0921-MR
ALLAN DAVID GRUNDY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
01-CR-1743 AND 02-CR-1479
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I respectfully dissent and vote to vacate Appellant's Second-Degree Rape
conviction and to remand the case with instructions for the trial court to perform its KRE
702 "gatekeeper" function by conducting the admissibility inquiry identified in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals . Inc . ,' and adopted in Kentucky in Mitchell v .
Commonwealth 2 with respect to the expert opinion testimony concerning the probability
that Appellant had impregnated the complaining witness . Although this Court held in
Fu ate that "the DNA comparison analysis using the RFLP and PCR methods is
admissible without being the subject of a pretrial Daubert hearing," 3 Appellant's motion
in limine did not challenge the scientific reliability of DNA comparisons in general, but
raised a specific objection to the proffered opinions in this case, i .e . , a 99.75%
1 509 U .S . 579, 113 S .Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed .2d 469 (1993) .
2 Ky., 908 S .W.2d 100 (1995), overruled in part by Fugate v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 993 S .W.2d 931 (1999).
3 Fugate , 993 S.W .2d at 937-8.
probability of paternity admittedly calculated using "modified" formulae and without any
established protocol from a mixed sample of fetal and maternal tissue that made the
standard DNA comparison calculations inapplicable . I agree with Appellant's contention
that the proffered evidence did not represent a "method[ ] or technique[ ] that ha[s]
been scrutinized well enough in prior decisions to warrant taking judicial notice of their
status, "4 and thus the trial court was required to evaluate the scientific reliability of this
expert testimony before permitting its introduction . Accordingly, I would vacate
Appellant's conviction and remand this case for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether this evidence was scientifically reliable . If the trial court
found that the evidence should not have been admitted, Appellant would be entitled to
a new trial at which this evidence would be excluded . If, however, the trial court found
the evidence to be scientifically reliable, it would reinstate the prior judgment of
conviction, and Appellant could seek appellate review from the trial court's reliability
determination .
Cooper and Stumbo, JJ ., join this dissenting opinion .
4 Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 12 S.W.3d 258, 261 (2000).
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