BAT YULLIN LEE SANDIFER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIYI_L PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0888-MR
BAT
YULLIN LEE SANDIFER
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
2001-CR-1286
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Yullin Lee Sandifer, was convicted of first-degree robbery by a Fayette
County jury and received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment . His appeal comes
before this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . Appellant asserts the
following errors : 1) the introduction of an in-court identification and a photographic
identification denied Appellant a fair trial; 2) the trial court improperly failed to enter a
directed verdict of not guilty ; and 3) the prosecutor's improper comments unfairly
prejudiced Appellant.
On Friday, November 2, 2001, Appellant visited Melissa Davidson at Dennis
Shadoan's residence . Neither Shadoan nor Davidson knew Appellant's real name, only
that he was referred to as "Big U ." During this time, Shadoan was conversing with his
roommate, Leonard Sowers, and had his share of the rent, about $225, on the kitchen
table . Appellant left the apartment an hour later.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0888-MR
YULLIN LEE SANDIFER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
2001-CR-1286
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Yullin Lee Sandifer, was convicted of first-degree robbery by a Fayette
County jury and received a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment . His appeal comes
before this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b) . Appellant asserts the
following errors: 1) the introduction of an in-court identification and a photographic
identification denied Appellant a fair trial ; 2) the trial court improperly failed to enter a
directed verdict of not guilty; and 3) the prosecutor's improper comments unfairly
prejudiced Appellant .
On Friday, November 2, 2001, Appellant visited Melissa Davidson at Dennis
Shadoan's residence . Neither Shadoan nor Davidson knew Appellant's real name, only
that he was referred to as "Big U ." During this time, Shadoan was conversing with his
roommate, Leonard Sowers, and had his share of the rent, about $225, on the kitchen
table . Appellant left the apartment an hour later.
The next evening, Appellant phoned Shadoan and asked if he could come back
over for a few drinks . Appellant identified himself by referring to his presence the night
before . Shadoan noticed that the name "Sandifer" was displayed on his caller ID.
Appellant arrived about twenty minutes later. Appellant and Shadoan sat at the kitchen
table and talked for a few minutes until Appellant drew a small pistol and demanded
Shadoan's money. Shadoan managed to retreat into the bathroom. Appellant fired
through the bathroom door and grazed Shadoan's right thigh. Leonard Sowers phoned
911 after hearing the gunshot and screaming.
Police arrived at the scene and interviewed Shadoan and Melissa Davidson
soon afterwards . Police were able to obtain a photograph of Appellant after running the
name "Sandifer" through Detention Center Records . Davidson identified Appellant as
"Big U," the man who had visited Shadoan the previous night. Shadoan was shown an
array of six photographs on a single sheet of paper and identified Appellant .
Appellant was indicted for first-degree robbery on December 19, 2001, in Fayette
County. On May 21, 2002, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress any
identifications derived from the photographic line-up. Appellant was tried on September
10, 2002, and final judgment was entered on October 8, 2002.
Eyewitness Identifications
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the eyewitness
identifications into evidence . Kentucky courts have consistently applied the Biggers test
when considering the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. Roark v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 90 S .W.3d 24, 28 (2002) . The Bi
ers test consists of a two-
pronged inquiry : 1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive, and 2)
whether under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable despite
the suggestive procedure. Neil v. Biggers , 409 U .S . 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed . 2d
401 (1972).
The trial court heard arguments and extensive testimony from the investigating
officer regarding the identification procedure at the suppression hearing. After hearing
arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress because the identification was
not unduly suggestive under the circumstances. We agree .
Appellant argues that the photographic line-up was unduly suggestive because
he was the only person in the line-up with braids and one of only two people wearing
jackets . We find this argument unpersuasive for several reasons . First, the
investigating officer testified at the suppression hearing that he instructed the witnesses
not to take clothing or hairstyle into account when making an identification . Secondly,
Shadoan had seen Appellant the night before . On the night of the robbery, Shadoan
and Appellant sat and talked for a couple minutes before the robbery happened .
Finally, the line-up identification occurred just four hours after the incident took place.
We conclude that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive . There was
no error.
Motion for a Directed Verdict
In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly
failed to enter a directed verdict of acquittal . Appellant asserts that no reasonable jury
could have found him guilty of first-degree robbery based on the testimony at trial.
Appellant specifically refers to certain inconsistencies in Shadoan's statements and
allegedly defective police work. We disagree .
When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial judge must make all fair
and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth . Commonwealth v. Benham ,
Ky., 816 S.W .2d 186 (1991). Secondly, if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable
juror to conclude the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then a directed
verdict should not be granted. Id. A trial court should only grant a directed verdict if it
would be clearly unreasonable, based on the evidence as a whole, for a jury to find
guilt. Id .
Appellant has not demonstrated such a complete lack of evidence as to bring the
jury's verdict into question . Appellant merely attacks the credibility of Shadoan's
testimony . The weight and credibility of a witness's testimony is a matter for the jury to
decide. Commonwealth v. Cox , Ky., 837 S .W.2d 898 (1992). Additionally, "[i]t is
sufficient if the victim's testimony taken as a whole could induce a reasonable belief by
the jury that the crime occurred ." Id . at 900 . In light of the evidence, we find that a
reasonable jury could find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court
did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict .
Improper Comments
For his final assignment of error, Appellant argues that he was denied a fair trial
because the Commonwealth's Attorney made an improper comment regarding facts not
in evidence during Appellant's closing argument . This issue is unpreserved for
appellate review.
Appellant made reference to the Commonwealth's inability to produce the phone
records to physically demonstrate that Appellant called Shadoan's home . At this point
the Commonwealth objected and made the following statement, ". . . I don't know if we
could get those records, I think that [Appellant's remark] is an incorrect statement." The
trial judge responded that he would let the jury decide the issue. Appellant did not
object or request an admonition to the jury, but simply continued with his closing
argument.
We find that Appellant received a fundamentally fair trial to which he is entitled .
A fundamentally fair trial does not necessarily mean a perfect trial . Michigan v. Tucker ,
417 U .S . 433, 94 S . Ct . 2357, 41 L . Ed . 2d 182 (1974). Furthermore, Appellant has not
demonstrated the manifest injustice requisite for relief under the palpable error rule.
RCr 10.26.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
G. Todd Bradbury
4458 Rose Glade Circle
Lexington, KY 40515
Thomas Louis Conn
271 West Short Street, Suite 403
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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