FRANK JOHNSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 26, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$lt}TTPriTP
Courf of
2002-SC-0857-MR
FRANK JOHNSON
=4
~YEiIT
` LJ
LJ t3~
DACTIE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M . GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
98-C R-00301
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
Appellant, Frank Johnson, appeals as a matter of right' from the final judgment
of the Daviess Circuit Court sentencing him to twenty-five (25) years of imprisonment
for five (5) counts of third-degree sodomy . The issues presented are whether the trial
court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's juvenile record, whether Appellant's
right to a speedy trial was violated, whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's
motion for directed verdict, whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of
uncharged prior bad acts, whether the trial court erred in not striking a witness's
testimony as to Appellant's admission that he engaged in sexual acts with the victim,
and whether the sentence imposed upon Appellant violates the statutory maximum
provided by law.
1
Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b).
Appellant is best described as the victim's, N.J .'s, former step-grandfather . After
the divorce of N .J .'s mother and step-father, Appellant continued to have a relationship
with the victim until charges were brought in the summer of 1998 . Following a heart
attack in 1993, Appellant had stopped working, and spent much of his time with N .J.
and his best friend, W .M. Both N .J. and W.M. were thirteen at the time.
At trial, N .J. testified that Appellant's relationship with him changed when he was
about thirteen or fourteen years old . N .J. said that Appellant began buying clothes,
cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana for him, and giving him money . The victim stated
that Appellant let him drive his vehicle on outlying roads .
N .J. testified that Appellant began to talk with him about sex . He stated that
Appellant made pornography available to him in the form of magazines and videotapes .
Then, during a trip to southern Indiana, Appellant gave him a marijuana cigarette to
smoke and told him to look at a Playboy magazine. While the victim was looking at the
magazine, Appellant performed oral sex on him . N .J . testified that he and Appellant
had sexual contact on a regular basis from the time N .J. was thirteen until he was
fifteen . Appellant would bargain for "snuggle time," or oral sex in exchange for alcohol,
cigarettes, and marijuana . N.J . ended the sexual contact with Appellant on May 2,
1998, after telling his mother that Appellant had sexually abused him .
W.M ., N .J .'s best friend, testified that Appellant allowed him to have alcohol,
marijuana, and pornography when he came over to Appellant's home . W.M. said that
Appellant encouraged both children to masturbate in front of him while watching
pornographic videos. W.M . stated that N .J. had told him of the "snuggle time" with
Appellant . N .J . also told W.M. that Appellant had offered to perform oral sex, although
N .J. claimed that he had declined the offer.
W .M. said that his relationship with Appellant began to change in May of 1998,
after the end of N.J .'s relationship with Appellant . Appellant began to buy him
cigarettes and marijuana, and to give him money. He allowed W .M. to drive his car.
W .M . stated that every time he smoked marijuana, Appellant would ask him to sit on his
lap. He claimed that eventually Appellant began to put his hands under W.M.'s shirt.
W.M . testified that when he asked Appellant if N .J .'s accusations were true, Appellant
replied : "Yes and No . Yes it happened, but not the way N .J . said it did ." W.M. broke
off his contact with Appellant after an offer to buy him a class ring during his senior year
of high school . W .M . felt that Appellant's demands would increase if allowed to
purchase the ring.
At trial, Appellant claimed that N .J .'s accusations were the product of Appellant's
role as a disciplinarian in N .J .'s life and a belief that Appellant was "out to get him ."
Appellant testified to specific incidents that could have created this perception in N.J . :
he had turned in N .J .'s drug suppliers to the police, and had informed the police that
N .J. had lied to an officer as to the cause of a head injury during an accident
investigation . Appellant also stated that N .J. wanted to attend a friend's party, but had
been told that he was staying overnight with Appellant the evening of May 2, 1998,
when the accusations were made, because his mother would be away attending a
Garth Brooks concert . Appellant claims that the accusations were N .J .'s attempt to get
even with him.
Appellant was charged with five counts of third-degree sodomy, and indicted on
September 9, 1998 . Appellant was arraigned on September 15, 1998, and was
released on bond . The trial began on June 24, 2002 . The delay between indictment
and trial was forty-five (45) months. The record is silent as to the reasons for the great
majority of the delay, but Appellant was granted two continuances . The jury returned a
verdict of guilty for five (5) counts of third-degree sodomy . Appellant was convicted and
sentenced to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment, five (5) years for each count .
Appellant argues that the trial court's exclusion of N.J .'s juvenile record violated
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment . Appellant claims this violation
prohibited his defense from revealing N .J .'s bias against him . During crossexamination, N .J . was asked if he had appeared in court prior to that date for any
reason. N.J . replied that he had never been in court before . He stated that he had no
recollection of any court appearances, and that no criminal charges were ever filed
against him .
At trial, Appellant called Officer Mark Smith of the Owensboro Police Department
to testify about events concerning a head injury that N .J . had sustained as a child .
Officer Smith confirmed that N .J . had told him that he had fractured his skull as a result
of slipping on slick pavement while running around . Officer Smith then stated that upon
further investigation it was discovered that N .J. had actually sustained the injury when
he jumped from the running board of a moving van that he had been riding . Appellant
attempted to ask if N.J . had been charged with a crime as a result of the original report,
but the trial court curtailed this as an improper form of impeachment . The trial court did
allow Appellant to ask Officer Smith if N .J . had ever been required to appear in court,
but Appellant chose not to ask this question . Rather, Appellant chose to ask Officer
Smith if he and N.J. ever had any further dealings, to which the officer gave a negative
reply.
The procedure used to preserve trial court rulings on the admissibility of
evidence is detailed in KRE 103 and RCr 9.52 . KRE 103 provides :
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling . Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected ; and . . . .
(2) Offer of proof . In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, upon
request of the examining attorney, the witness may make a
specific offer of his answer to the question .
(b) Record of offer and ruling . The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in
which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon . It
may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form .
RCr 9 .52 closely tracks the language of KRE 103.2
Without an avowal a reviewing court lacks the information necessary to
determine whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding the testimony.
In the case sub judice, Appellant argues that the excluded testimony was necessary to
establish N.J .'s bias against him . In Caudill v. Commonwealth , the defendant in a
sodomy case attempted to establish that the mother of the victim was biased against
him, but did not offer an avowal of the excluded testimony . That defendant argued that
his defense was prejudiced by the absence of the testimony . We held in Caudill that
want of an avowal left the propriety of the trial court's exclusion unpreserved for review.
2RCr 9 .52 provides :
In an action tried by jury, if an objection to a question propounded to a
witness is sustained by the court, upon the request of the examining
attorney the witness may make a specific offer of his or her answer to the
question . The court shall require the offer to be made out of the hearing
of the jury. The court may add such other or further statement as clearly
shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the
objection made, and the ruling thereon . In actions tried without a jury the
same procedure may be followed, except that the court upon request shall
take and report the evidence in full, unless it clearly appears that the
evidence is not admissible on any ground or that the witness is privileged .
s
Commonwealth v. Ferrell , Ky., 17 S.W .3d 520, 523 (2000) ; Partin v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 918 S.W .2d 219, 223 (1996).
Ky., 777 S .W .2d 924 (1989).
5 Id . at 926 .
Regardless of preservation, it is unlikely that using this testimony to show N.J .'s
bias would have had a material effect on the case . Appellant was allowed to testify to
incidents showing motivation for N.J . to falsely accuse him . Appellant testified to
generally acting as a disciplinarian, reporting N.J .'s drug sources to police, alerting the
police to the real cause of N.J .'s head injury in an accident investigation, and interfering
with N.J .'s recreational plans immediately prior to the accusations of sodomy.
Any error the trial court might have made would not have been reversible .
Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis . The
inquiry in such a case is as follows :
Whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the crossexamination were fully realized, a reviewing court might
nonetheless say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case
depends on a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing
courts . These factors include the importance of the witness's
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course,
the overall strength of the prosecution's case.
Viewed with Appellant's own testimony, the testimony of Officer Smith appears
cumulative . Despite the exclusion of Officer Smith's testimony, Appellant was allowed
to paint a "reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation ."$
Additionally, the trial court allowed pertinent cross-examination of Officer Smith .
Appellant was permitted to ask Officer Smith if N .J. had ever appeared in court. This
went toward contradicting N .J . on his claim that his presence at trial was the first time
6 Delaware v . Van Arsdall, 475 U .S . 673, 680, 106 S . Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed . 2d 674 (1986);
Chapman v. California , 386 U .S . 18, 24, 87 S . Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed . 2d 705 (1967) .
7 _Id . at 684 (emphasis added) .
8 Commonwealth v . Maddox, Ky., 955 S .W .2d 718, 721(1997) .
he had ever been in a court proceeding . Appellant did not utilize this opportunity . In
light of these factors, any error the trial court may have made was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt .
Appellant's second argument is that he was denied a speedy trial, a right that is
protected by the Sixth Amendment of the U .S. Constitution and Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution . Barker v. Wingo9 set forth the test for determining if the right to
a speedy trial has been violated . Barker provides that when analyzing an alleged
speedy trial violation, a court must look to the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant.'° No single factor
is "necessary or sufficient" to establish a deprivation of a speedy trial ; instead, we must
balance all of the factors in conjunction with the particular facts of the case ."
The analysis begins with a determination of whether the length of the delay was
presumptively prejudicial . The length of the delay acts as a triggering factor. If it is not
presumptively prejudicial, then there is no violation of Appellant's rights and further
analysis is not required ; however, if it is deemed prejudicial, the analysis continues with
the remaining factors . '2 To determine whether a delay is presumptively prejudicial, the
nature of the charges must be viewed in regard to the length of the delay. 13 Cain v.
Smith 14 held that a complex case, such as conspiracy, may justify a longer delay than a
"mundane garden variety" burglary or assault.
9 407 U .S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2128, 33 L. Ed . 2d 101 (1972) .
'° _Id . at 530 .
" _Id . at 533 .
'2 Dunaway v. Commonwealth , Ky., 60 S .W .3d 563, 569 (2001).
'3
Id .
'4_
686 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1982) .
In the instant case, Appellant was charged with five counts of third-degree
sodomy . This is not generally a crime requiring forty-five months of preparation . Here
the great majority of the evidence is testimonial and required little discovery time. Cain,
a robbery case, held that a delay of eleven and one-half months triggered additional
inquiry into the remaining Barker factors . 15 In McDonald v. Commonwealth, 16 an appeal
from multiple convictions including rape, the pretrial delay of three years was
considered presumptively prejudicial . In the instant case, the delay of forty-five months
from indictment to trial in such circumstances clearly prompts further analysis .
Having concluded that the delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial, we
now turn to the reasons for the delay. Delays may fit within three categories : (1)
deliberate attempts to delay the trial so that the effectiveness of the defense is
impaired ; (2) neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded dockets ; and (3) valid
reasons, such as a missing witness ." Different reasons are accorded different weight
in the balancing process, so that a delay for negligence would weigh more heavily
against the negligent party than delay due to an overcrowded docket. '8 The primary
burden remains "on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to
trial ."' 9
The record is silent as to why there was a delay of thirty-eight months from the
date Appellant was indicted, September 9, 1998, to the pretrial conference on
December 4, 2001 . As it is the burden of the Commonwealth to explain the cause for
15
_Id. at 382 .
Ky., 569 S .W .2d 134,136 (1978)
" Barker, 407 U .S. at 531 .
'8
Dunaway , 60 S .W.3d at 570.
19
Barker, 407 U .S. at 529 .
's
pretrial delay, any unexplained delay is weighed against it . 2° However, from that
moment, the record shows that Appellant was the cause for all remaining delays until
the trial took place on June 24, 2002 . On March 5, 2002, Appellant told the trial court
he was not ready to proceed with trial and that additional investigation was required .
The trial court allowed six weeks for further preparation . Six and one-half weeks later,
on April 22, 2002, Appellant was granted an additional continuance and a new trial date
was set for June 24, 2002 . Delay caused by Appellant is not to be considered while
determining if the right to a speedy trial has been violated
21
The third factor in the Barker test regards Appellant's assertion of his right to a
speedy trial. In this case, Appellant never made a formal assertion of his right. A
failure to assert the right does not excuse a constitutional violation ; however, it will
make it difficult for Appellant to prove that there was a denial of his right . 22 Appellant
did file a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, but such a motion is not equivalent
to a formal demand for a speedy trial .23
The final Barker inquiry concerns the prejudice that Appellant suffered due to the
delay. Prejudice can take one of three forms as identified by the Barker court: (1)
oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3)
impairment to the defense by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence .24
As Appellant was released on bond almost immediately, the first form of prejudice does
not exist in this case .
2°
Cain , 686 F.2d at 382.
2' Gabow v. Commonwealth , Ky., 34 S .W.3d 63, 70 (2000) .
22
Cain , 686 F.2d at 383-84 .
23
Tamme v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 973 S .W.2d 13,22 (1998) .
24
Barker, 407 U .S. at 533 .
Appellant does contend that he was prejudiced in the two remaining ways . He
claims that his health deteriorated during the forty-five months prior to trial due to
anxiety and concern, and that he was prejudiced from the inability of some witnesses to
clearly recall facts . No evidence is presented linking Appellant's worsened health to the
delay of the trial . The burden of showing actual prejudice is on Appellant . 25 It is not
improbable that the health of an elderly man might decline during a period of almost
four years, independent of any strain caused by an impending trial .
Although Appellant claims that he suffered prejudice due to witnesses' difficulty
in recalling events, Appellant never discloses what information has been denied him by
the passage of time . Appellant specifically complains of only one witness, other than
himself, that being the victim, N .J . The Commonwealth's chief witness is the least likely
of all to aid in Appellant's defense . As to Appellant's claim that he had difficulty with
memory recall, the person best positioned to gauge his ability to testify effectively was
Appellant himself. If he had wanted to present well preserved testimony to the jury,
Appellant would have asserted his right to a speedy trial rather than actively seeking
continuances .
There is no claim that a key witness was unavailable at trial, that an alibi was
unable to be presented, or that the defense had been irreparably harmed by the loss of
some tangible evidence . There is no showing that Appellant endured oppressive
pretrial incarceration . All that is claimed here is that an elderly individual suffered illhealth, which is not directly connected to pretrial anxiety.
In summary, although the forty-five month pretrial period is presumptively
prejudicial, that alone does not constitute a violation of Appellant's right to a speedy
25
Preston , 898 S.W .2d at 504.
10
trial. Appellant's motions for continuances, failure to assert his right to a speedy trial,
and lack of actual prejudice diminish the weight of Appellant's claim sufficiently that
reversal is not required .
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
directed verdict. Appellant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient as
a matter of law to support a conviction for third-degree sodomy . The standard for a
motion of directed verdict is set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham :16
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . For the
purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that
the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserve to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony .
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal .
Upon motion for directed verdict, the trial judge is in the best position to analyze
the evidence presented, and to determine if it is "sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
2'
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty." The Benham
standard explicitly states that questions pertaining to credibility are reserved for the jury.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth's evidence took the form of testimony from
individuals that Appellant claims have bias against him . Although it is true that
testimony may sometimes be so "incredible on its face as to require its rejection as a
matter of law, ,28 that is not true in this case. The testimony presented at trial was not
26
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991) .
_Id .
28 Taylor v. Commonwealth , 301 Ky. 109, 113, 190 S.W.2d 1003, 1005 (1945) .
11
27
so "incredible or improbable or so at variance with natural laws or common human
experience as to be patently untrue,"
29
thus requiring a reasonable jury to find for the
defendant. The jurors' function was to hear the testimony and determine its veracity.
The trial court correctly denied the motion for directed verdict.
Appellant's fourth claim is that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of
uncharged prior bad acts . Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference at
trial to Appellant's supplying N.J . and W.M . with cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, or
pornography. This motion was denied by the trial court. At trial Appellant did not make
specific objections to any of the Commonwealth's evidence of wrongfully supplying the
above substances to minors . Although we question whether this claim is properly
preserved, 3° we will address the merits of the argument .
At trial, N .J . testified that immediately prior to his first sexual encounter with
Appellant he was given a pornographic magazine to look at and a marijuana cigarette to
smoke. The victim also claims that Appellant negotiated "snuggle time" based on debt
owed for alcohol, cigarettes, and marijuana . W.M . testified that Appellant encouraged
both him and N .J . to masturbate in front of him while watching pornographic movies .
Appellant also required that W.M . sit on his lap and allow himself to be touched
underneath his shirt when given marijuana.
From the evidence, Appellant offered these substances to N.J . and W.M . in
close temporal proximity to sexual acts and intimate contact. As such, a "special
relationship" exists between the evidence of these acts and the charged offense of
29 Bussey v. Commonwealth , Ky., 797 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1990).
30
See Tucker v. Commonwealth , Ky., 916 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1996) (holding that
absence of a contemporaneous objection inadequate to preserve issue even though
defendant had filed motion in limine).
12
sodomy because they are "so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
the case that separation of the two could not be accomplished without serious adverse
effect on the offering party. ,31 The giving of favors and substances was quid pro quo
for sexual contact . Because of this "special relationship," the testimony that Appellant
supplied the children with the foregoing was relevant and properly admitted at trial .
Appellant's fifth argument is that the trial court erred by not striking W .M.'s
testimony. The Commonwealth called W .M . as a witness to testify that Appellant
admitted to having sexual encounters with N .J. The Commonwealth had notified
Appellant's counsel of its intent to use W .M.'s testimony, pursuant to RCr 7 .24, but had
indicated that the admission had taken place soon after the charges had been filed . In
his testimony, however, W .M. stated that the conversation occurred two years after the
charges had been filed . Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not excluding the
testimony because it was admitted in violation of RCr 7.24(1) . RCr 7 .24(1) provides
that an "attorney for the Commonwealth shall disclose the substance, including time,
date, and place, of any oral incriminating statement known by the attorney for the
Commonwealth to have been made by a defendant to any witness . . . ...
While a formal exception is no longer necessary to preserve an issue, 32 a timely
objection is still required for review . 33 A timely objection has generally been defined as
"one that is made as soon as the basis for objection becomes apparent . ,34 A party that
does not raise a timely objection waives review of the issue .35 The discrepancy of the
3'
KRE 404(b)(2) . See also Pendleton v. Commonwealth , Ky., 83 S .W.3d 522, 528
2002) .
2 RCr 9 .22.
33
Patrick v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 436 S .W.2d 69, 74 (1968).
34
Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 1 .10[4][a] (4th ed . 2003).
35
Stephenson v . Commonwealth , Ky., 982 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1998) .
13
conversation's date was immediately apparent, but Appellant did not object until three
hours after W .M .'s testimony.
Furthermore, the trial court offered Appellant a continuance, a form of relief
suggested in RCr 7 .24(9), to afford Appellant time to accumulate appropriate rebuttal
information . This offer was declined . This Court has held that one "cannot intentionally
decline to avail himself of a remedy granted by the court and then claim on appeal that
he was prejudiced . 3s
Finally, Appellant contends that the twenty-five year sentence imposed on him by
the trial court exceeded the statutory maximum provided by the General Assembly.
KRS 532 .110(1) provides :
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a
defendant for more than one (1) crime, including a crime for which
a previous sentence shall run concurrently or consecutively as the
court shall determine at the time of sentence, except that:
(c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not
exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would
be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for
which any of the sentences is imposed . In no event shall the
aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed seventy (70)
years.
The crime of third-degree sodomy is a class D felony . According to KRS 532.080(6)(b),
the longest term which a class D felon sentenced as a first-degree persistent felony
offender may be required to serve is twenty years . As such, the sentence of twenty-five
years violates the statutory maximum set forth by law, and this cause must be
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. In all other respects, the final judgment is
affirmed .
All concur.
36
Berry v. Commonwealth , Ky., 782 S.W.2d 625, 628 (1990) .
14
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
John R. Tarter
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.