ANTHONY LAMONT HUTCHINSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NO-TICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0626-MR
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ANTHONY LAMONT HUTCHINSON
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
NO . 02-CR-00187
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING FOR A NEW TRIAL
This matter-of-right appeal arises from a guilty verdict of a Fayette Circuit Court
jury convicting Appellant, Anthony Lamont Hutchinson, of first-degree robbery, two
counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and for being a second-degree persistent
felony offender (PFO) . We reverse and remand for a new trial .
On October 29, 2001, following a conversation with an acquaintance, Linda
Bacon, the victim herein, was walking back to her motor vehicle when an individual,
allegedly Appellant, pulled at her purse and mentioned something about money . Bacon
had a brief verbal exchange with this individual, and then continued to walk toward her
vehicle. As Bacon entered her vehicle, she inadvertently pressed the automatic lock
and window buttons, thereby mistakenly unlocking the doors and rolling down the
windows . The individual then reached into the passenger-side window seemingly in an
attempt to take Bacon's purse, which Bacon had placed in the passenger-side seat after
entering the vehicle. According to Bacon's testimony, the individual stated that he was
"strapped," meaning that he carried a firearm on his person. Bacon stated the weapon
was tucked in the waistband of the individual's pants and that both the handle and the
trigger of the weapon were plainly visible . Bacon then proceeded to drive away in an
attempt to escape from this individual . As she was driving away, the individual
discharged his weapon multiple times in the vehicle's direction . There were children
within close proximity as this incident transpired .
On February 18, 2002, the Fayette County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Appellant with the following counts: (1) robbery in the first degree ; (2)
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon ; (3) wanton endangerment in the first
degree (as to Linda Bacon) ; (4) wanton endangerment in the first degree (as to other
persons) ; and (5) for being a PFO in the second degree. The handgun possession
charge was subsequently dismissed by the trial court.
Following a jury trial in the Fayette Circuit Court, Appellant was convicted on one
count of first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and for
being a second-degree PFO. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the
state penitentiary totaling twenty years. He therefore brings the instant appeal as a
matter of right. Ky . Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
The first two assignments of error concern the in-court identification of Appellant
made by the victim, Linda Bacon . First, Appellant contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to hold a suppression hearing regarding Bacon's in
court testimony identifying him as the perpetrator . Second, he contends that he was
denied due process of law under both the federal and state constitutions by the
admission of the in-court identification . We cannot agree with either contention ;
nonetheless, we must reverse for a new trial because the jury was improperly
instructed.
Appellant asserts that a suppression hearing on identification procedures out of
the jury's presence is required under Kentucky law. For authority, Appellant cites to
Moore v . Commonwealth , Ky., 569 S .W.2d 150 (1978), where this Court stated that
when "there is a substantial basis for the claim that a forthcoming in-court identification
is tainted by an improper pretrial identification procedure, a suppression hearing, if
affirmatively requested, should be conducted ." Id . at 153 . Additionally, in Francis v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 468 S.W.2d 287 (1971), our predecessor court held that a trial
court erred by denying a defendant's request for a hearing outside the presence of the
jury to determine if a witness' in-court identification was influenced by a police lineup .
However, the preceding opinions are not applicable here as no pretrial
identification or confrontation procedure was conducted . The police did not employ a
showup, lineup, or photographic display in order to get the victim to identify Appellant .
In his reply brief, Appellant argues that the police "short-circuited the process" by
providing Appellant's name and description to Bacon, instead of using a formal
procedure to ascertain if she "truly had an independent recollection of the perpetrator ."
Essentially, Appellant is arguing that Bacon should have been required to participate in
a police-sanctioned pretrial identification procedure, such as viewing a lineup or an
array of photographs . While it oftentimes may be preferable for a crime victim to
participate in a confrontation or identification procedure, such as a lineup, the failure to
hold a procedure of the like does not amount to a violation of Appellant's due process
rights . See Code v. Montgomery , 725 F .2d 1316, 1320 (11 th Cir. 1984) ; Branch v.
Estelle , 631 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980) . Moreover, Appellant's argument seems to
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insinuate "that there was something intolerably prejudicial in the fact that an identifying
witness was made aware of who the defendant was before she took the stand ." State v.
Ober, 359 A.2d 624, 626 (N.H . 1976) . However, "[t]his is not sufficient to invalidate an
in-court identification ." Id. ; United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 122 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U .S. 981, 94 S . Ct. 1573, 39 L. Ed . 2d 878 (1974) . Indeed, we find
nothing to indicate that Bacon's in-court identification of Appellant was tainted in any
fashion .
"A judicial determination outside the presence of the jury of the admissibility of
identification evidence may often be advisable ." Watkins v. Sowders , 449 U.S . 341,
349, 101 S . Ct. 654, 659, 66 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1981) . However, it is our belief that "such a
determination" is not "constitutionally necessary" under the circumstances of the
present case. Id . In other words, Appellant was not entitled to a hearing regarding the
victim's in-court identification .
With respect to the admissibility of the in-court identification, Appellant
complains, inter alia, about the "many discrepancies in Bacon's continually changing
story ." However, it is within the jury's province to assess the sincerity of a witness'
testimony . Leigh v. Commonwealth , Ky., 481 S.W.2d 75, 79 (1972) . The reliability or
correctness of Bacon's in-court identification of Appellant and her credibility as a witness
are questions that the jury is best suited to consider . As the United States Supreme
Court stated in Manson v. Brathwaite , 432 U .S . 98, 97 S . Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed 2d 140
(1977), "[j]uries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight
of identification testimony that has some questionable feature ." Id . at 116, 97 S. Ct. at
2254 .
Furthermore, we do not agree with Appellant's assertion that the totality of the
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circumstances suggests Bacon's in-court identification is not reliable. During her
testimony at trial the victim stated that she was only a few feet away from the
perpetrator and got a good look at him . She positively identified Appellant as the
perpetrator . Any inconsistencies in Bacon's testimony could have been and were
addressed via cross-examination . "[W]here there has been no pretrial identification
procedure and the defendant is identified in court for the first time, the defendant is not
deprived of a fair trial because the defense counsel is able to explore weaknesses and
suggestiveness of the identification in front of the jury." People v. Medina , 208 A.D .2d
771, 772, 617 N.Y .S .2d 491, 492-493 (N .Y. App . Div. 1994) .
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances particular to this case, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a suppression
hearing regarding Bacon's in-court identification of Appellant . We further conclude that
admission of the in-court identification did not deny Appellant his rights to due process .
Next, Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to not direct a verdict of
acquittal concerning the first-degree wanton endangerment charge as to the victim .
(Appellant assigns no error with regard to the first-degree wanton endangerment charge
as to other persons) . He asserts that the firing of the handgun in the direction of the
victim's automobile constituted part of the act of first-degree robbery, and therefore, it
could not be prosecuted as a separate charge . We disagree .
In support of his assertion, Appellant cites to our decision in Marshall v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 625 S.W.2d 581 (1981) . In that case, we found a double jeopardy
violation where the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment was based on
evidence that the appellant therein pointed a pistol at customers and employees during
the course of robbing a pharmacy. Id . at 582. Additionally, in Whorton v.
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Commonwealth, Ky., 570 S.W.2d 627 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, Kentucky v.
Whorton, 441 U .S. 786, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 60 L. Ed . 2d 640 (1979), we held that it was
error for the wanton endangerment charge to be submitted to the jury based on the fact
that the appellant had fired a shot into the ceiling of a restaurant during the course of a
robbery . Id . at 631 ; see also , Gilbert v. Commonwealth , Ky., 637 S.W.2d 632 (1982),
cert. denied, Gilbert v. Kentucky , 459 U .S. 1149, 103 S . Ct. 794, 74 L. Ed . 2d 998
(1983) .
Appellant's reliance on the above cases is misplaced. Unlike Marshall and
Whorton, the shots here were not fired during the course of a robbery . There was
evidence presented at trial indicating that no shots were fired until after Bacon's vehicle
had sped away from Appellant . Bacon testified that she could see the handle and
trigger of a handgun on Appellant's person when Appellant attempted to take her purse
from her vehicle. As the Commonwealth correctly notes, this evidence was adequate to
support a charge of first-degree robbery. See Lambert v . Commonwealth , Ky. App .,
835 S .W.2d 299 (1992) . Taking this evidence into account, it necessarily follows that
the offense of first-degree wanton endangerment as to the victim was separate and
distinct from the commission of the robbery .
Following a consideration of the evidence as a whole, and applying the directed
verdict test set forth in Commonwealth v . Benham , Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991), we hold
that it was clearly not unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant guilty under the third
count of the indictment. Id . at 187 . As the prosecution undoubtedly produced more
than a mere scintilla of evidence, this case was submitted to the jury in an appropriate
manner. Id . at 188. There was no error.
Appellant's final issue pertains to the trial court's decision to not follow the
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misdemeanor sentencing procedure set forth in Commonwealth v. Philpott, Ky., 75
S.W.3d 209 (2002) . Defense counsel moved the trial court to employ this procedure .
However, because Philpott was not yet final at the time, the trial court denied the
motion . The trial court also stated that it could not perceive of any prejudice to
Appellant arising from its decision to not employ the procedure . Appellant filed a timely
motion for a new trial, citing Philpott, which was then final, thus preserving the issue for
review by this Court. We must therefore reverse this matter for a new trial at which the
jury shall be properly instructed .
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court and remand for a new trial.
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J., dissents without separate opinion .
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT :
Shelly R . Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601-1133
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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