DANA LLOYD NAPIER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2002-SC-0596-MR
APPELLANT
DANA LLOYD NAPIER
V.
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
02-CR-00070
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
Appellant, Dana Lloyd Napier, was convicted in the Floyd Circuit Court for the
May 2001 murder of his neighbor, Dairl Eddington, and sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Finding no error, we affirm .
On May 6, 2001, Eddington was shot and killed while mowing his yard in Perry
County, Kentucky. The murder weapon, a .12-gauge shotgun, was recovered near
Appellant's property . The investigation revealed that the gun belonged to Appellant's
father-in-law, who stated he had loaned the gun to Appellant . Appellant's two sons both
told authorities that Appellant confessed to shooting Eddington, and asked them to
retrieve the gun and dispose of it after the authorities were gone . The motive for the
shooting appeared to be a boundary line dispute . Appellant was indicted the following
week for capital murder .
In December 2001, trial commenced in the Perry Circuit Court . After court
recessed for lunch during jury selection, the Commonwealth set up a display of four
photographs of the victim . When the thirty-four potential jurors returned from lunch,
they observed the photographs. Defense counsel immediately moved that the panel be
discharged and the case rescheduled for trial with a new jury panel. The
Commonwealth responded that it had set up the display for the victim's family to choose
a photograph to be used during trial . The prosecutor explained that the courtroom was
supposed to have been locked and the photographs removed prior to the jurors
returning . Nonetheless, the trial court granted Appellant's motion and declared a
mistrial. While there was a subsequent hearing concerning the mistrial and the
Commonwealth's actions in causing such, the trial court did not make any specific
finding of prosecutorial misconduct.
Prior to the second trial, a special judge was appointed since the Perry Circuit
Judge had a scheduling conflict which precluded his availability on the date the trial was
set. On the morning of trial in June 2002, the special judge entered an order moving the
trial to Floyd County, his home county. All parties agreed to the change of venue since
a defense witness was a member of the Perry County jury pool . Following a trial in the
Floyd Circuit Court, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-five
years imprisonment. This appeal followed . Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
I.
Appellant first contends that because the mistrial was the result of prosecutorial
misconduct, retrial is barred on double jeopardy grounds. Specifically, Appellant relies
on this Court's opinions in Commonwealth v. Deloney , Ky., 20 SW.3d 471 (2000), and
Tinsley v. Jackson , Ky., 771 S.W .2d 331 (1989), in arguing that the Commonwealth's
act of creating a "shrine" to the victim, which it was aware the jurors would see upon
reentering the courtroom, constituted bad faith and overreaching that barred any
subsequent prosecution on the murder charge. We disagree .
The law is clear that in a jury trial, jeopardy does not attach until the jury is
impaneled and sworn . Crist v. Bretz, 437 U .S. 28, 38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed .2d 24
(1978) . As we noted in Couch v. Maricle , Ky., 998 S.W.2d 469 (1999), "[t]he reason for
attaching jeopardy at this point is to protect the accused's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal ." Citing Oregon v . Kennel , 456 U .S. 667, 102 S .Ct .
2083, 72 L.Ed .2d 416 (1982) . Appellant's reliance on Deloney and Tinsley is misplaced
since both cases involved the grant of a mistrial after the jury had been selected and
sworn .
Here, jury selection was not completed at the time the thirty-four jurors returned
to the courtroom and observed the photographs . Certainly, we appreciate Appellant's
argument that the display was inappropriate and prejudicial . And, it is clear from the
transcript of the hearing concerning the mistrial that the trial court was extremely
incensed by the Commonwealth's conduct . However, because the jury was not
impaneled and sworn, jeopardy had not attached and it was not necessary for the trial
court to make a finding as to whether the prosecutor's conduct rose to the level of bad
faith or overreaching . The appropriate remedy was to discharge the jury pool and
reschedule the trial. As such, retrial simply was not barred by double jeopardy
principles.
II .
Appellant next contends that the change of venue from Perry County to Floyd
County did not comport with the statutory requirements of KRS 452 .220(2) . Appellant
concedes that this error is not preserved but urges review under RCr 10.26 . We find no
error, palpable or otherwise .
Prior to the second trial, it was brought to the special judge's attention that the
Perry County jury pool was tainted because it included a defense witness, Francis
Nancy Haley, Appellant's sister-in-law . The trial court thereafter entered an order
stating, in pertinent part, "the Commonwealth and the defendant being in agreement to
change venue in this action to Floyd County, and the Court being sufficiently and
otherwise well advised ; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that venue is hereby changed to
Floyd County." The record does not contain a motion by either party requesting the
change in venue, and it is unclear who advised the trial court of the problem with the
jury pool .
However, the court's order reflects that venue was changed with the
agreement of the parties and the record contains absolutely no evidence to the contrary .
Notwithstanding Appellant's apparent agreement to the change in venue, he now
asserts that such was improper because the requirements of KRS 452.220 were not
observed . Specifically, he argues that subsection (2) mandates a petition in writing,
verified by the defendant, and two affidavits from credible persons "not kin to or of
counsel for the defendant" stating essentially that Appellant cannot receive a fair trial in
the county objected to. See also Whittler v. Commonwealth , Ky., 810 S .W.2d 505
(1991), and Bryant v . Commonwealth , Ky., 467 S .W.2d 351 (1971). However, KRS
452 .220(2) is applicable only when the motion for change of venue is made by the
defendant. Subsection (1) governs a motion made by the Commonwealth and requires
only that it file a signed petition stating the reasons for a change of venue . Regardless
of which party moves for a change of venue, KRS 452 .220(3) provides that
"[a]pplications under this section shall be made and determined in open court, and the
court shall hear all witnesses produced by either party and determine from the evidence
whether the defendant is entitled to a change of venue ." In making its determination,
the trial court has wide discretion which will not be disturbed if supported by substantial
evidence. See Stopher v. Commonwealth , Ky., 57 S .W.3d 787 (2001), cert. denied ,
535 U .S. 1059 (2002) .
In Morris v. Commonwealth , 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948), our
predecessor court held that constitutional and statutory provisions governing an
accused's right as to the place of trial are mandatory . However, that right, as with other
constitutional rights, is personal to the accused and may be waived either by failure to
object to improper venue or by agreement of the parties to a venue other than that
specified by statute . United States v. Rodri uez, 67 F.3d 1312 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied , 517 U .S. 1174 (1996) .
In Commonwealth v. Hampton , Ky., 814 S.W.2d 584 (1991), the Commonwealth
and the defense agreed to a change of venue from Knox County to Madison County .
The Madison Circuit Court thereafter ordered, sua sponte , the retransfer of the case to
Knox County on the grounds that "venue is not a matter that may be agreed on by the
participants in a criminal proceeding ; but rather, once a request for change has been
made, it is a matter of judicial determination ." Id. at 585 . In affirming the Madison Circuit
Court's retransfer order, the Court of Appeals ruled that under the venue removal
statute, KRS 452.210, the Knox Circuit Court was required to change venue to an
adjacent county to which there was no valid objection . Only upon a finding that the
defendant could not receive a fair trial in an adjacent county, would the trial court have
the authority to move the case to another convenient county. The Court of Appeals
concluded that there was no such determination made .
In reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court relied on the decision in
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 266 Ky. 662, 99 S .W.2d 774 (1936), wherein the parties had
also entered into an agreement to change venue to a nonadjoining county. In upholding
the change of venue, our predecessor court held that "in lieu of hearing evidence the
court has the right to approve the agreement of the parties and authorize the change of
venue to the county agreed upon." Id. at 775. See also Sturgill v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
516 S.W.2d 652, 653 (1974) . Thus, in Hampton , supra , we concluded that venue may
be waived by the parties in a criminal action by agreement or otherwise, and that an
agreement by the parties dispenses with the statutory requirements of the trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing . Id . 814 S.W.2d at 587.
Here, Appellant not only failed to object to the change of venue from Perry to
Floyd County, but he specifically agreed to such. Thus, he cannot now complain on
appeal about any alleged improper procedure by the trial court. We find no error
occurred in transferring venue to Floyd County .
Ill .
Appellant's last allegation of error concerns two alleged improper contacts with
jurors. The first occurred when a juror approached one of the police officers present at
trial and asked a question unrelated to the case, namely the legality of turning on red at
a traffic signal. The officer declined to answer the question and the Commonwealth
thereafter immediately informed the trial court of the incident. The trial court declined to
grant Appellant's motion for a mistrial, finding that no prejudice resulted from the
incident . The second alleged improper contact occurred during the defense case when
the Commonwealth informed the trial court that a juror had asked one of the
investigators whether the gun would be returned to Appellant's father-in-law . The
investigator did not respond. The trial court again denied Appellant's motion for a
mistrial finding no prejudice had occurred .
Other than citing Hamilton v. Poe, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 840 (1971), for the
proposition that improper contact with jurors is grounds for a mistrial, Appellant fails to
explain how he was prejudiced by either one-sided and brief incident. Neither the police
officer nor the investigator responded to the juror questions, and the Commonwealth
immediately informed the trial court of both contacts . In Talbott v . Commonwealth , Ky.,
968 SW.2d 76, 86 (1998), we held that innocent contacts involving light and
insubstantial matters between a witness and a juror are harmless violations of KRS
29A .310(2)' and do not deprive a defendant of a fair trial. We simply fail to perceive
how either isolated incident prejudiced Appellant or created a manifest necessity
warranting a mistrial . No error occurred .
The judgment and sentence of the Floyd Circuit Court are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J ., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Wintersheimer, J .J .,
concur. Stumbo, J ., not sitting .
KRS 29A.310(2) provides :
No officer, party, or witness to an action pending, or his attorney or
attorneys shall, without leave of court, converse with the jury or any
member thereof upon any subject after they have been sworn .
7
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Ned Barry Pillersdorf
Pillersdorf, Derossett & Lane
124 W. Court Street
Prestonsburg, KY 41653
Joseph R . Lane
Pillersdorf, Derossett & Lane
124 W . Court Street
Prestonsburg, KY 42653
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Louis F . Mathias, Jr.
Office of the Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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