GERALD YOUNG V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
'Sixprrutt Courf of
2002-SC-0588-MR
APPELLANT
GERALD YOUNG
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE
1997-CR-1069-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
In 1998, Young was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to
death . He appealed and this Court affirmed his conviction but reversed his death
sentence because there was no aggravating circumstance applicable to his
participation in the murder and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty
phase . Young v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 50 S.W .3d 148 (2001) . A new penalty phase
was conducted in 2002 and the jury sentenced Young to life in prison . It is from this
sentence that he now appeals .
The questions presented on appeal are whether the parole statistics sought to
be introduced by Young are probative of his chances of being paroled and whether the
closing argument of the prosecutor was legally proper.
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce statistical evidence
establishing the probability of Young receiving parole . He claimed that the evidence
was admissible under recent amendments to the truth-in-sentencing statute, KRS
532.055(2)(b), which allows a defendant to introduce evidence in mitigation or in
support of leniency . At a pretrial hearing on the motion, the trial judge expressed
concerns about the evidence because the statistics charting the decisions of the current
parole board were not probative of the decisions of a future parole board . She also
suggested that defense counsel obtain a witness who could testify about the statistics .
Defense counsel filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion on
June 4, 2002, attaching as exhibits copies of certified records of the parole board's
annual statistics for fiscal years 1993-94 through 2000-01 . On June 6, 2002, the trial
judge entered an order neither sustaining nor overruling the motion at that time, but
requiring the defendant to provide additional support or argument for introducing the
evidence .
During a bench conference at the new sentencing hearing, defense counsel
sought to introduce the statistical evidence concerning parole. The Commonwealth
objected because the records offered by the defense did not indicate the amount of
time each prisoner was deferred and there was no witness present to explain these
facts . It also objected on grounds that parole is not a random act and the statistics do
not show the probability that this defendant would be paroled . The trial judge sustained
the Commonwealth's objection because there was no witness to explain the statistical
data . Ultimately, the jury sentenced Young to life in prison . This appeal followed .
I . Parole Statistics
Young argues that the trial judge erred by prohibiting him from introducing
statistical evidence of the likelihood that he will receive parole to rebut the prejudicial
implications of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth of minimum parole
eligibility. He contends that Abbott v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 822 S .W.2d 417 (1992), is
no longer applicable because of legislative changes in KRS 532 .055. We find no error.
The statistics compiled by Young and sought to be introduced as to parole
probability are not probative of his chances of being paroled . The evidence he attempts
to present does not predict his actual chances of being paroled and therefore is
irrelevant and incompetent . See KRE 401-403 . The statistics presented for the years
1993 to 2001 cover only the actions of the current parole board . His parole
determination will be made by a different board selected by a different administration
which may have different parole policies . Parole determination is inherently an
individualized decision based on the particular facts of the case under consideration
and it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to predict by generalized probability
statistics . See Hunt v. State, 583 A.2d 218 (Md. 1990).
The contention by Young that his statistical evidence rebuts the parole eligibility
evidence of the Commonwealth is without merit. The Commonwealth offered proof,
pursuant to KRS 532 .055(2)(x)(1) of the minimum parole eligibility of Young, not proof
regarding the probability that Young would ever actually be paroled. The statistical
evidence presented by Young does not controvert the parole eligibility proof presented
by the Commonwealth and, consequently, does not qualify as rebuttal . See Abbott ,
supra.
Our review indicates that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to
accept the proffered statistical evidence from Young . The evidence simply fails to
demonstrate what it is offered to prove; it does not indicate that Young is likely or
unlikely to be paroled when he becomes eligible. The evidence relies on the
assumption that the Young case is an "average" case and is highly speculative. The
decision whether to grant parole to a defendant is an inherently individualized decision
and although statistics may illustrate what happens in the average situation, they are
not probative as to what will happen in a particular case .
II . Closing Argument
Young contends that he was denied due process and substantially prejudiced by
the closing argument of the prosecutor encouraging the jury to ignore evidence of
mitigation and to send a general message to the community by imposing a maximum
sentence against him. He concedes that this issue is not preserved but seeks review
pursuant to RCr 10.26 .
Upon a careful examination of the record in this case, we have determined that
the comments of the prosecutor were not error and were certainly not palpable error.
RCr 10 .26 . He did not make unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the opposing
advocate . His comments on the mitigation evidence were not misleading and the
prosecutor confined himself to the facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may be
drawn therefrom.
When prosecutorial misconduct is claimed, the relevant inquiry on appeal should
always center around the overall fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
prosecutor . Maxie v. Commonwealth, Ky., 82 S .W .3d 860 (2002); see also
Commonwealth v. Petrey, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 417 (1997) . Here, Young received a
fundamentally fair trial. He has no basis for his complaints . A complete review of this
case indicates that there were no due process violations relating to either the federal or
Kentucky Constitution .
The sentence is affirmed .
Cooper and Graves, JJ ., concur. Johnstone, J., concurs by separate opinion .
Keller, J ., dissents by separate opinion and is joined by Lambert, C.J ., and Stumbo, J .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Misty Jenine Dugger
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Brian T . Judy
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$uyrrmr 0-1.vurf of `rufurkV
'Pt
2002-SC-0588-MR
GERALD YOUNG
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE
1997-CR-1069-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
I agree with much of the thoughtful dissent of Justice Keller which supports the
admission of parole data offered by a defendant during the sentencing hearing . It
appears to me that the 1998 amendment to KRS 532 .055(2)(b) should be construed to
permit a defendant to present evidence regarding the possibility of parole in order to
rebut the prejudicial effect of the Commonwealth's evidence of minimum parole
eligibility . However, I am not persuaded that the evidence in this case was sufficiently
developed to allow its admission . Thus, I would leave the issue for another day.
RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixpratr (9ourf of ~rnfurkg
2002-SC-0588-MR
GERALD YOUNG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE
1997-CR-1069-002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
From the time that Kentucky first adopted bifurcated Truth-in-Sentencing
procedures for felony criminal trials, issues began cropping up about the type and
extent of parole information a jury should receive prior to making its sentencing
decision . It is beyond dispute, however, that in our eighteen (18) years of experience
under Truth-in-Sentencing, we have concluded that the possibility that a defendant
might receive an early release from prison is a relevant factor in a jury's sentencing
determination . After all, we have permitted the introduction of evidence relating to
parole eligibility,' good time credits, 2 and credit for time served 3 because those matters
"potentially affect the actual duration of a period of imprisonment imposed by the jury . "4
Boone v. Commonwealth , Ky., 780 S .W.2d 615 (1989) . See also Offutt v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 799 S .W.2d 815, 817 (1990).
'
2 Cornelison v. Commonwealth , Ky., 990 S .W.2d 609 (1999) .
3 Commonwealth v. Higgs , Ky., 59 S .W.3d 886, 893-94 (2001) .
4 Cornelison , 990 S.W .2d at 611 .
In affirming the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court in the case at bar, however,
today's plurality opinion merely perpetuates the inevitable "confusion and `half-truths"' 5
that Justice Leibson foreshadowed when this Court first extended comity to KRS
532 .055, and continues to "allow the Commonwealth to produce vague, uncertain and
incomplete evidence about existing minimum parole guidelines .
,6
When this Court
previously expressed its view that parole eligibility statistics were not admissible under
the then-existing version of KRS 532.055(2)(b), a dissenting opinion made a persuasive
case for the introduction of actual parole data as "evidence in mitigation" to rebut the
prejudicial implications of parole eligibility information introduced by the
Commonwealth :
These statistics were the only means available to the
appellant to complete the information given by the
Commonwealth, and to restore some degree of fairness and
credibility to the sentencing process . The Majority Opinion
shuts the door on legitimate rebuttal; it denies fundamental
fairness .'
Subsequent to that opinion, however, the case for the admission of parole data became
virtually unassailable when the General Assembly amended KRS 532 .055(2)(b) to
permit defendants to introduce a broader range of evidence in Truth-in-Sentencing
proceedings, i .e. , "evidence in mitigation or in support of leniency ."8 In light of this
statutory change, there is no longer any serious dispute that, at KRS 532 .055 Truth-in5 Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky ., 734 S .W.2d 794, 800 (1987) (Leibson, J .,
dissenting) .
6 Huff v . Commonwealth , Ky., 763 S.W.2d 106, 112 (1988) (Leibson, J .,
dissenting) .
Abbott v . Commonwealth , Ky., 822 S.W.2d 417, 420 (1992) (citations omitted)
(Leibson, J ., dissenting) .
8 1998 Ky. Acts . ch. 606, § 111 (effective July 1 5, 1998) (emphasis added) .
Sentencing proceedings, criminal defendants are entitled to introduce proof that they
are unlikely to be paroled at their initial parole eligibility hearing . 9 Accordingly, today's
plurality opinion abandons the view that KRS 532 .055(2)(b) excludes proof on that
topic, and instead takes issue with the form of the evidence that Appellant offered to
prove the unlikelihood that he would be paroled at his minimum parole date - i .e. , the
certified copies' ° of Kentucky Parole Board records showing that only a fraction of
inmates received a recommendation for parole at their initial parole eligibility hearings
between fiscal years 1993-1994 and 2000-2001 ." The plurality opinion affirms the trial
court's decision to exclude Appellant's statistical evidence because, in its estimation,
the Parole Board's records "do[ ] not indicate that Young is likely or unlikely to be
paroled when he becomes eligible . 02 Because "'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence
9 I would observe that the Commonwealth essentially conceded as much in the
trial court when it admitted that Abbott "was somewhat altered by the change of the
statute ." And, in its brief to this Court, the Commonwealth's only retort to Appellant's
argument that the amendment to KRS 532 .055(2)(b) authorizes "parole probability
evidence" is a statement in a footnote that reads "[t]he amendment . . . does not define
or explain the scope or purpose of the change in the statutory language ."
1° See KRE 803(8) ; KRE 901(b)(7) ; KRE 902(4) .
11 The Parole Board's statistics demonstrated that at initial parole eligibility
hearings : (1) parole was actually recommended for between only nine percent (9%) and
twenty percent (20%) of inmates ; and (2) the Parole Board typically orders "serve outs"
for more than twice the number of inmates that it recommends parole :
FY
00-01
99-00
98-99
97-98
96-97
95-96
94-95
93-94
# Initial Hrngs .
5,047
4,872
4,852
5,244
6,458
5,532
4,497
4,241
12
Rec. for Parole
784(16%)
436(9%)
626(13%)
496(9%)
907(14%)
854(15%)
726(16%)
856(20%)
Young v . Commonwealth , Ky.,
(emphasis added) .
S.W .3d
Deferred
2,099(42%)
2,094(43%)
2,091(43%)
2,519(48%)
2,879(45%)
2,192(40%)
1,727(38%)
1,772(42%)
Serve Outs
2,164(42%)
2,342(48%)
2,135(44%)
2,229(43%)
2,672(41%)
2,486(45%)
2,044(46%)
1,613(38%)
(2004) (Slip Op . at 4)
having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
determination of an action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence[,]" 13 and the concerns highlighted in the plurality opinion address themselves
only to the weight that the jury should assign to such evidence, i.e . , to its sufficiency
rather than to its admissibility, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse Appellant's life
sentence and to remand Appellant's Murder conviction to the trial court for a new KRS
532.055 Truth-in-Sentencing proceeding .
In the outset, I must note that the basis for the trial court's decision to exclude
this evidence was wholly unrelated to the grounds upon which today's plurality opinion
deems it inadmissible. Appellant filed a motion in limine in which he sought the trial
court's approval to introduce the Parole Board's statistical records "to rebut the
prejudicial implications of the Commonwealth's evidence of minimum parole eligibility,
should the Commonwealth introduce such evidence ." On the day of trial, the
Commonwealth objected to the introduction of the records on the grounds that the raw
data could be misleading. The Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney hypothesized
that the Parole Board might be "cooking its books" by denying parole at initial eligibility
hearings but then granting parole to large numbers of inmates after short deferments
and therefore argued that the raw data should not be admitted into evidence unless the
defense could produce a witness, subject to cross-examination, who could explain and
interpret that data . Although today's plurality opinion's holding is premised exclusively
on a conclusion that "[tJhe evidence . . . does not predict his actual chances of being
KRE 401 . See also KRE 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, by acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by
these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.") .
13
paroled and therefore is irrelevant and incompetent[, ]"14 and the plurality opinion states
that "the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to accept the proffered
statistical evidence[,] "15 I would note that the trial court did not utter any of the words
"probative" or "relevant" or "substantially more prejudicial than" when it excluded this
evidence . Instead, after observing that the prosecuting attorney "raised a good point
about deferrals" and vocalizing the possibility that the Parole Board's data might "make
them look better than they actually are," the trial court ruled that Appellant could not
introduce the Parole Board records "without having someone come in to `flesh out"' the
data contained in those records . Accordingly, this is not a case where we must give
deference to a trial court's relevancy determination ; this trial court made no such
determination, and I would further observe that neither the plurality opinion nor the
Commonwealth make any attempt to defend the trial court's ruling on its own merits .
.
KRS 532 .055 "embraces the idea of informed decision-making by a jury
This
Court granted comity to the Truth-in-Sentencing Act to permit "a better informed
sentencing process" 1' free of the chief deficiencies under the prior procedure whereby
"the jury [was] required to sentence in a vacuum without any knowledge of the
defendant's past criminal record or other matters that might be pertinent to consider in
the assessment of an appropriate penalty . "18 This Court has described the policy
behind Truth-in-Sentencing as allowing the jury access to "full and accurate information"
14
Young ,
15
Id . at
S.W.3d at
(Slip Op . at 3) (citing KRE 401-403) .
(Slip Op. at 4) .
16
Turfway Park Racing. Ass'n v. Griffin , Ky., 834 S.W .2d 667, 673 (1992) . See
also Mabe v. Commonwealth , Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668, 672-3 (1994) .
17
Reneer, 734 S.W .2d at 797.
18 Id
relevant to its decision, including how much of the sentence the defendant was likely to
serve:
[T]he policy embodied in the "truth-in-sentencing" statute,
KRS 532 .055 is to provide full and accurate information to
the sentencing jury, and to insure that the sentencing jury is
well informed about all pertinent information relating to the
person on trial. The jury was entitled to know when it was
deliberating Appellee's sentence not only how much of the
sentence he was likely to serve , but also how much of it he
had already served .
Today's plurality opinion subverts those ends by depriving juries of evidence that
is necessary for them to contextualize parole eligibility information and to distinguish
between eligibility for parole consideration and the probability (or improbability) that a
defendant will actually be paroled when he or she first becomes eligible . Although the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence govern KRS 532 .055 Truth-in-Sentencing proceedings
before a jury ,2° and the plurality opinion states repeatedly (at least three (3) times by my
count) that the Parole Board's records are not probative of whether Appellant actually
will be paroled at his initial eligibility hearing, the opinion contains only one (1) passing
citation to the KRE's three (3) most important relevancy rules, but nothing that even
resembles an analysis of the admissibility of such evidence under those rules. As such,
it appears that the plurality opinion has defined "probative" using some independent
and undefined standard that has nothing to do with the relevancy provisions of the
' 9 Hi
2°
s, 59 S .W.3d at 894 (citations omitted and emphasis added) .
KRE 1101 (b) ("These rules apply generally to . . . criminal proceedings[ .]). Cf .
McGuire v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 885 S.W.2d 931, 938 (1994) (applying KRE 403 to
evidentiary rulings in Truth-in-Sentencing proceeding) .
Kentucky Rules of Evidence, which "tilt[ ] outcomes toward admission rather than
exclusion ."
21
The inclusionary thrust of relevancy as a concept is
assured in two ways. By using the words "any tendency" to
describe relevant evidence, the rule intends to declare that
an item of evidence is relevant if it possesses any probative
value at all . By using the gauge "more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence," the rule
makes it clear that an item of evidence may be relevant
even though it leaves the proposition toward which it is
offered in great doubt . . . . In other words, an item of
evidence is relevant under the terms of Rule 401 if it
advances the inquiry to any deqree at all .
When viewed through the proper lens of KRE 401, the parole records were relevant to
prove that Appellant's parole at the time of his initial hearing was anything but a
foregone conclusion . Although the plurality opinion's criticisms of this evidence are fair
- the records from past parole proceedings, which group the entire inmate population
together, do not establish conclusively that Appellant will be denied parole on this
Murder sentence when he first comes before a future Parole Board 23 - those criticisms
address themselves to the sufficiency 24 of Appellant's evidence rather than its
21
80(4t"
ROBERT
ed . 2003) .
G . LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 2 .05[3], at 79-
22
Evidence Rules Study Committee, Kentucky Rules of Evidence, Final Draft 21
(Nov. 1989) .
I would dispute, however, the plurality opinion's statement that "[t]he statistics
presented for the years 1993 to 2001 cover only the actions of the current parole
board[,]" Young ,
S .W.3d at
(Slip Op. at 3), see KRS 439.320 (describing the
procedures for the appointment of Parole Board Members and the length of their
terms), and I would observe that the records that Appellant sought to introduce
reflected parole decisions made by Parole Boards appointed by both Governor
Brereton Jones (1991-1995) and Governor Paul Patton (1995-2003) .
23
24
LAWSON, supra note 21 at § 2.05[3], at 80 ("Lack of appreciation of the
leniency of this requirement and of the law's powerful tilt toward admission over
exclusion can result from inadequate awareness of the difference between the
concepts of `relevancy' and `sufficiency ."') .
admissibility under our Rules of Evidence. Although the plurality opinion's concerns
identify issues that the Commonwealth could bring to the jury's attention through
argument and/or independent evidence, to be relevant under the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence an item of evidence "need not prove conclusively the proposition for which it
is offered . It need not even make that proposition appear more probable than not. . . . It
is enough if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more probable than it
would appear without the evidence . Even after the probative force of the evidence is
,25
spent, the proposition for which it is offered still can seem quite improbable .
Perhaps Appellant could have accumulated more specific parole data that was
limited to inmates convicted of Murder or produced an expert witness who could have
testified to his or her opinion regarding Appellant's prospects for parole . The possibility
that Appellant might have found better evidence to prove his claim, however, does not
render irrelevant the certified Parole Board records that Appellant actually sought to
introduce in this case, which showed that, in any given recent year, at best one-fifth
(1/5t") of inmates received a recommendation for parole at their initial parole hearings .
Those records permitted a reasonable inference that Appellant's early parole was, at
best, indefinite, and the trial court erred when it excluded this evidence.
In my view, this case is a prime illustration of why criminal defendants must be
permitted to introduce such evidence . In its opening statement to the jury in this
sentencing-phase-only retrial, the Commonwealth explained that it would introduce
parole eligibility guidelines that "tell you when a defendant is eligible to first meet the
parole board to see if he's going to be released or not." In its summation, however, the
25
Evidence Rules Study Committee, Kentucky Rules of Evidence, Final Draft 21
(Nov . 1989) (quoting CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 542-43 (3d ed . 1984)) .
Commonwealth's discussion of the guidelines left a distinctly different impression . In
fact, the Commonwealth omitted any use of any form of the word "eligibility" when it
urged the jury to "send a message" to the defendant by giving him the maximum
sentence possible and referenced the only exhibit published to the jury as follows: "I
know about these parole guidelines - twelve (12) years for twenty-four (24) years and
above including life ." I appreciate the fact that a defendant can explain to the jury that
"eligibility is no guarantee, and the defendant may have to serve every single day of the
sentence you fix." But, in this case, Appellant's trial counsel recognized that it may
require more than argument to shake a jury of its preconceptions and thus sought to
introduce documentary evidence to prove that only a small fraction of inmates receive
recommendations for parole at their initial eligibility date . In my view, there is no
question that the evidence excluded by the trial court would have made the argument
more tangible for the jury, which presumably had no experience with the parole
system and was thus prone to interpret parole eligibility as the near-certainty to which it
was implicitly equated during the Commonwealth's summation . Justice Leibson's
dissenting opinion in Abbott says virtually everything that needs to be said about the
reasons that such evidence is relevant to a jury's sentencing recommendation :
There is no logical reason why, when a jury has been
given evidence of minimum parole eligibility, the defendant
may not mitigate the resulting prejudice by offering statistics
showing that only a fraction of convicts are granted parole
on their initial try. To hold otherwise misleads the jury into
believing that inmates are frequently paroled when they first
become eligible and to encourage jurors to impose harsher
sentences than they would otherwise think appropriate . . . .
26
See Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV .
311, 370 (2003) ("Providing Jurors with information about parole . . . practices would not
only serve the goal of consistency and the fair administration of justice, but would also
promote the transparency and accountability of the justice system .") .
If the jury is entitled to know that a defendant may not serve
the full term it imposes, surely it is also entitled to know that
the vast majority of convicts are not paroled when they first
become eligible. . . .2'
In my opinion, those words are as true today as they were when they were written
twelve (12) years ago, and Appellant should have an opportunity at a new sentencing
hearing to introduce this statistical information for the jury's consideration .
Lambert, C .J . and Stumbo, J., join this dissenting opinion .
27
Abbott, 822 S .W .2d at 420 (citations omitted) (Leibson, J ., dissenting) .
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.