MITCHELL B . THOMAS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2002-SC-0552-MR
AIL
MITCHELL B . THOMAS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HON . ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, SPECIAL JUDGE
01-CR-0008
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellant stands convicted of one (1) count of Trafficking in a Controlled
Substance In or Near a School and of three (3) counts of First-Degree Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, Second or Subsequent Offense . The jury recommended a three
(3) year sentence for the conviction of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in or near a
School and a twelve (12) year sentence for each conviction of First-Degree Trafficking
in a Controlled Substance, Second or Subsequent Offense . The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of twenty (24) years . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of
right,' claiming that the trial court erred (1) by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
' KY. CONST . § 110(2)(b) .
evidence of prior bad acts by Appellant, and (2) by failing to instruct the jury on
entrapment . Finding no error, we affirm .
II. BACKGROUND
Between August 18 and October 24, 2000, members of the Buffalo Trace
Narcotics Taskforce3 worked with two (2) civilian informants, John Horn and Billy Joe
Kirby, who engaged in four (4) separate drug transactions with Appellant on three (3)
separate occasions . Horn and Kirby were well-known to Appellant as each had a
history of purchasing and using crack cocaine with Appellant . Horn became a civilian
informant as part of a plea bargain in which a felony charge against him, i .e . , attempting
to falsely obtain prescription drugs, was reduced to a misdemeanor in exchange for his
agreement to assist the task force in controlled drug "buys . ,4 For each "buy," the
informants received compensation of one hundred ($100.00) dollars, in addition to any
cash provided by the task force for the buy. The basic maneuvers undertaken by the
task force with respect to the civilian informants were (1) to wire the informants with
listening equipment, (2) to provide the informants with cash to facilitate a buy, (3) to
have the informants approach the defendant at his home and indicate their interest in
making a buy, and (4) to conduct surveillance on the vehicle occupied by Appellant .
Following this basic plan, the drug buys charged in the indictment took place .
2 In addition to these contentions, Appellant originally asserted that he could not
be convicted of both second or subsequent offender status and persistent felony
offender status. Upon further reflection, Appellant withdrew this contention in his reply
brief.
3 According to Officer Tim Fegan, a narcotics officer for the Buffalo Trace
Gateway Narcotics Task Force, the task force investigates mid-level to street-level
dealers in eight counties and aids in the prosecution of individuals charged with these
types of crime .
4 A "buy" is the term used by the taskforce to refer to a purchase of drugs .
On August 18, 2002, members of the narcotics task force met with Kirby and
equipped his vehicle with a transmitter, placed a recorder on his body, provided him
with one hundred ($100 .00) dollars, and advised him to attempt to make a drug
purchase from Appellant . Kirby went to Appellant's residence and Appellant left with
Kirby in search of someone from whom to purchase crack cocaine . Kirby and Appellant
drove around the area known as "Commerce Street" and approached a residence .
Appellant left the vehicle and went inside, returned and indicated that no one inside had
crack to sell, and the two continued to a different location . Appellant again exited the
vehicle, and when he returned he provided Kirby with a substance later determined to
be crack cocaine . Kirby then returned to the taskforce and surrendered the drugs. On
September 19, 2000, members of the task force met with Horn, equipped him with a
body transmitter and micro recorder, provided him with one hundred ($100 .00) dollars,
and advised him to attempt to make a drug transaction . Horn went to Appellant's home,
indicated that he was interested in purchasing crack cocaine, and gave him the money
provided to him by the task force with which to purchase the drugs . Appellant instructed
Horn to meet him at a car wash in Maysville and approximately fifteen (15) to twenty
(20) minutes later, Appellant met Horn and provided him with a substance later
determined to be crack cocaine . Horn then delivered the drugs to the narcotics task
force . On October 24, 2000, Horn again worked with the narcotics task force to arrange
a buy between himself and Appellant . Much like the September 19, 2000, arrangement,
Horn met with members of the narcotics task force, they wired him and provided him
with one hundred ($100 .00) dollars, and then they followed his vehicle at a safe
distance while he attempted to arrange a second purchase . Horn again went to
Appellant's residence . Appellant entered Horn's car and stated that he did not have any
money but that he had Darvocet .5
Appellant offered to sell the pills to Horn and stated
that he could then use that money to purchase crack cocaine. Horn agreed to the
transaction and then drove Appellant to the residence of a known drug dealer.
Appellant went inside, purchased crack cocaine, and split the drugs with Horn . Horn
then delivered the Darvocet pills and the crack cocaine to the narcotics task force.
Appellant's defense throughout the trial was that he was a drug addict who
facilitated drug "buys" for Horn and Kirby, but he was not a trafficker . Appellant stated
that because both Horn and Kirby were white, they were not able to purchase crack
cocaine easily because many dealers would not sell to them . Thus, Appellant's
presence ensured that they would be able to purchase the substance. Appellant
contended that he was a crack addict in dire financial straits and would take desperate
measures in order to obtain drugs. He maintained that he and the informants would
pool their money in order to purchase a greater quantity of crack cocaine and would
generally smoke the entire amount upon purchase. Appellant made much of the fact
that he did not engage in these encounters in order to make a profit and that his intent
was not to sell or deal drugs . He maintained that he was not a drug trafficker because
his sole intent in facilitating the transactions was to "get high ."
The Commonwealth introduced testimony by informant Horn in order to rebut
Appellant's contention that he did not sell drugs for profit . Horn testified that the first
time he met Appellant, he was in the Fourth Street area and Appellant approached him
and asked whether he was interested in purchasing crack. Horn responded
5 Testimony at trial revealed that the Darvocet was prescribed to Appellant's wife
for an arm injury and was taken without her knowledge .
affirmatively, told Appellant how much he wanted, and Appellant procured a "fifty"
($50.00 worth) of cocaine for him .
The grand jury charged Appellant with three (3) counts of First-Degree Trafficking
in a Controlled Substance, Second or Subsequent Offense, and one (1) count of
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance In or Near a School . In the guilt phase of the first
trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the three (3) counts of First-Degree
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance but convicted Appellant of Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance In or Near a School for the sale of the Darvocet pills . The trial
court accepted the jury's verdict on Trafficking in a Controlled Substance In or Near a
School, declared a mistrial on the remaining three (3) counts of First-Degree Trafficking
in a Controlled Substance, and proceeded with the penalty phase on Appellant's
conviction for Trafficking in a Controlled Substance In or Near a School . The jury
recommended a sentence of three (3) years for that conviction .
At Appellant's subsequent trial on the remaining three (3) counts, the jury found
Appellant guilty of the remaining counts, found Appellant to be a second or subsequent
offender, and recommended an enhanced sentence of twelve (12) years for each
conviction . The jury recommended that the second sentence run consecutively with the
first sentence and that the third sentence run concurrently . In other words, the jury
recommended a total sentence of twenty-four (24) years for the three (3) counts of FirstDegree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, Second or Subsequent Offense .
In accordance with the juries' recommendations, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to three (3) years for Trafficking in a Controlled Substance In or Near a
School and to an aggregate sentence of twenty-four (24) years for Appellant's three (3)
convictions for First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, Second or
Subsequent Offense . Additionally, the trial court ran the three (3) year sentence
concurrent with the other sentences for a total sentence on all counts of twenty-four (24)
years. Appellant appeals his convictions to this Court as a matter of right. We affirm .
III . ANALYSIS
A. PRIOR BAD ACTS
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Horn to testify over
Appellant's objection about Appellant's previous solicitation and sale of cocaine to him
more than one (1) year previously . Appellant contends that Horn's testimony, which
Appellant characterizes as "uncorroborated prior bad act testimony," merely showed
Appellant's criminal disposition and should have been excluded under KRE 404(b),
which provides :
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith . It may, however be admissible :
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident[ .)
Appellant testified that he did not sell drugs for profit but only engaged in these
drug transactions to "get high" :
It didn't have anything to do with profits or anything like
that. It was just getting a buzz . If you want to make a profit,
you just get out there and sell it, standing on the street with a
pocket full of it, and just, you know, just sell it. That's how
you make your profit, but it didn't have anything to do with
that. All I did was go out to get high off mine.
To rebut Appellant's testimony, the Commonwealth called Horn as a rebuttal witness,
and he testified that the first time he met Appellant, Appellant solicited and sold him fifty
($50.00) worth of cocaine:
Q1 .
Mr. Horn, would you tell the jury, please, when you
first met the defendant, Mitch Thomas?
A.
Q2 .
A.
Q3 .
A.
Q4.
A.
Q5 .
A.
Q6 .
A.
Q7.
A.
Fourth Street, Maysville, Kentucky.
What were the circumstances?
He come up to me and asked what I needed, and I
said, "A fifty of crack cocaine ."
And then what happened?
He went and got it and brought it back to me. I gave
him the money and then I left .
And approximately how long was this before you
worked for the task force?
Better than a year .
Did you know Mitch Thomas before that?
No.
Is that the first time that you had ever seen him?
Yes.
Is that the first time you ever talked to him?
Yes.
The Commonwealth asserts that Horn's testimony concerning Appellant's
previous sale of cocaine to him was not offered to show Appellant's criminal disposition .
Rather, the Commonwealth claims that the evidence was offered to prove that, contrary
to Appellant's assertion, he was not just a user but also engaged in the trafficking of
cocaine, and therefore, Horn's testimony was admissible .
We disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in admitting
Horn's testimony . Horn's testimony was relevant inasmuch as Appellant's only
"defense" to the charges was that he was not a "drug dealer" but simply facilitated the
buying and selling of drugs between individuals in order to obtain drugs to satisfy his
own addiction. Testimony that he previously solicited and sold drugs to Horn would
tend to refute this claim ; thus, the evidence is probative for a reason other than solely
showing Appellant's criminal disposition to traffic in drugs . Appellant had previously
submitted an entrapment instruction to the trial court, and Horn's testimony rebuts
Appellant's claim that he was not predisposed to engage in the drug buys . Accordingly,
Horn's testimony about Appellant's prior trafficking in cocaine does not fall under KRE
404(b)'s proscription against evidence of prior bad acts, but rather, it comes under KRE
404(b)(1)'s inclusionary provision, i.e. , proof of motive, intent, or predisposition .
Although we agree that the probative value of Horn's testimony was slight and
the testimony created a danger of undue prejudice, the balancing of its probativeness
against undue prejudice was the province of the trial court,' and its ruling is reviewed
under the standard of "whether there has been an abuse of that discretion .
,8
"The test
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ."9
Utilizing this test, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Horn's testimony concerning
Appellant's prior trafficking in cocaine . Additionally, we would point out that the
evidence that Appellant engaged in all of the charged trafficking offenses was
6 See United States v. Vance , 871 F .2d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 1989) ("This court has
noted that Rule 404(b) `is actually a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, since only
one use is forbidden and several permissible uses of such evidence are identified ."'
(citation omitted)).
KRE 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence .") . Accord Butcher v. Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S.W.3d 3, 10 (2002)
("Under KRE 403, the trial court must weigh the prejudicial effect against the probative
value of the evidence sought to be admitted .") ; Commonwealth v. English , Ky., 993
S .W.2d 941, 945 (1999) ("The balancing of the probative value of such evidence against
the danger of undue prejudice is a task properly reserved for the sound discretion of the
trial judge .") ; Rake v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 450 S.W .2d 527, 528 (1970) ("it is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the probative value of evidence
is outweighed by its possible prejudicial effect and to admit or exclude it accordingly .") .
8 English, 993 S .W.2d at 945 .
9 Id.
overwhelming, and accordingly, any error in admitting Horn's testimony would be
harmless .' °
Appellant argues that because Horn's testimony about the prior cocaine sale was
uncorroborated, the trial court should have excluded the testimony since the jury could
not "reasonably conclude" that the prior sale took place. We disagree . Although we
have not directly addressed this issue in the context of uncorroborated testimony of
prior bad acts, we have held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is
sufficient to support a conviction ." A fortiori , a jury may reasonably conclude from a
witness's uncorroborated testimony whether a prior drug sale occurred .
B. ENTRAPMENT INSTRUCTION
Alternatively, Appellant argues that if this Court determines that the prior bad act
evidence, discussed supra, was properly admitted, then the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. We disagree .
Appellant concedes that this claim of error was not properly preserved for
appellate review. As a result, he asks that we review this claim as palpable error under
RCr 10 .26 . But, we note that although Appellant failed to object when the trial court did
not instruct the jury on entrapment, Appellant had previously submitted an instruction on
the defense of entrapment to the trial court as part of the "Proposed Defense
' o RCr 9 .24 ("No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no
error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the
court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice . The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties .") .
11 Hodge v. Commonwealth , Ky., 17 S.W. 3d 824, 841 (2000) .
Instructions ." And, we find that the tendering of the entrapment instruction was
sufficient to preserve the claimed error under RCr 9 .54(2), which reads :
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless the party's position has been fairly
and adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes objection
before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the
matter to which the party objects and the ground or grounds
of the objection .
Thus, because Appellant offered an entrapment instruction, we review Appellant's
contention as a preserved error.
Appellant admits that he was predisposed to buy and use cocaine but claims that
he was entitled to the entrapment instruction based upon his trial testimony that he did
not actively engage in the sale or distribution of drugs, that he did not receive any profits
from the transactions at issue, that he only engaged in the behavior because of his
addiction, and that he was not pre-disposed to engage in the trafficking offenses . The
entrapment statute, KRS 505 . 010, reads as follows :
(1)
(2)
A person is not guilty of an offense arising out of
proscribed conduct when:
(a)
He was induced or encouraged to engage in
that conduct by a public servant or by a person
acting in cooperation with a public servant
seeking to obtain evidence against him for the
purpose of criminal prosecution ; and
(b)
At the time of the inducement or
encouragement, he was not otherwise
disposed to engage in such conduct .
The relief afforded by subsection (1) is unavailable
when :
(a)
The public servant or the person acting in
cooperation with a public servant merely
affords the defendant an opportunity to commit
an offense ; or
(b)
The offense charged has physical injury or the
threat of physical injury as one (1) of its
elements and the prosecution is based on
conduct causing or threatening such injury to a
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person other than the person perpetrating the
entrapment.
The relief provided a defendant by subsection (1) is a
defense .
"The defense of entrapment is available when there is evidence that the
defendant was induced by police authorities, or someone acting in cooperation with
them, to commit a criminal act which he was not otherwise disposed to commit ."12
Therefore, the issue in this case is whether sufficient evidence 13 existed to create a
doubt based on the defense of entrapment. 14 If the answer is yes, Appellant was
entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. 15 "The sufficiency of the evidence to
accomplish that purpose is a question of law for the courts to determine on a case-bycase basis. "16 Thus, we review de novo the trial court's decision not to instruct on
entrapment . 17
Appellant testified that he and the informants were "crack buddies" and that they
would pool their money and buy crack cocaine together in order to obtain a larger
12 Commonwealth v. Day, Ky., 983 S .W.2d 505, 508 (1999) .
13
"Sufficient evidence" also termed "satisfactory evidence" means "[e]vddence
that is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth ." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 580 (7 th ed . 1999) .
14 Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky., 555 S.W.2d 252, 257 (1977) ("Once there is
evidence sufficient to create a doubt, yes then the state has the burden of proof and
there must be an instruction so casting it .") ; Day , 983 S.W.2d at 508 ("As with any other
"defense" under the penal code, once the defendant introduces enough evidence to
create a doubt, the burden of proof shifts to the Commonwealth and there must be an
instruction so casting it.").
15
Brown , 555 S .W.2d at 257; Day, 983 S .W.2d at 508.
16
Jewell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (1977) .
17 Carroll v . Meredith , Ky. App., 59 S .W.3d 484, 489 (2001) ("An appellate court
reviews the application of the law to the facts and the appropriate legal standard de
novo."); 5 AM.JUR .2D, Appellate Review §§ 684, 697, 698 (1995) .
quantity . He testified that they would generally consume the drugs as soon as they
were purchased, and that although he and Horn "hung out" on a regular basis, Kirby
would only come to Appellant's residence when he wanted to "get high ." Appellant
further stated that he would procure the drugs because the two informants are white
and it was unlikely that any drug dealers would sell to them, and it was his addiction that
induced him to engage in these transactions, not a quest for profits . Thus, he claimed
that he was not a typical drug trafficker . However, Appellant states that "this is a
trafficking by transfer case[,]" and although he claims that "it is highly unlikely that [he]
would have bought and transferred crack cocaine to the confidential informants if they
had not come to him and asked him to do it[,]" he candidly admits that "[h]e had to sit
around and wait for someone with more money to come by so they could pool their
money and get more crack cocaine ." We fail to see how these facts demonstrate that
Appellant was not predisposed to commit the charged crimes; instead, the evidence,
particularly Appellant's testimony, demonstrates that he was predisposed to commit the
drug trafficking offenses . Here, it is undisputed that Appellant obtained cocaine for the
purpose of selling or transferring it to the confidential informants, and regardless of
whether he sold the cocaine to the informants or transferred it to them, his admitted
conduct constituted trafficking . The confidential informants merely afforded Appellant
an opportunity to commit the charged offenses, and therefore, the entrapment defense
'8 KRS 218A.010(28) ("'Traffic' . . . means to manufacture, distribute, dispense,
sell, transfer , or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a
controlled substance." (emphasis added)) ; KRS 218A.010(29) ("`Transfer' means to
dispose of a controlled substance to another person without consideration and not in
furtherance of commercial distribution ." (emphasis added)) .
- 1 2-
was unavailable to him .' 9 Accordingly, we find that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant an entrapment instruction .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Mason Circuit Court .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Keller, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Johnstone, J., concurs in results only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
19
KRS 505 .010(2)(a).
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