JONATHAN A . BRUCE V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0482-MR
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JONATHAN A . BRUCE
V
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 00-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit murder, first-degree robbery,
and theft by unlawful taking over $300, and received a thirty-year sentence pursuant to
a plea agreement with the Commonwealth . He appeals to this Court as a matter of
right. Ky. Const. ยง 110.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal, (1) that the trial court failed to hold the
mandatory competency hearing mandated by KRS 504 .100, and (2) that his guilty plea
was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made . For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court .
COMPETENCY
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine his
competency to stand trial or enter a guilty plea . During several pre-trial conferences,
both the defense counsel and the Commonwealth agreed that Appellant's competency
was not in question although Appellant had been sent to Kentucky Correctional
Psychiatric Center (KCPC) while in jail due to his depression and "suicidal ideations ."
The record is unclear as to the events leading up to Appellant's admission to
KCPC. Dr. Frank DeLand, the staff psychiatrist at KCPC, twice evaluated Appellant and
his report stated that Appellant had been transferred from the county jail after having
threatened to kill himself with a bed sheet fashioned into a rope . Defense counsel
stated to the trial court that Appellant had been transferred there from the Hardin
County Jail because the jail "did not know what to do with him." It is unclear from the
record whether the trial court or the district court ordered that Appellant be evaluated at
KCPC .
In any event, Appellant was evaluated and determined to have adjustment
disorder with depression and anxiety, but was determined to be competent to
understand the legal proceedings against him. Dr. DeLand also determined that
Appellant was not suicidal as a result of depression or mental illness, but merely
threatened it because he felt the conditions at the county jail were inhumane.
As a result of Appellant having been admitted to KCPC, the Commonwealth
made a motion requesting a competency hearing be scheduled for September 25, 2001 .
This motion was in fact in the record . There was no signed order from the trial court
granting the motion ; however, all parties appeared in front of the judge on that date .
At the hearing, the trial court began by stating that they were before the court on
a defense motion . The prosecutor responded that it was the Commonwealth's motion
and that the first order of business should be to have a quick competency hearing .
Defense counsel responded by explaining to the trial court that the defendant had had
some emotional problems while awaiting trial and the jail apparently sent him to KCPC
because they did not know what else to do with him . As a result, defense counsel
continued, the Commonwealth decided that just to be safe, a competency hearing
should be scheduled. Defense counsel stated that he had never questioned Appellant's
competency and that he and the Commonwealth had discussed that there was no need
for Dr . DeLand to testify because both of his reports found Appellant competent . The
prosecutor agreed but stated that he felt since the issue had been raised, they were
mandated under the law to hold a hearing although both sides agreed that Appellant
was competent to enter a plea, which is what Appellant intended to do. The trial court
stated that she did not know if they had to do a long, formal hearing if both sides agreed
that the defendant was competent . Defense counsel interjected that to his knowledge,
the issue of competency had only been raised by the Commonwealth's motion for a
hearing . The prosecutor responded that it may have been the district court that ordered
Appellant be transferred to KCPC, he wasn't sure, but that he had made a motion for a
hearing and in order to move forward, they needed to have a finding of competency .
Defense counsel then stated that all that was required of them was to say that they had
seen and accepted as written the reports of Dr. DeLand and that "we concur that there
are no reasonable grounds on which we can ask the court to find Mr. Bruce not to be
competent ." The trial court then responded by saying, "given what you've said to me
about the history of the case, then, I think it's appropriate . . . and in view of your
agreement particularly, that I make a finding then, that he is competent to stand trial,
based on what you've just told me ."
Appellant correctly notes that KRS 504.100 mandates that the trial court hold a
competency hearing if it "has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial ." Appellant likewise correctly states that a defendant may not
waive a competency hearing . Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 103 S .W.3d 687, 692
(2003) ; Mills v . Commonwealth , Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (1999) . Although it is
arguable and unclear from the record whether there even existed reasonable grounds to
question Appellant's competency, we nonetheless find that the trial court complied with
the mandate of KRS 504.100 by holding such a competency hearing on September 25,
2001 .
Presumably, all parties were present before the trial court on September 25,
2001, upon the Commonwealth's request for a competency hearing . The court had two
reports from the staff psychiatrist at KCPC that found Appellant competent to stand trial .
Both defense counsel and the Commonwealth agreed that they had read and accepted
the findings in the reports and had discussed previously that it was not necessary for Dr.
DeLand to testify before the court. Defense counsel stated numerous times that
Appellant's competency was not an issue and that the Commonwealth had only
scheduled the hearing in an abundance of caution . After having listened to the parties
and having reviewed two reports finding Appellant competent, the trial court then made
a finding that Appellant was indeed competent to enter a plea of guilty . Accordingly, we
find that the trial court thoroughly evaluated Appellant's competency by conducting an
evidentiary hearing in compliance with KRS 504 .100 . There was no error.
GUILTY PLEA
Next, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to determine whether his guilty
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made . After the trial court made a
finding of competency, defense counsel stated that Appellant was prepared to enter a
plea of guilty. Appellant signed a "Motion to Enter Guilty Plea" that enumerated those
rights specified in Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U .S. 238, 89 S . Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274
(1969), and defense counsel signed a "Certificate of Counsel" acknowledging that he
had gone over the rights with Appellant .
The trial court read aloud each right and asked Appellant if he understood that he
was giving up those rights, to which Appellant responded that he did understand .
Appellant did not inform the trial court of his desire to withdraw his plea until he was
scheduled to be sentenced on December 11, 2001 . At that time, he asked the judge if
he could read a letter that he had written to her regarding his desire to withdraw his
plea . The trial court found that Appellant had no basis for asking to withdraw his plea,
as his only offered reason was that he just didn't understand what he had done .
Appellant also complained that his attorney had only gone to see him a couple of times
in jail. Defense counsel then asked the court to appoint conflict counsel to consult with
Appellant, as Appellant had intimated that perhaps defense counsel had ineffectively
represented him. The Commonwealth objected, but ultimately the trial court continued
the hearing so that Appellant could consult with another attorney .
On January 15, 2002, Appellant, represented by conflict counsel, again stated his
desire to withdraw his plea . Appellant testified that he felt like he was time-pressured to
make a decision during the September 25, 2001 hearing or the Commonwealth's plea
offer would have been rescinded . He also stated that it was not until after he went back
to jail and "had a few months to think about it," that he decided to change his plea,
which he thought he would still be able to withdraw . The trial court stated that it
appeared Appellant had just changed his mind and overruled his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea . The court specifically recalled having gone over Appellant's rights with him
carefully and that he responded affirmatively that he understood everything he was
being told .
Appellant alleges that his confusion during the plea colloquy was evident from his
behavior in pausing and conferring with his attorney before answering some of the
court's questions . While the trial court was asking Appellant if he understood certain
rights, he conferred with his attorney, and after having spent several minutes off the
record, defense counsel asked the court if they could continue after the rest of the
docket had been called . The trial court agreed and when Appellant returned, the judge
specifically asked him numerous times if he had any doubt about his plea . The court
also stated several times that Appellant did not have to enter a plea that day, and that if
he had a problem with anything, or felt like he wanted to tell the court anything, he did
not have to enter a plea . Appellant expressed his desire to proceed with his plea and
defense counsel stated that they had conferred off the record regarding a different
issue. The trial court started again from the beginning by enumerating those rights
Appellant was giving up by pleading guilty and Appellant answered affirmatively to each.
He specifically stated that he did not have any questions for the court.
The trial court also stated the possible penalties applicable to Appellant and
stated that the facts of the case were such that Appellant had caused serious physical
injury by shooting the victim in the face with a handgun .
"The validity of a guilty plea depends 'upon the particular facts and
circumstances . . . including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused ."'
Kotas v. Commonwealth , Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978) (quoting Johnson v . Zerbst,
304 U .S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L . Ed . 1461 (1938)) . The trial court is in the best
position to evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea . Id. Here, the
trial court determined, and the record supports, that Appellant voluntarily entered a
guilty plea with a full understanding of the consequences of that decision . Appellant
signed a written waiver of his rights . The trial court went over Appellant's signed waiver
twice in open court . The trial court repeatedly gave Appellant opportunities to enter the
plea at another time and specifically asked Appellant if he had any questions or if he
would like to tell the court anything . Appellant responded that he fully understood and
did not have any questions for the court. The signed waiver, along with the
thoroughness of the plea colloquy, is sufficient to show that Appellant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered a guilty plea .
RCr 8.10 states that a court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.
The decision to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Bronk v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (2001) ; Anderson v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
507 S .W.2d 187, 188 (1974). Appellant did not allege a misunderstanding of the
ramifications of his guilty plea until several months after it was entered . The trial court
found that Appellant did not offer any basis in support of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea . We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
Appellant to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, there was no error.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
William Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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