MICHAEL D . ANDERSON V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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,$ixyrrxctr Courf of '9U ,
2002-SC-0227-MR
PIR
MICHAEL D. ANDERSON
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN HAYDEN, JUDGE
01-CR-19
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Michael D. Anderson, Jr., was convicted by a Henderson Circuit Court
jury of wanton murder and sentenced to forty-six years in prison . He appeals to this
Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. §110(2)(b), claiming that (1) the trial court
erroneously refused to strike three jurors for cause; (2) the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction of wanton murder; and (3) the trial court erroneously
permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence in chief during rebuttal. We affirm .
On December 31, 2000, Appellant, then nineteen years old, was residing with his
pregnant girlfriend, Ashley Gordon, age seventeen, in a hotel room at the Holiday
House in Henderson, Kentucky. Living with them were Ashley's mother, Dorothy
Slaten, and Ashley's four siblings, Patricia Gordon, age thirteen, Nathan Gordon, age
ten, Larry Slaten, age five, and Amber Slaten, age three weeks . Although thirteen years
old, Patricia had the mental capacity of a five-year-old child . She weighed ninety-six
pounds .
During her recovery from the birth of her youngest daughter, Dorothy Slaten
delegated to Appellant and Ashley the responsibility for disciplining the other three
children . There was evidence that Appellant physically abused both Nathan and
Patricia . For example, Appellant would have them "sit on the wall," a military style of
punishment that requires the person being punished to lean against the wall in a sitting
position without benefit of other support for a long period of time. If the children
attempted to rest from this position, Appellant would beat their knees with a beer bottle .
Another form of punishment employed by Appellant was a technique referred to as the
"Rock bottom move" that he learned from watching professional wrestling on television.
The "Rock bottom move" is performed by grabbing another person by the neck and
violently thrusting that person backwards to the floor.
Patricia Gordon was killed by blunt force trauma to the head during the night of
December 31, 2000. The Commonwealth presented evidence at trial that Appellant
ordered Patricia to "sit on the wall" after she knocked over his "PlayStation" video game
system and ate the family's last piece of bread . When Patricia attempted to rest from
the "sitting on the wall" position, Appellant used the "Rock bottom move" to repeatedly
slam her head against the floor. On the first two occasions, Patricia's head struck some
garbage bags filled with clothing. However, on the third occasion, her head struck the
concrete floor, which caused her to lose consciousness. Ashley advised her mother
what had happened and Nathan ran to a nearby gas station to dial 911 for emergency
assistance . Appellant fled the scene.
Officers from the Henderson County Sheriffs Office arrived at approximately 3 :40
a .m. on January 1, 2001, and found Patricia lying unresponsive on a bed. Appellant
returned to the scene shortly thereafter, spoke with the officers, and denied any
involvement in Patricia's injuries. Paramedics transported Patricia to a local hospital
where she died the next day. An autopsy revealed that she died from a blunt force
injury to her head that caused massive hemorrhaging and swelling of the brain. The
pathologist also found extensive bruising on Patricia's hips, shoulders, buttocks, arms,
knees and legs . Police officers returned to Appellant's hotel room and placed him under
arrest. After being informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S . 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed .2d 694 (1966), Appellant confessed to slamming Patricia's head
into the floor that night. His confession was read to the jury at trial .
I. MOTIONS TO STRIKE JURORS FOR CAUSE .
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it refused his request to strike
Juror Nos. 29, 30 and 65 for cause. He alleges that this was prejudicial to him as he
was therefore required to use three of his peremptory strikes to excuse those jurors.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S .W.2d 151, 259 (1993).
A. JUROR NO. 29.
For an unknown reason, the jury strike sheets were not included in the record on
appeal as required by CR 75.07(4). Thus, Appellant was permitted, over the
Commonwealth's objection, to file a narrative statement, CR 75 .13, to show that he did
exercise peremptory strikes against the three jurors and that he exercised all of his
peremptory strikes as required to preserve this issue for appeal . Thomas , supra, at
259 . However, the narrative statement goes further and recites that Appellant timely
moved to excuse all three jurors for cause. The videotape of the proceedings (bench
conference portions of which are audible though not visible) clearly reflects that while
Appellant did move to strike Juror Nos. 30 and 65, he did not move to strike Juror No .
29. A narrative statement is available only when there is "no videotape, mechanical or
stenographic record of the evidence or proceedings at hearing or trial." RCr 75 .13(1).
Obviously, a narrative statement cannot be used to create a record different from that
which was properly recorded .
Defense counsel made a statement on the record after the jury was selected and
sworn and after the remaining jurors had been excused that he had exercised
peremptory strikes to excuse Juror Nos. 29 and 65 (but not Juror No. 30) because the
trial court had overruled his motion to strike them for cause. Even if we were inclined to
interpret that statement as a motion to strike Juror No. 29 for cause, it would have been
untimely . Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, a motion to strike a juror for
cause must be made before the jury is sworn . Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 391
S.W .2d 365, 366 (1965). Because no motion was made to strike Juror No . 29 for
cause, we will not address whether she was unqualified to sit as a juror on Appellant's
case . Pelfrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S .W.2d 524, 526 (1992).
B. JUROR NO. 30.
Juror No. 30 was employed by the attorney who had been appointed as the
guardian ad litem for Dorothy Slaten's remaining children in proceedings to terminate
Slaten's parental rights . Juror No . 30 stated that she knew nothing about Appellant's
case, that she had not formed an opinion as to his guilt or innocence, and that she could
be fair and impartial if selected as a juror. Appellant moved to strike the juror for cause,
claiming that her employment relationship with the guardian ad litem for the Slaten
children, two of whom were scheduled to be prosecution witnesses, rendered her unfit
to serve as a juror. We disagree .
A trial court's decision as to whether to excuse a juror for cause is reviewed for
abuse of discretion . Adkins v. Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S .W.3d 779, 795 (2003);
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 83 S .W .3d 522, 527 (2002). "It is the probability of
bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause." Pennington v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 316 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958) (citations omitted) . Juror No. 30
affirmed that she had not previously formed an opinion as to Appellant's guilt and that
she could be impartial; thus, there is no allegation that she was actually biased against
Appellant . The remaining inquiry is whether her employment in the office of the
guardian ad litem for the Slaten children amounted to implied bias .
A juror will be excused for implied bias when bias can reasonably be inferred
from a juror's "family or business relationship with a party, a victim or the prosecuting
attorney where the relationship is not so close as to cause automatic disqualification but
nevertheless transgresses the concept of a fair and impartial jury." Montgomery v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 819 S .W .2d 713, 717 (1991) (citing Marsch v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830, 834 (1988). There is no evidence that the guardian ad litem for
the Slaten children was associated with the Commonwealth's Attorney or involved in
any aspect of the prosecution of Appellant's case. Juror No. 30 indicated that she had
not acquired any information about Appellant's case due to her employment other than
that he was charged with killing one of the Slaten children . We conclude that Juror No .
30's mere employment by an attorney who had been appointed as guardian ad litem for
a trial witness is not the type of close business relationship that "transgresses the
concept of a fair and impartial jury." See, e.g., Dillard v. Commonwealth , Ky., 995
S.W .2d 366, 369 (1999) (no implied bias attributed to juror who worked as a fireman at
same station in which victim served as captain) ; Copley v. Commonwealth , Ky., 854
S.W.2d 748, 750 (1993) (no implied bias even though juror was a fellow employee of
victim) ; Sanders v. Commonwealth , Ky., 801 S.W .2d 665, 669 (1990) (no implied bias
even though juror worked with victim's spouse); Compare Alexander v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 862 S .W .2d 856, 862-65 (1993) (bias found in sexual abuse case where juror was
familiar with victim through her employment as an investigative social worker with Child
Protection Services and stated that her position would affect her ability to remain
impartial), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S.W .2d
883, 891 (1997). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror
No. 30 for cause .
C . JUROR NO. 65.
Juror No . 65 stated that he was exposed to news coverage of Patricia's murder
one year prior to trial. He then engaged in the following discussion with the trial court,
the prosecutor, and defense counsel :
Judge :
As result of [the media coverage], did you form an opinion as
to guilt or innocence or come to any sort of conclusion?
Juror:
I'd be lying if I said no. You know I . . .
Judge:
O .K. You feel that you have come to an opinion as to guilt or
innocence?
Juror:
Not yet. No. It weighs pretty heavy to one side though . I'll
say that.
Judge :
Well, let me ask you this, whatever you may have heard or
read, that's not evidence .
Juror:
That's right.
Judge :
Okay. Evidence is what comes from this witness stand and
any exhibits that are introduced into the trial.
Juror:
I understand that.
Judge :
Okay. Could you insure the [Commonwealth's Attorney] and
the attorneys and [Appellant] that whatever you did read or
may have heard, it's been a year ago, and I know that your
retention may be better than mine, but could you assure
them, all parties, that you would decide this case solely on
the evidence that comes from the witness stand as well as
any and all physical exhibits that they introduced? And there
is no right or wrong answer, if you can't, that's fine, and if
you can, that's also fine. In other words, do you feel that
whatever you may have read or heard today would affect
your decision?
Juror:
No . I'm willing to listen to whatever.
Judge:
Can you assure and look at me and tell me you can assure
us that, because it's been a year ago, how good is your
retention?
Juror:
Well, I mean, this is a pretty spectacular you know, if I'm not
mistaken this is where a boy killed a girl over a video game .
It's pretty much a dysfunctional type family situation and I,
you know, these kind of things stick out in my mind .
Judge :
Sure, and, but, you can, can you assure that, that, in other
words, it won't, whatever you heard and read won't affect
your decision here today . In other words, you can assure all
of us that?
Juror:
Yeah, I'll do that.
Judge:
Okay, Mr. Nesmith do you . . .
Def. Atty. :
When you read that, do you remember what your emotional
reaction was to reading those stories?
Juror:
I thought it was terrible.
Def. Atty. :
Did you read the paper this morning?
Juror:
No, I didn't .
Def. Atty.:
When you read those, did you think that something pretty
horrible had happened that dav?
Juror:
Yeah, definitely .
Def. Atty.:
Do you still think that?
Juror:
Well, it's gonna be -tour burden to prove me otherwise .
Com. Atty. :
Let me ask a question . Unfortunately, in this and other
communities there are murders committed . Would you
consider any murder to be terrible?
Juror:
Well, sure, absolutely .
Judge:
Can you assure me and both parties . . . in other words, you
said that it's going to be their burden. I can tell you that is
not the law.
Juror:
Okay.
Judge:
The law is that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof
to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. If they do
not do that, can you assure me that you could vote for an
acquittal?
Juror:
Yes I could.
Judge :
Okay. If they don't do it here in this courtroom. But by the
same token . The flip side is, that if they do prove it, see,
they'll [the Commonwealth] want to hear this answer, if they
do prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, could you
find [Appellant] guilty?
Juror:
Yes .
Judge:
Okay. And the flip side, I've already asked .
Juror:
I'll base my decision on the facts here today .
Judge:
So, I'll tell you that it's not their burden.
Juror:
Right.
Judge:
It is the Commonwealth's burden. Can you assure the court
that you'll follow my instructions as to the law?
Juror:
That's right, I can.
(Emphasis added .)
Appellant first points to Juror No . 65's response to the two-part question as to
whether he had "formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence or come to some sort of
conclusion" as a reason why he should be struck for cause. Obviously, the juror's
positive response was to the second part of the question because his answer to the
very next question posed to him was that he had not yet come to an opinion as to guilt
or innocence . The second reason Appellant offers as to why Juror No. 65 should have
been struck for cause is his statement to defense counsel that "it's going to be your
burden to prove me otherwise ." However, that statement referred to his previous
affirmative response to defense counsel's question as to whether he thought "something
pretty horrible had happened out there," not whether he thought Appellant was guilty .
Whether a prospective juror should be excused for objective bias must be
determined by the totality of the circumstances . Montgomery, supra, at 718 . Unlike the
four jurors discussed in Montgomery, id . at 716, Juror No . 65 never claimed to have
formed an opinion as to Appellant's guilt or innocence. Thus, unlike the jurors in
Montgomery, id . at 718, he was not "rehabilitated" by the trial judge's "magic questions ."
Juror No. 65 assured court and counsel that he could be fair and impartial despite the
"spectacular' media coverage, that he would decide the case solely on the evidence
presented in court, and that he would follow the trial court's instructions in deciding the
case .
There is no per se rule that mere exposure to media reports about a case
merits exclusion of a juror . To the contrary, in order to merit
disqualification of a juror, the media reports must engender a
predisposition or bias that cannot be put aside, requiring the juror to
decide a case one way or the other. . . . The Constitution does not require
ignorant or uninformed jurors; it requires impartial jurors. While it may be
sound trial strategy for an attorney to exclude anyone with knowledge of
the facts or the parties, such a result is not mandated by the Constitution.
Hodge v. Commonwealth , Ky., 17 S.W .3d 824, 838 (2000) (quoting McQueen v.
Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1319-20 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) . We conclude from
the totality of the circumstances that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling the motion to excuse Juror No. 65 for cause.
11. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE .
Appellant asserts that the evidence against him was insufficient to support his
conviction of wanton murder . The crux of Appellant's argument is that given his low IQ
of sixty-six, a level classified as "borderline mentally retarded," and the fact that he killed
the victim while using a "normally harmless" wrestling maneuver, no reasonable juror
could believe that he was "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and
unjustifiable risk" that death would result from his actions, KRS 501 .020(3) (definition of
"wantonly"), or that the circumstances "manifest[ed] extreme indifference to human life."
KRS 507.020(1)(b) (element of wanton murder) . We disagree .
A trial court should not grant a motion for a directed verdict if, drawing all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, "the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty . . . ." Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S.W .2d 186, 187 (1991) .
At a pretrial competency hearing, Dr. Steven Simon, a psychologist at the Kentucky
Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), testified that Appellant was capable of
appreciating the criminality of his conduct at the time the offense was committed . Thus,
the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to decide whether Appellant was aware of
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the risk of slamming the head of a ninety-six-pound female child against a concrete
floor. The drafters of the Model Penal Code had this to say about the element of
"extreme indifference to human life":
There is a kind of [wanton] homicide that cannot fairly be
distinguished . . . from homicides committed [intentionally] . [Wantonness]
. . . presupposes an awareness of the creation of substantial homicidal
risk, a risk too great to be deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the
actor's conduct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and the
motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is
needed to identify the case where [wantonness] should be assimilated to
[intention] . The conception that the draft employs is that of extreme
indifference to the value of human life. The significance of [intention] is
that, cases of provocation apart, it demonstrates precisely such
indifference . Whether (wantonness) is so extreme that it demonstrates
similar indifference is not a question that, in our view, can be further
clarified ; it must be left directly to the trier of facts.
1974 Commentary to KRS 507.020(1)(b) (quoting Model Penal Code, § 201 .2,
Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No . 9, 1959) (emphasis added).
In view of Dr. Simon's opinion as to Appellant's competency at the time the
offense was committed, we conclude that the trial court did not err in submitting the
issue of Appellant's mens rea to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Mackert, 781 A .2d
178, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (evidence was sufficient to support third degree
(wanton) murder conviction where defendant abused child to such an extent that child
subsequently died due to blunt force trauma) .
III. REBUTTAL TESTIMONY .
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to
present the testimony of Dr. Simon as rebuttal evidence . More specifically, Appellant
claims that Dr. Simon was improperly permitted to repeat allegedly incriminating
statements that Appellant made to him at KCPC . We disagree .
The pattern of events giving rise to this issue is unusual . Early in the afternoon
of the second day of trial, the Commonwealth moved for an overnight recess so that it
could procure the attendance of additional witnesses. The trial court sustained
Appellant's objection and instructed the Commonwealth to produce additional witnesses
or close its case. Having no additional witnesses available, the Commonwealth rested
its case-in-chief. After the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal,
Appellant then proceeded with his defense. However, at the conclusion of the
testimony of his first two witnesses, Appellant also moved for an overnight recess,
claiming that his final two witnesses, Dr. Simon and Dr. Dennis J. Buchholz, another
KCPC psychologist, could not be present that day.' Not surprisingly, the prosecution
objected, citing the trial court's previous refusal of its request for a recess. Appellant
claimed that the testimony of both witnesses was necessary to prove his sympathy for
the victim in order to negate the inference of extreme indifference to human life . After a
lengthy in-chambers discussion, the trial court granted Appellant's motion, subject to the
condition that the Commonwealth could reopen its case-in-chief to present testimony as
to Appellant's lack of sympathy for the victim, in addition to its right to present evidence
in rebuttal.
The following morning, the Commonwealth elected not to introduce any "lack of
sympathy" evidence and Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Buchholz. Contrary
to Appellant's previous representations, Dr. Buchholz's testimony had little to do with
Appellant's sympathy for the victim . Instead, Dr. Buchholz testified that his
examinations of Appellant's motor functions, memory, and IQ had led him to conclude
' Appellant did not serve Dr. Simon with a subpoena until 2:00 p.m. that day.
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that Appellant had an IQ of sixty-six and other significant cognitive limitations that
placed him in the category of "borderline mental retardation ." Dr. Buchholz opined that,
based upon Appellant's cognitive limitations and his less-than-ideal home life and
upbringing, his educational development was at only a third grade level. Dr. Buchholz
added that he forwarded his findings to Dr. Simon, who then used them in his
subsequent report to the trial court .
At the conclusion of Dr. Buchholz's testimony, Appellant closed his case. The
Commonwealth then called Dr. Simon on rebuttal. Appellant did not initially object to
the Commonwealth's decision to call Dr. Simon as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Simon
testified that despite Appellant's cognitive limitations, he possessed sufficient mental
faculties to understand and appreciate the magnitude of his conduct. He then
proceeded to repeat Appellant's account to him of the events leading up to the victim's
death . Appellant objected, claiming that Dr . Simon's reiteration of Appellant's
statements to him was improper rebuttal evidence . The Commonwealth explained that
the statements were offered to rebut Dr. Buchholz's opinion as to Appellant's cognitive
impairment by showing that Appellant could succinctly recount details of the events
occurring on the night of the victim's death . The trial court overruled Appellant's
objection but admonished the jury to consider Dr. Simon's testimony only to the extent
that it related to Appellant's mental condition.
Dr. Simon then recounted, in part, what Appellant told him regarding the night of
Patricia's death:
[Appellant] stated that the victim in this case was Dorothy's thirteen-yearold daughter who he stated was disabled and picked on a lot by her family
- by everybody . [Appellant] stated that the victim "has the mind of a five
year old." He recalled that on the night in question, he had been drinking
and smoking marijuana and was in bed with his girlfriend, who was
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pregnant at the time . [Appellant] recalled that "I drank a lot and smoked a
lot of bud ." He recalled that the victim, Patricia, who was thirteen years of
age, began acting out by pulling her hair and calling herself stupid .
[Appellant] recalled that "I told Patricia 'you're not stupid' and put her on
the wall military style." He described this as a form of discipline where he
instructed Patricia to squat against the wall "with her back end to it."
[Appellant] stated that he was trying to discipline Patricia for these types of
behaviors, as well as other self-abusive type behaviors such as biting
herself. [Appellant] stated that Patricia's mother, Dorothy Slaten, was
present "but wouldn't do nothing ." [Appellant] reported that the last thing
he recalled was, "I said don't get off the wall" and he fell asleep.
[Appellant] stated that the next thing he remembered was his girlfriend
waking him up and telling him that "Patricia is off the wall." However, he
stated that when he woke up, he saw Patricia lying down and that "I say
what happened?" According to Appellant, his girlfriend and the other
children, "all of them said 'Mommy did it."' He recalled that he picked
Patricia up off of the floor and put her on the bed and told the ten-year-old
boy present, Nathan, to call 911 "and I left." [Appellant] stated that he left
because he was afraid of the ambulance and police coming . Indeed, he
stated that he climbed a tree and "watched everything," including
observing three police officers pulling up . [Appellant] stated that he stayed
in the tree all night until the police left the next morning . He recalled that
he then came down from the tree, went to a friend's house and that "I kept
calling the hotel to patch me to room 145 to see if everything was okay."
He finally reached his girlfriend, who informed him that her mother was at
the hospital .
Appellant claims that it was reversible error to permit Dr. Simon to repeat these
statements as rebuttal evidence . We disagree .
Although a trial court may "for good reason in furtherance of justice" allow the
parties to reopen their case-in-chief, RCr 9.42(e), the Commonwealth chose not to do
so when given the opportunity . Instead, it offered the testimony of Dr. Simon in rebuttal .
Nevertheless, RCr 9 .42, which governs the order of proceedings in a criminal trial,
provides that "[t]he parties respectively may offer rebutting evidence, unless the court,
for good reason in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence-in-chief." RCr
9 .42(e). KRE 611 (a) also provides that:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
- 1 4-
(1)
Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth ;
(2)
Avoid needless consumption of time ; and
(3)
Protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment .
It is well-established that a trial court has "great discretion" in determining
whether to allow the introduction of rebuttal evidence, and a decision will not be
overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ruppee v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 821 S .W .2d 484, 487 (1991); Pilon v. Commonwealth , Ky., 544 S .W.2d 228, 231
(1976). Also, whether to admit testimony in rebuttal, which properly should be
introduced in chief, is ordinarily a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cf. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 633 S.W.2d 69, 70 (1982); Robert G. Lawson, The
Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §3 .20, at 156-57 (3rd ed ., Michie 1993) ("The trial
judge has broad discretion to control the interrogation of witnesses and production of
evidence and decisions made in the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed
absent a showing of abuse and prejudice ."). See also Davis v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
795 S .W.2d 942, 947 (1990). Federal cases interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 611, which mirrors KRE 611, agree . See, e.g . , United States v. Puckett , 147
F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 1998) ("A trial court has discretion to exercise control over the
order of interrogating witnesses to make the interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of truth, Fed . R. Evid . 611, and no reversal is warranted unless an
abuse of discretion affects the substantial rights of the parties.") (quotations omitted) .
Of course, this discretion is not unlimited . In Gilbert , supra, we held that "[t]he
Commonwealth should not be permitted to take undue advantage of the defendant and
withhold important evidence until near the close of the trial, and then introduce it in the
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guise of rebuttal evidence ." Id . at 71 (citations omitted) . Gilbert found reversible error in
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce, as rebuttal evidence, the defendant's taperecorded admission that he raped his eleven-year-old granddaughter . Id . at 70-71 .
Although this evidence directly contradicted the defendant's testimony at trial, we held
that these statements went beyond diminishing the defendant's credibility and into
providing substantive evidence of the crime . As this was presented at the end of the
trial, the defendant's case was greatly prejudiced . Id . We noted that "it is improper for a
trial court to permit evidence to be introduced in rebuttal that could and should have
been introduced in chief, if it appears probable that its introduction after the defense has
rested will have a prejudicial effect on the defendant's case." Id. at 70 (citing Archer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S .W.2d 141, 143 (1971)) . See also Wager v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 751 S .W.2d 28, 29 (1988) (reversible error for trial court to allow jailhouse informant
to testify to defendant's alleged confession as rebuttal evidence where informant had
not been listed as a witness and had not testified during the Commonwealth's case-inchief).
We find no abuse of discretion in the case sub iudice. Appellant presented the
testimony of Dr. Buchholz during his case-in-chief to emphasize his extremely low IQ
and cognitive impairment in order to demonstrate to the jury his inability to appreciate
the risk created by his conduct. The Commonwealth offered Dr. Simon's testimony to
rebut this theory by showing that, despite his low IQ, Appellant had sufficient mental
capacity to relate his version of the events to Dr. Simon in a succinct and logical
manner. Nor are we able to perceive how the relation of Appellant's statements to Dr.
Simon prejudiced his defense . Appellant did not admit to having caused Patricia's fatal
injuries. In fact, his version was that the other children claimed that their mother had
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injured Patricia . Since Appellant did not testify in his own defense (he could have been
impeached by his prior felony offense), he was able to impart this information to the jury
through Dr. Simon without being subjected to cross-examination.
Appellant received adequate notice of the Commonwealth's intent to use Dr.
Simon as a rebuttal witness. Written notice of that fact and a copy of Dr. Simon's report
were filed and served on defense counsel on January 9, 2002, twenty days prior to trial.
Compare Wager, supra , at 29 (jailhouse informant not previously listed as a witness) .
Finally, the trial court's admonition to consider the evidence only for the purpose of
evaluating Appellant's mental state further reduced any possible prejudice . Ruppee ,
supra, at 487 . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Simon to relate
to the jury as rebuttal evidence the statements made to him by Appellant at KCPC .
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the
Henderson Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A . B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
Suite 200
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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