JERRY MARSHALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCED URE PROMUL GATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
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JERRY MARSHALL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
2001-CR-0066
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
VACATING IN CASE NO. 2002-SC-0026-MR
AND
AFFIRMING IN CASE NO . 2003-SC-0068-TG
Marshall appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted him of
manufacturing methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony
offender in case No . 2002-SC-0026-MR. He was sentenced to a total of thirty years in
prison . Marshall also appeals in 2003-SC-0068-TG from an order denying his pro se
motion for relief pursuant to CR 60 .02 . We have combined these two appeals in order
to render one opinion.
The questions presented are whether the prosecutor improperly commented on
the evidence ; whether the jury instruction on manufacturing methamphetamine was
erroneous ; whether the trial judge correctly refused to answer a question posed by the
jury; whether the motion to suppress should have been granted ; whether Marshall was
entitled to an instruction on attempt to manufacture methamphetamine ; whether bad act
evidence was improperly admitted, and whether the trial judge properly denied
Marshall's pro se CR 60 .02 motion.
Marshall was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine and being a seconddegree persistent felony offender . A jury convicted him of both charges and he was
sentenced to twenty years on the drug charge, which was enhanced to thirty years
because of the persistent felony offense . Following his conviction, Marshall filed a pro
se CR 60.02 motion that alleged fraud and perjured testimony by the officers regarding
whether the items in his truck were in plain view . The circuit judge denied the motion
without appointment of counsel or a hearing . These appeals followed .
Closing Argument/Jury Instruction
Marshall argues that the Commonwealth misstated the law in closing argument
by telling the jury that it only needed to find he possessed one of the chemicals in order
to convict him. of manufacturing methamphetamine . He also contends the trial judge
erred by instructing the jury that it could convict him on the drug charge by finding that
he had possessed "ether and/or lithium batteries and/or ephedrine pills ."
The evidence found during the search of the car driven by Marshall consisted of
ephedrine, lithium batteries and starting fluid (ether) . There was, however, no
anhydrous ammonia recovered, an essential ingredient for making methamphetamine .
In Kotila v. Commonwealth , Ky., 114 S.W .3d 226 (2003), a majority of this Court held
that KRS 218A . 1432(1)(b) permitted a conviction only when the defendant possessed
all, rather than any, of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine .
Here, because Marshall did not possess all of the chemicals or equipment, he
was entitled to a directed verdict on this charge . It necessarily follows that the
Commonwealth misstated the law in its closing argument and that the jury instruction
was erroneous. We must observe that neither the Commonwealth nor the trial judge
had the benefit of our decision in Kotila, supra , which was rendered more than a year
after Marshall's trial. However, pursuant to Kotila, we must vacate Marshall's
conviction . Because we are vacating the conviction, it is unnecessary to address the
remaining issues raised in this appeal .
CR 60.02
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in denying the CR 60 .02 motion. Marshall alleged in the 60.02
motion that the officers lied 21 times about items in his truck being in plain view.
Although he did not present any evidence or testify at trial, he did testify at the
suppression hearing and denied that anything was in plain view. Considering our
decision to vacate the judgment of conviction, we find it unnecessary to discuss this
issue further.
Therefore, in 2002-SC-26-MR, the judgment of conviction is vacated . In 2003SC-68-TG, the order of the trial judge denying the CR 60.02 motion by Marshall is
affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., Cooper, Johnstone, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Keller, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion and is joined by
Graves, J .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Appellate Division
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D . Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Michael Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Auyrtmt (9ourf of '~R rufixrkV
2002-SC-0026-MR & 2003-SC-0068-TG
JERRY MARSHALL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
2001-C R-0066
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms the trial court's denial
of CR 60 .02 relief in 2003-SC-0068-TG . In addition, I agree with the "meat" of the
majority opinion's analysis as to Appellant's first allegation of error in 2002-SC-0026
MR, his matter-of-right appeal, i.e. , that Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine
conviction cannot stand in light of Kotila v. Commonwealth ,' in which this Court
"construe[d] [KRS 218A .1432(1)(b)'s use of] `the chemicals or equipment' to mean all of
the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine." 2 I
thus agree with the majority's conclusions that the wording of the trial court's jury
instruction on Manufacturing Methamphetamine was prejudicially erroneous, that the
Commonwealth further compounded the instructional error when it misstated the
applicable law during its closing argument to the jury, and, in fact, that the trial court
' Ky., 114 S .W.3d 226 (2003) .
2 Id . at 237 .
should not have instructed the jury on the offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine
at all because the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict for that crime .3 I
dissent, however, from the majority's ultimate holding in Appellant's matter-of-right
appeal, which simply vacates Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction
without remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings . While the majority
provides no explanation for its holding in this regard, I can only assume that it rests on
one (1) of two (2) possible erroneous premises, i .e. , either a view that Appellant was
entitled to a complete acquittal when the Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie
case for the indicted offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine or a belief that
constitutional double jeopardy principles prohibit Appellant's retrial for lesser-included
offenses after an appellate finding that the evidence was insufficient to support his
Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction . A directed verdict of complete acquittal
would have been improper in this case, however, for the reason that the evidence
justified lesser-included offense instructions on both Criminal Attempt to Manufacture
Methamphetamine and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia . Further, this Court's
reversal (or vacating) of Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction on
grounds of evidentiary insufficiency creates no double jeopardy bar to Appellant's retrial
for the lesser-included offenses that were supported by the evidence . Therefore,
having reviewed Appellant's remaining allegations of error (and determined that
Appellant's third and fifth allegations of error lack merit and his second allegation is
moot), I vote to reverse Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction and
3 Stated otherwise, the trial court should have granted a directed verdict in
Appellant's favor as to the charge of Manufacturing Methamphetamine . See infra notes
5 and 6 and surrounding text . The majority opinion phrases this as "because Marshall
did not possess all of the chemicals or equipment, he was entitled to a directed verdict
on this charge." Slip Op . at 2 (emphasis added) .
remand the indictment to the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to prosecute
Appellant for those lesser-included offenses at a new trial .
Count one of the indictment against Appellant read :
On or about February 25, 2001, in McCracken County,
Kentucky, the above named defendant, Jerry A. Marshall,
committed the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine
when he possessed the chemicals or equipment for the
manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine, against the peace and
dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
With the benefit of hindsight (in the form of this Court's holding in Kotila), it is clear that
Appellant - who possessed some of the chemicals necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine, i .e. Sudafed (which contained ephedrine, a methamphetamine
precursor), starter fluid (which contains ether), and lithium batteries, but not all of the
necessary chemicals - was "overcharged" with an offense that the Commonwealth
could not prove at trial . Appellant does not escape criminal liability for his conduct,
however, simply because the Commonwealth was unable to prove the elements of the
indicted offense . KRS 505 .020(2) provides that:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense that is
included in any offense with which he is formally charged .
An offense is so included when :
(a)
It is established by proof of the same or less than all
of the facts required to establish the commission of
the offense charged ; or
(b)
It consists of an attempt to commit the offense
charged or to commit an offense otherwise included
therein . . . . 4
4 KRS 505 .020(2) . See also Official Commentary to KRS 505 .020
(Banks/Baldwin 1974) ("[Subsection (2)] provide[s] . . . the circumstances under which
conviction of an offense not expressly named in the charging instrument is
appropriate .") .
And, it is black-letter law that a "trial court should not direct a verdict of acquittal where
the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of a lesser offense than that charged
,5
in the indictment . Instead, "where the state fails to demonstrate a prima facie case on
the crime charged, but does so on a lesser included offense, the trial court [should]
direct a verdict of acquittal on the crime charged and submit the evidence to the trier of
fact for consideration of the lesser included offense .
,6
In this case, Appellant was not
entitled to a complete acquittal under count one of the indictment because the evidence
supported lesser-included offense instructions on both Criminal Attempt to Manufacture
Methamphetamine under KRS 506 .010 and KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) and Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia under KRS 218A.500 .'
In fact, Appellant's brief's fourth allegation of error is that "the trial court erred to
Marshall's substantial detriment by failing to instruct the jury on attempt to manufacture
methamphetamine," a lesser-included offense that Appellant argues was "merited on
5 75A Ann. JUR . 2D Trial § 1044 (1991) . See also Baker v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
973 S.W .2d 54, 55 (1998) ("Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
Commonwealth's case, alleging insufficiency of the evidence . This motion was properly
denied by the trial court as appellant was not entitled to a complete acquittal of all
charges in the indictment and all lesser included offenses ." (emphasis added)) ;
Campbell v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 564 S .W .2d 528, 530 (1978) ("A motion for directed
verdict of acquittal should only be made (or granted) when the defendant is entitled to a
complete acquittal - i.e., when, looking at the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty, under any possible theory, of any of
the crimes charged in the indictment or of any lesser included offenses ." (italicized
emphasis in original, underlined emphasis added)) .
6 75A Ann . JUR . 2D Trial § 1044 (1991) .
Although the offense of Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor under
KRS 218A.1437 would also appear to fit the facts of this case, Appellant was indicted
for conduct that occurred in February 2001 and KRS 218A.1437, which was not
effective until July 15, 2002, is thus "not applicable to this case because it was created
after the conduct for which Appellant was indicted occurred ." Kotila , 114 S.W.3d at 246 .
these fact[s]." For reasons that I explained in depth in my separate opinion in Kotila , 8 I
believe that Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine is a lesser-included
offense to Manufacturing Methamphetamine under KRS 218A .1432(1)(b) . And, on the
evidence presented in this case, I agree with Appellant's contention that a jury could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that his accumulation of chemicals to
manufacture methamphetamine constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in Manufacturing Methamphetamine as defined in KRS
218A. 1432(1)(b) .
Additionally, under KRS 218A.500, possession of any chemical or item of
equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine can be considered
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia depending upon the circumstances of the
possession or intended use :
As used in this section and KRS 218A.510 :
(1)
"Drug paraphernalia" means all equipment, products
and materials of any kind which are used, intended
for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating,
cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing ,
compounding, converting, producing, processing,
preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging,
storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting,
inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human
body a controlled substance in violation of this
chapter . . . .
(2)
part) .
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of
planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,
manufacturing , compounding, converting, producing,
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing,
repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting,
ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the
8 Kotila , 114 S .W.3d at 250-256 (Keller, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in
human body a controlled substance in violation of this
chapter .
Any person who violates any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for the first
offense and a Class D felony for subsequent
offenses . 9
As such, because a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
possessed chemicals, which constituted less than all of the chemicals necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine, with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 1°
9 KRS 218A .500 (emphasis added) . See also KRS 218A .510 (outlining factors
to consider in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia) .
'° I would observe that the jury in this case actually did make these findings in its
verdict, which found Appellant guilty of Manufacturing Methamphetamine under an
instruction that was, for all practical purposes, actually a Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia instruction in that it required a finding "[t]hat Jerry Marshall possessed
ether and/or lithium batteries and/or ephedrine pills with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine." Cf. 1 COOPER, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 9 .34A (4 th ed .
1999) (an instruction that defines the substantive elements of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia as: "[t]hat . . . the Defendant [used] [possessed with the intent to use]
(ID drug paraphernalia" and "[t]hat he did so with the intent to
(method) [e .g., (use it to) inhale
(ID substance) into his body] .") . Accordingly, if
not for the possibility that Appellant could be convicted upon retrial of Criminal Attempt
to Manufacture Methamphetamine, the appropriate holding in this case would appear to
be a reversal of Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction and a remand
of the indictment to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction for Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia and for resentencing on that lesser-included offense . See
Rutledge v. United States , 517 U.S . 292, 306, 116 S .Ct. 1241, 134 L .Ed.2d 419 (1996)
("[F]ederal appellate courts appear to have uniformly concluded that they may direct the
entry of judgment for a lesser-included offense when a conviction for a greater offense
is reversed on grounds that affect only the greater offense . This Court has noted the
use of such a practice with approval .") ; Morris v . Matthews, 475 U .S. 237, 246, 106
S.Ct . 1032, 89 L .Ed .2d 187 (1986) ("in cases like this, therefore, where it is clear that
the jury necessarily found that the defendant's conduct satisfies the elements of the
lesser included offense, it would be incongruous always to order yet another trial[ .]");
United States v. Skipper, 74 F .3d 608 (5 Cir. 1996) (reversing and vacating conviction
of possession with intent to distribute, but remanding the case to the district court with
instructions to enter a judgment of guilt of simple possession and to sentence the
appellant for that offense) ; Dickenson v. Israel , 644 F .2d 308 (7th Cir. 1981) (denying
habeas relief to petitioner-appellant whose armed robbery conviction was reversed, but
remanded for entry of conviction and sentencing on simple robbery by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court) ; Shields v. State , 722 So.2d 584 (Miss . 1998) (conviction for
-6-
Appellant could also have been found guilty of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under
this indictment .
Because the majority opinion is silent as to its rationale for simply vacating
Appellant's conviction without remanding it for further proceedings, it appears that a few
words may be appropriate regarding the double jeopardy implications of our
determination that the Commonwealth failed to prove a prima facie case of
Manufacturing Methamphetamine. Those few words are these : there are no double
jeopardy implications relevant to the retrial of the lesser included offenses in this case .
Certainly, a verdict of acquittal is a bar to a subsequent conviction for the same
offense ," and, as such, "[t]he proscription against double jeopardy precludes retrial of
the same offense after a directed verdict of acquittal[,]" 12 or an appellate determination
aggravated assault reduced to simple assault by Mississippi Supreme Court under
"direct remand rule"); Id . at 585-586 (collecting cases) . In Commonwealth v. Bivins ,
Ky., 740 S .W.2d 954 (1987), however, this Court placed Kentucky in "a distinct minority
of courts," Shields , 722 So .2d at 586, when it stated - in dicta and without any citation
to authority - that "[a] reviewing court has no authority to reduce the sentence to a
lesser included offense . If it reverses for insufficient evidence to prove the principal
charge it must remand for trial of the lesser offense ." Bivins , 740 S .W.2d at 956. See
also White v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 770 S .W.2d 222, 224 (1989) (holding - again
without citation - that remanding for entry of judgment as to Second-Degree PFO
status after the jury's verdict as to First-Degree PFO was set aside on grounds of
evidentiary insufficiency would abrogate a defendant's statutory right to trial by jury as
to PFO status) . In my view, the Bivins dicta, which, like the White holding, has never
been cited for that proposition in any published Kentucky decision, is incorrect and
should be expressly overruled . This Court may remand a case for entry of a judgment
of conviction on a lesser included offense in the exercise of its constitutional appellate
jurisdiction. See KY . CONST. § 110(2)(a) ; Copley v . Craft, Ky ., 341 S .W .2d 70, 72
(1960) ("[A]ppellate jurisdiction is the power and authority to review, revise, correct or
affirm the decisions of an inferior court, and, more particularly, to exercise the same
judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction." (emphasis
added and citations omitted)) .
11
United States v. Ball , 163 U .S . 662, 16 S .Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed 300 (1896) .
12 Kotila, 114 S .W .3d at 236 n .1 (citing Commonwealth v. Mullins , Ky ., 405
S .W.2d 28, 30 (1966) and Commonwealth v. Ramey, 279 Ky. 810, 132 S .W .2d 342,
344 (1939)) . See also Smalis v . Pennsylvania , 476 U.S . 140, 106 S .Ct. 1745, 90
-7-
that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 13 By the same token, a
conviction for a lesser-included offense constitutes an implicit acquittal as to greater
offenses and thus bars a subsequent prosecution for a greater offense . 14 However,
"the concept of acquittal by implication climbs up the ladder, not down[,]" 15 and an
appellate determination that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict on a greater
offense does not constitute a double jeopardy bar to subsequent prosecution for lesserincluded offenses that were supported by the evidence . 16 Because the evidence
introduced at trial warranted instructions as to Criminal Attempt to Manufacture
Methamphetamine and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the Commonwealth is not
barred from prosecuting those offenses upon remand .
L .Ed .2d 116 (1986) ; Hudson v. Louisiana , 450 U .S . 40, 101 S .Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed .2d 30
(1981) ; Sanabria v . United States , 437 U .S . 54, 98 S .Ct. 2170, 57 L .Ed .2d 43 (1978) ;
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co . , 430 U .S . 564, 97 S .Ct . 1349, 51 ~ .Ed .2d 642
(1977) ; Fong Foo v . United States , 369 U .S . 141, 82 S.Ct . 671, 7 L.Ed .2d 629 (1962);
Gill v. Commonwealth , Ky., 648 S .W.2d 846 (1982) .
13 Burks v. United States , 437 U .S . 1, 98 S .Ct. 2141, 57 L .Ed .2d 1 (1978) . See
also Davis v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 899 S .W.2d 487, 490 (1995), overruled on other
grounds by, Merriweather v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 99 S .W.3d 448 (2003) ; Perkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 694 S .W.2d 721, 722 (1985) ; Coomer v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App ., 694 S .W.2d 471, 472 (1985); McIntosh v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 582 S.W.2d
54, 58 (1979) . Cf. Greene v. Massey, 437 U .S . 19, 98 S .Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15
(1978) .
14
Green v. United States , 355 U .S . 184, 78 S .Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed .2d 199 (1957).
See also Brown v. Ohio , 432 U .S . 161, 87 S .Ct. 2221, 53 L,Ed .2d 187 (1977) .
15 McGinnis v. Wine , Ky., 959 S .W .2d 437, 439 (1998).
16 Shute v. Texas, 117 F .3d 233 (5th Cir. 1997) ; Anderson v . Mullin, 327 F .3d
1148 (10 Cir. 2003) ; Beverly v. Jones , 854 F.2d 412 (11 Cir. 1988) ; White v .
Commonwealth , 770 S .W .2d at 223 ("Here there was insufficient evidence of PFO I but
sufficient evidence and a finding of guilt on all the elements of PFO II . Therefore, a
retrial would not be barred by double jeopardy .") . McGinnis, 959 S .W .2d at 440 . Cf.
Commonwealth v. Ray , Ky. App ., 982 S .W .2d 671 (1998) .
I recognize that, if given the opportunity, the Commonwealth might elect not to
prosecute Appellant for the lesser-included offenses at a new trial .
However, I believe
that decision should be made by the Executive Branch authorities that are responsible
for prosecution of criminal offenses, not by this Court . Accordingly, I would reverse
Appellant's Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction and remand the indictment to
the trial court for further proceedings, which could include prosecution for the lesserincluded offenses of Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine and
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia .
Graves, J ., joins this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
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