JOHN G . MOORE, SR . AND C. SHARON MOORE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN G . MOORE, JR . V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
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2001-SC-0227-DG
DAME
JOHN G . MOORE, SR. AND
SHARON MOORE, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
ESTATE OF JOHN G . MOORE, JR.
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APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-0526-MR
HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT NO. 97-CI-00758
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellants, John G . Moore, Sr. and Sharon Moore, Personal Representatives of
the Estate of John G. Moore, Jr . appeal from an opinion of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the Order Granting Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") entered by
the trial court .
On September 30, 1999, a Hopkins County jury determined that Appellee,
Environmental Construction Corporation ("Environmental") had caused the death of
John G . Moore, Jr. through "deliberate intention" when the walls of the trench in which
he was working caved in, burying him and causing his death by "compression
asphyxia ." Upon Environmental's motion, the trial court entered an Order Granting
C,- .
JNOV and stated that from the evidence presented at trial "the only reasoned analysis
is that John G. Moore, Jr. did not die as a result of the deliberate intention of the
Defendant or its employees ." Upon review, the Court of Appeals, "[h]avng thoroughly
analyzed the evidence presented in this matter against the standard set for recovery by
KRS 342 .610(4) and [relevant case law] believe[d] the trial court properly entered
JNOV." From a review of the trial proceedings and the evidence presented therein, we
hold that the trial court's grant of JNOV was appropriate and therefore affirm .
11 . BACKGROUND
In April of 1996 Environmental won the bid on the contract for a sewer
rehabilitation and new sewer project in Dawson Springs, Kentucky. The contract
contemplated 120 days for the project, which would involve digging trenches and laying
new sewer lines throughout the town, including work in residential areas .
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") Regulations as
enforced by Kentucky provide that for trenches exceeding five feet in depth, employers
must take one of three safety precautions to prevent cave-ins : a) sloping the sides of
the trench away from the excavation, b) shoring the walls of the trench with hydraulic
jacks or timbers, or c) installing a trench box inside the trench in which employees can
perform their work .' Before leaving headquarters in Lexington, Randy Price ("Price"),
the ten-year superintendent for Environmental, made a conscious decision to leave the
shoring jacks and trench box in Lexington . Once work began in Dawson Springs, Price
used the sloping or "cutting back" method where the trench exceeded five feet in depth .
At the beginning of July, 1996, Price called on a second crew to help with the
trench and pipe laying work . At the request of William Wilson, one of Environmental's
1 29 C . F. R 1926.652 .
officers, Michael Sargent ("Sargent"), who had previously worked for Environmental and
had experience in trench work, joined the project and brought along his son Lewis .
Price made Sargent the foreman and "competent person ,2 for the second crew based
on Sargent's past work for Environmental and Sargent's competent person training
,3
certification . At the end of July, Sargent hired his "nephew' John G . Moore, Jr . as an
additional second crewmember.
When Sargent and his crew began the trench work on Fredericks Road, Price
told Sargent that he would obtain whatever safety devices Sargent thought necessary
to do the job right and ensure that no one was injured . Both Price and Sargent
classified the soil type in that particular trench as the most cohesive type and the least
likely to cause a cave-in and determined that no safety precautions needed to be taken.
In the deposition that was read to the jury at trial, Sargent stated that "[he] deemed it
safe [him]self or [he] wouldn't have allowed [his] son and [his] nephew or [him]self to
get in the hole and work ."
Charles Wilson ("Wilson"), who dug the Fredericks Road trench with a backhoe,
testified at trial that the trench walls were solid with no cracks or dirt clods falling out.
Sargent and his son Lewis both noted that the soil was a hard clay that was hard to dig
in some parts and easier in others . Nevertheless, sometime in the late morning or early
afternoon of July 30, 1996, Lewis Sargent exited the trench in which he and John, Jr .
2 "Competent person means one who is capable of identifying existing and
predictable hazards in the surroundings, or working conditions which are unsanitary,
hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt
corrective measures ." 29 C .F .R . 1926 .650 (a) .
3 John G. Moore, Jr. was the stepson of Sargent's sister-in-law; however, John,
Jr. had lived with Sargent and his son Lewis for approximately eight months and Lewis
commonly referred to John, Jr. a s his cousin and Sargent commonly referred to him as
his nephew .
were working ; Sargent replaced his son in the trench because John, Jr. was bent over
the sewer pipe preparing it for the next piece and Sargent did not like to leave a worker
in a trench alone . Suddenly, a nine-foot long portion of the trench wall collapsed onto
John Moore, Jr.'s back . Sargent then tried to dig his nephew out with his bare hands,
but the backhoe operator warned him to get out of the trench because it was about to
collapse again . Sargent escaped the second cave-in and the crewmembers began
digging out John, Jr. Their attempts were in vain because the collapsed trench wall had
buried and suffocated him almost instantly .
After John, Jr.'s body was recovered, Price had the trench filled in because it
was located near a street in a residential area . Work on the project was halted for two
days. Once work resumed, Steve Rogers ("Rogers"), a Kentucky OSHA inspector, was
called to the site to investigate . Although Rogers'could not investigate the trench
because it had been filled in, he noted that the decision to fill in the trench was
reasonable given that it was in a residential area . Rogers talked to Price and two other
employees who were working the day of John, Jr.'s death and issued four serious
citations .4 Rogers stated that all his citations were based on facts that Price had
relayed to him and he noted that Price appeared forthcoming and truthful . At trial,
Rogers testified that he saw no evidence to indicate that Environmental had a
deliberate intention to injure or kill John G . Moore, Jr .
At trial, all parties involved recognized the safety precautions for trench work and
acknowledged a risk of injury or death from failure to take the proper precautionary
4 The citations were for not reporting the accident to the Kentucky OSHA
regulatory agency within eight hours of the event; for failing to provide a ladder to
escape the trench ; for failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspection of
trench ; and for not taking adequate safety precautions for a trench over five feet deep,
i.e., sloping, shoring or installing a trench box.
measures .5 The Appellants believe that Environmental's failure to take the proper
precautions constituted a deliberate intention to kill their son, such that the exclusivity
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act would not apply:
If injury or death results to an employee through the
deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or
death, the employee or his dependents may take under this
chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a cause of action at law
against the employer as if this chapter had not been passed,
for such damage so sustained by the employee, his
dependents or personal representatives as is recoverable at
law.6
Although the jury's verdict confirmed the Appellants' position, the trial judge determined
that the safety violations did not amount to a deliberate intent on the part of
Environmental to bring about the death of John G . Moore, Jr. and entered a JNOV for
Appellee .
III . ANALYSIS
Upon review of the Order Granting JNOV, we must examine the trial court's
decision under the clearly erroneous standard .' That is to say, we must review all the
evidence presented to the jury and must uphold the trial court's decision if "after all the
evidence is construed most favorably to the verdict winner, a finding in his favor would
not be made by a reasonable [person] .,,8
5 The exception was Sargent, who stated in his deposition that at the time he
took the competent person training no precautionary measures were required to be
taken in soil that was classified as Type A, i .e ., the most cohesive .
6 KRS 342 .610(4).
Crest Coal Co. v. Bailey, Ky., 602 S .W .2d 425 (1980).
8 First and Farmers Bank of Somerset v. Henderson, Ky. App ., 763 S .W .2d 137,
(1988); Brewer v . Hillard , Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 1, 9 (1999) ; Taylor v. Kennedy , Ky. App.,
700 S .W.2d 415, 416 (1985)(where a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
should not be granted unless "no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable
men could differ") .
As provided in Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp. , 9 "`deliberate intention'
[has been interpreted to mean] that the employer must have determined to injure an
employee and used some means appropriate to that end, and there must be specific
intent ." 1° "`The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that the act is
causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great
the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional
wrong .""'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky recently
encountered the exception to the exclusivity provision of the Kentucky Workers'
Compensation Act and determined that without evidence that the employers acted to
harm employees, evidence that the employers knew that employees would be exposed
to chemicals that caused cancer but did not take measures to reduce or alleviate risks,
was insufficient to give rise to a tort cause of action under the deliberate intention
exception to the exclusivity provision of Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act . 12
In Tennessee, where a deliberate intention must also be established to avoid the
exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act, evidence of an employer's failure to
follow safety regulations and a history of disregarding safety regulations 13 or permitting
9 Ky., 277 S.W .2d 25 (1955).
10
Id. at 27 .
W illiamson v . Water Mania, Inc ., 721 So .2d 372, 373 (Fla . Dist. Ct . App.
1998)(citing Fisher v. Shenandoah General Constr. Co ., 498 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla.
1986)(quoting WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984))).
11
12
13
Blanton v. Cooper Indus ., Inc. , 99 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co . , 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn . App . 1993) (where
employee, who was injured while using explosives during excavation job, alleged that
employer failed to follow applicable safety regulations during employee's work, that
dangerous working conditions 14 has been found insufficient to establish that an
employer had actual intent to injure an employee. Many other states in which Workers'
Compensation exclusivity is abrogated when the employer intentionally causes injury or
death, have concluded that violations of OSHA regulations or other safety standards
alone do not rise to the level of an intentional wrong necessary to overcome the
Workers' Compensation exclusivity provisions 15 because mere knowledge and
employer had history of disregarding safety regulations concerning use of explosives,
and that all personnel assigned to project, including foreman, were untrained in use of
explosives) .
14
Mize v. Conagra, Inc. , 734 S .W .2d 334 (Tenn . App. 1987) (where personal
representatives of employees killed in explosion at manufacturing plant were not
entitled to maintain wrongful death action against employer, notwithstanding that
explosion resulted from accumulation of grain dust and inadequate ventilation caused
by employer's knowing violation of safety regulations, since knowingly permitting
dangerous working conditions to exist and violation of safety regulations was not
sufficient conduct to establish intentional injury exception to the Workers'
Compensation Act).
15
Estate of Richard by Cunningham v. American Wrecking Corp . , 134 F . Supp.
2d 252 (D . Conn. 2001) (where fatal injuries to demolition worker who was cutting steel
beams were not intentionally caused by employers, even though OSHA violations may
have been described as negligent, grossly negligent, and even willful actions on part of
employers) ; Allen v. Southwest Salt Co . , 718 P .2d 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (where
gross negligence in maintaining hazardous workplace and in failing to make safety
modifications on harvester did not show a deliberate intent to inflict injury on employee
who was injured by harvester) ; Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc. , 429 P.2d 504
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (where employer's conduct did not amount to willful misconduct
sufficient to take the action out of the Workers' Compensation Act when employer
disregarded repeated warnings by state safety inspectors regarding twenty-five foot
deep trench, knew that previous cave-in had occurred, had instructed decedents that in
the event of a cave-in they were to try to crawl inside a sewer pipe in the ditch and wait
until they were dug out, and at the time of the fatal occurrence, the decedents tried but
failed to reach the pipe); Ramos v . Town of Branford , 778 A.2d 972 (Conn. App. Ct.
2001) (where absent evidence that town's and marshal's alleged violations of safety
regulations were committed with conscious and deliberate intent directed to purpose of
inflicting injury, action brought against town and town's fire marshal by the estate of
deceased volunteer firefighter, alleging that town and its fire marshal violated various
safety standards was barred by exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act);
Greene v. Metals Selling Corp. , 484 A.2d 478 (Conn. App. Ct . 1984) (where allegations
of willful and wanton violations of federal Occupational Safety and Health Act and its
state counterparts were insufficient to support widow's common law action for wrongful
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appreciation of the risk involved in an act is not the same as the intent to cause the
injury . 16 Mere carelessness or negligence, however gross, wanton or reckless, does
not establish such intent . 17
From a review of the trial proceedings and the evidence presented therein, we
determine that the trial court's grant of JNOV was appropriate, as "it is the duty of the
court to set aside a jury verdict which imposes liability upon sympathetic considerations,
where fault is not shown .
death of her husband); Hatcher v. Bullard Co. , 477 A.2d 1035 (Conn . Super. Ct. 1984)
(where there was no allegation that employer intended or that conduct was calculated
to injure decedent, allegations that employer intentionally, wantonly and willfully violated
OSHA regulations resulting in death of decedent were insufficient to allow widow's
common law tort action to overcome exclusive remedy of Workers' Compensation Act);
Subileau v. Southern Forming , 664 So .2d 11 (Fla. Dist . Ct. App. 1995) (where even
though employer knew of past injuries to workers from falls from elevated worksites,
employer had been cited by OSHA several times for failure to provide guardrails, and
employer failed to erect guardrails at construction site, employer's actions did not
render death of construction worker in fall intentional) ; Boyer v. Louisville Ladder Co . ,
403 N.W .2d 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied , 428 Mich . 905 (1987) (where
employer's failure to provide safety cable to worker, who was injured when scaffolding
on which he was working fell, was not within intentional-tort exception notwithstanding
allegation that employer's failure to provide cable was willful, intentional, and with
knowledge that injury was substantially certain to follow, since worker failed to show
that employer intentionally caused scaffolding to fall; mere knowledge and appreciation
of risk involved in act is not same as intent to cause injury) ; DeLane ex rel . DeLane v.
City of Newark, 778 A.2d 511 (N .J . Super. Ct. App . Div. 2001) (where city's employees'
violations of laws governing electrical hazards, failure to inform firefighters of law
regarding proximity limitations to high voltage wires, and violations of safety statutes,
albeit reckless, did not rise to "intentional wrong" necessary to overcome exclusivity
provisions of Workers' Compensation statutes).
16
Boyer, 403 N .W .2d 210.
17
McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co . , Ky., 419 S.W.2d 542 (1967); Brierly v.
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc . , 184 F .3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999) ; Jenkins v. Carman
Mfg . Co . , 155 P . 703 (Or. 1916) ; Winterroth v. Meats, Inc . , 16 P .2d 522 (Wash. App .
1973) .
18 Brothers v. Cash , Ky., 332 S .W .2d 653, 655 (1960) .
The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the
Appellants, shows that since the trench was over five feet deep Environmental failed to
comply with Kentucky OSHA regulations regarding safety precautions for trench work
by not sufficiently sloping the trench, shoring the trench walls, or installing a trench box.
Environmental failed to provide the proper means of escape from the trench and failed
to report John G . Moore, Jr.'s death to Kentucky OSHA officials within the required
eight hours . Environmental also failed to have a competent person perform daily
inspections of the site .' 9 Environmental knew that injury or death could result from a
failure to take the proper precautions . Nevertheless, Environmental's violation of OSHA
regulations and acknowledgement of the possible consequences does not amount to a
deliberate intention to produce John G . Moore, Jr.'s death .2°
Appellants' reliance on the inferred intent approach in homicide cases is
misplaced as the actions of defendants in such homicide cases involve intentional
action directed toward the victim. In the case of Parker v. Commonwealth ,21 on which
's For purposes of this review, we assume that Sargent was not a competent
person. However, Steve Rogers testified that had he been shown Sargent's competent
person certification, he would have withdrawn the corresponding OSHA violation .
2°
Although we do not adopt the substantial certainty test, because the
intentional-harm exception to the exclusive remedy of Workers' Compensation requires
actual intent to harm and intent grounded on the theory of substantial certainty would
not bring a claim within the exception, it should be noted that even under that test,
Environmental's actions do not constitute deliberate intention . Peay v. U .S. Silica Co . ,
437 S.E .2d 64 (S .C. 1993) . In Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co . , 442 S .E.2d 53 (N .C. Ct .
App. 1994) where an employee was killed from a partial cave-in of an excavated trench,
the appellate court determined that the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
defendant construction company was proper although the company disregarded safety
rules for trenches deeper than five feet and allowed the employee to work without hard
hat, because a disregard of safety rules was at most negligent and inadvertent, and
thus did not rise to the level of intentionally doing something that was substantially
certain to result in an accident that would kill an employee .
21
Ky., 952 S.W .2d 209 (1997) .
Appellants rely, the actions of the defendant involved one blow to his 22 month-old
stepson's head with his fist and other blows to the child's head by striking it against a
fixed object . There, the defendant's intent could be inferred because of the direct
action he took and the extent of the victim's injuries . Had the blows to the child's head
been an accident they would not have been so numerous or severe . In Hudson v.
Commonwealth ,23 the defendant strangled his girlfriend to death, bound and gagged
her and left her body in the trunk of a car. In Stopher v. Commonwealth ,24 the
defendant killed a sheriff's deputy by shooting him in the face and in Smith v.
Commonwealth,25 the defendant shot an acquaintance at point blank range. The
intentional and vicious actions by the defendants in each of these cases eliminated the
possibility that the deaths were caused by accident and justified the inferred intent
approach . Absent actions of the same nature, this approach cannot be used to infer
deliberate intent under KRS 342 .610(4) .
In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that "constructive intent" would satisfy the
requirement necessary for "wilful misconduct" under Arizona's exception statute, the
court in Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc . ,26 stated that the statute required that
there be a "deliberate" intention as distinguished from some kind of intention presumed
from gross negligence . Affirming a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
22
Id . at 212 .
23
Ky ., 979 S .W .2d 106 (1998).
24
Ky ., 57 S .W .3d 787 (2001).
25
Ky ., 737 S.W.2d 683 (1987) .
26
429 R .2d 504 (Ariz. Ct. App . 1967).
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court concluded that there had been a failure to establish that the employer had acted
with the intent required by the statute .2'
"It must be remembered that it's not the depravity of the employer's conduct that
is being tested, but the narrow issue of the intentional versus the accidental quality of
the precise injury . ,28 Therefore, a "[v]iolation of a safety statute [a]lone does not
constitute intentional injury," and neither does "failure to follow recommended
procedures or to take standard precautions . ,29
"[T]o
say that a safety statute was
violated is only to say that an employer has failed to use reasonable care . 30
In the case sub iudice, the Appellee's actions involved a failure to follow safety
regulations . Although Environmental was cited for serious Kentucky OSHA violations,
from the evidence presented to the jury, viewed in a light most favorable to the
Appellants, there is no indication that Environmental's failure was done with the
deliberate intention to produce John Moore, Jr.'s death . Without more, Environmental's
violation of Kentucky OSHA regulations does not amount to the deliberate intention
necessary to pursue remedies outside of the Workers' Compensation Act .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Cooper, Johnstone and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur. Lambert, C.J ., dissents by
separate opinion in which Graves and Stumbo, JJ ., join .
27
Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc. , 429 P.2d 504 (Ariz . Ct. App. 1967) .
28 Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc. , 246 S .E .2d 907, 922 n. 3 (W . Va . 1978)
(Neely, J ., dissenting), superseded by statute as recognized by Handley v. Union
Carbide Corp. , 804 F .2d 265 (4 Cir. 1986) .
29 Mandolidis, 246 S .E .2d at 922, 923 (Neely, J ., dissenting) .
31
Id . at 923.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS, JOHN G. MOORE, SR. AND SHARON MOORE,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN G . MOORE, JR. :
W. Douglas Myers
Deatherage, Myers & Haggard
701 South Main Street
PO Box 1065
Hopkinsville, Kentucky 42241
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, THE KENTUCKY ACADEMY OF TRIAL
ATTORNEYS:
Gregory N . Schabell
Busald, Funk & Zevely, PSC
226 Main Street
Florence, Kentucky 41042
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Joe A. Evans, III
Frymire, Evans, Peyton, Teague & Cartwright
One South Main Street
PO Box 695
Madisonville, Kentucky 42431
Richard L. Frymire, Jr.
Frymire, Evans, Peyton, Teague & Cartwright
One South Main Street
PO Box 695
Madisonville, Kentucky 42431
RENDERED : AUGUST 26, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*ixprettte (gourf of ltrufurhV
2001-SC-0227-DG
JOHN G . MOORE, SR. AND SHARON
MOORE, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN G. MOORE, JR .
V
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-0526-MR
HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT NO. 97-CI-00758
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion that affirms the trial court's
grant of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") in favor of Appellee,
Environmental Construction Corporation . The trial court overturned the jury award of
damages in favor of Appellants, Sharon and John Moore, Sr., for the wrongful death of
their son, John Moore, Jr . The majority held that "the trial court's grant of JNOV was
appropriate, as `it is the duty of the court to set aside a jury verdict which imposes
liability upon sympathetic considerations, where fault is not shown ."" I believe that
Appellants presented more than sympathy; that their evidence was sufficient for the jury
Moore v. Environmental Construction Corp . , Ky.,
S.W.3d
(200_)
(majority opinion) (Slip op. at 8), quoting Boyer v. Louisville Ladder Co. , 403 N .W .2d
210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) .
to reasonably find that Appellee acted with deliberate intent to bring about the death of
the decedent.
The evidence presented at trial revealed deliberate actions on the part of
Appellee in forcing its employees, including the deceased Mr . Moore, to work in a
manifestly unsafe environment. Appellee purposefully did not provide safe working
conditions for the digging of the trench . It refused to install a trench box or adequately
slope the sides of the trench . Kentucky OSHA standards require safety precautions
when trenches are over five feet deep, and the trench in question was at least seven
feet deep . These actions by Appellee were intentional and fully supported the jury
finding of liability against Environmental.
At trial, management personnel of Environmental admitted that Appellee
knew of the dangers, hazardous conditions, and potential consequences associated
with placing Mr. Moore in an unsafe trench . The testimony also revealed that Appellee
knew that cave-in of the trench was likely and that anyone in the trench at the time of
the cave-in would be seriously injured or even killed as a result . Furthermore, testimony
disclosed that Appellee had knowledge of specific risk factors that greatly increased the
likelihood of a cave-in : 1) an exposed gas line, 2) vibrations from an adjacent highway,
and 3) unstable soil . Even with all of these known risks and probabilities of death or
serious injury, Appellee ordered the decedent to work in the trench . The evidence also
showed that Appellee failed to report the decedent's death in a timely manner, even
though it knew that the death was the result of its actions .
Upon review of a JNOV motion, the court must "consider the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and to give that party every
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record ."2 Additionally, the motion
should not be granted "unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue
in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable [persons]
could differ. ,3 It is erroneous to declare that the death of Mr. Moore was caused by
Appellee's omissions, because the decedent's death was the direct result of Appellee's
deliberate and intentional act of ordering him to work in death-probable conditions .
Moreover, the jury was entitled to infer intent based upon Appellee's actions following
the incident . Its failure to report the decedent's death and filling the trench subsequent
to the removal of the body, Appellee impeded or prevented inspectors from fully
investigating the incident . The evidence and allowable inferences were sufficient to
create a material issue of fact as to whether Appellants met their burden of proving
deliberate intent to cause death .
Kentucky is not alone in having an exception to the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act and allowing recovery for injuries as a
result of intentional or deliberate actions by the employer. Some other jurisdictions use
a substantial certainty test. The majority opinion relies on Dunleaw v. Yates Constr .
Co.4 for the proposition that Environmental's actions did not meet the substantial
certainty test.
In Dunleaw , the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that summary
judgment granted by the trial court to the defendants was proper, because the plaintiff
had failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding under the exception in
2 Brewer v. Hillard , Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 1, 9 (1999) .
3 Taylor v. Kennedy , Ky. App ., 700 S .W .2d 415, 416 (1985) .
4 442 S .E .2d 53 (N .C . App . 1994) .
Woodson v. Rowland.5 In Dunleaw , the trench did not exceed five feet deep in all
areas of the trench . For this reason, the company did not supply a trench box. In spite
of what appeared to be stable soil, there was a partial cave-in and an employee was
killed . The court distinguished these facts from the situation in Woodson where the
high court of North Carolina recognized a narrow exception based on egregious facts.
The facts included several safety citations, showed required work in a fourteen-foot
deep trench, and showed the failure to provide any safety precautions . The Supreme
Court of North Carolina recently described the Woodson exception as one that "applies
only in the most egregious cases of employer misconduct" and where "there is
uncontroverted evidence of the employer's intentional misconduct and where such
misconduct is substantially certain to lead to the employee's serious injury or death .,,6
We hold that when an employer intentionally engages in
misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause
serious injury of death to employees and an employee is
injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the
personal representative of the estate in case of death, may
pursue a civil action against the employer. Such misconduct
is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based
thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
Act.
This discussion in Pleasant [,325 S.E.2d 244 (1985)] makes
clear that an actual intent to cause injury is not a necessary
element of an intentional tort generally, nor is it required for
intentional tort claims based on work-related injuries.'
The facts of the present case are disturbingly similar to those in Woodson
v . Rowland . 8 Here the employer knew that the trench depth required safety precautions
407 S.E.2d 222 (N .C . 1991) .
s Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck,
(Slip op. at 4).
Woodson, 407 S .E .2d at 340-42.
s Supra .
S .E .2d
,357 N .C. 552 (N.C . 2003)
due to the likelihood of cave-in, but the employer deliberately did not make available or
use a trench box. Rather the employer left all safety equipment behind instead of
taking it to the work site. As in the Woodson case, the deceased employee was forced
to work under manifestly unsafe conditions. Further, it appears from the testimony and
other evidence that it was substantially certain that a serious injury or death would
occur as a result of the actions by Environmental.
KRS 342 .610(4) allows recovery outside of the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act upon a showing of intent. The legislature has not
eliminated liability when employers act egregiously and cause the death or serious
injury of employees . But, this Court has effectively immunized employers from payment
of damages despite egregious behavior by a draconian construction of the statute .
Instead of analyzing this case as a civil action for damages and allowing the jury to
draw proper inferences, the majority has held Appellants to a standard that would be
appropriate for a homicide prosecution .
For the reasons stated herein, I would reverse the trial court's grant of
JNOV and reinstate the jury verdict.
Graves and Stumbo, JJ ., join this dissenting opinion .
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