FRANKLIN RALPH ROARK V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCED URE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYINANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO-BE PUBLISHED
,*Uyr:eMr xurf of
(A
XT
6.
2001-SC-0080-TG
FRANKLIN RALPH ROARK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
98-CR-00336
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Franklin Roark, was convicted by a jury of one (1) count of FirstDegree Rape, two (2) counts of First-Degree Burglary, and one (1) count of FirstDegree Robbery. After the jury found Appellant to be a First-Degree Persistent Felony
Offender (PFO), he received life sentences for his First-Degree Rape and First-Degree
Robbery convictions and forty (40) year sentences for each of his First-Degree Burglary
convictions . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right,' raising six issues for our
consideration : (1) whether a witness's posthypnotic identification of Appellant was
admissible ; (2) whether a witness is subject to cross-examination on a statement made
by her during hypnotic session ; (3) whether a witness may testify as to statements
KY. CONST.
§110(2)(b) .
made by her during hypnotic session; (4) whether other crimes allegedly committed by
Appellant were admissible ; (5) whether a mistrial should have been granted because of
improper statements by Commonwealth's witnesses; (6) whether a prior conviction of
Appellant was admissible when the conviction remained on appeal ; and (7) whether the
evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's convictions . Finding no reversible error,
we affirm .
II. BACKGROUND
In the late evening of October 24, 1998, Melissa and Brandon Barry's residence
on Curley Court in Burlington, Kentucky, was burglarized . Among the items taken from
the residence were a .22 caliber revolver and several pieces of jewelry. That same
night, S .M . was spending the evening out with her boyfriend, her son, and her son's
girlfriend . At that time, S .M . was awaiting the completion of work on her home, thus she
had obtained a short-term lease and moved into an apartment on Curley Court only a
few weeks prior. S.M .'s apartment was located just a few doors from the Barry's
residence . S .M . returned home with her boyfriend and son at approximately 11 :30 p .m.
that evening . Shortly thereafter, both her son and her boyfriend left, leaving S.M . alone
in the apartment .
Preparing for bed, S.M . was in the bathroom when she turned and saw a
masked man holding a gun standing in the doorway. He put a pillowcase over her
head, tied her hands behind her back, and proceeded to sexually assault and rape her
by penetrating her with his fingers and penis. He asked her where she kept her money
and jewels, and as she listened, he went from room to room searching for her
valuables . Her assailant then fled . S .M . drove to her boyfriend's home in Florence,
Kentucky, and contacted the police .
Less than one week later, the Boone County Police Department recovered two
(2) necklaces that had been stolen in the Barry burglary from Quick Cash Pawn Shop in
Latonia, Kentucky. The necklaces had been pawned by a man who claimed he had
done so at the behest of Appellant . Appellant was then arrested and charged with
First-Degree Burglary of the Barry home, First-Degree Rape of S .M ., First-Degree
Burglary of S .M .'s apartment, and First-Degree Robbery of S.M . In December 1998,
Appellant was indicted by the grand jury on all of the charges, along with a charge of
being a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender, and his jury trial took place in July
2000 .
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of other crimes in order to
demonstrate a similar pattern of crimes committed by Appellant . Testimony was
offered by police officers from the Kentucky State Police and the Boone County, Kenton
County, Pendleton County, and Fort Wright police departments, as well as from three
(3) victims of similar sexual assault/burglary crimes, who testified as follows :
N .T. testified that on November 29, 1997, she was at home alone when she
heard a noise that sounded like breaking glass . She later discovered that a basement
window had been broken and that her bedroom had been ransacked . Money and
numerous items of jewelry were missing from the bedroom, including a cross and chain .
A few weeks later, on December 19, 1997, N .T. was standing in her kitchen when
suddenly the kitchen door swung open and a figure rushed at her and attacked her. As
N .T. struggled with the intruder, he produced a knife, placed it against her throat and
ordered her to quiet down . He forced her onto the floor, removed his coat, covered her
head with it, ordered her to lie still, and began to take things from the residence . By
lifting up the coat, N.T. was able to observe the intruder for a few seconds before he
attacked her again, pulled her robe up over her head, and began to sexually assault
her. He tied her hands in front of her body with rope, cut off her underwear with the
knife, and digitally penetrated her vagina and anus . Shortly thereafter, he fled the
residence and N.T. called the police . N.T. later discovered that the intruder had stolen
money and a cameo broach from her bedroom, much as the November 29th burglar had
done. The cameo brooch and the cross and chain were recovered from Appellant's
residence in Butler, Kentucky during a search performed on October 29, 1998 .
A.R. testified that on September 17, 1998, as she entered her home in Fort
Wright, Kentucky, she was attacked by a masked assailant and thrown to the floor.
Brandishing a knife, the assailant then bound her hands with pantyhose and covered
her head with a pillowcase. He forced A.R. onto the couch, raped her, forced her to
perform oral sex upon him, and repeatedly asked her if she "liked" it. He then
demanded money and jewelry, and then fled the residence . Two (2) of the rings stolen
during the attack were recovered from the Quick Cash Pawn Shop in Florence ; the
items were pawned by Appellant's live-in girlfriend, at his behest.
A.H. testified that on October 15, 1998, she was raped in her residence in Butler,
Kentucky, by a masked assailant . The man entered through a window near the front of
her residence . Armed with a gun, he bound her hands with pantyhose, covered her
head with a pillow, and forced her onto the bed. When she resisted, he punched her in
the head until she relented . He then raped her, penetrated her rectum with his fingers,
and performed oral sex upon her, all the while inquiring as to whether she was
"enjoying" it . After raping her, he demanded and took cash and jewelry from the
residence, including a herringbone necklace, before fleeing . The necklace was
recovered from Quick Cash Pawn Shop in Florence ; it had been pawned by a man who
did so at the behest of Appellant .
Appellant was convicted as charged on all counts . In the sentencing phase, the
jury first recommended a sentence of twenty (20) years for each conviction, and then,
after finding Appellant to be a First-Degree PFO, recommended enhanced sentences of
life imprisonment for the First-Degree Rape and First-Degree Robbery convictions and
enhanced sentences of forty (40) years for both First-Degree Burglary convictions . The
jury recommended that the sentences run consecutively. The trial court sentenced
Appellant to imprisonment in accordance with the jury's recommendations, 2 and this
appeal followed .
2 The trial court's judgment, itself, does not set forth the sentences finally
imposed by the trial court but refers to "See attached sheet ." A single sheet of paper
styled "SENTENCING" is contained in the record next to the judgment and presumably
is the "attached sheet" referred to in the judgment. The enhanced sentences
recommended by the jury are set forth in the attachment, which also contains the jury's
recommendation of consecutive sentences . Appellant's brief only mentions the
enhanced sentences fixed by the jury and makes no mention of the jury's
recommendation of consecutive sentences . The Commonwealth's brief states only that
Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment, and it too makes no mention of the
recommendation of consecutive sentences . Generally, a sentence of life imprisonment
may not run consecutively to another sentence, Holloman v. Commonwealth , Ky., 37
S .W.3d 764 (2001); Mabe v. Commonwealth , Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668 (1994); Hall v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 862 S.W .2d 321 (1993); Lear v. Commonwealth , Ky., 884 S.W.2d
657 (1994), but under KRS 533 .060(2) any felony sentence, including a life sentence,
received for a felony committed while on probation or parole for a prior felony must run
consecutively to any other felony sentence, White v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 32
S .W .3d 83 (2000) ; Devore v. Commonwealth , Ky., 662 S .W .2d 829 (1984) ; Riley v.
Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934 (1987), subject, however, to KRS 532 .110(1)(c)'s 70-year
limitation on the aggregate of consecutive term-of-years sentences. We are unable to
determine from the record whether Appellant was on parole at the time of the
commission of the subject offenses, but this is of no consequence because "[t]he
application of KRS 533 .060(2) is essentially administrative in nature, and is certainly
properly included in the duties of the Corrections Cabinet[,]" Riley v. Parke , Ky., 740
S.W.2d 934, 936 (1987); Cardwell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 12 S.W .3d 672 (2000), and
therefore, the Department of Corrections (formerly the Corrections Cabinet) will
determine whether Appellant's sentences run concurrently or consecutively. Riley,
supra; Cardwell , supra . We would note, however, that under KRS 532 .110(1)(c) the
111. ANALYSIS
A. N.T.'S POSTHYPNOTIC IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT
Appellant objected to N .T.'s testimony because she identified him only after a
hypnotic session . This issue was thoroughly analyzed in Appellant's appeal of his
conviction for crimes against N.T. In Roark v. Commonwealth 3 (hereinafter Roark I ),
we adopted the "totality of circumstances" approach as "the soundest approach thus far
developed for evaluating the admissibility of evidence that is the product of an
hypnotically induced, refreshed or enhanced recollection .,,4 We then applied the
"totality of circumstances" test to N .T.'s identification of Appellant and concluded that
"the trial judge's admission of N.T .'s posthypnotic identification and testimony in Roark
11 was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion .,,5 For the same reasons, we
again find that the trial court's admission of N.T.'s posthypnotic identification in the
present case was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of its discretion.
In his reply brief,6 Appellant argues that the Roark I analysis does not apply
because N .T.'s identification of Appellant "is being introduced in a collateral case ." We
disagree . N.T.'s identification and testimony is still the evidence being evaluated, not
S .M .'s testimony. The factors remain the same .
B.
IMPEACHMENT OF N .T.
aggregate of Appellant's two Burglary sentences (forty-years each) may not exceed
seventy (70) years.
3
Ky., 90 S.W .3d 24 (2002).
4 Id . at 36.
5 Id . at 37 (citation omitted) .
6 In fairness to Appellant, we observe that Roark I was decided after Appellant
filed his original brief in this appeal .
In response to the Commonwealth's Attorney's (CA) questions during her direct
testimony regarding her hypnotism, N .T. testified as follows:
CA :
Following the time you were hypnotized, was there any new
information that came out of that about your attacker? (pause)
Anything that you hadn't previously remembered? (long pause) I
mean, were you able to name a person in that --
N .T . : Oh . In the hypnosis you mean?
CA:
Yes .
N .T. : Yeah, I did, you know.
C.A. : OK, Now, who is the person that you are referring to?
N.T. :
His name is [D .M .]
C.A . : And, did you tell the hypnotist that he was the person
that attacked you?
N .T. : No, I didn't .
C .A. : What did you tell her about that person N .T. : I just said . . . it just popped in my brain, um, um . . .I just
said that he was a friend of my son's and, um, I don'
know C .A. : Did you say that he was the person that attacked
you?
N.T. :
No I didn't .
C.A. : What did you say?
N .T. :
I just, I don't know, I just, uh, I just said he was a
friend of my son's and he just lived, um, behind us at
one time . But I just didn't, um, I didn't say it was him,
the person that attacked me .
C .A . : Was [D .M .] the person that attacked you?
N .T. : No it wasn't .
C .A. : Did [D .M .] look like the person that attacked you?
N .T . : No he didn't.
C .A. : OK. Following the hypnosis do you have any
independent recollection about what you said during
that session?
N .T. : Not really. No I don't.
Although an audio recording' was made of N .T .'s hypnotism session and was
made available to Appellant's lawyer, his lawyer sought to impeach N .T .'s testimony by
utilizing a purported transcript of the audiotape in cross-examining her on statements
that she made during the session . The trial court ruled, however, that the transcript
could not be used to impeach N .T. because N .T . could not remember what she said
during the hypnotism session . Appellant claims that the trial court erred in not
permitting Appellant's counsel to use the transcript to impeach N .T . We disagree .
In Wise v. Commonwealth , 9 the Court of Appeals pointed out that Kentucky case
law had "thoroughly settled" the issue and that "the credibility of any witness, including
one's own witness, may be impeached by showing that the witness has made prior
inconsistent statements[,]"'° and stated that "[n]o person should have the power to
obstruct the truth-finding process of a trial and defeat a prosecution by saying, 'I don't
remember .""' The Wise Court noted, however, that "[t]he trial judge has a broad
discretion in deciding whether or not to permit the introduction of such contradictory
evidence[.]" 12 This Court recently cited Wise approvingly in Manning v .
Commonwealth ,, and pointed out that "[t]he Wise Court concluded that it is within the
In Roark I , the audio tape was admitted into evidence during the testimony of
Jill Brunner, the hypnotist. Roark, 90 S .W .3d at 37.
8 Although the Commonwealth's Attorney entered both the audiotape and
transcript into the record by avowal, they were not made part of the record on appeal
and are not available for our review.
9 Ky. App ., 600 S.W .2d 470 (1978).
10
Id . at 472.
11
Id . Accord Young v. Commonwealth Ky., 50 S.W .3d 148 (2001).
12
Wise , 600 S .W.2d at 472 .
13 Ky .,
23 S.W .3d 610 (2000).
trial court's discretion to admit the contradictory evidence .
"14
Accordingly, as with most
rulings regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence, whether to allow
impeachment of N.T . with statements that she allegedly made during her hypnotism
was within the discretion of the trial court, and the standard of review is whether there
has been an abuse of that discretion . 15
In Mills v . State, defense counsel sought to refresh the recollection of a witness
by using statements that the witness did not recall making while under hypnosis . The
trial court sustained objections to defense counsel's attempts to show the witness a
transcript of the hypnotherapy session and to play a tape of the hypnotherapy session .
In upholding the trial court's ruling, the Arkansas Supreme Court first noted that the
"situation is different from when a defendant or witness is called to give hypnotically
refreshed testimony[, ]07 and that the defendant "presents us with no authority for why
statements of a witness made under hypnosis should be relevant, reliable, or otherwise
admissible
."1s
Then, after mentioning that the statements were allegedly made by the
witness "while she was in a hypnotic trance," 19 the Mills Court held that the trial court
14 Id . at 613 .
15 Commonwealth v. King , Ky., 950 S .W.2d 807, 809 (1997) ("It is a well-settled
principle of Kentucky law that a trial court ruling with respect to the admission of
evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion ."); Johnson v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 105 S.W .3d 430, 438 (2003) ("We review a trial court's KRE 403
decision for abuse of discretion .") .
16
910 S .W .2d 682 (Ark . 1995).
17
Id . at 690 (citations omitted) .
1s
Id .
19
Id .
did not abuse its discretion in "disallowing the use of [the witness's] statements made
under hypnosis to expand her testimony.
,20
Although Arkansas has adopted a modified form of the per se inadmissible rule
for testimony induced, refreshed or enhanced by hypnosis
,21
and although Mills does
not involve an attempt to impeach a witness's testimony with a prior inconsistent
statement, but rather to refresh a witness's testimony, we find it persuasive . We too
agree that it is one thing to admit hypnotically-refreshed testimony and quite a different
matter to admit statements made by a witness while under hypnosis . Like in Mills,
Appellant did not present any evidence that a statement made by a witness while under
hypnosis is "relevant, reliable, or otherwise admissible ." Roark I did not address this
issue; so, the "totality of circumstances" test does not apply to this situation . To allow
cross-examination of a witness based on statements made by the witness while under
hypnosis would be akin to allowing cross-examination of a witness based on statements
made while the witness was asleep or otherwise unconscious
.22
Neither situation
promotes trustworthiness in the statements made by the witness . Additionally, we point
out that the situation presented here, i .e. , the witness was never aware of making the
statement, is different from the situation presented when a witness claims a loss of
memory. In the former, the witness never had any memory of making the statement to
20
Id .
21
Partin v. State , 885 S .W .2d 21, 22 (Ark. 1994) ("This court's decision in Rock
v. State, 708 S .W.2d 78 (Ark. 1986), vacated, 483 U .S . 44, 107 S .Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d
37 (1987)], held that hypnotically enhanced testimony of a criminal defendant is
inadmissible per se, and that testimony of pre-hypnotic memories is admissible if shown
by the proponent by clear and convincing evidence to be reliable and if limited to
memories prior to the hypnosis .") .
22
Indeed, one of the definitions of hypnosis is "[a] sleeplike condition." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed . 2000).
-10-
begin with; whereas, in the latter, the witness has merely forgotten - either voluntarily or
involuntarily - that she made the statement. Thus the hypnotized witness is called
upon to testify to a statement that she never had any memory of making . Accordingly,
her failure to recall the statement cannot fairly be classified as inconsistent with her
present testimony . For the above reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's refusal to allow Appellant's attorney to use the transcript in his crossexamination of N .T.
Additionally, we would note that Appellant's lawyer did not attempt to use the
audiotape itself, but rather he opted to use a purported transcript that was not properly
authenticated 23 and was strongly contested by the Commonwealth, and rightfully so,
whether the transcript was an accurate translation of the audiotape. We would also
mention that the proper foundation was not laid for impeaching N .T.'s testimony .24 And,
finally, we point out that this claimed error was not properly preserved with avowal
testimony by N .T. 25
C. N .T.'S HYPNOTIC STATEMENTS
Appellant argues that "[N .T .] should not have been permitted to testify about
anything related to her hypnosis session because she could not remember any of what
happened during the session[,]" and therefore, "she had no personal knowledge of the
23
KRE 901 (a) ("General provision . The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.") .
24
KRE 613(a); Noel v. Commonwealth , Ky., 76 S .W .3d 923 (2002).
25 C
9 .52 .
ommonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17 S .W .3d 520, 525 (2000) ; KRE 103(a)(2) ; RCr
session and was not competent to testify about the session ." KRE 601(b)(2) 26 and
60227 are cited in support of this argument. Although we tend to agree with Appellant
that N.T .'s testimony relating statements that she made while hypnotized was improper,
this claimed error was admittedly not preserved, and because Appellant does not allude
to any prejudice resulting from this particular testimony of N .T ., we do not find that
Appellant suffered manifest injustice as a result of such testimony . Appellant has failed
to demonstrate "that a substantial possibility exists that the result would have been
different" absent the claimed error. Accordingly, we decline to review this claimed
error under a palpable error standard .29
D. PRIOR BAD ACTS
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith . It may, however, be admissible :
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]
Thus, evidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant for some purpose other than to
show criminal disposition .31 Here, the evidence of Appellant's other crimes had a two26
KRE 601 (b) ("Minimal qualifications . A person is disqualified to testify as a
witness if the trial court determines that he : . . . (2) Lacks the capacity to recollect
facts[ .]").
27
KRE 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.") .
28 Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S .W .2d 219, 224 (1996).
29 RCr 10 .26 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.");
Partin , supra note 28; Butcher v. Commonwealth , Ky., 96 S.W .3d 3, 11 (2002).
30
KRE 404(b) .
-1 2-
fold purpose : one, his identity and two, his modus operandi . Like the issues of corpus
delicti and identity, 32 the issues of identity and modus operandi are integrated .
Accordingly, "[i]t is entirely appropriate, we believe, for purposes of assessing the
admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes in the present context, to treat the evidence
as if offered to prove identity by similarity, and to require that the details of the charged
and uncharged acts be sufficiently similar as to demonstrate a modus operandi .,'33 The
standard was stated in Adcock v. Commonwealth : 34
In every case in which evidence of other crimes is sought
to be introduced to establish a pattern or scheme, the real
question is whether the method of the commission of the
other crime or crimes is so similar and so unique as to
indicate a reasonable probability that the crimes were
committed by the same person . If it does so, evidence that
the defendant committed the other crime is admissible . If it
only tends to show a disposition to commit a crime, the
.35
evidence is not admissible
In the present case, the evidence supports a finding that Appellant's signature was on
all of the crimes .
31
United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 1989) ("This court has
noted that Rule 404(b) `is actually a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, since only
one use is forbidden and several permissible uses of such evidence are identified ."'
(citation omitted)) .
32
Billings v. Commonwealth , Ky., 843 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992) ("While the issue
of the corpus delicti is primary in these cases, identity of the perpetrator (if any) is not
wholly irrelevant . It seems more accurate to say that the latter issue is assimilated into
the former. If the act occurred, then the defendant almost certainly was the perpetrator.
The two issues are essentially integrated .") .
33
Id
34
Ky ., 702
S .W .2d 440 (1986) .
35
Id . a t 443.
36
Rearick v. Commonwealth , Ky., 858 S .W .2d 185, 187 (1993) ("That is,
evidence of other acts of sexual deviance offered to prove the existence of a common
-13-
In each sexual assault/burglary/theft case, the perpetrator was armed and
committed a sexual offense, burglary, and theft with the object of the theft being money
and jewelry. Additionally, several common characteristics established a common
method, pattern, or modus operandi, by which the perpetrator committed the sexual
assault/burglary/theft crimes. For example, in the cluster of crimes occurring between
September 17, 1998 and October 24, 1998 (involving A.R ., A.H ., and S .M .), the
perpetrator of the sexual assaults/burglaries/thefts was armed with either a knife or gun,
demanded money, took jewelry and cash (among other things), wore a mask, and
entered through a window. Each victim noted the same characteristics regarding the
perpetrator's genitalia, notably, that the assailant demonstrated difficulty maintaining an
erection and that the size of his penis was quite small . In each instance, the victim was
bound with pantyhose and her head was covered with a pillowcase while she was being
sexually assaulted . As to N.T., the perpetrator again committed a sex offense, burglary,
and theft. He was armed with a knife, and stolen property was recovered that linked
Appellant to the crimes against her. The perpetrator came upon N .T. from behind eliminating the need for a mask - and placed his coat and then her robe over her head
- eliminating the need for a pillow case. We would also note that N .T. picked Appellant
out of both a photo lineup and an audio lineup.
S.M . was unable to identify her assailant, and no physical evidence was
introduced that connected Appellant to the sexual assault of her and the theft of her
property . Consequently, the admission of evidence of Appellant's prior crimes,
although highly prejudicial, was also highly probative because it established Appellant's
scheme or plan must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called
signature crime .") .
- 1 4-
identity as the perpetrator of the crimes against S .M . . Its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice .3'
As to the burglary of the Barry home, the perpetrator gained entry through a
window, apparently wore gloves, and was linked to property stolen from the home . The
Barry home was only a few homes away from S .M .'s residence, and the burglary
occurred earlier the same night as the assault of S .M. and the burglary of her home .
Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support a finding that he committed the
burglary . We disagree . Proof of Appellant's possession of property taken in the
burglaries was sufficient evidence that he committed the crime :
Wahl's second assigned error is that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant submission of the case to the jury. He
says that the only evidence connecting him with the crime
was his having had possession of the goods . It is well
established that where there is evidence of a breaking and
entering of a dwelling and property taken therefrom, and the
property is found in the possession of the accused, such
showing makes a submissible jury case.
For the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting into evidence the proof of Appellant's prior crimes .
E . MOTION FOR MISTRIALS
Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted Appellant's requests
for mistrials as a result of statements made by Commonwealth's witnesses . Terry
Brown, Appellant's nephew, when asked by the Commonwealth's Attorney how long he
37
KRE 403.
38 Wahl v. Commonwealth , Ky., 490 S.W .2d 769, 770-71 (1972) .
39 Commonwealth v. English , Ky., 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (1999) ("The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles .") .
-1 5-
had known Appellant, answered that he had known him since he got out of prison . The
trial court denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial but appropriately admonished the
jury. Jennifer Patrick, the wife of a co-worker of Appellant, mouthed the words "I could
kill you" to Appellant as she exited the stand .4° Appellant again moved for a mistrial
that was denied by the trial court ; however, the trial court admonished the jury not to
consider the witness's statement. Robert Thomas, the detective who investigated the
assault on N.T., opined that the perpetrator had committed these kinds of acts before
and would do so again . Again Appellant moved for a mistrial that was denied, and the
trial court admonished the jury. Detective Thomas then began testifying about
Appellant's Campbell County conviction, and as he read the conviction, he read that
Appellant had been convicted of being a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender .
Once again, Appellant moved for a mistrial that was denied ; however, Detective
Thomas then read only the underlying convictions but not the PFO conviction . We
disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court was required to declare a
mistrial .
"A mistrial is justified only when a `manifest necessity for such an action or an
urgent or real necessity' appears in the record[,]" and "[i]t is within the trial judge's
discretion whether a mistrial should be granted, and his decision should not be
disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion .,,41 Here, the testimony was not elicited by the
Commonwealth's Attorney . Jennifer Patrick's statement was not even responsive to a
question by the Commonwealth's Attorney but was simply uttered as she was leaving
4°
The assertion that witness Jennifer Patrick mouthed these words to Appellant
was not evidenced in the record . Only defense counsel's objection to the behavior was
recorded .
41
Neal v. Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S .W .3d 843, 851-53 (2003) (citations omitted) .
-1 6-
the witness stand . The trial court admonished the jury not to consider the complained
of testimony and the statement by the exiting witness. We find that no manifest
necessity for a mistrial or an urgent or real necessity appears in the record ; therefore,
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motions for
a mistrial.
F. ADMISSION OF APPEALED CONVICTION
Appellant claims as error the introduction into evidence of the fact of his
conviction in Roark I , which was on appeal at the time of his trial in this case . His
conviction was brought out during N .T.'s testimony in the guilt phase of the trial. While
this Court agrees that it was likely error to admit into evidence the fact that Appellant
had been convicted under the prior indictment ,42 this issue was not preserved for
appeal, and we do not find that the introduction of the conviction rises to the level of
"palpable error" .43 Regardless, Appellant's conviction has now been affirmed and any
error resulting from introducing the conviction while it was on appeal has now been
remedied . We would also note that even evidence of an uncharged prior crime is
admissible if sufficiently proven. In fact, evidence of prior bad acts by a defendant does
not have to be established by direct evidence .44
G . SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
B ut _cf. R. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 2.25(11)(C), at
90 (3d ed . Michie 1993) ("Evidence offered under the "other crimes" rules occasionally
consists of a conviction, making it easy to assume that the defendant, in fact,
committed the uncharged offense ."). It is doubtful if a conviction, itself, would satisfy
the standard for admission of a prior crime under KRE 404(b). See supra, Part IIID .
42
43
RCr 10 .26 .
44
Parker v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 952 S .W .2d 209, 213 (1997).
-17-
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's
motion for directed verdict because the Commonwealth did not produce sufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction . We review Appellant's argument under the
standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham:45
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court
must draw all fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth . If the evidence is sufficient to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a
directed verdict should not be given . For the
purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserv[e] to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be
given to such testimony .
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the
defendant entitled to a directed verdict .46
Appellant's claim is largely based on the Commonwealth's reliance upon
circumstantial evidence to prosecute the case .
However, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is
sufficient to support a criminal conviction as long as the evidence taken as a whole
shows that it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt." 4' Thus, we
consider whether, in view of the entire body of evidence presented by the
Commonwealth, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty .
Although the evidence in this case was circumstantial, the Commonwealth presented
45
Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991).
_Id . at 187 . See also Commonwealth v. Sawhill , Ky., 660 S .W .2d 3, 4-5 (1983)
("The clearly unreasonable test seems to be a higher standard for granting a directed
verdict . . . constitut[ing] an appellate standard of review.").
46
47
Trowel v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 550 S .W .2d 530 (1977) .
- 1 8-
sufficient evidence connecting Appellant to the burglary of the Barry residence and the
crimes against S.M . Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly overruled
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-820
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.