DENNIS LEE, UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC ., INTERNATIONAL TESLA ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND BETTER WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC . V. HONORABLE STEPHEN RYAN, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, SERVING AS JUDGE OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY GRAND JURY AND R . DAVID STENGEL, JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY 30 TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STATE.
AS MODIFIED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixpreme Courf of
~~x~~ixx.~
2002-SC-1057-MR
--
r" --,-
I !
DENNIS LEE,
UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC.,
INTERNATIONAL TESLA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
AND BETTER WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
V.
I
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM AN ORIGINAL ACTION BEFORE THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
ACTION NO . 2002-CA-2005
HONORABLE STEPHEN RYAN, JEFFERSON
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, SERVING AS JUDGE
OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY GRAND JURY
AND R. DAVID STENGEL, JEFFERSON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY 30TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
APPELANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Dennis Lee is the sole shareholder and executive officer of the following
corporate entities: United Community Services of America, Inc. (UCSA), International
Tesla Electric Company (ITEC), and Better World Technologies, Inc. (BWT). All three
entities are incorporated in Delaware and are primarily located in New Jersey. Lee and
his companies sought a writ of mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals . This
is an appeal from the denial of same .
Through his corporate entities, UCSA, ITEC, and BWT, Lee engages in the
promotion and sale of business opportunities of various products, including a device
that supposedly produces free electricity . Lee markets his products via an Internet site .
The site offers dealerships for those interested in marketing Lee's products, and it
allows individuals to sign up for product demonstrations . The site revealed that Lee
would be in Louisville for such a demonstration on October 8, 2001 . Lee was
subsequently arrested the same day in Louisville for alleged violations of state law
regarding the sale of business opportunities. KRS 367 .801 et seq .
Lee attempted to conduct another demonstration in Louisville on December 28,
2001 . However, on the same day, the office of the Attorney General filed a civil action
in Jefferson Circuit Court against Lee's corporate entities, which is still pending.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel. A.B. Chandler, III, Attorney General v. Dennis Lee
d/b/a United Community Services of America, and d/b/a Better World Technologies, and
d/b/a Int'I Tesla Electric Co. , No . 01-CI-8842 .
In April of 2002, the Jefferson County Grand Jury issued a two-count indictment
against Lee individually, alleging that he, acting alone or in complicity with others,
committed the following offenses : (1) Misrepresentation of Sale, Income or Profit of
Business Opportunities, and (2) Failure to Register Sale of Business Opportunities .
This indictment is currently pending in the second division of Jefferson Circuit Court, No.
02-CR-0995.
Following additional investigation by the office of the Attorney General, and at the
request of the office of the Jefferson County Commonwealth Attorney, the grand jury
proceeded to conduct an investigation of Lee's corporate entities . On May 13, 2002,
the grand jury issued subpoenas duces tecum to each of Lee's corporate entities. As
custodian of records for all three entities, Lee was served the subpoenas while
attending his arraignment on the criminal indictment brought against him individually .
On May 29, 2002, Lee attempted to have the grand jury subpoenas stayed by
Judge Lisabeth Hughes Abramson, the judge overseeing the grand jury at the time, but
the request was denied . Lee also moved the trial court overseeing his individual
criminal case to enter an injunction preventing discovery of the records of his corporate
entities. Lee argued, inter alia , that the office of the Jefferson County Commonwealth
Attorney was improperly using the grand jury as a discovery device in contravention of
that court's previously entered discovery order. However, the court denied Lee's
motion, stating that this was a matter for the judge overseeing the grand jury.
On August 5, 2002, Judge Stephen P. Ryan, the new presiding grand jury judge,
conducted a hearing concerning the grand jury subpoenas at issue . Although it was
apparent that Lee would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination if
ordered to testify before the grand jury, Judge Ryan determined that a hearing was
needed in order to ascertain whether Lee was entitled to Fifth Amendment protection .
Lee was then ordered to appear before the grand jury and to provide it with various
corporate records sought by the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney . Lee appeared
before the grand jury on August 6, 2002, asserted his right against self-incrimination,
but failed to produce the records of his corporate entities. On August 12, 2002, Judge
Ryan determined that Lee, due to the criminal charges pending against him, did not
have to testify before the grand jury, and that his assertion of the Fifth Amendment was
proper. However, Judge Ryan further determined that Lee's Fifth Amendment
protections did not extend to the records of his corporate entities . Thus, Lee was found
in contempt for not turning over the records of his corporate entities to the grand jury,
and was fined $1000 .00 a day until compliance with the order of August 5, 2002 .
Lee then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ prohibiting (1) the discovery of
items, documents, and testimony pursuant to the grand jury subpoenas, and (2) the
enforcement of the contempt finding and derivative fines levied against him . Lee also
sought mandamus relief directing Judge Ryan to enter a protective order for both
himself and his corporate entities, thereby quashing the grand jury subpoenas, and
further a reversal of the contempt finding against him. The Court of Appeals denied this
petition. Lee now brings this appeal before this Court as a matter of right. CR
76 .36(7)(a).
Lee contends that the grand jury subpoenas, which were served on him as
custodian of records of his corporate entities, should be quashed because the
Commonwealth is in effect circumventing the rules of discovery applicable to the still
pending criminal case against him by improperly using the investigative processes of
the grand jury. The essence of Lee's contention is that the overriding purpose of the
subpoenas is not related to the civil proceedings against his corporate entities. Rather,
the overriding purpose of the subpoenas is to allow the prosecution to gather evidence
to be used in preparation for the pending criminal case against Lee.
Last year, we considered a case similar to the one at bar, Bishop v. Caudill , Ky.,
87 S .W.3d 1 (2002) . The issue before us in that case was "whether the grand jury
process [was] being improperly used as a substitute for discovery . . . . .. Id . at 4 .
Therein we stated that "[i]f the purpose of subpoenaing [witnesses] before the grand jury
is to use the grand jury proceedings as a guise for trial preparation, the subpoenas must
be quashed ." Id . at 3. Similarly, if the purpose of issuing subpoenas to Lee, as
custodian of records, is to use the grand jury proceedings as a "guise for trial
preparation" for the pending criminal case against Lee, then the subpoenas must be
quashed .
The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Bishop from the case at bar by
pointing out that the subpoenas in Bishop were issued under a pending indictment
number . Here, the corporate entities have not been indicted and the grand jury
subpoenas are not pursuant to Lee's indictment . The Commonwealth also asserts that
the clear purpose of the grand jury investigation is to uncover wrongdoing by the
corporate entities, and not Lee individually . Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends
that the corporate entities lack standing to challenge the subpoenas .
It is generally true that criminal defendants lack standing to inquire into grand jury
investigations . Bishop , supra at 4 . However, this is correct only "so long as the
motivating purpose of the grand jury investigation is not the accumulation of evidence
for a pending criminal case . . . ." In re Grand Jury Investigation (General Motors Corp.) ,
32 F.R.D. 175, 183 (S. D . N .Y. 1963) . Here, the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney
assigned to the grand jury has made it clear that he may use information that Lee
provides to the grand jury in the pending criminal case. Also, in its own brief submitted
to this Court, the Commonwealth states that a grand jury investigation of Lee's
corporate entities began in part at the request of the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney .
We also note, and the Commonwealth is aware, that Lee is the sole shareholder
and executive of UCSA, ITEC, and BWT. The pending criminal indictment against Lee
is directly related to his corporate entities, as he markets his products through them .
Given the circumstances, and contrary to the Commonwealth's position, we cannot say
that the clear purpose of the grand jury investigation is to uncover wrongdoing by the
corporate entities, and not to accumulate discovery information in preparation for the
forthcoming trial on the criminal indictment against Lee individually .
The remedy that Lee desires in this case, i.e. , a writ of prohibition and
mandamus, is an extraordinary form of relief. Generally, a writ will only be granted if (1)
the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction, or (2) the
lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury
would result. Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes , Ky., 952 S .W.2d 195, 199
(1997) . While we rarely grant such relief, there is a serious question regarding whether
the investigative procedures of the grand jury are being used in an improper fashion . In
Bishop , supra, we ultimately reversed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for a determination to be made as to whether the sole or
dominant purpose of the issuance of the subpoenas was to facilitate discovery by the
Commonwealth of facts related to a pending criminal indictment . Id. a t 4. We follow our
decision in Bishop and hold that, under the circumstances, a like conclusion is
appropriate in this case as well .
Lee also claims he was improperly served the grand jury subpoenas . We find
this argument to be wholly without merit and need not address it . As to Lee's argument
concerning his right against self-incrimination, we hold that the right simply does not
extend to the records of his corporate entities. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U .S.
99, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 101 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1988) ; Bellis v. United States , 417 U.S. 85, 94 S.
Ct . 2179, 40 L. Ed . 2d 678 (1974) .
Wherefore, for the reasons aforesaid, we reverse the order of the Court of
Appeals and remand with directions to grant Lee's petition until such time that the
presiding judge in appellant's case can conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to
determine whether the sole, dominant, or motivating purpose of the grand jury
subpoenas at issue is an attempt by the Commonwealth to gather discovery information
for the pending criminal case against Lee. If such a determination is made, the
subpoenas shall be quashed forthwith .
Lambert, C .J. ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone and Stumbo, JJ ., concur . Keller, J.,
concurs in the decision to reverse and remand this case for the Court of Appeals to
issue a writ, but dissents from the majority opinion to the extent that it requires the trial
court to proceed directly to an evidentiary hearing in order to resolve the issue of
whether trial preparation was the Commonwealth's "sole or dominant purpose" for
causing the subpoenas to be issued . See Bishop v. Caudill , Ky ., 87 S.W.3d 1, 4-8
(2002) (Keller, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wintersheimer, J ., dissents
without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS,
J . Fox Demoisey
Demoisey Law Office
Suite 1210 Starks Building
455 South Fourth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Jonathan E. Breitenstein
Demoisey Law Office
Suite 1210 Starks Building
455 South Fourth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
STEPHEN RYAN, JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT JUDGE, SERVING AS JUDGE OF THE
JEFFERSON COUNTY GRAND JURY:
Stephen P . Ryan
Judicial Center
700 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
R. DAVID STENGEL, JEFFERSON
COUNTY COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY
30TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT :
R. David Stengel
Commonwealth Attorney
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Franklin Todd Lewis
Jefferson Commonwealth Attorney
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Jeanne Deborah Anderson
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, KY 40202
,Suprtme (~vurf of ~6ufurkV
2002-SC-1057-MR
DENNIS LEE,
UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC .,
INTERNATIONAL TESLA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
AND BETTER WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
V.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM AN ORIGINAL ACTION BEFORE THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
ACTION NO . 2002-CA-2005
HONORABLE STEPHEN RYAN, JEFFERSON
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, SERVING AS JUDGE
OF THE JEFFERSON COUNTY GRAND JURY
AND R . DAVID STENGEL, JEFFERSON COUNTY
COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY 30TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
APPELANTS
ORDER
Appellee's petition for modification of this Court's Memorandum Opinion is
granted in part .
The Memorandum Opinion rendered herein on June 12, 2003 is modified by the
substitution of new pages 6 and 7 of the Opinion as originally rendered . Said
modifications do not affect the holding .
All concur.
Entered : September 18, 2003 .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.