STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC . V. KENNY POPP ; HON . W . BRUCE COWDEN, JR ., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' APPELL,EES COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC .
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-0167-W C
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 97-78122
KENNY POPP ; HON . W. BRUCE
COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE ; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELL,EES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Workers'
Compensation Board and the Administrative Law Judge, which held that the employer
is not entitled to a credit as a result of the settlement with a third party tortfeasor.
I.
The issue as framed by Steel Technologies, Inc., is that the ruling of the
Administrative Law Judge that the employer is not entitled to a credit against the award
of income and medical benefits is erroneous as matter of law.
The employer argues it upheld its burden of proof, entitling it to a credit, by
merely showing that the claimant received $98,000 as a result of his settlement . The
employer then contends that the claimant never brought any evidence before the
Administrative Law Judge to counter this proof, and therefore, the employer is entitled
to the entire $98,000 as a credit.
The employer argues that the ALJ, the Board and the Court of Appeals have all
misconstrued controlling precedents in this area, in particular, Whittaker v. Hardin , Ky.,
32 S .W.3d 497 (2000) and Davidson v. Travelers Ins . Co . , Ky.App ., 56 S .W.3d 457
(2001) .
Popp alleges that he received a severe electrocution injury to his shoulder and
arm while replacing fuses in an electric control box in 1997. Popp filed a workers'
compensation claim and also a third-party action in circuit court against Morehouse
Electric . Liberty Mutual was the workers' compensation insurer for Steel Technologies
at the time of this accident . It intervened in the third-party action to recoup the monies it
had paid and might pay in the future on Popp's behalf. The third-party action was
settled for $165,000. No settlement agreement was ever introduced into evidence . In
the workers' compensation claim, the ALJ determined that the employer had not
satisfied its burden of proof. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, as did the
Court of Appeals. This appeal followed .
II.
The employer has the burden of proving entitlement to a credit. Once that
burden is met, the burden of going forward falls on the claimant . Whittaker, supra .
Assuming the employer met its burden by showing that the claimant received $98,000,
the employer's evidence was rebutted . As the ALJ pointed out, the testimony of Mr.
Hoback, counsel for the insurer, supported the idea that the $25,000 received was not
just for past disability payments by the insurer. It seems very reasonable that the
insurer believed $25,000 was as good as they could do for all of the case. The
employer is correct that the ALJ cannot assume what portion of the recovery was for
past and what portion was for future disability with regard to the employer. However,
the ALJ can take notice of the fact that the insurer only took $25,000 and is not the one
seeking a credit now.
In the civil suit, Morehouse Electric agreed to settle with the Popps and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company for $165,000 . Liberty Mutual was paid $25,000 as a partial
reimbursement for the funds already paid and for future benefits . The Popps portion of
the settlement was $140,000, of which they received $98,000, with the balance of the
money being used for attorney fees and other expenses. The AU concluded that Popp
sustained an occupational disability of 38 .5% as well as being entitled to a 1 .5%
multiplier pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) . He declined to give a credit to Steel
Technologies against the monies received in the civil suit settlement . The AU
explained pursuant to Whittaker , that the employer had the burden of proving the
affirmative events of an entitlement to a credit and he concluded that the employer had
not satisfied this burden .
The ALJ relied on the decision of this Court that an AU had jurisdiction to
determine credit for subrogation and that the burden of proving the affirmative defense
of entitlement to a credit was on the employer, and where prima facie evidence of a
credit was introduced, the burden of going forward with evidence that a portion of the
tort recovery is not available for subrogation credit should be placed on the employee.
In Davidson v. Travelers Ins . Co . , supra, the Court of Appeals reached a similar
conclusion, holding that because Davidson and the tortfeasor did not agree to an
allocation of the proceeds, the fact finder bore the duty to account for the entire sum .
Steel Technologies continues to argue that it is entitled to the entire $98,000 settlement
because the claimant did not present probative and substantive evidence that would
allow an allocation of damages by the ALJ between pain and suffering, loss of future
earnings or future medical benefits and the claim of Mrs . Popp for a loss of consortium .
Here, the employer bears the burden of proof and if unsuccessful on appeal, the
question really becomes whether the evidence is so overwhelming as to compel a
decision in its favor. See Paramount Foods, Inc. v . Burkhart , Ky., 695 S .W .2d 418
(1985).
III .
A decision in favor of the claimant should not be disturbed on appeal if it is
supported by substantial evidence of probative value. We find that to be the case here .
In addition, the Supreme Court should not overturn a decision of the Court of Appeals
unless it perceives that the court has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent or committed error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause an
injustice . See Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelley , Ky., 827 S .W .2d 685 (1992). In this
case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the employer had the burden of
proving the affirmative defense of entitlement to a credit and where that is the case and
it is not successful, then the question on appeal is whether the evidence is so
overwhelming in consideration of the entire record as to have compelled a finding in its
favor. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.App., 673 S .W.2d 735 (1984). We find that
the Court of Appeals correctly decided the case and that there is no manifest or flagrant
injustice .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur except Stumbo, J ., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
James G . Fogle
FERRERI & FOGLE
203 Speed Building
333 Guthrie Green
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
G. Edward James
516 Highland Avenue
P.O . Box 373
Carrollton, KY 41008
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