THOMAS RIDGE V VMV ENTERPRISES, INC . ; HON . THOMAS A NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED : September 18, 2003
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2002-SC-0853-WC
THOMAS RIDGE
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-0449-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 99-58317
VMV ENTERPRISES, INC . ; HON. THOMAS A
NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
KRS 342.270(1) requires the joinder of all known causes of action against the
named employer during the pendency of a workers' compensation claim . After
sustaining a work-related knee injury in 1998 and a work-related back injury in 1999,
the claimant filed an application for benefits with respect to the knee injury and settled
the claim. Subsequently, he filed an application with respect to the back injury . In a
decision that was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court
of Appeals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the claim on the ground that
the claimant had failed to join it during the pendency of the knee injury claim as
required by KRS 342 .270(1). We affirm .
In July, 1998, the claimant sustained a work-related injury to his left knee. He
returned to light-duty work, and on April 13, 1999, he sustained a work-related lower
back injury. A November 3, 1999, letter from the employer's carrier to the claimant's
attorney proposed that the parties settle the knee injury claim "and concentrate on the
back claim ." The claimant filed an application for benefits with respect to the knee
injury on April 19, 2000. In August, 2000, he and the employer agreed to settle the
claim, and an ALJ approved their agreement . It made no reference to the back injury,
and on February 26, 2001, the claimant filed an application for benefits with respect to
that injury. He had not returned to work since the back injury and maintained that he
could not do so until after he underwent a surgery that his physician proposed . The
employer denied the claim and filed a special answer in which it asserted that the claim
was barred by KRS 342 .270(1) .
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the employer paid temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits with respect to the back injury from May 11, 1999, to June 17,
1999, and from November 8, 1999, to December 26, 1999, for a total of $10,653 .22.
They also stipulated that the knee and back injury claims were separate and that the
employer had paid separate TTD and medical benefits with respect to the two claims.
The ALJ noted that although the claimant was clearly aware of his back injury when
settling the knee injury claim, he did not seek to join the claims . After stating that the
burden was on the claimant to comply with KRS 342.270(1) between the date of the
back injury and the date upon which the knee injury claim was settled, the ALJ
determined that the claim for the back injury must be dismissed .
In a petition for reconsideration, the claimant asserted that the ALJ had
misinterpreted KRS 342 .270(1), arguing that the provision required joinder of all claims
arising out of the same incident, not joinder of all claims . He also complained that the
ALJ had failed to address his argument that because the employer agreed to bifurcating
the claims, it was estopped from relying upon KRS 342.270(1) as a basis for seeking
dismissal of the back injury claim . See Carroll County Memorial Hospital v. Yocum, Ky.,
489 S .W.2d 246 (1972) . He requested that the entire claim be reconsidered, including
the issues that were not addressed . After the petition was summarily denied, he
appealed, but the Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed .
Appealing, the claimant emphasizes that he suffered different injuries on
different occasions and asserts that KRS 342 .270(1) applies separately to each
incident . In the alternative, he maintains that because the employer's carrier proposed
settling the knee claim, it agreed to bifurcating the claims and is estopped from relying
upon KRS 342 .270(1) as a basis to dismiss the back claim . He also asserts that the
ALJ erred by failing to consider the question of estoppel, by failing to make specific
findings on the matter when asked, and by dismissing the back claim without
addressing all of the contested issues .
KRS 342.270(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows :
When the application is filed by the employee or during the pendency of
that claim, he shall join all causes of action against the named employer
which have accrued and which are known, or should reasonably be
known, to him. Failure to join all accrued causes of action will result in
such claims being barred under this chapter as waived by the employee.
The portion of KRS 342 .270(1) that is presently at issue was adopted effective
December 12, 1996, as part of a comprehensive revision of Chapter 342 . Until the
adoption of KRS 342.270(1), workers were permitted to file multiple claims and were
not required to join them, even when the claims resulted from the same accident .
Woodbridge INOAC, Inc. v . Downs, Ky .App ., 864 S .W.2d 306 (1993) . In Jeep
Trucking, Inc . v. Howard , Ky ., 891 S .W .2d 78 (1995), we were faced with a problem
that resulted from the separate litigation of overlapping injury and occupational disease
claims that resulted in awards in excess of the maximum for total disability. After noting
considerations such as judicial economy, minimizing litigation costs, and the fact that a
proper resolution of issues such as apportionment, offset, credit, excess disability, and
overlapping disability require the consideration of all relevant claims together, we urged
the enactment of legislation to address the problems created by the piecemeal litigation
of workers' compensation claims . Id . at 79-80. The amendment's apparent purpose
was to do so .
The language of KRS 342 .270(1) is clear, unequivocal, and mandatory, both with
respect to a worker's obligation to join "all causes of action" against the employer during
the pendency of a claim and with respect to the penalty for failing to do so . Under KRS
342 .270(1), it is immaterial that the claimant's knee and back injuries arose at different
times, involved separate claims, and were treated by the parties as separate matters .
Once he filed a claim for the knee injury, KRS 342.270(1) required him to file and join
the claim for the back injury before the knee injury claim was settled.
We are not persuaded that by sending a letter to encourage settlement of the
knee injury claim so that the parties could concentrate on the back injury or that by
paying separate TTD benefits for the two injuries, the employer or its carrier engaged in
conduct that warranted an estoppel . The injuries occurred at different times and
affected different parts of the claimant's body. At the time that the letter was sent, no
claim had been filed for either injury. Although TTD benefits continued to be paid for
the back injury at that point, the parties stipulated that they ceased shortly thereafter on
December 26, 1999. The knee injury claim was not filed until April 19, 2000. Contrary
to the claimant's assertion, there is no indication in the record that any TTD benefits for
the back injury were paid after the knee injury claim was filed.
Unlike the situation in Carroll County Memorial Hospital v. Yocum , supra, nothing
in the employer's letter referred to the filing of a claim or indicated that the claimant
need not be concerned with the filing requirements or periods of limitations with respect
to the injuries . Thus, we fail to see how the employer's conduct could reasonably have
misled the claimant into thinking that it was unnecessary to file a claim for the back
injury and to join that claim during the pendency of the knee injury claim . For that
reason, we are not convinced that the employer was estopped from relying upon KRS
342 .270(1).
In view of our conclusions that KRS 342 .270(1) required joinder and that the
employer's conduct did not warrant an estoppel, we also conclude that the ALJ did not
err in dismissing the back injury claim . Under those circumstances, the entire claim
was barred, and questions concerning the claimant's entitlement to medical benefits
and additional TTD benefits were moot. For that reason, we find no error in the ALJ's
failure to address those issues .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John T. Carneal
P .O . Box 428
Paducah, KY 42002
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Lyn A. Douglas
Clark Ward & Cave
601 W. market Street, Ste . 403
Louisville, KY 40202
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