JONATHAN LEE CUNNINGHAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPOR1"ANTNOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0760-TG
APPELLANT
JONATHAN LEE CUNNINGHAM
V.
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
99-CR-00023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict, which convicted
Cunningham of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and being a seconddegree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to a total of twenty years in
prison .
The sole question presented by Cunningham is whether reversible error occurred
when the trial judge allegedly failed to grant a hearing or relief pursuant to his pro se
motion to dismiss and motion for default judgment.
On June 8, 1999, the grand jury indicted Cunningham for first-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance and for being a second-degree persistent felony offender .
The charges stemmed from a controlled drug buy made by a confidential informant .
On March 7, 2001, Cunningham filed a pro se motion for dismissal of action .
Citing CR 77 .02, he moved for dismissal on the ground of failure to prosecute. On April
4, 2001, Cunningham filed a pro se motion for default judgment. Within the notice
portion of that motion, he stated that the foregoing "shall be Heard with the Defendant
Present in Open Court . . ." The trial judge held a hearing on the said motions on April
10, 2001 . Noting that the defendant cited several civil rules that did not apply, the trial
judge overruled both motions .
Cunningham was tried on May 21, 2001 . The jury convicted him of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance and being a second-degree persistent felony
offender . He was sentenced to ten years in prison for the trafficking charge, which was
enhanced to twenty years because of the PFO charge . Upon transfer from the Court of
Appeals, this appeal followed .
Cunningham argues that reversible error occurred when the trial judge failed to
grant a hearing or relief pursuant to his pro se motion to dismiss and motion for default
judgment . He contends that citation to the rules of civil procedure does not defeat the
motions and that his presence at the hearing was required by law.
The issue raised by Cunningham is totally without merit. Preliminarily, we
question whether Cunningham was entitled to a hearing or even a ruling on his pro se
motions . At that time, Cunningham was represented by counsel and never made an
unequivocal request to proceed pro se or an unequivocal request to limit the role of
counsel . Faretta v. California , 422 U .S . 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed .2d 562 (1975);
Moore v. Commonwealth , Ky., 634 S .W .2d 426 (1982).
Nevertheless, the trial judge held a hearing and, although Cunningham was not
present, he was represented by counsel . Cunningham's presence was not required
because this was not a critical stage of his trial . See RCr 8 .28(1) .
In any event, it is
not reversible error to conduct legal arguments between court and counsel outside the
presence of the defendant. Tamme v. Commonwealth , Ky., 973 S.W .2d 13 (1998).
Cunningham was in no way prejudiced .
Even if we interpret the March 7, 2001 pro se motion for dismissal of action as a
motion for a speedy trial, Cunningham was tried within 180 days of that motion . See
KRS 500.110 . Accordingly, he is not entitled to any relief on that ground .
We fully recognize that the rules of civil procedure are applicable in criminal
proceedings to the extent they are not superseded by or inconsistent with the criminal
rules. RCr 13.04. The motion for a default judgment, however, was precluded by CR
55 .04 .
The trial judge did not err in overruling the two pro se motions . Cunningham
was not denied any of his Federal or State constitutional rights .
Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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