HOSEA ARON CHATMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMP RTANT NOTIC
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003
NOT TO BE PU
2002-SC-0717-MR
HOSEA ARON CHATMAN
V.
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
2001-CR-0150
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted Chatman
of theft by unlawful taking over $300 and being a first-degree persistent felony offender .
He was sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison.
The questions presented are whether the trial judge properly resolved Chatman's
request for outside counsel or request to proceed pro se ; whether an inventory list of
items stolen was competent evidence ; whether the prosecutor conducted an improper
experiment during closing argument; whether the Commonwealth improperly narrated
the surveillance tape, and whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the closing
argument of the guilt phase.
A Wal-Mart employee observed Chatman taking DVD and VHS tapes into the
garden area of the store and placing them outside the fence . Chatman then left the
store . When confronted in the parking lot by the store manger, Chatman was unable to
produce a receipt for the items he was carrying . Chatman then handed some of the
DVDs to the manager and dropped the remainder of the items. He started to run but
three store employees apprehended and held him until police arrived . The store
security camera recorded portions of the theft. Within an hour of the crime, a store
employee inventoried the thirty-one items taken including their price . The items were
then re-stocked for sale .
Chatman was charged with one count of theft by unlawful taking over $300 and
being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree . The prior felony charges included
twelve counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument ; second
degree arson ; second-degree escape ; resisting arrest; second-degree burglary and
first-degree sexual abuse . He was convicted of both charges in this case and was
sentenced to five years on the theft charge enhanced to twenty years pursuant to the
PFO charge. This appeal followed .
I . Outside Counsel
Chatman argues that the trial judge did not properly resolve his request for
outside counsel or allow him to proceed pro se because he merely told him to file an
RCr 11 .42 petition and did not hold a hearing to determine a) whether he could
represent himself or b) the extent of the conflict. We disagree .
After his indictment and before his arraignment, Chatman filed a pro se motion
for appointment of outside counsel . He stated that he had a conflict with the office of
public defenders based on a bar complaint pending against an attorney appointed by
that office . Following another pro se motion by Chatman in which he alluded to a
conflict with his attorney, the trial judge responded that he would not consider any pro
se motions because Chatman had counsel . Two weeks before trial, defense counsel
filed a motion to withdraw and to allow Chatman to proceed pro se. After a hearing on
the motion, the trial judge denied the same . Five days after trial, Chatman filed a
motion to be appointed pro se counsel or co-counsel for final sentencing and to be
allowed to file a pro se motion for a new trial . The trial judge denied this motion as well.
In Faretta v. California , 422 U .S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed .2d 562 (1975) the
Supreme Court held that the protection of the Sixth Amendment includes the right of an
accused to waive counsel to represent himself. In Wake v. Barker, Ky., 514 S .W.2d
692 (1974), we concluded that the best procedure, upon an unequivocal request to
proceed pro se, or an unequivocal request to limit the role of counsel, is for the trial
judge to conduct a hearing to determine whether the waiver is being made knowingly
and intelligently . However, the principles of Faretta , supra , and Barker, supra, only
become applicable when the request to proceed pro se or with counsel in a limited
fashion is timely made and is unequivocal .
Here, neither the pro se motions nor the motion filed by defense counsel were an
unequivocal request to proceed pro se. See Faretta ; Moore v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
634 S .W.2d 426 (1982) ; Barker. This was made abundantly clear at the hearing on the
motion by defense counsel . There, the chief complaint by Chatman was that his
defense counsel was not adequately representing him . Chatman stated that his
attorney had not talked to him and would not present his defense or subpoena his
witnesses . He also complained that defense counsel had not yet obtained clothes for
him to wear at trial . Chatman never made an unequivocal request to proceed pro se .
He simply expressed displeasure with the way his attorney was handling his case . The
trial judge was not required to inquire whether Chatman could represent himself . The
extent of the conflict was fully explored .
The expression "counsel of one's own choice" drawn from the holding of the
case in Powell v. State of Alabama , 287 U .S. 45, 53 S .Ct . 55, 77 L .Ed . 158 (1931),
does not mean that an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of any
particular attorney . Hargrove v. Commonwealth , Ky., 362 S.W .2d 37 (1962). A
defendant is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the appointment of a
substitute "except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse by counsel ." Fulz v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 398 S.W.2d 881, 882 (1966). Here, there were none. As noted
by defense counsel at the hearing, the bar complaint filed against her had been
dismissed. Chatman did not dispute this fact. We agree with the rationale of State v.
Davis, 577 N.W .2d 763 (Neb.Ct.App . 1998) that the filing of a bar complaint against a
public defender does not automatically entitle the defendant to new counsel . The trial
judge did not err in denying any of the motions . Chatman's right to counsel under the
federal and state constitutions was not violated .
II . Evidence of Value
Next, Chatman contends that his conviction must be vacated because the
Commonwealth did not introduce competent evidence to prove the value and nature of
the items stolen in this case . We disagree .
Before arraignment, Chatman filed a motion to "hold evidence and amend
charge" based on KRS 422 .350. As noted earlier in this opinion, the trial judge
responded that it would not consider the pro se motions because Chatman had
counsel . Defense counsel then filed a motion to suppress the inventory list of items
stolen because it was not the best evidence . At a subsequent hearing, she argued that
Wal-Mart should have taken photographs of the items and that there was no proof of
the actual value of the items. The trial judge denied the motion .
One of the elements of a charge of theft by unlawful taking is that the items in
question are valued at more than $300. KRS 514 .030(2) . The Commonwealth must
prove the market value of the items at the time and place of the theft. Commonwealth
v. Reed , Ky., 57 S .W .2d 269 (2001) citing Perkins v. Commonwealth , Ky., 409 S .W.2d
294 (1966). Testimony of the owner of the property is competent evidence as to the
value of the property . Reed , supra , citing Poteet v. Commonwealth , Ky., 556 S .W .2d
893 (1977).
Here, a Wal-Mart employee testified that the items taken from the store were
valued at over $300.00.
The Best Evidence Rule has no application in this case. The
itemized list was competent evidence. We recognize that KRS 422.350 permits
photographic evidence in prosecutions of offenses defined in KRS Chapter 514 or 515 .
That statute, however, does not preclude testimony of the owner as to the value of the
items in question . Cf. Reed . No error occurred . There was no violation of either the
state or federal constitution .
III . & IV. Closing Experiment/Narration
We will consider the next two arguments by Chatman together . First, Chatman
claims that the prosecutor improperly conducted an experiment without foundation
during the closing argument when he filled a plastic bag with thirty-one unnamed items
and told the jury that the defendant could have had thirty-one items in a shopping bag .
Second, Chatman argues that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to narrate
the videotape of him in the Wal-Mart rather than merely allowing it to be played to the
jury. He concedes that both of these issues are not properly preserved but seeks
review pursuant to RCr 10.26.
The palpable error rule in RCr 10.26 is not a substitute for the requirement that a
litigant must contemporaneously object to preserve an error for review. RCr 9.22. The
general rule is that a party must make a proper objection to the trial judge and request a
ruling on that objection, or the issue is waived . See Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82
S.W.3d 894 (2002). See also Bell v. Commonwealth , 473 S.W .2d 820 (1971). An
appellate court may consider an issue that was not preserved if it deems the error to be
a "palpable" one which affected the defendant's "substantial rights" and resulted in
"manifest injustice ." RCr 10 .26 . In determining whether an error is palpable, "an
appellate court must consider whether on the whole case there is a substantial
possibility that the result would have been any different ." Pace, supra , quoting
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, Ky., 646 S .W .2d 43, 45 (1983) .
Here, Wal-Mart employees caught Chatman in the act of stealing thirty-one DVD
and VHS tapes . The store surveillance system recorded at least portions of the theft.
Considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt, review of either of these issues
pursuant to RCr 10 .26 is unwarranted .
V. Race Card
Finally, Chatman contends that the prosecution injected race into the case by
implying that Wal-Mart would not try to prosecute an innocent person and that the
defense was asking the jury to believe that the only reason that he was arrested was
because he was black. This issue is not properly preserved for appellate review. RCr
9 .22 . When defense counsel objected to the racial reference, the prosecutor stated that
he would withdraw it. No further relief was requested . Consequently, any objection to
these comments was waived . Cf. Wilcher v. Commonwealth , Ky., 566 S .W .2d 812
(1978).
Neither the state nor the federal constitutional rights of Chatman were violated .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur except Keller, J ., who dissents in part and would vacate the final
judgment and remand the case for a new final sentencing hearing because Appellant's
Motion to be Appointed Pro Se Counsel or Co-Counsel for Final Sentencing was an
unequivocal request that, if knowing and intelligent, entitled Appellant to represent
himself at final sentencing.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A . B . Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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