EMILIO CAMESO REYES APPEALED V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : OCTOBER 23, 2003
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,Suprrutt 49ourf of ~Ri,
2002-SC-0600-MR
EMILIO CAMESO REYES
V.
APPELLANT
APPEALED FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE
CRIMINAL NO . 01-CR-0705
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
Appellant, Emilio Cameso Reyes, was convicted in the Fayette Circuit Court of
murder and tampering with physical evidence . He was sentenced to life imprisonment
and appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Finding no error, we affirm .
Appellant's convictions stem from the May 9, 2001, shooting death of his former
girlfriend, Maria Castro Cruz. Evidence at trial indicated that the victim had ended the
relationship earlier that year, much to Appellant's dismay . At the beginning of May
2001, the victim moved into the Zandale Terrace Apartments with her new boyfriend,
who was also Appellant's coworker. Sylvia Johnson, another resident of the apartment
complex, testified that on the day of the shooting she observed Appellant crossing the
parking lot holding a gun. Shortly thereafter, Johnson heard four gunshots . Resident
Greg Flora further testified that following the gunshots, he saw Appellant leaving the
building. Appellant was apprehended at his apartment later the same day. In fact,
when police arrived, Appellant walked out of his apartment and surrendered . Police
found the gun and spent casings hidden behind a dresser in Appellant's bedroom .
Appellant was tried in the Fayette Circuit Court in May 2002. While Appellant
admitted shooting the victim, he contended that he was acting under extreme emotional
disturbance at the time . Nonetheless, the jury found him guilty of murder and tampering
with physical evidence, and recommended a life sentence and a one-year sentence,
respectively . Judgment was entered accordingly .
I.
Appellant first argues that the trial court failed to give an instruction on
reasonable doubt as it applied to extreme emotional disturbance . Appellant contends
that the trial court was required to instruct the jury that if it had a reasonable doubt as to
whether he was acting under the influence of EED, it could not find him guilty of murder
but would have to find him guilty of first-degree manslaughter.
Since the amendment of RCr 9 .56 by this Court in 1978, "courts are no longer
required to instruct upon reasonable doubt concerning the degree of the offense ."
Carwile v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 656 S .W.2d 722, 724 (1983) . In Butts v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S .W .2d 943, 946 (1997), we explained that, "[w]hile [Carwile ,
supra] does not suggest that a court may never instruct on reasonable doubt as to the
degree of the offense, such an instruction is now viewed as unnecessary, particularly
when the same concepts are dealt with in other instructions ."
Recently, however, in Commonwealth v . Hager, Ky., 41 S .W .3d 828, 831-832
(2001), this Court found error in the failure to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt with
respect to the issue of extreme emotional disturbance . "Although not mentioned in RCr
9 .56, that instruction is required when there is evidence authorizing an instruction on
extreme emotional disturbance . Holbrook v. Commonwealth , Ky., 813 S .W .2d 811, 815
(1991), overruled on other g rounds, Elliott v . Commonwealth , Ky., 976 S .W.2d 416
g
(1998); Edmonds v. Commonwealth , Ky., 586 S .W.2d 24, 27 (1979), overruled on other
rounds, Wellman v. Commonwealth , Ky., 694 S.W .2d 696 (1985)." According to
Hager , supra, the proper instruction concerning reasonable doubt in cases where there
is sufficient evidence to instruct on EED is now as follows :
A. The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime and
the Indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having
any weight against him. You shall find the Defendant not guilty
unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone and beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is guilty. If upon the whole case you have
a reasonable doubt that he is guilty, you shall find him not guilty.
B. If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant would be guilty of intentional Murder under
Instruction No . [ ], except that you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether at the time he killed [the victim], he was or was not acting
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall not
find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction
No . [ ], but shall find him guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter under
Instruction No. [ ] .
Id. at 847 . While the trial court in this case included the first part of the
above instruction, it did not instruct on part (B).
However, Appellant concedes that this issue is not preserved . He neither
tendered a requested instruction nor objected to the instructions as given . RCr 9 .54(2)
provides :
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and
3
adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or
by motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court
instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party
objects and the ground or grounds of the objection .
This Court has consistently held that failure to comply with subsection (2) of RCr 9.54
prohibits appellate review of claimed error in the instructions . In order to preserve an
alleged error for appellate review, compliance with RCr 9.54 is mandatory . Binion v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 891 S .W.2d 383 (1995) ; Commonwealth v . Duke, Ky., 750 S.W.2d
432 (1988) .
The reasonable doubt instruction that was given in this case comported with the
language of RCr 9.56 . Further, the jury was properly instructed on the definition of
EED, as well as the elements of murder in the absence of EED and first-degree
manslaughter. Accordingly, we do not find that the failure to instruct the jury on
reasonable doubt as it applied to EED resulted in a manifest injustice or deprived
Appellant of a fair trial so as to rise to the level of palpable error warranting reversal .
RCr 10 .26 .
Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed
verdict on the tampering with physical evidence charge . The Commonwealth
introduced evidence that police located the murder weapon, as well as a bag containing
the spent casings, behind a dresser in Appellant's bedroom . Appellant contends that
the act of placing his "legally-owned" gun behind the dresser was not concealment, but
rather was the "normal act of a gun owner" placing it out of plain view . We disagree .
KRS 524.100 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence
when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or
may be instituted, he :
(a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes or alters physical
evidence which he believes is about to be produced or
used in the official proceeding with intent to impair its
verity or availability in the official proceeding[ .]
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth . Commonwealth v.
Benham , Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991) . While Appellant maintains that placing a gun
and spent casings behind his dresser was the normal act of a gun owner, the jury could
have also believed that Appellant was attempting to conceal the murder weapon . "The
compelling logic . . . is that one who has committed a criminal act and then conceals or
removes the evidence of the crime does so in contemplation that the evidence would be
used in an official proceeding which might be instituted against him ." Burdell v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 990 SW.2d 628, 633 (1999) . The weight and credibility of the
evidence was a determination to be made by the jury. The Commonwealth certainly
produced sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.
Ill .
Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of
Maritza Chavez Castro, the victim's niece. Castro testified concerning a phone call the
victim received from Appellant shortly after the relationship had ended. Castro stated
she heard the victim tell Appellant to stay away from her because she did not want
anything to do with him. Castro testified that although she did not recognize Appellant's
voice when she answered the phone, she overheard the conversation and, after the
fact, the victim had confirmed it was Appellant . Castro further testified that not long
after the phone conversation, she was present at the victim's apartment one evening
when Appellant showed up armed with a gun. The victim told Appellant she did not want
him there and went into a bathroom. Castro stated that Appellant forced his way into
the bathroom and began hitting the victim . Castro admitted that she did not witness the
confrontation (because the door was closed) but could hear the sounds of a physical
altercation and heard the victim ask Appellant, "Why are you hitting me?" Castro
commented that the victim received a black eye from the incident.
Appellant argues that Castro's testimony was not proper KRE 404(b) evidence as
it had no purpose other than proving criminal disposition and inflaming the minds of the
jurors. Further, Appellant claims that since he admitted shooting the victim, the
evidence was irrelevant. Again, we disagree .
The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible pursuant to KRE 404(b)(2),
in that it was "inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that
separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party ." However, KRE 404(b)(1) also permits the introduction of prior bad
acts if "offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake ." Here, Castro's
testimony was certainly relevant to whether Appellant had the motive and intent to
murder the victim or whether, as he maintained, he was acting under extreme emotional
disturbance at the time of the shooting . No error occurred .
The judgment and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Karen Maurer
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
A. B . Chandler III
Attorney General
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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