ATR WIRE & CABLE COMPANY v. BETTY JO BENJAMIN ; DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS, SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND; HON . JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED : APRIL 24, 2003
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ATR WIRE & CABLE COMPANY
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2755-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 93-50778
BETTY JO BENJAMIN ; DIVISION OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS,
SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND;
HON . JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING_ IN PART. REVERSING IN PART. AND REMANDING
In a reopening proceeding an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that
because the claimant sustained a subsequent injury that was not work-related and
because the subsequent medical treatment was for the effects of that injury, the
employer was not liable for the expense . Reversing a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board), the Court of Appeals determined, however, that the
ALJ's analysis was incomplete and that uncontradicted medical evidence compelled a
finding that the treatment was compensable as a natural consequence of the workrelated injury. We affirm with regard to the necessary legal analysis but reverse to the
extent that a particular finding is compelled on remand .
At the time of her injury, the claimant had worked for the defendant-employer for
14 years, the last ten of which had been as a forklift operator . On July 20, 1993, she
felt a sharp pain in the left side of her neck while backing up a fork lift. Her symptoms
increased, leading her to inform her supervisor later in the shift. After working lighter
duty for about six months, she quit working altogether and has not worked since then.
On June 19, 1997, an ALJ awarded a 30% occupational disability, expressing a
belief that the claimant could return to light duty work so long as she avoided bending
her neck frequently. In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Patrick's
testimony that the claimant sustained a herniated disc without nerve impingement and
that she should not lift more than 15 pounds or repetitively rotate or hyperextend her
neck. At the time, Dr. Patrick indicated that the claimant's cervical condition warranted
a DIRE Category II impairment of 5% . He also indicated that she had full flexion,
extension, lateral tilting, and rotation of her neck but that she had soreness to the
extremes .
In 1998, after the pain in her neck and back failed to improve, the claimant
underwent a cervical discectomy and fusion at C5/6, after which she moved to reopen
the claim. The motion was denied under the 1996 amendment to KRS 342 .125 that
imposed a two-year waiting period on reopening, and her appeal was held in abeyance
pending a decision concerning the applicability of the amendment to a pre-December
12, 1996, injury . Sometime in March, 1999, the claimant slipped in some liquid while
shopping. Although she did not fall, she did experience pain in her neck and back.
Thus, she sought treatment in the emergency room and from Dr. Gilbert, her treating
physician since 1996. The claim was reopened in January, 2000 .
In November, 1998, Dr. Gilbert noted that the claimant was doing very well at 90
days after her surgery. She had indicated that she was amazed at the amount of pain
relief that the surgery produced and that she took pain medication only on an asneeded basis . On March 9, 1999, Dr. Gilbert noted no new findings although the
claimant complained of some symptoms that were unrelated to the injury . On March
29, 1999, she reported that she had slipped on some liquid on March 23, after which
she had experienced increased neck, arm, low back and leg pain. On April 28, 1999,
she complained of dizziness and anxiety since the recent incident, and she continued to
do so on May 12, 1999. On September 17, 1999, Dr. Gilbert noted persistent pain
since the March, 1999, incident . As of November 17, 1999, he assigned a 20%
impairment for neck and back pain due to the work-related injury and also noted that
the claimant experienced chronic pain since the March, 1999, incident . When deposed,
Dr . Gilbert indicated that although none of the claimant's impairment was due to the
March, 1999, incident, medical treatment since then was related to the incident. He
explained that the claimant was off medication before the incident but that, since the
incident, she was back on medication and required much more treatment .
Dr. Keating, a chiropractor, initially saw the claimant on March 25, 1999. At that
time, she reported that she slipped on water and oil while shopping . She indicated that
she jerked to catch herself from falling and felt a sharp pain in her neck as well as in her
mid and lower back. Dr. Keating reported that, in his opinion, the incident was the
cause of the claimant's present symptoms. He also stated :
However, Ms. Benjamin's past medical history is significant for prior
cervical spine injuries which required disc surgery and fusion . This slip
injury has currently exacerbated her previously dormant cervical spine
condition .
Convinced that the claimant's occupational disability had increased since the
initial award, the AU determined that her present disability due to the injury was 75% .
Relying upon Dr. Gilbert's testimony that all medical care he provided after the March
23, 1999, incident was related to the effects of the incident, the AU determined that the
incident was significant and that because it was not work-related, it relieved the
employer from responsibility for the subsequent medical care . The claimant appealed .
In determining that the decision was erroneous as a matter of law and should not
have been affirmed, the Court of Appeals relied upon Addington Resources v . Perkins ,
Ky.App ., 947 S .W.2d 421 (1997). Appealing the decision, the employer maintains that
the present facts are distinguishable because, here, the AU chose to rely on testimony
from Dr. Gilbert and Dr. Keating that subsequent medical treatment was attributable to
the effects of the March, 1999, incident rather than the work-related injury. Thus, the
decision was supported by substantial evidence and should not have been disturbed .
Whereas,'in Addinaton , the AU relied upon medical evidence that were it not for the
work-related injury and resulting surgery, the worker would not have had the changes in
his spine that led to the subsequent injury at a different level . Thus, the conclusion that
the worker's medical expenses remained compensable despite the subsequent injury
was upheld by the court as being supported by substantial evidence .
The Addin ton decision was grounded in the principle that a subsequent injury is
compensable, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury,
if it is the direct and natural consequence of a compensable primary injury . Id . at 423.
The employer is correct in asserting that both Dr. Gilbert and Dr. Keating attributed the
disputed medical expenses to the March, 1999, incident. As the Court of Appeals
correctly explained, however, the AU reached a conclusion about the legal significance
of that testimony without completely analyzing the evidence.
Medical testimony established that because the claimant's cervical condition had
stabilized and no longer required regular treatment or pain medication until after the
March, 1999, incident, it was the incident that precipitated the need for treatment.
However, the ALJ's opinion made no reference to Dr. Keating's statement that the
incident exacerbated the previously dormant cervical spine condition and failed to
consider whether the need for treatment following the March, 1999, incident was a
direct and natural consequence of the claimant's pre-existing condition. Although
Dr. Keating's statement appears to be uncontroverted, the AU is the finder of fact and
is free to reject even uncontroverted medical evidence if a sufficient basis for doing so
is stated . See, for example, Osborne v. Pepsi-Cola , Ky., 816 S .W.2d 643 (1991) ;
Mengel v. Hawaiian-Tropic Northwest and Central Distributors . Inc., Ky.App ., 618
S .W.2d 184 (1981) . For that reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals only to the extent
of determining that we are unwilling to deprive the AU of discretion on remand.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and this matter is remanded to the AU for further consideration .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
James G. Fogle
Ferreri & Fogle
203 Speed Building
333 Guthrie Green
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
BETTY JO BENJAMIN :
McKinnley Morgan
Morgan, Bailey & Collins
P.O. Box 1780
Hyden, KY 41749
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
SPECIAL FUND:
Barbara Sutton
Labor Cabinet - Special Fund
1047 U .S . Hwy. 127 South
Suite 4
Frankfort, KY 40601-9979
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