STACY THACKER V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Aupraur (90urf of
2002-SC-0305-MR
STACY THACKER
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
2001-CR-00237
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
A Pike Circuit Court jury found Appellant guilty of the Murder of Brian Ray
Tackett ("Tackett"), but was unable to agree upon his sentence, and the trial court
thereupon discharged the jury and subsequently imposed a sentence of fifty years
imprisonment .' Appellant, therefore, appeals to this Court as a matter of right2 and
argues that the trial court erred by (1) excluding a toxicology report performed on
Tackett and (2) failing either to declare a mistrial or to strike a witness's testimony when
it differed from the witness's earlier statement to the police . We disagree with
Appellant's allegations of error and we affirm the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court .
' KRS 532 .055(4) provides : "in the event that the jury is unable to agree as to the
sentence or any portion thereof and so reports to the judge, the judge shall impose the
sentence within the range provided elsewhere by law." See also RCr 9.84(1) and
Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 563, 568-69 (2002).
2 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b) .
II. BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2001, Tackett died as the result of a blunt force injury to his head .
At trial, the Commonwealth proved that, a few days prior to his death, Tackett had
informed Appellant's girlfriend that he (Appellant) had been cheating on her, that he
was still cheating on her, and that he was bragging about it. When Appellant's girlfriend
subsequently confronted Appellant about Tackett's allegations of his infidelity, Appellant
told her not to listen to Tackett and then began searching for Tackett.
On the day of Tackett's death, Appellant called Tackett's mother's home, where
Tackett lived, looking for him . He first talked to Tackett's mother at 7 :15 or 7 :20 a .m .,
and he made three additional unsuccessful calls during the day to Tackett's home in his
attempts to locate Tackett .
David Ray lived on Pike County's Booker Fork Road, the same road on which
the Tackett home was located . Ray was riding his ATV3 on Booker Fork Road when he
was asked by Appellant if he had seen Tackett . When Ray answered that he had not,
Appellant left but came back later and asked him again . Ray further testified that
Appellant was alone and driving a red pickup truck .
Deborah Roberts and her brother Ricky Roberts, also residents of Booker Fork
Road, testified that Appellant stopped at their house and asked them if they had seen
Tackett . Deborah responded that she had seen Tackett drive by on a four-wheeler.
She then asked Appellant why he was looking for Tackett, and Appellant responded
that he was going to kill Tackett, but then he snickered and said that he just wanted to
3 "ATV" is an abbreviation for "all-terrain vehicle ." It is "[a] small, open motor
vehicle having one seat and three or more wheels fitted with large tires . It is designed
chiefly for recreational use over roadless, rugged terrain ." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed . 2000).
talk to him because he had been telling his girlfriend a bunch of lies . Deborah and
Ricky also confirmed that Appellant was alone and driving his red pickup truck.
Jackie and Darlene Robinson testified that Appellant stopped at their home later
that evening looking for Tackett because he had seen Tackett's truck parked in their
driveway. They explained to Appellant that the truck was parked there because Jackie
was in the process of buying it from Tackett . They, too, confirmed that Appellant was
alone and driving a red pickup truck .
The Commonwealth also called witnesses to prove that Appellant and Tackett
were together shortly before Tackett's death at the location on Booker Fork Road where
Tackett's body was found . Misty Hamilton was looking out the front widow of her house
when she saw Tackett, who was on an ATV, talking to a man sitting in a red pickup
truck . The ATV and the truck were parked facing opposite directions on Booker Fork
Road . Although Hamilton could see Tackett clearly, she did not identify the man in the
truck, and she did not see him get out of the truck or engage in a fight with Tackett .
After she observed the men talking, she went into the kitchen of her home . But within a
minute or two after going into the kitchen, Hamilton testified that James Quinn
("Quinn"), a neighbor, knocked on the door of her home and told her, "Call 911! They
beat Brian!" Hamilton immediately went outside to check on Tackett while her neighbor
called 911 . She found Tackett lying face down in the road next to his ATV.
Quinn, Shane Bentley, and Nathan Slone were working on a truck across the
road from Hamilton's house. Quinn testified that he heard Tackett's ATV stop, and he
got out from the underbody of the truck and saw Tackett talking to someone who was
sitting in a red pickup truck. Quinn then crawled back under the truck and heard the
truck leave in a fast manner. A few minutes later, Quinn again came out from
underneath the truck, and observed that the pickup truck was gone and Tackett was
lying in the road . Quinn then ran to Hamilton's house. Quinn did not hear any shouting
by the men or see them engage in a fight.
Shane Bentley ("Bentley") testified that, although he did not observe the entire
incident, he did see Tackett get hit twice in the back of the head while Tackett was
sitting on his ATV and then saw Tackett fall off of the ATV onto the road . Bentley
further testified that he did not see anyone get out of the pickup truck and that Tackett
was not fighting back.
Dr. Greg Davis, Kentucky's Associate Chief Medical Examiner, performed an
autopsy on Tackett. He testified that the cause of Tackett's death was "blunt force
injuries of the head."
Appellant testified in his own defense . He admitted that he was searching for
Tackett that day, but he claimed that the purpose of his search was only to confront him
about Tackett's comments regarding Appellant's infidelity. Appellant admitted that he
met up with Tackett on Booker Fork Road and confronted him about the conversation.
According to Appellant : (1) he got out of his pickup truck and approached Tackett, who
was sitting on his ATV; (2) after he spoke to Tackett about the exchange Tackett had
with Appellant's girlfriend, Tackett spit on him; (3) Appellant then removed the keys
from Tackett's ATV and threw them over to the side of the road ; (4) while he was doing
so, Tackett reached into the bed of Appellant's pickup truck, removed an axe that
Appellant had placed in the bed of the truck, and swung the axe over Appellant's neck
and began strangling him from behind ; (5) Appellant fought back and eventually
wrestled away the axe, but Tackett was still hanging onto him and was preparing to
strike Appellant with his fist; (6) Appellant then struck Tackett with the axe until he let go
of him . Appellant thus claimed that he acted in self-defense in the face of Tackett's
initial aggression with the axe as his weapon .
The jury found Appellant guilty of murdering Tackett, and the trial court accepted
the jury's verdict. After deliberating for approximately two hours on the penalty,
however, the jury informed the trial court that they were unable to reach a unanimous
verdict on Appellant's sentence . Accordingly, the trial court discharged the jury, and at
final sentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of fifty years imprisonment
4
111111. ANALYSIS
A. THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT
A toxicology report was prepared in connection with the autopsy performed by
Dr. Davis . The Commonwealth had previously filed a motion in limine to exclude the
introduction of the toxicology report into evidence . So, when Appellant's lawyer asked
Dr. Davis about the importance of the toxicology report during the trial, the
Commonwealth duly objected and the trial court held an in camera hearing on its
admissibility. The toxicology report showed a very low level of oxycodone in Tackett's
blood and only a "presumptive presence" of cocaine metabolites in Tackett's urine .
While he testified that the oxycodone, potentially, could have had a pain dulling effect
on Tackett, Dr . Davis was uncertain of the effect of the oxycodone on Tackett because
he did not know how long Tackett had been taking the drug and he may have been
acclimated to its effect. As for the cocaine metabolites, Dr. Davis pointed out that they
were in Tackett's urine, rather than his bloodstream, where they could have an effect on
him . Additionally, Dr. Davis explained that he rarely includes a presumptive presence
4 See supra note 1 .
of any substance in his autopsy reports since the result is not worth much without a
confirmative test.
The Commonwealth argued that the evidence had little, if any, probative value
and was highly prejudicial to its case. Appellant's lawyer countered that the toxicology
report was a critical part of the autopsy since the autopsy was not finalized until the
toxicology results were received, and furthermore, the results indicated the presence of
drugs that may have dulled Tackett's pain and thereby may have enhanced his ability to
fight in a struggle .
The trial court found that the toxicology report did not confirm the presence of
cocaine in Tackett's system, and therefore, the evidence of cocaine was without
probative value . As to the oxycodone, the trial court found that the drug was within the
therapeutic range, or even less, and that the expert could not testify that it would have
had any effect on Tackett's behavior or his ability to feel pain. As a result, the trial court
found that the oxycodone evidence was of little probative value and that its admission
would be highly prejudicial to the Commonwealth . Consequently, the trial court found
that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Based on
its findings, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection and excluded the
toxicology report from being introduced into evidence by Appellant .
Appellant's argument on appeal is that the toxicology report was admissible
under KRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule . We agree that
a toxicology report prepared as part of an autopsy report may qualify as a business
record and thus be admissible, but, as the Commonwealth states in its brief, this
5 KRE 803(6); KRE 805 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to
the hearsay rule provided in these rules."); KRE 703(a) ("The facts or data in the
-6-
argument misses the point. Regardless of whether evidence is admissible under the
hearsay chapter as a business record, it may still be inadmissible by reason of another
evidence rule .6 And in this case, the trial court excluded the toxicology report because
it found (1) that the evidence of cocaine lacked any probative value, and (2) that the
probative value of the oxycodone evidence was substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. This weighing of the evidence by the trial court was proper under
KRE 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence .
The trial court's findings regarding the toxicology report are supported by the
evidence, and therefore, they are not clearly erroneous and subject to being set aside
by this Court.' Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was properly excluded by the
trial court.
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing . If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence ."; _
cf.
Kirk v. Commonwealth, Ky. 6 S.W.3d 823 (1999) (holding that an autopsy report was
admissible as a business record) .
6 Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky ., 954 S .W .2d 954, 958 (1997) ("If a
particular entry in the record would be inadmissible for another reason, it does not
become admissible just because it is included in a business or public record .") .
CR 52 .01 ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.") ; Rockwell Intern . Corp . v. Commonwealth, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky.App., 16 S .W .3d 316, 319 (1999) ("Since the trial
court determines the credibility and weight to be given to evidence, it is the function of
the trial judge to choose which evidence to accept. We will not interfere with that
choice, unless it is clearly erroneous.") (citations omitted) .
B. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
Bentley's trial testimony differed from the statement he gave to the police during
their investigation of Tackett's death. At trial, he testified that, while working with friends
on a truck, he saw Tackett, sitting on his ATV, parked directly beside a red pickup truck
on the road just down from his friend's house, and that he saw Tackett fall from the
four-wheeler to the ground after Appellant struck him twice while he lay slumped over
its handles . In his prior signed statement to the police, however, Bentley claimed to
have seen the two vehicles but denied seeing any physical interaction between the two
men . Because of this discrepancy, Appellant claims that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to declare a mistrial or strike the testimony . We disagree .
First, Appellant failed to preserve this claim of error ,8 but asks us to review it
under RCr 10 .26 9 as palpable error. We may "consider an issue that was not preserved
if [we] deem[ ] the error to be a 'palpable' one which affected the defendant's
'substantial rights' and resulted in 'manifest injustice ."'1° "In determining whether an
error is palpable, [we] 'must consider whether on the whole case there is a substantial
possibility that the result would have been any different .""' We note that the
Commonwealth's evidence against Appellant was overwhelming . Additionally, we
observe that Bentley's trial testimony was essentially consistent with his statement to
8 Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S .W .3d 894, 895 (2002) ("The general rule is
that a party must make a proper objection to the trial court and request a ruling on that
objection, or the issue is waived ."); RCr 9.22; KRE 103(a)(1) .
9 RCr 10 .26 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.").
1°
Commonwealth v. Pace , supra at 895 .
the police with one difference : whether he saw Appellant hit Tackett . Of course,
Appellant admitted at trial that he hit Tackett . But even excluding Bentley's testimony
and Appellant's admission, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
evidence was that Appellant hit Tackett. Accordingly, we do not find that a substantial
possibility exists that the result would have been different absent the claimed error.
Second, regardless of the preservation issue, we hold that the admission of
Bentley's testimony was not error. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's failure to
disclose that Bentley's trial testimony would differ from his statement was a violation of
both RCr 7.24 and 7.26 . We disagree . Neither rule requires such disclosure . The
relevant subsection of RCr 7.24 states:
(2) On motion of a defendant the court may order the
attorney for the Commonwealth to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents
or tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, that are in
the possession, custody or control of the Commonwealth,
upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of the defense and that the request is
reasonable . This provision authorizes pretrial discovery and
inspection of official police reports, but not of memoranda, or
other documents made by police officers and agents of the
Commonwealth in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case, or of statements made to them by
witnesses or by prospective witnesses (other than the
defendant) . (emphasis added) .
And, the relevant subsection of RCr 7.26 provides :
(1) Except for good cause shown, not later than forty-eight
(48) hours prior to trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth
shall produce all statements of any witness in the form of a
document or recording in its possession which relates to the
subject matter of the witness's testimony and which (a) has
been signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is or purports to
be a substantially verbatim statement made by the witness .
Such statement shall be made available for examination and
use by the defendant.
Bentley was a witness; thus RCr 7 .24 is not implicated . Bentley only informed the
police and the Commonwealth minutes before he testified that his previous statement
was incomplete ; therefore, RCr 7 .26 was not violated :
The crux of the Appellant's argument is that the
Commonwealth had a duty to advise the defense of the
additional information from Officer Pinnegar as soon as it
learned of the same .
Despite the fervor with which Appellant presses this issue,
he is unable to cite, and we are unable to find, any rule or
precedent which would require the Commonwealth to take
such action. RCr 7 .26(1) is clear in requiring only written
statements to be made available for use by the defendant.
It is not an infrequent occurrence during a criminal trial that a
witness who has produced or signed a written statement
reveals details not contained in the document. There is no
authority that would require a trial judge to confine a
witness's testimony to the four corners of his or her written
statement. Trial lawyers scrutinize the motive or basis for
such omissions or additions through the art of crossexamination .' 2
Accordingly, we hold that the admission of Bentley's testimony was not error;
thus it was not error for the trial court to strike his testimony or declare a mistrial.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court.
All concur.
12
Yates v. Commonwealth, Ky., 958 S .W .2d 306, 308 (1997).
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Jonah Lee Stevens
PO Box 1286
Pikeville, Kentucky 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Carlton S . Shier
Assistant Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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