HON . MARC I . ROSEN, JUDGE, BOYD CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. JOSEPH WATSON
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2002-SC-0057-MR
HON . MARC I . ROSEN, JUDGE,
BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
V.
APPELLANT
ORIGINAL ACTION FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2630
JOSEPH WATSON
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
AFFIRMING
Appellee Joseph Watson is charged with escape in the second degree, a Class
D felony, KRS 520 .030(2). After the Boyd Circuit Court denied his motion to dismiss for
failure to comply with his request for final disposition, KRS 500.110, Appellee petitioned
the Court of Appeals for relief pursuant to CR 76.36 . The Court of Appeals granted the
petition and issued a writ prohibiting the Boyd Circuit Court from continuing the
prosecution of the escape charge . Appellants appeal from that action as a matter of
right. Ky. Const. § 115; CR 76 .36(7)(a) . We affirm .
On July 29, 1999, Appellee's probation officer filed a criminal complaint against
him in the Boyd District Court alleging that Appellee had escaped from a half-way
house in Boyd County the previous day. A warrant of arrest was issued on July 29,
1999, but was not served on Appellant until more than a year later, November 9, 2000 .
At that time, Appellee was imprisoned on other charges at the Northpoint Training
Center in Mercer County, Kentucky. On November 15, 2000, the Boyd District Court
lodged a detainer against Appellee with Northpoint based on the escape charge
pending in that court .
On March 27, 2001, pursuant to KRS 500.110, Appellee filed a pro se request
for a final disposition of the escape charge within 180 days. Appellee filed his request
in the Boyd District Court and served notice on the Boyd County attorney, the
prosecuting officer responsible for representing the Commonwealth in that court. KRS
15.725(2). The district court took no action on the motion.
On April 26, 2001, a Boyd County grand jury issued a direct indictment against
Appellee on the charge of escape in the second degree, effectively removing the case
from the district court to the Boyd Circuit Court for further proceedings . Appellee did
not refile his request for a final disposition in the circuit court. However, on November
1, 2001, 219 days after that request had been filed in the district court, Appellee moved
for dismissal of the circuit court indictment for failure to prosecute the charge against
him within the required 180 days. The Boyd Circuit Court denied the motion, holding
that, because a district court has no jurisdiction to try a felony case, KRS 24A.110(1)(a),
Appellee had not filed his KRS 500 .110 request in the appropriate court, i .e. , the Boyd
Circuit Court .
Appellee then petitioned the Court of Appeals pursuant to CR 76 .36(1) for a writ
prohibiting the Boyd Circuit Court from proceeding against him on the escape charge.
The Court of Appeals, relying on Huddleston v. Jennings , Ky. App., 723 S .W.2d 381
(1986), granted the petition, holding that the filing of Appellee's request for a final
disposition in the Boyd District Court triggered the running of the 180 day period and
that the Commonwealth had, thus, forfeited the right to continue proceedings against
Appellee after the expiration of that period .
On appeal, Appellants assert that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ
because (1) Appellee did not file his request for a final disposition in the "appropriate
court," and (2) Appellee filed his request prematurely because he filed it before the
grand jury issued its indictment against him.
I. APPROPRIATE COURT.
KRS 500 .110 provides :
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a
penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he
shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he
shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be
made of the indictment, information or complaint ; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance .
(Emphasis added .)
The issue here is which court is the "appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction." That same issue was raised in Huddleston , supra, on virtually identical
facts. Like Appellee, the prisoner in Huddleston had been charged with a felony
offense by criminal complaint in district court and the district court had lodged a
detainer against him . Like Appellee, the prisoner in Huddleston filed his KRS 500.110
request for a final disposition in the district court and served notice on the county
attorney before the issuance of the grand jury's indictment against him . Id . at 382 .
Huddleston concluded that the prisoner had filed his request in the "appropriate court."
We interpret "the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of
the prosecutor's jurisdiction" to mean the prosecutorial office which has
lodged the detainer and the court in which the entered indictment,
information or complaint forming the basis for the detainer was pending
when the detainer was lodged. That, after all, is what the detainer is
about. . . . We believe the intent of the statute is that the 180 days begin
to run once an otherwise proper request is made to the court in which the
detainer charge was pending when lodged and to the normal prosecutor
in that court . An indictment on the same charge subsequent to the
lodging of the detainer would not require that the request be made to the
circuit court and the Commonwealth attorney unless the indictment had
become the basis for the detainer .
Id . at 382-83 (emphasis added) .
Huddleston further noted that a prisoner is not required to resubmit his motion to
the circuit court in the event his case is transferred upon a grand jury indictment, stating
that "it does not seem an unreasonable burden to place on the county attorney to
forward the request to the Commonwealth attorney, and upon the district court to
forward the request to the circuit court." Id.' On this rationale, Huddleston concluded
that the district court was the "appropriate court" for the filing of the prisoner's request
for a final disposition because the charge upon which the detainer was based was then
pending in that court even though jurisdiction was thereafter obtained by the circuit
In fact, Appellee's request for a final disposition in the case sub ludice was
forwarded to the circuit court and was included in the certified records of the Boyd
Circuit Court that were filed in the Court of Appeals .
court as a result of the subsequent indictment . Id. However, the petition for a writ was
denied in Huddleston because the prisoner's request for a final disposition had been
prematurely filed before the detainer was lodged against him, id . at 383, a circumstance
that did not occur in this case.
We find the reasoning in Huddleston to be sound and conclude that it applies
here as well. The detainer was lodged against Appellee by the Boyd District Court and
there was no case pending against Appellee in the Boyd Circuit Court at the time he
filed his KRS 500 .110 request for a final disposition . Thus, the request was "delivered
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction" as required by the statute .
Appellants' second claim in this regard is but an extension of their first, i.e. , that
the request failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CR 6 .04(1) because
Appellee did not provide notice of his request to the Commonwealth's attorney . The
statute only requires delivery to the "prosecuting officer." At the time the request was
filed, the only charges pending against Appellee were in the Boyd District Court and the
only officer then prosecuting Appellee was the county attorney .
Appellants next urge us to overrule Huddleston because it construes KRS
500 .110 inconsistently with the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(IAD), KRS 440.450-.990. The IAD applies to interstate detainers, i .e . , detainers lodged
by one state against prisoners incarcerated in another state, whereas KRS 500.110,
applies to intrastate detainers, i .e. detainers lodged by Kentucky courts against in-state
prisoners . Like KRS 500.110, the IAD requires the out-of-state prisoner to cause his
speedy trial request to be delivered to "the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court
of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction ." KRS 440.450, Article III(1) . However, the IAD
also provides that the "'appropriate court' as used in the agreement on detainers . . .
means the Circuit Court of competent jurisdiction ." KRS 440.460 . KRS 500 .110 does
not contain a similar provision . Appellants, however, would have us interpret KRS
500 .110 as if it did contain that provision .
Appellants cite Rushin v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 931 S .W .2d 456 (1996), for
the proposition that the provisions of KRS 440 .450, et seq ., and KRS 500.110 must be
interpreted identically in every case. However, Rushin only held that the defendant in
that case was not denied his right to a speedy trial under either the IAD or KRS
500.1 102 because no detainer had ever been lodged against him, and, in that respect,
the two statutes were "substantially identical ." Id . at 458-60 . See also, Commonwealth
v. Schneider, Ky. App ., 17 S.W .3d 530, 534 (2001) (interpreting the IAD) . Rushin did
not, however, hold that Kentucky courts must interpret KRS 500.110 as if it contained
the same provisions as the [AD. See Dunaway v. Commonwealth , Ky., 60 S .W .3d 563,
567 n .3 (2001) ("The IAD, though similar to KRS 500 .110, is not the same. . . . For that
reason, cases interpreting the IAD may not always be helpful in construing KRS
500.110 . . . .") . Therefore, we decline to hold that these similar, but not identical,
statutes must be construed as if they were identical . We specifically decline to engraft
KRS 440.460 onto the language of KRS 500 .110 . KRS 440.460 was enacted in 1974 .
1974 Ky. Acts, ch . 219, § 2 . KRS 500 .110 was enacted four years later. 1978 Ky.
Acts, ch. 78, § 7. If the General Assembly had intended for the IAD definition of
2 The record was unclear as to whether the defendant was being held as a
federal or a state prisoner and the trial court was unclear as to whether the resolution of
that fact would require analysis under the IAD as opposed to KRE 500.110 .
"appropriate court" to apply to requests made pursuant to KRS 500.110, it knew how to
do so . Its failure to do so is highly persuasive of a contrary intent .
Nor do we regard Fex v. Michi g an , 507 U .S . 43,113 S .Ct. 1085, 122 L .Ed .2d
406 (1993), as abrogating Huddleston , supra . In Fex, the Court was interpreting the
"delivery" requirement of the IAD and held that the 180-day period was not triggered
until the "appropriate prosecuting official" physically received the prisoner's request . Id .
at 52, 113 S .Ct. at 1091 . The identity of the "appropriate prosecuting official" was not at
issue in Fex; thus, that case has no application here and affords no basis for departing
from the sound reasoning expressed in Huddleston .
II. ALLEGED PREMATURE FILING .
Appellants assert that Appellee's request for a final disposition is null because
the request was filed prior to his indictment by the grand jury. Again, we disagree . As
pointed out in Huddleston , supra , it is the filing of a detainer (not,
.,
.g
.e
the issuance of
an indictment) against the prisoner that triggers the application of KRS 500 .110. 723
S.W.2d at 383 . In fact, the General Assembly enacted KRS 500 .110 for the
ameliorative purpose of lessening the detrimental effect that detainers have on the
prison population by requiring a court, upon request by a prisoner, to resolve untried
indictments within 180 days so that the detainer may be lifted if the prisoner is found
innocent of the charges . Dun_
away, supra, at 566; see also Huddleston , supra , at 383
("The purpose of [KRS 500 .110] is not to ensure the speedy disposition of every charge
. . . . Its purpose is to provide for the speedy disposition only of such charges as have
actually resulted in a detainer being lodged .") . Thus, a request for a final disposition is
not premature under KRS 500 .110 so long as the prisoner files it after a detainer has
been lodged against him; otherwise, the request is treated as a motion for a speedy trial
under the United States and Kentucky Constitutions . Huddleston , supra , at 383 . Since
Appellee filed his request after the district court lodged the detainer against him, his
request was not premature and complied with the procedural requirements of KRS
500 .110.
Appellants cite the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U .S .C. § 3161(c)(1), for the
proposition that the right to a speedy trial does not arise until after an indictment has
been issued . The Speedy Trial Act, however, has no relevance to our analysis of KRS
500 .110. The Speedy Trial Act does not require either the existence of a detainer or a
motion or request by the defendant in order to trigger its application . Further, it applies
only to defendants charged by indictment or information (not by criminal complaint)
unless the defendant specifically consents to trial before a magistrate .
Appellants' reliance on State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen , 253 So .2d 861 (Fla . 1971)
and State v. Clark, 501 P .2d 274 (Utah 1972), is also misplaced . While Butler, indeed,
holds that a written demand for a speedy trial filed before indictment is a nullity, id . a t
862, that case was interpreting a rule, Fla . R. Crim. P. 3.191, that applies only to
persons "charged with a crime by indictment or information" (not by criminal complaint) .
And while Clark did make the same holding with respect to a statute, Utah Code Ann . §
77-29-1, that applied to persons "charged with a crime by indictment, information or
complaint," Clark was subsequently abrogated by State v. Moore , 521 P.2d 556 (Utah
1974):
After further consideration and examination of the statute we conclude
that the 90-day period commences on the day the defendant notified the
county attorney of his request for final disposition of a case or cases
pending against him, and the filing of a complaint, information or
indictment does not affect the commencement of that period .
Id . at 558 . (Utah Code Ann . § 77-29-1 was subsequently amended and presently
applies only to prisoners subject to "any untried indictment or information .")
In addition to Moore , supra, courts of other states with statutes containing
language identical to KRS 500.110 have interpreted those statutes to not require the
existence of an indictment as a prerequisite to a request for a final disposition . E.g .,
People v. Lopez, 587 P .2d 792, 795 (Colo. Ct. App . 1978) ; Brooks v. State , 617 A.2d
1049, 1053 (Md . 1993) (citing , inter alia , Huddleston , supra); State ex rel. Kemp v.
Hod e, 629 S .W .2d 353, 360 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) ; cf. Brimer v. State , 402 P .2d 789,
793-94 (Kan . 1965) (request made to court in which charges were not yet pending but
to which charges were later transferred did not satisfy statute ; detainee required to
notify lower court from which detainer issued and where charges were pending at time
of notice).
Finally, Appellants cite Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S . 514, 92 S .Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d
101 (1972), the seminal case with respect to a defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial of the charges for which he is being held in pretrial detention . U .S. Const.,
amend . VI ; Ky. Const. § 11 . Barker, however, has no relevance to a prisoner's statutory
right under KRS 500.110 to a speedy trial of another charge for which a detainer has
been lodged against him. Compare Gabow v. Commonwealth , Ky., 34 S .W.3d 63, 6970 (2000) . Barker certainly does not hold that in order to preserve his constitutional
right to a speedy trial a defendant must file his motion for final disposition twice simply
because the government moves his case to another court.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for a writ of
prohibition against the Boyd Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS HON . MARC I . ROSEN, JUDGE, BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Dennis Stutsman
Department of Public Advocacy
Appellate Branch Manager
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
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