PATRICIA MCCOWAN V. MATSUSHITA APPLIANCE COMPANY ; HON . THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED : October 17, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*
reme Tourt of lKentuc
2001-SC-1046-WC
PATRICIA MCCOWAN
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APP ALS
2000-CA-2594-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 98-55074
V.
MATSUSHITA APPLIANCE COMPANY ;
HON . THOMAS A . NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
KRS 342 .0011(1) requires that a psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism must directly result from a physical injury in order to be
compensable . This workers' compensation appeal concerns whether KRS 342 .0011(1)
permits compensation for a physical change that results from mental or emotional
trauma . The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Workers' Compensation Board (Board),
and Court of Appeals have determined that it does not. We disagree and, therefore, we
reverse .
The claimant worked as a utility operator, supplying parts to co-workers on an
assembly line. On November 17, 1998, the line was stopped, allegedly because it ran
out of an item for which the claimant was responsible . Her supervisor indicated that
she confronted the claimant because a shut down of the line was a serious matter. A
heated argument ensued and, although no physical contact occurred, the claimant
became increasingly upset, feeling that she was being blamed unfairly for the stoppage .
She insisted that they continue the discussion in order to resolve the matter, but her
supervisor refused and told her to wait until later. Frustrated, she took her concerns to
the next higher level of management but was informed that her supervisor had the
authority to tell her what to do. At that point, she became very upset, began crying, and
went to the nurse's station . During questioning by a human resources representative,
she began to experience pain, heaviness in her chest, and nausea . She was taken by
ambulance to the local emergency room where it was determined that she had suffered
a heart attack.
At its inception, workers' compensation coverage was limited to traumatic,
accidental workplace injuries, and the courts were strict in their construction of the term
"traumatic" and contempla ted physical trauma . See, Jellico Coal Co . v . Adkins , 197 Ky .
684, 247 S .W. 972 (1923) . Over time, however, the term was less strictly construed
and came to include injuries that resulted from events of an unusual, unexpected, or
undesigned nature . See, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46
S .W.2d 87 (1932) . It also came to include physical trauma in the form of shock,
overexertion, or exposure to the elements. See, North American Refractories Co v
Jackson , Ky., 346 S .W.2d 10 (1961) ; Adams v . Bryant , Ky., 274 S .W .2d 791 (1955) .
Eventually, heart attacks that were precipitated by physical exertion or strain came to
be included . See, Hudson v. Owens, Ky., 439 S .W.2d 565 (1969) ; Grimes v. Goodlett
and Adams, Ky., 345 S .W.2d 47 (1961) ; Terry v. Associated Stone, Ky ., 334 S.W .2d
926(1960) .
In 1972, "injury" was redefined as "any work-related change in the human
organism," and the word "traumatic" was removed . 1972 Acts ch. 78, § 2 . Applying this
definition, the Court determined that physical trauma was no longer required and,
therefore, that when a dormant nondisabling mental condition was aroused by the
mental exertion of work, the mental breakdown that resulted was compensable as an
injury . Yocom v. Pierce , Ky., 534 S .W.2d 796 (1976) .
In an apparent attempt to limit coverage of so-called "mental-mental" claims,
KRS 342 .0011(1) was amended in 1994 to require that a psychological, psychiatric, or
stress-related change in the human organism must directly result from a physical injury .
1994 Ky . Acts ch . 181, Part 1, § 1 . But "injury" continued to be defined as a harmful
change and included harmful changes that were physical, psychological, or psychiatric .
Thus, the definition permitted compensation if mental trauma or exertion caused a
harmful physical change, and a harmful mental change directly resulted .
As effective December 12, 1996, KRS 342 .0011(1) provides as follows :
(1)
"Injury" means any work-related traumatic event or
series of traumatic events, including cumulative trauma,
arising out of and in the course of employment which is the
proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human
organism evidenced by objective medical findings . "Injury"
does not include the effects of the natural aging process,
and does not include any communicable disease unless the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the nature of
the employment. "Injury" when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include an occupational
disease and damage to a prosthetic appliance, but shall not
include a psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related change
in the human organism, unless it is a direct result of a
physical injury .
As we explained in Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v . West, Ky.,
52 S .W.3d 564, 566 (2001), the effect of this amendment is that the term "injury" now
refers to the traumatic event or series of such events that causes a harmful change
rather than to the harmful change, itself . Under the amended definition, a "physical
injury" is an event that involves physical trauma, without regard to the type of harmful
change that results . Id .
Both the Board and the Court of Appeals indicated that the goal of amending the
definition of "injury" with regard to psychological, psychiatric, and stress-related
changes was to prevent compensation for "mental-mental" claims . The majority view
was that the term "stress-related" denotes physical or mental changes that result from
stress . Although recognizing that the legislature may not have intended for the
amendment to preclude compensation for "mental-physical" claims, the majority
concluded that harmful changes that are caused by stress must directly result from a
physically traumatic event in order to be compensable.
KRS 342 .0011 does not define the term "stress-related," but among the
synonyms for the word "stress" are : distress, strain, constraining force or influence,
intense effort, exertion, pressure, and tension . See Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary (1975) . The factor that produces stress may be physical, chemical, or
emotional. Id. Furthermore, when stress acts upon the human organism, physical
and/or mental changes may result . Id .
The claimant asserts that although KRS 342 .0011(1) requires harmful mental
changes to result from a physically traumatic event in order to be compensable, it does
not require harmful physical changes to do so. Noting that the last sentence of KRS
342 .0011(1) refers to psychological and psychiatric changes, she maintains that the
term "stress-related" was used to denote a type of mental change or disorder . She
argues that the legislature sought to limit compensation based upon the type of harmful
change (i .e. , a mental change), rather than the type of trauma that produced it. Thus,
she construes KRS 342 .0011(1) as requiring that mental changes, whether they be
psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related, must result from a physically traumatic
event . She concludes that because the harmful change that she suffered was physical,
it was not "stress-related" for the purposes of KRS 342 .0011(1), and KRS 342 .0011(1)
did not require that it directly result from a physically traumatic event .
As was recognized by the Board and the Court of Appeals, the apparent goal of
the disputed amendment was to prevent compensation for so-called "mental-mental"
claims . The legislature attempted to do so in 1994, and we are persuaded that its goal
in 1996 was to do so more effectively by preventing compensation for all mental
changes that resulted from mental stress or trauma, including those that resulted from a
physical change . There is no indication that it intended to preclude compensation for
"mental-physical" claims as well . Furthermore, had that been the legislature's intent, it
would have defined "injury" as a work-related physically traumatic event, thereby
precluding both "mental-mental" and "mental-physical" claims . But it did not . In view of
this and of the fact that the last sentence of KRS 342.0011(1) refers to psychological
and psychiatric changes but not to physical changes, we are convinced that by
including the term "stress-related," the legislature intended to denote another type of
mental condition . We conclude, therefore, that the last sentence of KRS 342 .0011(1)
applies only to mental changes and requires that such changes must directly result from
a physically traumatic event in order to be compensable .
Although the trauma that the claimant experienced was emotional rather than
physical in nature, the harmful changes for which she sought compensation included
the heart attack and its consequences . Thus, the last sentence of KRS 342.0011(1) did
not apply to her claim, and the decision to the contrary was erroneous as a matter of
law. Under those circumstances, the claim must be remanded to the ALJ for further
consideration .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this matter is remanded to
the ALJ for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, Keller, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur. Cooper, Johnstone
and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join in a separate dissenting opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Phillipe W. Rich
Howes & Rich
Watterson City West, Suite 1020
1941 Bishop Lane
Louisville, KY 40218
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Sherri Porter Brown
Ferren & Fogle
300 E . Main Street
Suite 500
Lexington, KY 40507
RENDERED : October 17, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
apremE Tourt of Wentuckv
2001-SC-1046-WC
APPELLANT
PATRICIA MCCOWAN
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-2594-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 98-55074
MATSUSHITA APPLIANCE COMPANY ;
HON. THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION
KRS 342 .0011(1) requires that a psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism must directly result from a physical injury in order to be
compensable but does not define the term "stress-related ." With regard to the meaning
of a statutory term that is not defined, KRS 446 .080(4) provides as follows :
All words and phrases shall be construed according to the
common and approved usage of language, but technical
words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed according to such meaning.
The majority points out that synonyms for the word "stress" are: distress, strain,
constraining force or influence, intense effort, exertion, pressure, and tension . See
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1975) . The majority recognizes that physical,
chemical, or emotional factors may produce stress. Furthermore, it recognizes that
either physical or mental changes may result from stress . Yet, although "stress-related"
is neither a technical term nor a legal term of art, the majority ignores the dictionary
definition and concludes that the term refers to a type of mental condition .
The plain meaning of the words that are employed in KRS 342 .0011(1) indicates
that a stress-related change is a change that is caused by stress, regardless of whether
the stressor is physical, mental, or emotional and regardless of whether the change,
itself, is physical or mental. Thus, KRS 342.0011(1) requires that a harmful change that
is psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related must result from an event that involves
physical rather than mental or emotional trauma in order to be compensable . Harmful
changes that result from physical stress or exertion may be viewed as being the product
of physical trauma and, therefore, as being compensable ; however, harmful changes
that result from mental or emotional stress do not come within the 1996 definition of
"injury" unless they are the product of a physically traumatic event .
See Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Government v. West , Ky., 52 S .W .3d 564 (2001) .
The harmful changes for which the claimant sought compensation included the
heart attack and its consequences . Although there was evidence that those changes
were precipitated by work-related events, it is undisputed that the underlying trauma
was emotional rather than physical in nature . Under those circumstances, the harmful
changes that resulted were not compensable . Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals should be affirmed .
Cooper, Johnstone, Wintersheimer, JJ ., join .
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