RICHARD WAGERS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLWMED
2001-SC-0807-MR
RICHARD WAGERS
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B . VANMETER, JUDGE
CASE NO. 01-CR-00072
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Richard Wagers, was convicted in Fayette Circuit Court on one count
of First-Degree Sodomy and two counts of First-Degree Sexual Abuse and sentenced
to a total of thirty-five years imprisonment . The convictions stemmed from allegations
of abuse by the seven-year old daughter of Appellant's then-girlfriend, who testified that
Appellant had touched her private parts with his hand, his private part, and his tongue,
while he was babysitting the victim on a day home from school. He appeals as a matter
of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Appellant alleges several errors on appeal, specifically: (1) that he was denied a
fair and impartial jury when the trial court failed to follow the mandated procedures for
jury selection ; (2) that the trial court erroneously failed to strike six jurors for cause,
thereby requiring the defense to use its peremptory challenges to remove the jurors ; (3)
that the two counts of Sexual Abuse I should have merged with the count of Sodomy I,
as there was only one incident of abuse ; and (4) that the trial court should have granted
a directed verdict on the charge of Sodomy I, as there was no evidence that oral
contact was made with the victim's vagina . For the reasons set forth below, we affirm .
JURY SELECTION PROCESS
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to follow prescribed jury selection
procedures when it empanelled the jury from only twenty-six available venirepersons,
rather than the twenty-eight he contends is required by RCr 9.40 and KRS 29A.060.
When the trial court realized that there were only twenty-six potential jurors left after
nineteen had been struck for cause, rather than replenishing the potential panel with an
additional two venirepersons, the court asked the Commonwealth to give up two of its
peremptory challenges . The Commonwealth agreed, but defense counsel objected,
stating that he was entitled to choose from a full panel of twenty-eight .
A criminal defendant in a jury trial in circuit court is entitled to a jury of twelve
persons, and both the Commonwealth and the defense are each allotted eight
peremptory challenges. RCr. 9.40(1); RCr. 9.30(1) ; Ky. Const. § 7. Therefore, a total
of twenty-eight venirepersons were necessary to properly empanel the jury in this case.
RCr. 9.36(2) . RCr. 9.30 states in pertinent part:
(1)(a) In a jury trial in circuit court the clerk, in open court,
shall draw from the jury box sufficient names of the persons
selected and summoned for jury service to compose a jury
as required by law. If one or more of them is challenged, the
clerk shall draw from the box as many more as are
necessary to complete the jury.
(1)(c) When it appears that the names in the jury box are
about to become exhausted, the judge may obtain additional
jurors by drawing from the drum, or, with the consent of the
parties, by ordering the sheriff or a bailiff appointed by the
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court to summon any number of qualified persons .
Appellant's argument on appeal focuses on the randomness of the jury selection
employed by the trial court and relies upon Robertson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 597
S .W.2d 864 (1980) . In Robertson , this Court reversed a criminal conviction without any
showing of prejudice to the defendant, because the trial court had allowed a substantial
deviation from the jury selection process mandated by RCr 9 .30 and KRS 29A.060 . Id .
at 865 . There, the trial court began with thirty-six jurors and initially filled the jury box
with jurors 1 through 12 . As certain jurors were excused, the court replaced them with
the next lowest-numbered juror in consecutive order. This method, in effect, allowed
the parties to determine which jurors would be seated if certain jurors were struck .
"[P]reservation of randomness is a central principle in the jury selection process .
However, 'randomness means that, at no time in the jury selection process will anyone
involved in the action be able to know in advance, or manipulate, the list of names who
will eventually compose the . . . jury."' Hodge v. Commonwealth , Ky., 17 S .W.3d 824,
840 (2000) (quoting Williams v . Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 734 S.W.2d 810, 812-813
(1987)) .
In the situation at bar, the trial court's request for the parties to forego
peremptory strikes rather than empanel two additional jurors, does not rise to the level
of deviation that deprived the defendant in Robertson of a jury selected at random .
There was no way that either party could have manipulated the composition of the jury
or known in advance which jurors would have eventually sat on the panel. "We would
not consider minor errors in jury selection reversible in the absence of a showing of
prejudice ." Robertson , supra at 865. Appellant cannot show how he was prejudiced by
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the court's failure to empanel two additional jurors that either party may have ultimately
peremptorily challenged . Accordingly, we hold that the trial court in this instance,
substantially complied with RCr 9.30 and KRS 29A.060 governing the jury selection
process .
JURORS NOT STRUCK FOR CAUSE
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to excuse six jurors
for cause due to various biases against the defense.
None of the six jurors that Appellant argues should have been excused as
unqualified actually sat on the jury . However, Appellant exhausted all eight of his
peremptory strikes, and thus he is entitled to challenge the composition of the jury.
Marsch v . Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830 (1987). "To obtain a reversal for
infringement of his right to exercise peremptory challenges, appellant need only show
that the trial court erred in overruling any one of his challenges for cause." Alexander v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 862 S.W.2d 856, 865 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Stringer
v . Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S .W.2d 883 (1997) (quoting Marsch , supra , at 834) .
Appellant sets out four primary reasons for the challenges to the six individual
jurors not struck for cause, specifically that: (1) several jurors were unable to state
unequivocally that they could be impartial ; (2) some jurors were victims of past sexual
abuse ; (3) several jurors indicated that they would tend to believe either witnesses for
the prosecution or children ; and (4) several jurors indicated a tendency to impose the
maximum punishment.
The decision of whether to excuse a juror for cause is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, Alexander , supra , at 864, and "great deference is afforded that
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decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion ." Mills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 95
S.W .3d 838, 842 (2003) . Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
excuse any of the challenged jurors for cause . Two of the jurors were sexually abused
as children but each ultimately stated that they could set aside their experience and be
fair. These same two jurors also stated that they "would have a tendency to believe
kids," or that they would "possibly" be inclined to automatically believe what the children
said . "[T]he mere fact that a person has been the victim of a similar crime is insufficient
to mandate a prospective juror be excused for cause." Bowling v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
942 S .W.2d 293, 299 (1997) . The trial court observed first hand the responses and
demeanor of these jurors and clearly felt that they were capable of rendering a fair and
impartial verdict based solely on the evidence . We cannot say that the refusal to
excuse these two jurors for cause was an abuse of discretion . Therefore, no error
occurred .
Likewise, excusal for cause is not mandated simply because a juror favors
severe penalties if he or she ultimately states that they will consider the full range of
penalties . Woodall v. Commonwealth , Ky., 63 S .W.3d 104, 119 (2001), cert. denied,
123 S . Ct . 145, 154 L . Ed . 2d 54, 71 U.S .L.W. 3236 (2002) ; Grooms v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 756 S .W.2d 131, 137 (1988) ("[A] juror should be excused for cause if he would be
unable in any case, no matter how extenuating the circumstances may be, to consider
the imposition of the minimum penalty prescribed by law.") . Several of the jurors here,
when asked by defense counsel if they would go straight to the maximum penalty if the
defendant was found guilty, initially equivocally stated that they probably would favor
the maximum . However, when questioned by the Commonwealth, the jurors stated that
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they would be able to consider the entire range of penalties before making their
decision . The trial court was satisfied, as are we, that the jurors were not biased, as
their responses to the Commonwealth were not merely serving to "rehabilitate"
otherwise unqualified jurors. See Montgomery v. Commonwealth ,
713, 718 (1991) .
Ky ., 819
S.W.2d
There was no error.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant also contends that his convictions on the two counts of Sexual Abuse I
(one count as a lesser-included offense of Rape I, and one count as a primary offense
for touching the victim's vaginal area with his hand) should have merged into the
conviction for Sodomy I because the sexual contact constituting the basis for those
charges was merely incidental to the contact required for the act of sodomy .
Alternatively, Appellant argues that he should have been granted directed verdicts on
both Sexual Abuse I charges, as there was not sufficient evidence to submit those
charges to the jury.
Appellant's initial argument is grounded upon double jeopardy principles and he
further directs us to Turner v. Commonwealth ,
Ky ., 767
S .W.2d
557, 558 (1988),
where
we held a defendant's conviction for first-degree sexual abuse merged into his
conviction for first-degree rape because the evidence showed the sexual contact
involving the defendant's hand was only incidental to the accomplishment of the rape ;
and therefore, conviction for both offenses constituted double jeopardy .
In the case at bar, the evidence of the alleged acts of abuse consisted entirely
of the victim's testimony that Appellant had touched her private parts with his hand,
private part, and tongue over the course of one day. The evidence does not show that
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the touching by Appellant's hand or penis was in any way incidental to the
accomplishment of the sodomy . Therefore, the two separate charges of Sexual Abuse
I (as a primary offense, and as a lesser-included offense of Rape I) that arose from the
contact with Appellant's hand and penis, respectively, were based on separate acts of
"sexual contact" and were not merely incidental to the touching with Appellant's tongue.
The fact that the three acts may have occurred close in time to one another is
irrelevant . See Hampton v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 666 S.W.2d 737, 739-740 (1984) .
Accordingly, Appellant was properly charged and convicted of three separate offenses .
Appellant's alternative argument that he was entitled to a directed verdict on both
counts of Sexual Abuse I is rejected . Although the victim's testimony was lacking in
detail, there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable juror could have believed the
appellant was guilty of each instance of sexual abuse. Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky.,
816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
DIRECTED VERDICT ON SODOMY I
Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to grant his
directed verdict on Sodomy I because there was no evidence that Appellant's tongue
actually touched the victim's vagina . This argument is also rejected because based on
the evidence it would not have been clearly unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant
guilty of Sodomy I . Id . The victim testified, although briefly, that the appellant had
touched her private parts with his tongue. The jury is entitled to believe her testimony .
Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Appellant a directed verdict on
Sodomy I .
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction against Appellant, Richard Wagers, is
affirmed .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur.
Keller, J ., concurs in result only and would hold that the trial court erred in failing to
remove one or more jurors for cause, but that the error was harmless in this case
because Appellant exercised his peremptory challenges to cure the error. See Garnble
v. Commonwealth , Ky., 68 S.W .3d 367, 374-375 (2002) (Keller, J ., dissenting) ; Stopher
v. Commonwealth , Ky., 57 S.W .3d 787, 813-818 (2001) (Keller, J ., dissenting) .
Stumbo, J ., dissents by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, #302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
~ix~rx~~e Court of ~mfurkV
2001-SC-0807-MR
RICHARD WAGERS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B . VANMETER, JUDGE
CASE NO . 01-CR-00072
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority opinion . I believe that one of the
jurors, who had herself been a victim of sexual abuse as a child, should have been
stricken for cause, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that this juror could not
have rendered a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence . RCr 9.36.
Juror #444 admitted to having been sexually abused as a child and during voir
dire was questioned as follows :
DEF : Okay, which of the questions did I ask were you going
to tell us about?
JUROR : Actually, it's one of the earlier ones that you had
brought up. I've been a victim of child abuse, and obviously,
I know that it's very impactful and can affect many facets of
a person's life . I think that I'm capable of listening to
evidence and being fair, but I thought that you would want to
know.
DEF : Sure, I would assume that sitting through a case like
this would make you feel extremely uncomfortable.
JUROR : It could, but you know, I still feel that hearing the
evidence and stuff I could try to be impartial, but at the same
time, it could .
DEF : Do you think that you would lean toward the
prosecution a little bit or . . .
JUROR: I would like to think no, you know, I mean, I would
like to think, I mean, you need to know where I'm coming
from .
DEF : Oh, absolutely, we want people to come up here and
tell us the truth, we appreciate it.
JUROR: You know, just because something happened to
me, I wouldn't want to pin it on somebody that I didn't think
deserved to have that pinned on. I mean, I think that I'm
capable of determining whether or not I think this man did it
or not . But, you know, if you, if you think that, you know, in
the, should we choose him to be guilty, you know, if you
think that my experience would impact my thoughts toward
the sentence or anything like that, you know, I don't know .
DEF : Well, let's talk about that. The judge explained earlier
that there's two parts to the trial in Kentucky. There's the
guilty/not guilty and then there is the sentencing . And, in the
sentencing, the judge would give you a range of penalties. If
you found him guilty, do you think you would go to the
maximum penalty?
JUROR : Well, I think I would try my best to do, to judge by
what I thought he was guilty of . Like you mentioned crime A,
B, or C, if I thought he was guilty of A then so be it.
COM: So, when we get right down to it, could you consider
the full range of penalties?
JUROR : I don't know how to answer that, I've never been a
juror before, you know . So, this is kind of a new thing . I
don't know how to say that, but for me to tell you that, there
is more involved with what these kids are going through than
what just is on paper or comes out in trial. I can tell you firsthand it's going to take a long time for these kids to work
through it. So, I don't know, I mean it's a complicated issue.
I don't know how to tell you, I don't think I would say, "hey,
give this guy the max based on that ."
COM: Would you at least consider, if the judge tells you that
the range is X to Y to Z, would you at least consider the full
range before you made any decision on penalty?
JUROR : Yeah .
DEF: Do you think that you would, with what you went
through, do you think that you would be inclined to
automatically believe what the children say if the children get
up here and testify?
JUROR : Possibly, yeah I would have to say that possibly, I
would .
DEF : Okay.
COM : Depending on whether you found them to be truthful
or not, I mean, possibly you would, but does that mean you
wouldn't, possibly you would think they're lying after you
heard them testify?
JUROR : Yeah, just you know, I really do think, you know,
I've worked very hard on this issue personally, so I would like
to think I could, you know, weigh all of it and try to, you
know, and see this as a distinct separate issue, you know. I
think I would not take it personally or anything, but I also
think that you all, you know, the whole idea of the trial is to
define a number as far as their injury is concerned, it's hard
to put a number to that.
DEF: You mean penalty wise or . .
JUROR : No, the amount of suffering that the kids have
endured, it's hard to talk to a kid that is maybe 10 or 11 and
understand the scope of their injury is what I mean .
DEF: Because it's going to affect them the rest of their
lives?
JUROR : Yeah, so with that in mind .
DEF: Okay, I don't have any more questions, the judge may have some .
"The exercise of the sound discretion of the trial judge must be accomplished
consistent with the right of the defendant to a fair and impartial jury. Composition of the
jury is always vital to the defendant in a criminal prosecution and doubt about unfairness
3
is to be resolved in his favor." Fuqate v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 993 S.W .2d 931, 939
(1999) .
In refusing to strike Juror #444 for cause, the trial court stated that although the
juror had been the victim of past sexual abuse, she had gone to great lengths to explain
that she could listen impartially to the evidence presented . I do not agree that this
juror's responses indicated that she was capable of being completely impartial .
Juror #444 was very honest about her attempts to come to grips with the events
of her past, yet her struggle was evident in her response that she "would try to be
impartial" when evaluating the evidence . Although bias is not automatically presumed if
a juror has been the victim of a similarly violent crime, see Woodall v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104 (2001), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 145 (2002); this, accompanied by
the equivocal nature of Juror #444's responses regarding her ability to put her past
experience behind her and listen impartially to the evidence, gives me reasonable
grounds to believe that this juror was not capable of rendering a fair verdict. The
Commonwealth's inquiries with regard to her ability to be impartial and whether she
could at least consider the entire range of penalties before going straight to the
maximum sentence, does not "rehabilitate" a juror who "should [have been] considered
disqualified by [her] personal knowledge or [her] past experience, or [her] attitude as
expressed on voir dire." Alexander v. Commonwealth , Ky., 862 S .W.2d 856, 865
(1993), overruled on other grounds, Stringer v . Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S .W.2d 883
(1997) (quoting Montgomery v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (1991)) . "A
trial court's decision whether a juror possessed 'this mental attitude of appropriate
indifference' must be reviewed in the totality of circumstances. It is not limited to the
juror's response to a 'magic question ."' Montgomery, supra, at 718 .
Even though the juror did eventually say that she would consider the entire range
of penalties, the response came after several leading questions from the
Commonwealth. Accordingly, I feel that in light of Juror #444's entire comments, the
trial court abused its discretion when it refused to strike this juror for cause .
Also, since I would reverse and remand for a new trial, upon remand I would
direct the trial court to examine the evidence more closely to determine if there is, in
fact, any evidentiary support for the two separate counts of Sexual Abuse I . If the court
finds that the sexual contact with Appellant's hand was merely incidental to the
accomplishment of the contact with Appellant's penis or tongue, then double jeopardy
would preclude a conviction based upon that conduct as a separate incident of abuse .
Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 557, 558 (1988).
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