CHRISTOPHER LEE FLORENCE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : AUGUST 21, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2001-SC-0658-MR
CHRISTOPHER LEE FLORENCE
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
2001-CR-00504
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Christopher Florence, was convicted in the Fayette Circuit
Court of one count of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the second
degree, two counts of Theft by Deception Over $300, and Persistent Felony Offender
(PFO) in the first degree . The final judgment sentenced Appellant to a total of twenty
years' imprisonment . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right.'
Appellant raises three issues on appeal, (1) whether the trial court improperly
disallowed a Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, (2)
whether the trial court erroneously failed to inquire into the reasoning behind Appellant's
failure to testify, and (3) whether Appellant should have had a directed verdict on one or
both counts of theft by deception .
'KY. CONST . § 110(2)(b).
On March 3, 1999, Appellant opened an account in the name of William C.
Vance at Whitaker Bank, in Lexington by depositing $50 cash. The next day, he
returned to the same bank location and cashed a bank counter check on the account
for $35. On March 5, 1999, Appellant deposited a check for $3740 made payable to
William C. Vance from Rooftek drawn on Fifth Third Bank. Whitaker Bank failed to
place any hold on funds availability . It was later determined that the Rooftek account
with Fifth Third Bank had been closed and the check was dishonored .
Meanwhile, on March 6, 1999, at a different Whitaker Bank location, Appellant
cashed another counter check for $3540 on the William C . Vance account. At that
time, Appellant presented identification verifying that his name matched the name on
the account. On March 7, 1999, Appellant issued a "starter" check for $903 to Trans
World Express (TWE) to purchase an airline ticket . A TWE manager determined that
this check was illegible, so Whitaker accommodatingly replaced it with a cashier's
check.
On March 11, 1999, the Lexington Police Department took a report regarding
William C . Vance from Whitaker Bank . It was determined by the police detective that
William C . Vance was not the wrongdoer's correct name . Appellant's identity was
learned by means of a Teletype from the police department in Hamilton County, Ohio .
The Hamilton County police found a Kentucky identification card for a William C. Vance
during an investigation of Appellant's half-brother . From this information, the Lexington
detective obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant and the arrest was made .
Prior to trial, Appellant objected to any testimony from Detective Chris White, the
Commonwealth's proposed handwriting analysis expert witness, regarding the "science"
of handwriting analysis without a prior Daubert hearing . The trial court overruled the
motion. It determined that handwriting evidence had been admissible for a long period
of time and therefore a Daubert hearing was not necessary. At trial, before the
Commonwealth put Detective White on the stand, it suggested that the trial court revisit
the Daubert hearing issue . The Commonwealth stated that it could not in good faith
argue that the scientific handwriting analysis testimony was admissible without a
Daubert hearing . The trial court disagreed stating that handwriting evidence has been
"admissible for eons."
At trial, Detective White testified as to his training as a handwriting analysis
expert, and he testified that his opinion in the case was based on the handwriting
samples provided . Specifically, White testified that he completed a questioned
document course offered by the United States Secret Service and he also participated
in a two-year internship in the field . As a questioned document examiner, he is a
member of the association of questioned document examiners and members of this
organization exchange notes and compare experiences . White also testified that he
. has trained other questioned document examiners who have completed the course.
White stated that he performs examinations for the police and privately. He testified
that he has performed about 120 examinations .
White also testified about the science of handwriting analysis . He stated that
handwriting is even more precise than DNA for identification purposes . To perform an
examination, White testified that an examiner must have known samples and compare
them with the questioned documents . In this case, the known samples were the
William C. Vance identification card, and the Whitaker Bank account application. The
questioned documents were the $35 cashed check, the deposited Rooftek check, the
$3540 cashed check, and the $903 check payable to TWE . White opined that the
questioned documents were consistent with the known documents and that all
documents were written by the same person.
Appellant's first claim of error is that failure of the trial court to hold a Daubert
hearing to determine the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony regarding
handwriting analysis was an abuse of discretion. He claims that the error was
compounded when the trial court allowed the expert witness to testify about the science
of handwriting analysis and express an expert opinion regarding the evidence
presented at trial.
In Mitchell v. Commonwealth ,2 this Court adopted the analysis of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals . Inc .3 wherein the United State Supreme Court set out
key considerations for admitting expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Thompson , 4 this Court adopted the
reasoning of Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael 5 in that the Daubert analysis "applies
not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on
`technical' and `other specialized' knowledge ."6
When a party proffers expert testimony, the trial court must determine in a
preliminary hearing pursuant to KRE 104, "whether the expert is proposing to testify to
(1) scientific [, technical, or other specialized] knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue ."' The nonexclusive, flexible factors to
2 Ky., 908 S .W.2d 100 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 993 S .W .2d 931 (1999).
3 509 U.S . 579, 113 S . Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed . 2d 469 (1993).
4 Ky., 11 S .W.3d 575 (2000).
5 526 U .S . 137, 119 S . Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed . 2d 238 (1999) .
6 _Id .at141 .
Goodyear Tire , 11 S .W.3d at 578, quoting Daubert , 509 U.S . at 592, 113 S . Ct. at
2796.
be considered in determining the admissibility of the proffered expert testimony as set
forth in Daubert and adopted in Mitchell are : (1) whether the theory or technique can be
or has been tested ; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review or publication ; (3)
whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or
technique has general acceptance within its particular scientific, technical, or other
specialized community .$
The foregoing factors represent the prevailing standard for the determination of
whether to admit expert testimony . In Johnson v. Commonwealth ,9 we clarified when a
Daubert hearing is required . This Court followed the Third Circuit decision in United
States v. Martinez ' ° where "it was held that once an appropriate appellate court holds
that the Daubert test of reliability is satisfied, lower courts can take judicial notice of
reliability and validity of the scientific method, technique or theory at issue ."" In
Johnson, we held that microscopic examination of hair has sufficiently met the scientific
reliability standard and that a Daubert hearing was no longer required . This Court
identified other types of scientific evidence that had been recognized as reliable (breath
testing for determination of blood alcohol content, HLA blood typing for paternity
determination, fiber analysis, ballistics analysis, and fingerprint analysis), and "[o]n the
basis of those decisions, trial judges in Kentucky can take judicial notice that those
methods or techniques have achieved the status of scientific reliability."
Daubert, 509 U .S. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. 2796-97.
.,
'Ky 12 S.W.3d 258 (1999) .
10
3 F.3d 1191 (3rd Cir. 1993).
11 Johnson , 12 S .W.3d at 261 .
12
Id . at 262.
13 Id
. (citations omitted) .
8
13
In the present case, the Commonwealth admits that there are no Kentucky cases
holding that handwriting analysis evidence is scientifically reliable . However in Marcum
v . Gallup' 4 and Jones v. Sutton 15 the lower courts allowed such expert testimony and
were affirmed on appeal . In those cases, it seems to have been assumed that the
testimony was admissible. As such, the state of the law with respect to handwriting
analysis is similar to Johnson v. Commonwealth , supra , wherein various fields of
scientific inquiry were recognized to have achieved acceptance in Kentucky law, and
are thus acceptable for judicial notice . In such circumstances we held that the expert
opinion would be admissible without a Daubert hearing but that an opposing party
would be entitled to be heard with evidence to the contrary . "In this respect, however,
judicial notice relieves the proponent of the evidence from the obligation to prove in
court that which has been previously accepted as fact by the appropriate appellate
court . 06 However, the foregoing should not be understood as depriving a trial court of
discretion to conduct a Daubert hearing if the court believes a Daubert hearing would
be helpful or doubts the reliability of the expert testimony .
Applying Johnson , there is a burden shift from the party offering expert testimony
to the party opposing the testimony . The opposing party, when it so requests, has a
right to present evidence that the scientific evidence at issue is not or is no longer
scientifically reliable. In the present case, Appellant did not challenge the reliability of
the expert handwriting analysis with evidence to the contrary . Rather he sought only a
Daubert hearing, and under Johnson v. Commonwealth and relying on the general
acceptance of handwriting analysis as demonstrated by Marcum v. Gallup and Jones v.
Ky., 237 S .W .2d 862 (1951) .
Ky., 255 S.W .2d 658 (1953) .
16
Johnson, 12 S .W.3d at 262.
'4
15
Sutton , a preliminary hearing was not required without a proffer of evidence challenging
the reliability of the discipline at issue.
There is another issue, however, that causes concern . In addition to testifying
generally about handwriting analysis and expressing the opinion that Appellant had
created the fraudulent documents at issue, Detective White was also permitted to
extravagantly opine that handwriting analysis is more precise than DNA evidence, thus,
in effect, testifying in favor of his own testimony . However, there appears to be no
objection to this facet of Detective White's testimony and Appellant's request for a
Daubert hearing is not sufficient to preserve the issue. If Appellant objected to this
element of Detective White's testimony, it was his duty to object contemporaneously
and seek appropriate relief from the trial court." His failure in this regard is fatal to any
relief in this Court.
Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court for failure to allow
a Daubert hearing .
Appellant's second claim of error is based on a statement made by his trial
counsel during closing argument. He contends that upon hearing the statement the trial
court should have inquired to determine if Appellant was waiving his right to testify or
whether Appellant desired to testify.
18
Appellant acknowledges that this claim is unpreserved, and as such we will
consider this claim only under RCr 10 .26. This Court recently decided Crawley v.
" Bowers v. Commonwealth , Ky., 555 S .W .2d 241, 243 (1977) .
'8 Counsel stated to the jury that:
So if you are upset that Mr. Florence did not take the stand today . Don't
be upset with him ; be upset with me cause [sic] I am the one who told him
not to testify . He doesn't need to testify . He's presumed innocent . The
burden is on the Commonwealth, and they have not met their burden .
Commonwealth , 1 9 wherein we held that "a trial court has a duty to conduct further
inquiry when it has reason to believe that a defendant's waiver of his right to testify was
not knowingly or intelligently made or was somehow wrongly suppressed ."2° In
Crawler, the trial court questioned defense counsel to determine if counsel wanted to
put on record that the defendant was aware of his right to testify but was waiving this
right. Counsel responded in the negative because the appellant wanted to testify but
she would not allow it. Counsel in Crawler then told the jury that appellant wanted to
testify but that she would not allow him to testify so they should not hold it against the
appellant that he did not testify.
The right to testify and present a defense is specifically a personal right of the
accused .21 Yet, Crawler makes it clear that circumstances can arise requiring the trial
court to directly inquire of the accused for the protection of his or her constitutional
rights . Refusal of counsel to allow a defendant to testify is such a circumstance . In this
case, there is no statement by trial counsel that he refused to allow Appellant to testify .
Likewise, there are no other arguments that manifested a need for a direct colloquy
between the trial court and Appellant .
Appellant's final claim of error is that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of two counts of theft by deception . Appellant
claims that the Commonwealth failed to show that he knew that the check from Rooftek
made payable to William C. Vance would not be honored . At trial, Appellant moved for
Ky., 107 S .W.3d 197 (2003).
_Id . at 199 .
21
See U .S. Const. Amend . V and VI ; Ky. Const . § 11 ; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U .S. 44,
107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed . 2d 37 (1987); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F .3d 9 (3
Cir. 1995); Crawler, supra .
's
2°
a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case but failed to renew the
motion at the close of all evidence .
Despite lack of preservation, a review of the evidence shows that Appellant was
identified as the person cashing the checks and the person pictured on the Kentucky
identification card for a William C. Vance . There was also evidence presented through
testimony of a bank employee that Appellant had not made any further deposits or
withdrawals since the last transaction . Based upon this review of the evidence, it was
not unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant guilty.
22
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed .
All .concur.
22
Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S.W .2d 186,187 (1991).
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B . Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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