COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. JONATHON SHANE MCMANUS AND ADAM LEVI KEISTER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
"Suyrrm'r (.T Vurf of Rruf
Qi
2001-SC-0312-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
NOS . 98-CR-00185-001 & 98-CR-00185-002
COURT OF APPEALS NOS. 99-CA-3071 & 99-CA-2867
JONATHON SHANE MCMANUS
AND ADAM LEVI KEISTER
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE STUMBO
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART. AND REMANDING
On July 30, 1998, Jon Hayden, a McCracken County Deputy Sheriff, received
information that McManus and Keister, the appellees herein, were cultivating marijuana
at the residence they shared in Paducah, Kentucky. This information was relayed to
Hayden by an officer of the Murray Police Department, who had received said
information from Keister's estranged wife . The address of the residence, 938 Lorine
Lane, was located via a civil summons previously served on Keister .
During the evening hours of August 6, 1998, Hayden, along with two other
deputies, traveled to the McManus and Keister residence in order to investigate the
information previously received . The law enforcement officers did not secure a search
warrant before they went to the residence because they did not believe they had
sufficient reliable information to obtain one . They knocked on the door of the residence;
McManus answered and then stepped out onto the porch in order to speak with the
officers. The officers informed McManus that they had received information that
marijuana was being cultivated inside the home, and asked for McManus' consent to
search the premises . After McManus declined the request, the officers cautioned
McManus that if there was marijuana being grown inside the residence, he should
dispose of it, as the officers would likely return .
The officers left the residence . As they reached the public sidewalk, one of the
officers noticed that the blinds were open on the picture window, which was located to
the right of the front door . For the next several minutes, the officers observed McManus
and another man running in a frenzied manner throughout the residence carrying items
the officers deemed to be related to the indoor cultivation of marijuana, including pots
and grow lights. Hayden contacted Chief Deputy Terry Long, who instructed Hayden to
secure the residence by a warrantless entry, if Hayden believed that evidence was
being destroyed. Long sought and received the same advice from the McCracken
County Attorney . Hayden and the other officers then forced their way into the
residence. Marijuana plants, and other incriminating evidence, were recovered as a
result . McManus and the other man were taken into custody . Keister was not inside
the residence at the time, but was apprehended soon thereafter.
In the McCracken Circuit Court, both McManus and Keister moved to suppress
the evidence recovered at their residence . The appellees contended that the
warrantless entry conducted by the McCracken County Sheriff's Department was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of
the Kentucky Constitution . The trial court did not agree and denied the motions .
McManus then entered a conditional guilty plea under RCr 8.09 to one count
each of trafficking in marijuana (KRS 218A.1421), tampering with physical evidence
(KRS, 524 .100), and possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (KRS
218A.1415) . Keister entered a conditional guilty plea under RCr 8 .09 on one count of
cultivation of marijuana (KRS 218A.1423) and for being a persistent felony offender
(PFO) in the second degree (KRS 532.080(2)) . Both received a sentence of ten years
in prison .
McManus and Keister appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking review of the
trial court's denial of their respective motions to suppress . A unanimous panel of the
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court committed error by not granting the
suppression motions . The panel also held that there were no exigent circumstances
sufficient to justify the warrantless entry of the appellees' residence . It was further held
that the circumstances relied upon by the police were created by the officers' visit to the
McManus home . The Commonwealth petitioned the Court of Appeals for a rehearing,
which was denied . The Commonwealth then sought discretionary review of the instant
matter in this Court, which was granted .
We now consider the points of error asserted by the Commonwealth .
I.
The Commonwealth first argues that it was error for the Court of Appeals to
determine that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry into the
McManus and Keister residence .
Absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers may not enter an
individual's private residence in order to conduct a warrantless search. Pavton v. New
York, 445 U.S . 573, 590, 100 S . Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653 (1980) . The
Commonwealth bears the burden to demonstrate that exigent circumstances were
present justifying the warrantless entry. Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U .S . 30, 34, 90 S. Ct.
1969, 1972, 26 L . Ed . 2d 409, 413 (1970) . "It is fundamental that all searches without a
warrant are unreasonable unless it can be shown that they come within one of the
exceptions to the rule that a search must be made pursuant to a valid warrant." Cook v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 826 S.W .2d 329, 331 (1992) . The Commonwealth also carries the
burden to demonstrate that the warrantless entry into the McManus and Keister
residence falls within a recognized exception . Gallman v. Commonwealth , Ky., 578
S .W.2d 47,48 (1979) .
The Commonwealth contends that the officers believed that McManus and
another man were destroying evidence related to the offense of marijuana cultivation .
Destruction of evidence is a recognized exigent circumstance creating an exception to
the warrant requirement . Cormney v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 943 S .W.2d 629, 633
(1996) (citing Taylor v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 577 S.W.2d 46 (1979)) . The
Commonwealth relies on Segura v. United States , 468 U .S. 796, 104 S . Ct. 3380, 82 L .
Ed. 2d 599 (1984), where the United States Supreme Court held "that securing a
dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of
evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of
either the dwelling or its contents ." Id . at 810 .
The Commonwealth's reliance on Segura is misplaced . Unlike the law
enforcement officers in Segura, the officers here did not have probable cause to enter
the appellees' residence . In Seguura , the officers "had abundant probable cause in
advance of their entry to believe that there was a criminal drug operation being carried
on in petitioners' apartment." Id . Specifically, the officers "had maintained surveillance
over petitioners for weeks, and had observed petitioners leave the apartment to make
sales of cocaine ." Id . a t 810-811, 104 S . Ct. at 3388. Here the officers had not
conducted a surveillance operation of the appellees' residence . Furthermore, Deputy
Hayden admitted that he and the other officers did not have probable cause to obtain a
search warrant based solely on information originating from Keister's estranged wife.
However, the Commonwealth asserts that the information from Keister's
estranged wife, coupled with the officers' own observations at the residence, reasonably
gave the officers probable cause to believe that marijuana was being cultivated in the
residence. Since the officers were concerned that evidence was being destroyed,
exigent circumstances were present authorizing the warrantless entry of the appellees'
residence. We are not persuaded by this contention .
The Se ura Court reaffirmed the rule that a warrantless search, absent exigent
circumstances, is not legal . Id . at 810, 104 S. Ct. at 3388. "Where there are exigent
circumstances in which police action literally must be `now or never' to preserve the
evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation ."
Roaden v. Kentucky , 413 U .S . 496, 505, 93 S . Ct. 2796, 2802, 37 L . Ed . 2d 757, 765
(1973). While the officers observed items that could be related to marijuana cultivation,
they did not observe marijuana or any other illegal substance, only flower pots and grow
lights . As stated above, the officers were aware they did not have probable cause to
receive a search warrant before they went to the appellees' residence . Further, the
Commonwealth failed to establish that the observed grow lights, pots and planting trays
could be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained .
Under the circumstances, we do not think it was reasonable for the officers to
enter the appellees' residence without prior judicial evaluation . "Before agents of the
government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to
demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries ." Welsh v . Wisconsin ,
466 U .S. 740, 750, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098, 80 L. Ed . 2d 732, 743 (1984) . The
Commonwealth has not adequately demonstrated that exigent circumstances existed to
overcome this presumption . Therefore, we find no error in the Court of Appeals'
decision . The trial court should have granted both motions to suppress. Because we
have held that there were no exigent circumstances, we need not address the
Commonwealth's second issue.
The Court of Appeals, applying Johantgen v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 571
S.W.2d 110 (1978), reversed the trial court outright because "a conviction [was]
impossible absent the evidence obtained by the unconstitutional entry and seizure ."
The Commonwealth asserts the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of its authority
when it essentially directed an acquittal in favor of McManus and Keister by "ruling on
evidence admissibility as opposed to evidence sufficiency ." We agree .
We have held that it is not the province of this Court to determine if "the
Commonwealth can produce sufficient competent evidence to avoid a directed verdict of
acquittal upon retrial ." Osborne v . Commonwealth , Ky., 43 S .W.3d 234, 245 (2001) .
Likewise, it was not within the Court of Appeals' authority to essentially direct a verdict
in favor of the appellees . The Commonwealth is free to continue its prosecution of the
appellees. However, any such prosecution will be without the benefit of evidence
gathered as a result of the unlawful warrantless entry.
For the reasons aforesaid, we affirm the Court of Appeals on Point I, reverse on
Point II, and hereby remand this matter to the McCracken Circuit Court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion .
Cooper, Johnstone and Keller, JJ., concur. Graves, J ., dissents by separate
opinion, with Lambert, C.J ., and Wintersheimer, J ., joining that dissent .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
William F. McGee
P.O. Box 39
Smithland, KY 42081
Andrew T. Coiner
P.O . Box 2441
Paducah, KY 42002
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sup:raatt (gourf of 'mfurkv
2001-SC-0312-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
NOS . 98-CR-00185-001 & 98-CR-00185-002
COURT OF APPEALS NOS . 99-CA-3071 & 99-CA-2867
JONATHON SHANE MCMANUS
AND ADAM LEVI KEISTER
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Respectfully, I dissent. I believe the proper disposition of this matter is an order
of remand to the circuit court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law as
previously requested by the Commonwealth Attorney . On May 19, 1999, the trial court
entered a one-line order denying Appellees' motion to suppress, namely, "IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants' motion to suppress is DENIED ." The trial
court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
On September 8, 1999, after entry of Appellees' conditional guilty pleas, the
Commonwealth filed the following motion:
Pursuant to RCr 9.78, the Commonwealth moves that the Court
enter the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion
to Suppress, filed with this motion.
In support of this motion, the Commonwealth states that the Court
has denied the defendants' motion to suppress . The defendants have
now pled guilty, under the condition that they be permitted to appeal the
Court's denial of their motion to suppress . Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law have not been entered setting forth the Court's
reasons for its decision .
So moved this 8th day of September, 1999 .
Criminal Rule 9 .78 provides, in pertinent part, as follows :
If . . . a defendant moves to suppress . . . . the fruits of a search, the trial
court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . and at the conclusion
thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of
fact raised by the motion . . . and necessary to support the ruling . If
supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court
shall be conclusive .
Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1978), holds that RCr 9 .78
requires the trial court to make findings of fact supporting its decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress evidence of a confession or other incriminating statements or
evidence of fruits of a search . The trial judge is in the best position to determine the
credibility and sufficiency of the evidence and an appellate court is bound by the
findings of fact of the trial judge unless there is a clear error or abuse of discretion .
Meaningful appellate review is impeded in this case because the trial court did
not enter findings of fact. Without a reasoned explanation, neither the parties nor this
Court knows the rationale for the court's ruling . Consequently, should the trial court find
and conclude that exigent circumstances existed, this matter should be affirmed as a
matter of law.
I am of the opinion that the frenzied destruction of marijuana cultivation
paraphernalia, plainly observed by sheriff's deputies from a public sidewalk, created a
exigency of sufficient magnitude to justify the warrantless entry into Appellees' home .
Warrantless entry is justified when police must act "now or never" to preserve evidence
of criminal activity. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U .S. 496, 93 S .Ct. 2796, 37 L .Ed .2d 757
(1973) . Exigent circumstances may occur which excuse the warrant requirement when
the physical destruction of incriminating evidence is imminent. Cormney v.
Commonwealth , Ky . App., 943 S .W.2d 629 (1996) .
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that in order to
temporarily dispense with the warrant requirement police officers must show "a
reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling" as well as an "objectively
reasonable basis for concluding that the loss or destruction of evidence is imminent ."
United States v. Sangineto-Miranda , 859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6t" Cir. 1988) . Furthermore,
in evaluating police claims of exigent circumstances, courts must "consider the totality of
the circumstances, as well as the `inherent necessities of the situation at the time ."' Id .
at 1512, quoting United States v. Rubin , 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied ,
414 U.S . 833 (1973).
Police officers, due to their training and experience, may legitimately perceive
criminality in objects or conduct that would appear innocent in the perspective of an
untrained layman . Texas v . Brown , 460 U .S . 730, 103 S .Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed .2d 502
(1983) . See also Washington v . Chrisman , 455 U.S . 1, 102 S .Ct. 812, 70 L .Ed .2d 778
(1982) . Deputy Sheriff Hayden immediately recognized that the grow light, pots, and
trays inside Appellees' home were likely associated with the cultivation of marijuana.
That insight, augmented by the tip as well as by McManus' apparent destruction of
evidence following the "knock and talk," properly led Deputy Hayden to conclude that
exigent circumstances were present necessitating warrantless entry.
In section IV of Sequra v. United States , 468 U .S . 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82
L.Ed .2d 599 (1984), Chief Justice Burger pointed out that seizures of premises are less
likely to violate the Constitution than are searches, because seizures affect only
possessory interests rather than the more highly protected privacy interests . In Section
IV of Sequra , however, the Chief Justice was joined only by Justice O'Connor . In
differentiating between searches and seizures, the Chief Justice opined:
3
[T]he heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not
implicated where a seizure of the premises, not a search, is at issue . We
hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause,
to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is
being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or
its contents .
Id . at 810 (emphasis in original) .
The absence of a true exigency necessitating warrantless entry does not
inexorably lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained in a subsequent search . If
information sufficient to support a probable cause determination existed independent of
any evidence discovered during an illegal entry, evidence discovered later pursuant to a
judicially sanctioned search warrant is not tainted . Segura , supra , (majority opinion, ยงยง IIII, V & VI) . The tip received by the McCracken County Sheriff's Department, along with
the observation of marijuana cultivation paraphernalia inside the McManus home,
provided independent grounds upon which to base a search warrant. No evidence
discovered in the warrantless entry was required in the probable cause determination,
despite the fact that such evidence was included by Deputy Hayden in the warrant
application .
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable . Here,
the police officers had reasonable belief of a crime being committed based not only on
reliable information, but also on personal observation that there was indoor cultivation of
marijuana. Delaying entry would have created a substantial risk that evidence would
have been destroyed . These critical circumstances dictated that a seizure be executed
immediately to preserve the status quo without the delay attendant to obtaining a
warrant. This was an exigent circumstance because there was an immediate
compelling need for official action and insufficient time to secure a warrant .
In United States v . Korman, 614 F .2d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1980) cert . denied , 446
U .S. 952 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approved of the
lower court's deferential attitude toward law enforcement officers :
It is also to be noted in this regard that the case law is
clear that the agents, in reaching a decision of the nature
that they did here, need only have sufficient information to
justify the warrantless entry to reasonably conclude that
evidence would be destroyed or removed . A hindsight,
Monday-morning quarterback position, which might show
that in fact that was not about to happen, is not the standard
by which their conduct is to be judged, but rather the
situation as it appeared to them at the time.
The presence or absence of exigent circumstances involves a finding of fact
which is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Richard , 994 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir.
1993) . In the absence of a full evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court,
it is impossible for any reviewing court to determine the legality of the seizure. The trial
court should make the requested findings of fact concerning exigent circumstances.
Lambert, C.J ., and Wintersheimer, J ., join this dissenting opinion .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.