JOE MORRIS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
JOE MORRIS
V.
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
2000-CR-0048
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Joe Morris, was convicted of one count of First-Degree Rape and two
counts of First-Degree Sexual Abuse. He was sentenced to thirty-five years'
imprisonment on the rape charge and five years' imprisonment on each sexual abuse
charge, with the sentences to be served consecutively for a total of 45 years . He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right . We reverse and remand .
Morris was convicted of sexually abusing his biological daughter, C .M., and
C .M .'s friend, S .M . Morris's conviction for rape was in connection with an incident that
occurred about 16 years earlier. This incident involved D .F., the daughter of a woman
with whom Morris was living . C .M . and S.M . made statements to the police alleging that
Morris had touched them inappropriately . D .F. found out about these allegations and
went to the Commonwealth's Attorney and alleged that Morris had raped her on at least
eight occasions.
At trial, C .M . testified that, when she was nine years old, Morris touched her
vagina and breast one night in Morris's room when only Morris and C.M . were present.
C.M . testified that Morris called her to his room and told her to shut the door behind her
and take off her pants. Morris then touched her private areas and forced her to touch
his private areas. This molestation continued until C .M.'s mother returned home, at
which time C .M . put back on her pants and went to bed . C .M . stated she told her
mother about this event and her mother, Diana Morris, confronted Appellant about it.
S .M ., a friend of C .M ., testified that sometime prior to Christmas, during the
month of December 1999, Morris touched her inappropriately. S .M . was also nine
years old at the time. On this particular occasion, S.M . came to spend the night at
C.M .'s house. S.M . and C .M . originally fell asleep in C.M .'s room . Sometime during the
night both children moved to Morris's room to sleep on the floor. S.M . testified that
while she was sleeping on the floor, Morris touched her buttocks and also her chest
area . S . M. testified that she awoke to find Morris touching her inappropriately. She told
Morris that she was sick and wanted to go home, but Morris would not let her call her
mother to come pick her up. S .M. testified that she told C.M. about the incident the
next day.
C.M.'s mother, Diana Morris, testified that sometime in April of 2000, C.M. told
her what Morris had done to her and S .M . Mrs. Morris testified that she confronted
Appellant about his sexual contact with C .M. and S .M. Soon after, she contacted the
police, who arrested Morris on April 6, 2000.
Prior to review of the case by the Breckinridge County grand jury, Mrs. Morris
testified that she called D .F. and advised her of the charges against Appellant . D.F .
then notified police that she had known Morris as a child ; D .F.'s mother was Morris's
aunt.
At trial, D .F. testified that, after her parents separated, Morris moved in with her
mother . Soon afterwards, Morris began to fondle D.F., who was nine years old at the
time . This fondling took place whenever D .F.'s mother was not home . D .F . testified
that this occurred while the family lived in Breckinridge County, Kentucky. Upon moving
to another city in Breckinridge County, D .F. testified that Morris forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him once a week until she left her mother's home and went to
live with her father. D .F . testified that the sexual intercourse occurred over a four-year
period until she turned 13 .
I.
Introduction of Witness Statements
Morris argues that he was denied due process of law and his constitutional rights
to be heard and represented by counsel when the trial court allowed the
Commonwealth to enter two transcribed witness statements into evidence for the
purpose of allowing the jury to consider the statements during deliberations . We agree
and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial .
At trial, defense counsel recalled C .M . and S .M . in an attempt to impeach their
testimony with what were alleged to be prior inconsistent statements made during
police interviews . A small portion of C.M.'s taped statement to the police was played to
the jury to point out an inconsistency in the victim's live trial testimony . S.M .'s taped
statement was not played.
After laying a foundation for their introduction, the Commonwealth moved in
rebuttal to introduce transcribed versions of the taped statements that C .M. and S .M.
gave to the police. In response, defense counsel apparently agreed that the
statements could be read to the jury in open court, but objected to allowing the
statements to be sent with the jury to consider during its deliberations . The trial court
granted the Commonwealth's motion and admitted the statements into evidence as
substantive exhibits. During its deliberations, the jury had access to the statements,
which were never read in open court, and thus, never subjected to adversarial testing.
Pursuant to RCr 9 .74, no information may be given to the jury after the jury has
retired for deliberation except in open court in the presence of the defendant and the
entire jury. In Mills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 44 S .W .3d 366, 371 (2001), this Court held
that this rule was clearly violated when the jury was allowed to play witness interview
tapes in the privacy of the jury room, where those tapes were not played for the jury in
open court . In the case at bar, although it is not ascertainable whether the jury actually
reviewed the statements, the introduction of the transcribed statements as substantive
exhibits making them available to the jury for review, outside of open court, was
reversible error regardless of whether Morris can show prejudice . Id . at 372, citing Lett
v. Commonwealth , 284 Ky. 267,144 S .W .2d 505, 509 (1940).
II .
Severance of Charges
Morris argues the trial court denied him his right to a fundamentally fair trial when
it refused to sever the rape counts of the indictment from the sexual abuse counts of
the indictment . Morris argues that because the alleged rape occurred 16 years before
the alleged sexual abuse, the remoteness of the two crimes indicates that they are not
so similar to constitute a common scheme or plan or modus operandi ; thus, the joinder
of the two crimes prejudiced Morris . We disagree . We address this issue because it is
likely to recur at retrial .
"The trial court has broad discretion with respect to joinder of charges and will
not be overturned absent a showing of prejudice and clear abuse of discretion ."
Rearick v. Commonwealth , Ky., 858 S .W .2d 185, 187 (1993). A significant factor in
determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced is the extent to which the
evidence of one offense would be admissible in the trial of the offense charged .
Spencer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 554 S.W.2d 355 (1977). Therefore, if the evidence of
prior sexual misconduct is inadmissible, joinder is not appropriate . See RCr 9 .16.
In Pendleton v. Commonwealth , Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985), we held that
"evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts [is] admissible if it tend[s] to show motive,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, intent, or knowledge, or common scheme or
plan." Id . at 552 .
In the case at bar, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993
S.W .2d 941 (1999), in ruling that the evidence of Morris's prior acts of sexual
misconduct was admissible as modus operandi . In English, the defendant was
convicted of sexually abusing his wife's two grandnieces . Id . at 942 . At trial, two adult
nieces of defendant's wife testified that the defendant similarly abused them when they
were children . Id . In holding that this evidence was properly admitted, we determined
that because it was offered to show a modus operandi for the purpose of proving
motive, intent, knowledge, and the absence of mistake or accident, it was not prejudicial
to the defendant and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge . Id . at 945 .
"In order to prove the elements of a subsequent offense by evidence of modus
operandi, the facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the
charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were committed
by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea . If
not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition and is
inadmissible ." Id ., quoting Billings v. Commonwealth . Ky., 843 S .W .2d 890, 891 (1992) .
In English, we found that the testimony of the two adult nieces proved the
defendant "knew what he was doing (knowledge), he did it on purpose (intent, absence
of mistake or accident), and he did it for his own sexual gratification (motive) ." Id .
Similarly, in the case at bar, we find that the evidence of Morris's prior sexual
misconduct is similar enough to prove modus operandi . A jury could find with
"reasonable probability" that Morris committed both the rape and sexual abuse crimes
alleged and that these acts were accompanied by the same mens rea . In all of the
incidents, Morris was in a position of authority, they all involved young girls around the
age of nine, whom he knew, and although the allegation made by D .F. involved sexual
intercourse, D .F . testified that the events in question began, like the others, with
inappropriate touching . The similarities between the alleged rape and the alleged
sexual abuse tended to prove that Morris committed both acts (identity), knew what he
was doing (knowledge), did it on purpose (intent), and did so for his own sexual
gratification (motive) .
"The test of relevancy having been satisfied by proof of a modus operandi, the
evidence of Appellant's prior sexual misconduct was properly admitted unless its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice." Id . It
is at this point that the issue of remoteness becomes a factor . "However, [remoteness]
is not the sole determining factor." Id. "[It] is less significant when the issue is modus
operandi than when the issue is whether both crimes arose out of a common scheme or
plan." Id . at 944. Likewise, in English we held that remoteness is not a bar to the
introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct, particularly where the
evidence is offered to prove modus operandi .
Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion . Therefore,
because the evidence of the alleged rape was admissible to prove a modus operandi,
the trial court did not err in denying Morris's motion to sever.
III.
Directed Verdict
Morris was indicted on eight counts of first-degree rape, one count for each
season during 1978 and 1979 . After both sides rested their respective cases, the trial
judge granted Morris's motion for directed verdict on seven of the eight first-degree rape
counts, but left intact the count of first-degree rape occurring in or about the winter of
1979 . On appeal, Morris argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the remaining count that went to the jury. We address this issue,
which concerns the sufficiency of the evidence against Morris, because, if correct,
double jeopardy principles would bar retrial of the first-degree rape charge . See
Crawley v. Kunzman , Ky., 585 S.W .2d 387, 388 (1979) .
Morris argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
first-degree rape . Specifically, he argues that there was no evidence that he had
intercourse with D.F . before her twelfth birthday. This same argument was made to the
trial court, which disagreed . The trial court found that there was a four-month period in
which Morris lived in the same household as D .F. while she was still under the age of
twelve and that the alleged intercourse could have occurred during this time . As these
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, they are conclusive on the
issue. See , etc . , Diehl v. Commonwealth , Ky., 673 S.W .2d 711, 712 (1984). Thus,
there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and there is no double jeopardy
bar to retry Morris on the first-degree rape count .
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Breckinridge Circuit Court is
hereby reversed and this case is remanded for a new trial consistent with this Opinion .
Lambert, C.J. ; Graves and Johnstone, JJ ., concur. Cooper, J ., concurs in part
and dissents in part by separate opinion, with Keller and Stumbo, JJ ., joining .
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents without opinion, and would affirm the conviction in all
respects .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
#npraut Tourt of Xenturkg
2001-SC-0282-MR
JOE MORRIS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
2000-CR-0048
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
CONCURRIN G IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that it was reversible error to permit
the jury to take the transcripts of Officer Pace's audiotaped interviews of C .M . and S .M
to the jury room for consideration during deliberations . However, I would go further and
hold that it was error even to admit those transcripts into evidence . I dissent from the
majority opinion's failure to require a severance of the trial of D.F .'s allegations of firstdegree rape from the trial of C.M.'s and S .M .'s allegations of first-degree sexual abuse.
I also dissent from the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support
Appellant's conviction of first-degree rape under Count 10 of the indictment, i .e . , sexual
intercourse with a child under twelve "in or about the winter of 1979 ." (The trial judge
correctly dismissed the other seven counts of first-degree rape .)
I. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS .
C .M . and S .M . testified that Appellant sexually abused them on separate
occasions when each was under twelve years of age. Officer Pace interviewed C.M .
and S .M. separately about their respective allegations and an audiotape was made of
each interview. The audiotapes were subsequently reduced to written transcripts by the
Commonwealth's Attorney's office . (Appellant does not contest the accuracy of the
transcripts .) During the course of her interview, C.M . made the following statements
with respect to Appellant's sexual assault on S.M . :
Q.
How do you know he did that to her?
A.
Because he got on the floor with her and turned over her way and
he had his hands on her.
Q.
Okay, did you see that or is that just what she told you?
A.
I heard that, I saw it.
Q.
You saw it? Where did he have his hands on her?
A.
On her private part.
At trial, C .M. testified that she did not see Appellant abuse S.M . but only knew
what S.M . had told her. To impeach C.M .'s credibility as a witness, defense counsel
introduced and played for the jury that portion of the audiotape of C.M.'s interview
quoted above. He did not introduce any portion of S.M .'s audiotaped interview.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce and mark as exhibits the
typed transcripts of Pace's entire interviews of both C.M . and S .M ., and the jury was
permitted to take those transcripts to the jury room for consideration during their
deliberations .
KRE 106 provides :
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced
by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of
any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. [Emphasis added .]
That does not mean that if one party introduces an excerpt from a writing or
recorded statement that the adverse party is entitled to introduce the entire remaining
portion thereof.
[T]he rule does not require introduction of the entire writing or recorded
statement, but only so much thereof "which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it," i .e. , that portion which concerns
the specific matter introduced by the adverse party. White v.
Commonwealth , 292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d 873, 877 (1942). The issue is
whether "the meaning of the included portion is altered by the excluded
portion ." Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933 S .W .2d 811, 814 (1996).
The objective of KRE 106 "is to prevent a misleading impression as a
result of an incomplete reproduction of a statement." Id. (quoting R.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook ยง 1 .20, at 48 (3d ed .
Michie 1993)). See Gabow v. Commonwealth , supra [Ky., 34 S .W .3d 63
(2000)], at 68 n.2. Thus, Young would not have been permitted to play
the audiotapes in their entirety even if he had so requested .
Young v. Commonwealth , Ky., 50 S .W .3d 148, 169 (2001).
A review of the entire transcript of C .M .'s interview discloses no other statements
with respect to whether C .M. did or did not actually see Appellant sexually abuse S .M.
Thus, "the meaning of the included portion" was not altered by anything in the
remainder of the interview. Id . In fact, other than the one prior inconsistent statement
of C .M ., KRE 801A(a)(1), the transcript consists of (1) C .M .'s description of what she
saw Appellant do to S .M. (which C.M. neither testified to nor denied under oath, KRE
801A(a), KRE 613); (2) C.M.'s repetition of S.M .'s prior consistent statements (which
were not offered for rebuttal purposes, KRE 801A(a)(2)); and C. M.'s own prior
consistent statements of what Appellant did to her (same). Id . Because none of this
evidence falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, KRE 106 was misused to
bootstrap inadmissible evidence into the trial of this case .
It goes without saying that since Appellant did not introduce any portion of S .M .'s
interview, KRE 106 provides no basis whatsoever for the admission of the transcript of
that interview.
As the majority correctly points out, the error was then compounded when the
jury was permitted to take the transcripts to the jury room for consideration during
deliberations.
Generally, a jury is not permitted to take even a witness's sworn
deposition to the jury room . The primary reason for the rule is that jurors
may give undue weight to testimony contained in such a deposition and
not accord adequate consideration to controverting testimony received
from live witnesses. . . . It is even worse to permit the jury to take with
them to the jury room an unsworn statement of a witness . . . . that not only
bolsters the witness's trial testimony but also contains facts and opinions
to which the witness did not testify .
Berrier v. Bizer, Ky., 57 S .W .3d 271, 277 (2001) (citations omitted) .
II. SEVERANCE .
The indictment charged Appellant with two counts of sexual abuse in the first
degree, i .e . , sexual contact with C.M. and S .M. in December 1999 (Counts 1 and 2),
and eight counts of rape in the first-degree, i.e. , sexual intercourse with D.F., then a
child under the age of twelve, in the spring, summer, fall, and winter of 1978, and in the
spring, summer, fall, and winter of 1979 (Counts 3 through 10) . The majority opinion
correctly observes that the primary test for improper joinder is whether evidence of one
offense would be admissible at the trial of the other. Price v. Commonwealth , Ky., 31
S .W .3d 885, 889 (2000). I agree that Commonwealth v. English , Ky., 993 S.W .2d 941
(1999), holds that mere temporal remoteness does not preclude introduction of
evidence of a prior offense to show modus operandi per KRE 404(b)(1) . Id . at 944-45.
However, regardless of temporal proximity, evidence of a prior offense is admissible to
prove modus operandi only if "the facts surrounding the prior misconduct [were] so
strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the
acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the
same mens rea . If not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal
disposition and is inadmissible ." Id . at 945 . In English, the defendant was charged with
touching the vaginal areas of two of his wife's grandnieces and the prior misconduct
consisted of touching the vaginal areas of two of his wife's nieces.
In each instance the victim was a prepubescent female relative of
Appellee's wife . In fact, the familial relationship with each victim was the
same, except for the generational gap . Each incident occurred while the
victim was a visitor in Appellee's home and either on a couch or in a chair,
presumably in a living room area as opposed to, etc .,, a bedroom. Each
incident occurred while Appellee's wife was also present in the home .
Finally, each incident consisted of Appellee touching the victim's vaginal
area .
Id . See also Violett v. Commonwealth , Ky., 907 S .W.2d 773, 775-76 (1995) (severance
not required where the defendant was charged with sexually abusing and raping both
his daughter and stepdaughter when the girls were eleven and twelve years of age,
including digital penetration and rape of both); Lear v. Commonwealth , Ky., 884 S .W .2d
657, 660 (1994) (evidence that the defendant had raped and sodomized other young
female step relatives over a period of years was properly admitted in the trial of an
indictment charging him with the rape and sodomy of his pre-teenage stepdaughter and
step niece) . Compare Rearick v. Commonwealth , Ky., 858 S.W.2d 185, 188 (1993)
(holding that it was error not to sever charges of sexual touching, indecent exposure to,
and removal of the clothing of a female friend's daughter from charges of multiple acts
of anal intercourse with a biological son and from charges of indecent exposure to and
sexual touching of a six-to-eight-year-old clothed female child) ; Billings v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 843 S.W.2d 890, 894 (1992) (holding that it was error to admit
evidence that the defendant sexually touched and indecently exposed himself to the
victim's younger sister and that he encouraged the younger sister to watch sexually
explicit movies, in the trial of an indictment charging him with oral sodomy of his
thirteen-year-old stepdaughter) .
Here, the acts committed against C.M . and S .M . were sufficiently similar in
nature and close in time to be probative of intent and modus operandi ; thus it was
proper to consolidate those charges for trial. Likewise, pursuant to English, supra ,
evidence that Appellant had engaged in sexual touching of D .F . several years earlier
when she was about the same age as C.M . and S.M . would have been admissible to
prove intent and modus operandi with respect to the charges pertaining to C.M . and
S .M . However, evidence of Appellant's multiple acts of sexual intercourse with D .F.
would not have been admissible at the trial of the sexual abuse charges involving C.M .
and S .M . ; and, since Appellant was not indicted for first-degree sexual abuse of D.F .,
evidence of his sexual abuse of C .M . and S .M . eight-to-ten years later, would not be
admissible at the trial of the indictment for first-degree rape of D. F. Thus, the eight
counts of the indictment charging Appellant with first-degree rape of D .F. should have
been severed from Counts 1 and 2 for purposes of trial .
III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF FIRST-DEGREE RAPE .
D.F .'s date of birth is December 15, 1968, and she was thirty-two years old when
she testified at the trial of this case. The indictment charged Appellant with eight counts
of rape in the first degree for having sexual intercourse with D.F. during the spring,
summer, fall and winter of 1978, and the spring, summer, fall, and winter, of 1979,
during which time D .F. was less than twelve years of age . KRS 510 .040(1)(b)2 . To
convict of first-degree rape in the absence of forcible compulsion, the sexual
intercourse with D.F . must have occurred prior to her twelfth birthday, December 15,
1980.
D.F . testified that she lived in Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, with her parents
and two younger brothers, Steven and Terry, until her parents separated . While they
were living in Decatur, D .F., her mother, and her brothers occasionally visited her
maternal grandmother in Hardinsburg, Breckinridge County, Kentucky. After the last
such visit, Appellant, who is D .F.'s first cousin and her mother's nephew, returned with
the family to Illinois . Shortly thereafter, D .F.'s mother and father separated . D.F., her
mother, her brothers, and Appellant then moved from Illinois to a small house in
Cloverport, Breckinridge County, Kentucky. D.F . testified that she moved to Cloverport
when she was "nine or ten years old ."
D .F. testified that she, her mother, her brothers, and Appellant continued to live
in Cloverport for two and one-half years . They then moved to Hardinsburg and lived
"for a while" with her (and Appellant's) grandmother before moving to a farm in the
small Breckinridge County community of Balltown . D.F . testified that, although
Appellant subjected her to sexual contact ("fondling" her vagina) while they lived in
Cloverport, he did not subject her to sexual intercourse until after they moved to
Balltown . She testified that Appellant continued to subject her to sexual intercourse
thereafter for "four or five years" until she was age thirteen at which time her father
came to Breckinridge County and took all three children with him to Illinois for a summer
visitation . During this visitation period, D .F . told her father that she was being sexually
abused by Appellant, whereupon her father filed a petition for and subsequently
obtained a change of custody of all three children.
D.F.'s brother, Steven, whose date of birth is April 26, 1970, testified that when
he was "seven or eight years old," he, his mother, his brother, D .F. and Appellant all
moved from Illinois to Cloverport where they lived for "one to two years" before moving
to Balltown . He testified that the three children returned to Illinois to spend summer
vacations with their father every year for "two or three years" and that the change of
custody was obtained after D .F. told her father during the last such visitation that she
was being sexually abused by Appellant .
To support his alibi defense, Appellant produced copies of his military records,
which reflect that Appellant was stationed at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San
Diego, California, from July 1977 to October 1977; at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
from October 1977 to February 1978 ; at El Toro Marine Base, California, from February
1978 to January 1979; at 1 st MAW, FPO San Francisco, California, i.e . , Japan, from
January 1979 until January 1980 ; and at Camp Pendleton, California, from January
1980 until he deserted on March 3, 1980 . Although the prosecutor suggested that
Appellant could have had sexual intercourse with D.F. in 1978 and 1979 while on
military leave, the records reflect that Appellant's only annual leave during that period
was from November 29 to December 28, 1978 . Appellant was stationed in California at
the time and claimed that he did not return to Breckinridge County, Kentucky, during
that leave period . Of course, as noted by the trial judge, D .F . did not testify that
Appellant had sexual intercourse with her during a brief period of military leave, but that
he did so only after they had lived together at three different locations over a period of
two and one-half years and that he continued to do so for four or five years .
Appellant further testified that after "going AWOL" in March 1980, he stayed in
hiding for three months in California and Mexico before returning to Breckinridge
County, where he lived with his parents until moving with his aunt (D .F.'s mother) to
Illinois in June 1980 . He then returned to Breckinridge County and lived with his
parents for a short while before taking up residence with D.F .'s family in Cloverport .
Appellant's trial testimony is consistent not only with his military records but also
with information contained in the official court records of the Sixth Circuit Court, Macon
County, Illinois, pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage of D.F.'s parents . Those
records, which were filed in this record by the Commonwealth pursuant to a discovery
order, reflect that D.F's father filed his petition for dissolution of marriage on June 10,
1980, and that the final judgment of divorce was entered on June 24, 1981 . A verified
petition for temporary relief, also filed on June 10, 1980, contains the sworn statement
of D.F.'s father that "the Respondent" (D .F.'s mother) had left Illinois and moved to
Kentucky with their children on June 7, 1980.
Thus, although D.F. believed that she was nine or ten years old when she moved
from Illinois to Cloverport, these contemporaneous official court records verify
Appellant's testimony that this move did not occur until June 1980, six months prior to
D.F.'s twelfth birthday . Further, Steven, who claimed to have been seven or eight years
old at the time, was actually ten years old . Thus, whether D.F. and Appellant lived in
Cloverport for one to two years (Steven's testimony) or two and one-half years (D .F.'s
testimony), D.F . must have been more than twelve years old when Appellant began
having sexual intercourse with her in Balltown .
The same Illinois court records reflect that D.F.'s father filed his petition for
modification of custody on June 28, 1983, when D.F . was fourteen years old, and that
the judgment of modification was entered on July 21, 1983 . These dates are consistent
with Steven's testimony that he, his brother, and D .F. visited their father during two
summers before D .F . reported the sexual abuse, which would correspond with the
family's residence for two years in Cloverport, i.e. , 1980 to 1982, during which no sexual
intercourse took place, and subsequent move to Balltown, where the sexual intercourse
occurred prior to their visitation with their father in the summer of 1983, during which the
petition for modification of custody was filed .
Thus, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth entitled Appellant to a
directed verdict of acquittal on the charges of first-degree rape, because the sexual
intercourse could not have occurred prior to D . F's twelfth birthday . However, after his
motion was overruled, Appellant, himself, testified that he and D.F .'s family lived in
Cloverport for "about four months" before moving to Balltown . That testimony placed
Appellant and D .F in Balltown as early as mid-October 1980, creating a two-month
window of opportunity for sexual intercourse to have occurred there prior to D .F.'s
twelfth birthday . A defendant who was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because
of the insufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence forfeits that entitlement by
presenting evidence in his own behalf that cures the defect in the Commonwealth's
case. Shepherd v . Commonwealth , 240 Ky. 261, 42 S .W .2d 311, 313 (1931) ; Cutrer v.
Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 697 S .W.2d 156,159 (1985).
The mere fact that D.F . was confused about how old she was when she lived in
Balltown would not have been fatal to the first-degree rape charges so long as D .F . and
Appellant lived in Balltown where the sexual intercourse occurred during any period of
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time when she was less than twelve years of age . Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 956
S.W.2d 883, 886 (1997) . As the majority opinion points out, Strin er also holds that the
date of the offense is not a material element unless time is a material ingredient of the
offense . Id . at 885-86 . However, in Strin er, the victim was only ten years old at the
time of her testimony, id . at 885, so she must have been under the age of twelve at the
time of the offense . Here, however, time is a material ingredient of the offense because
D . F. was not under the age of twelve when she testified and Appellant could not be
convicted of first-degree rape for having sexual intercourse with her unless that sexual
intercourse occurred prior to her twelfth birthday, December 15, 1980 .
The indictment could have been amended to conform the date of the offense to
the evidence, q.-g., "on or about October 1980 through December 15, 1980," because
that amendment would not have charged an additional or different offense . RCr 6 .16 ;
Gilbert v. Commonwealth , Ky., 838 S .W .2d 376, 377-78 (1991); Stephens v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 397 S .W .2d 157, 158 (1965) . However, a motion was not made
to amend the indictment and the indictment was, in fact, not amended .
Instead, the trial judge dismissed Counts 3 through 9 of the indictment as being
outside the time frame proven by the evidence, and instructed the jury under Count 10
that Appellant could be convicted of first-degree rape if the jury believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had sexual intercourse with D.F . "in or about the Winter,
1979," when D.F . "had not attained twelve (12) years of age, which she attained on
December 15, 1980." In my view, "in or about the Winter, 1979" was no more within the
time frame proven by the evidence than was, 9._q., "in or about the Fall, 1979" (count 9) .
In fact, Appellant was in Japan during the winter of 1979 (or in California if one believes
that the winter of 1979 extended to March 1980) . Under any set of facts supported by
the evidence, Appellant did not have sexual intercourse with D.F. prior to October 1980,
well after "the Winter, 1979 ." Thus, he was as equally entitled to a dismissal of Count
10 as he was to a dismissal of Counts 3 through 9. Although such would preclude his
retrial on any charge of first-degree rape, it would not preclude a new indictment for and
conviction of second-degree rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with D .F . between
December 15, 1980, and December 14, 1982, KRS 510.050(1)(a), or third-degree rape
for engaging in sexual intercourse with D .F. between December 15, 1982 and June
1983, KRS 510.060((1)(b) .
IV. COMMENT ON SILENCE.
During his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that, "[tooday will be
the first time Joe Morris has got his chance to tell his side of the story." To rebut this
remark, the Commonwealth, in its case in chief, called the investigating officer to the
witness stand for the sole purpose of testifying, over objection, that he had, in fact,
afforded Appellant an opportunity to speak with him, clearly implying that Appellant had,
instead, exercised his Constitutional right to remain silent . Later, during crossexamination of Appellant, the prosecutor elicited the fact that Appellant was in the
courthouse on the day the grand jury considered the evidence against him and that he
did not request the opportunity to testify before the grand jury. Finally, in closing
argument, the prosecutor stated : "He's had a chance to tell his story before today, but
he chose not to."
In view of the absence of any information in the record as to whether Appellant
had been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S . 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed .2d 694 (1966), I am unable to conclude that the evidence elicited by the
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prosecutor or the remarks made during closing argument were in violation of Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S . 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L .Ed .2d 91 (1976), or Niemeyer v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 533 S .W .2d 218 (1976) . However, if Appellant had received
Miranda warnings, then Doyle prohibits the use of his silence even for the purpose of
impeachment, 348 U .S . at 619, 96 S .Ct . at 2245 (assuming, of course, that innocuous
remarks made during opening statement are even subject to impeachment) .
Presumably, upon retrial, defense counsel will alter his opening remarks and the issue
will not recur.
Keller and Stumbo, JJ ., join this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part .
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