AARION LAMON JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPOR TANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY CO UR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 20, 2003
NOT TO BE PUSHED
AARION LAMON JOHNSON
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
CASE NO. 99-CR-00848
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING, AND REMANDING IN PART
Appellant, Aarion Lamon Johnson, entered a conditional guilty plea to six (6)
counts of Rape in the First Degree, six (6) counts of Burglary in the First Degree, two
(2) counts of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, one (1) count of Attempted Rape in the
First Degree, two (2) counts of Sodomy in the First Degree, one (1) count of Assault in
the First Degree, one (1) count of Theft by Unlawful Taking Over $300 (TBUT), and two
(2) counts of Burglary in the Second Degree on November 8, 2000, reserving the right
to appeal on the Appellant's Motion to Suppress. The trial court sentenced Appellant to
a total of one hundred (100) years incarceration - twenty (20) years on each of six
counts of Rape I, twenty (20) years on four counts of Burglary I, ten (10) years on the
remaining two counts of Burglary I, five (5) years on each of two counts of Sexual
Abuse I, ten (10) years on one count of Attempted Rape I, twenty (20) years on each of
two counts of Sodomy I, twenty (20) years on one count of Assault I, five (5) years on
one count of TBUT, and five (5) years on each of two counts of Burglary II . The trial
court ordered that the three counts of Rape I, one count of Sodomy I, and one count of
Burglary I were to run consecutively with each other and concurrently with all other
counts . Appellant now appeals his conviction to this Court as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b) .
The facts indicate that Appellant burglarized and/or raped at least six (6) women
in the Lexington area in early 1999 . A search warrant was issued based on a police
officer's affidavit detailing an interview on June 11, 1999, with Appellant's cousin and
one-time roommate . The roommate stated that Appellant had called him on May 13,
1999, to ask for a ride. Appellant subsequently admitted to the roommate that he had
broken into a girl's home earlier that day and had stolen several items . The affidavit
also stated that the roommate had later seen evidence of the burglary at the house the
two men shared . The affidavit further stated that there had been a report of a rape and
burglary on May 13, 1999, and the items listed as missing were exactly those the
roommate claimed to have seen at Appellant's house . A subsequent search of
Appellant's home on June 11, 1999, revealed many of the items that had been reported
stolen by the victim and had been seen by Appellant's roommate . Appellant
subsequently confessed to the police and detailed at least five other similar attacks he
had committed . Based on this information and other information obtained from
Appellant's girlfriend, police executed another search of Appellant's home on June 13,
1999, and obtained evidence implicating Appellant in several other crimes .
Appellant raises five (5) issues on appeal. We will examine each in turn.
I. WAS APPELLANT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A 100 YEAR SENTENCE IN EXCESS OF THE
70 YEAR MAXIMUM ALLOWED BY KRS 532 .110.
KRS 532.110(1)(c) provides as follows :
The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
shall not exceed in maximum length the longest
extended term which would be authorized by KRS
532 .080 for the highest class of crime for which any
of the sentences is imposed . In no event shall the
aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed
seventy (70) years .
Although the language in KRS 532 .110(1) grants the trial court broad discretion by
stating that multiple sentences "shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall
determine . . .," the discretion vested in the trial court is subject to the limitations set out
in KRS 532.110(1)(c) above. The trial court exceeded the maximum consecutive
indeterminate terms allowable by statute when it sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of one hundred (100) years imprisonment . Therefore, we reverse and remand for
re-sentencing in compliance with KRS 532 .110 .
II. WAS APPELLANT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AND SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO
DECLARE KRS 439.3401 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, SET A MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY OF TWENTY
YEARS FOR APPELLANT .
Appellant argues that this issue is preserved for appeal by motion and a hearing
that occurred on December 8, 2000 . It appears from the record that the conditional
plea agreement was entered into on November 8, 2000, and did not set out any specific
reservations for appeal . The Judgment on Guilty Plea entered by the trial court on
November 8, 2000, states only that the court is "reserving the Defendant's rights to an
appeal on his Motion to Suppress ." RCr 8.09, in part, states, "[w]ith the approval of the
court a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right,
on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any specified
trial or pretrial motion ." Since there is no written ruling of the trial court specifically
allowing Appellant the right to appeal the constitutionality of KRS 439.3401, or in the
alternative, set a minimum parole eligibility date, this issue is not preserved for review
and is not properly before this Court . However, because we must remand for
re-sentencing in any event, and in the interests of judicial economy, we will note that in
light of our recent decision in Hughes v. Commonwealth , Ky., 87 S .W.3d 850 (2002),
the legislative amendments to KRS 439 .3401 in 1998 do not affect this Court's
reasoning in Sanders v. Commonwealth , Ky., 844 S .W.2d 391 (1992) .
KRS 439.3401 sets out parole requirements for violent offenders and states in
relevant part :
(2) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital
offense and who has received a life sentence (and has not
been sentenced to twenty-five (25) years without parole or
imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole),
or a Class A felony and receives a life sentence, or to death
and his sentence is commuted to a life sentence shall not be
released on probation or parole until he has served at least
twenty (20) years in the penitentiary . Violent offenders may
have a greater minimum parole eligibility date than other
offenders who receive longer sentences, including a
sentence of life imprisonment .
(3) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital
offense or Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years
or Class B felony who is a violent offender shall not be
released on probation or parole until he has served at least
eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed .
Appellant argues that the application of KRS 439 .3401( 3) in his situation means that he
must serve at least eighty-five (85) years before he is eligible for parole, whereas, an
offender sentenced to life imprisonment may be released on parole after having only
served twenty (20) years . In Sanders , supra, this Court held that KRS 439 .3401 should
be interpreted as requiring service of fifty percent (50%) of a term of years sentence or
twelve (12) years (pre-amendment figures), whichever is less, before parole eligibility.
Id . at 394. In Hughes, supra , we addressed this very issue and held :
[T]he 1998 amendment of KRS 439.3401(3) changed only
the length of the period of parole disability from fifty percent
(50%) to eighty-five percent (85%) of the imposed sentence.
The amendment did not address the interpretation of the
statute set forth in Sanders . . . . "[T]he failure of the
legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a
statute [is] extremely persuasive evidence of the true
legislative intent."
Id . at 855-856 (citation omitted) . Nor does the addition of the language "[v]iolent
offenders may have a greater minimum parole eligibility date than other offenders who
receive longer sentences, including a sentence of life imprisonment," to KRS
439 .3401(2) indicate a contrary legislative intent . Id . at 856 . "The reference to 'other
offenders' obviously refers to offenders other than 'violent offenders .' Parole eligibility
guidelines for'other offenders' are generally established by the parole board, KRS
439.340(3), and nonviolent offenders obviously have earlier parole eligibility dates . 501
KAR 1 :030 § 3 . Furthermore, KRS 439.3401(2) pertains only to life sentences ." Id.
Accordingly, we hold that this Court's interpretation of KRS 439 .3401 in Sanders , supra,
still applies notwithstanding the 1998 legislative amendments.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY AN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE SEARCH
WARRANT.
Appellant alleges that the sworn affidavit of the police officer detailing the
interview with Appellant's roommate contained false or misleading information and was
so lacking in probable cause that officers should not have reasonably relied upon it.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the "anonymous informant" (Appellant's
cousin/roommate) referred to in the affidavit was not reliable because there was no
mention that the roommate suspected Appellant of having raped and beaten his
(roommate's) wife on June 11, 1999, thus providing a motive to lie about Appellant's
involvement .
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the 'veracity' and the 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place . And the duty of a reviewing court is simply
to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed .
Beemer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 665 S .W.2d 912, 914-915 (1984) (citation omitted)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U .S . 213, 238-239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed . 2d
527, 548 (1983)). The affidavit of June 11, 1999, sets forth the information provided by
Appellant's former roommate and specifically states the basis of the knowledge . The
fact that the roommate may have been prompted to contact authorities because he
believed his own wife to have been attacked by Appellant does not destroy his reliability
or veracity as Appellant contends .
Likewise, the fact that the information was not provided to the police officer until
twenty-nine days after the evidence was seen at the house does not render the affidavit
defective . There remained a fair probability that evidence of the crime would still be
present at Appellant's house even twenty-nine days after the attack . Specifically, the
affidavit stated that Appellant had given a pair of gloves stolen from the May 13th victim
to his girlfriend who also resided at Appellant's home . There is no indication that the
gloves would be "the type of property which would have been disposed of promptly after
the burglary" as Appellant argues as the basis for his claim that there was no probable
cause to believe the stolen property would still be located at his home when the warrant
was issued . Also, it is widely accepted that "suppression of evidence obtained pursuant
to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual
cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule." United
States v. Leon , 468 U .S . 897, 918, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3418, 82 L. Ed . 2d 677, 695
(1984) . We do not believe this to be one such case.
Furthermore, even assuming the affidavit was somehow defective, this Court
adopted the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Crayton v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 846 S .W.2d 684 (1992). Also, in Commonwealth v. Litke , Ky ., 873 S.W.2d 198
(1994), this Court revisited its adoption of the good faith exception and applied it
specifically to technical deficiencies in an affidavit underlying a search warrant. In Litke,
supra, we upheld the validity of the search by way of the good faith exception even
though the affidavit was deficient with regard to time specificity . In that case, the
fraudulent activity was alleged to have taken place sometime within the span of several
years . In the case at bar, there is only a twenty-nine day delay from the date the
roommate saw the evidence until he reported it to police, and there is no indication from
the record that the issuing magistrate or the serving officers executed the warrant in
bad faith . During the suppression hearing, the detective who prepared the affidavit
testified that in addition to the facts recited above, the informant advised him that the
items in question were still in Appellant's apartment as late as June 7, 1999, and that
the clothing worn by the rapist was also located there . Therefore, we hold that the initial
search of Appellant's home was proper as well as any subsequent search resulting
therefrom.
IV. WERE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED BY THE
TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO HOLD A COMPETENCY HEARING AS
REQUIRED BY KRS 504.100.
The trial court addressed the issue of Appellant's competency for trial on
numerous occasions. On August 27, 1999, Appellant requested and the court ordered
a mental evaluation be performed. On January 7, 2000, Appellant stipulated to Dr.
Harwell Smith's report stating that Appellant was competent to stand trial and based
upon that report, along with evidence in the record, the trial court found Appellant
competent . On March 3, 2000, the parties again stipulated to reports of Dr. Smith and
Appellant's own expert, Dr. Ruth, finding Appellant competent to stand trial . The
reports of both experts were entered into the record . Further, the trial court entered an
order dated March 6, 2000, specifically finding Appellant competent to stand trial . On
November 8, 2000, at entry of Appellant's conditional guilty plea, the trial court again
inquired into Appellant's competency and reiterated that the court had previously found
Appellant competent based on the parties' stipulations and specific findings . Finally, on
December 8, 2000, the Commonwealth requested that the court enter an order stating
that if Dr. Smith was called to testify as a witness "he would testify based upon his
report and the findings in his report, which was previously provided to the parties." The
court's order further stated that "[b]ased upon this stipulation and the findings in the
report, the Court hereby finds that the Defendant is competent to stand trial ." This
order dated December 8, 2000, was signed by all parties .
KRS 504.100 mandates that the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether
the defendant is competent to stand trial. Likewise, a defendant cannot waive a
-8-
competency hearing . Mills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (1999) . In the
case at bar, Appellant did not, in fact, waive his competency hearing, but instead merely
stipulated to the testimony of the examining experts who both found Appellant
competent to stand trial . On numerous occasions, the trial court made findings of
competency based upon the report of Dr. Smith and the evidence in the record . On
one occasion, the court suggested that Dr. Smith should be subpoenaed in order to
testify to his findings, but defense counsel agreed to stipulate to what Dr. Smith would
have testified to if called and subsequently his report was admitted into the record . The
abundance of caution exhibited by the trial judge and the numerous times competency
was addressed in the proceedings below suggest that the trial court conducted a
thorough evaluation of Appellant's competency to stand trial. KRS 504 .100 requires no
more. Therefore, we find that the requirement of KRS 504.100 mandating that the trial
court hold a hearing to determine competency was satisfied in this case and as a result,
Appellant was not denied due process of law.
It should also be noted that even if the proceedings conducted by the trial court
were not considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements of KRS 504.100, such would
be harmless error . In Mills, supra , this Court held that a defendant's waiver of the
mandatory competency hearing was harmless error. Specifically, we noted that Mills
could not rely on the expert's report on appeal because it found him competent and
having pointed to no other evidence in the record that he could have relied upon to
show that the trial court should have questioned his competency, we held harmless
error applied . Id . at 486 . Similarly here, Appellant cannot rely on either of the expert
reports to prove that his competency should have been questioned because both
concluded Appellant was competent to stand trial . Accordingly, we find that even if the
trial court had failed to hold a competency hearing in compliance with KRS 504 .100,
such a failure would have amounted to harmless error.
V. WERE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO RECUSE HERSELF .
This issue was not properly preserved for review by this Court and will therefore
not be heard on appeal . RCr 8 .09.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is hereby
affirmed, but due to the sentencing error, we remand for correction of Appellant's
sentence in conformity with this opinion .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, #302
Frankfort, Ky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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