DEMETRIUS GRAY HON . REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 20, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLASHED
r (90urf of
2000-SC-0992-TG
APPELLANT
DEMETRIUS GRAY
V
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HON . REBECCA M . OVERSTREET, JUDGE
NO . 2000-CR-0636
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Demetrius Gray, was convicted of Second Degree Escape and First
Degree Fleeing or Evading the Police by the Fayette Circuit Court . The jury
recommended a sentence of five years on each count to be run consecutively and each
was enhanced to fifteen years due to Appellant's persistent felony offender status . The
charges arose from Appellant's arrest for Receiving Stolen Property Over $300 and his
subsequent flight from police while being transported to the Fayette County Detention
Center. Appellant was ultimately acquitted of the underlying felony of Receiving Stolen
Property Over $300 but now appeals his convictions on the Escape and Fleeing
charges as a matter of right. Ky. Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES BY THE COMMONWEALTH
Appellant alleges reversible error occurred when the Commonwealth was
permitted to use its peremptory challenges to remove the only three black jurors from
the jury pool. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the Commonwealth from removing
members of the venire panel solely on the basis of race. Batson v . Kentucky, 476 U.S .
79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L . Ed . 2d 69, 83 (1986) . In Batson , the United States
Supreme Court articulated a three-step process for determining whether a prosecutor
has impermissibly struck jurors on account of their race . First, the defendant must show
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at 96 .
A defendant can establish a prima facie case merely by showing that the prosecutor
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a member of the defendant's cognizable
racial group . Id . Next, the burden shifts to the government to articulate a neutral
reason for exercising the peremptory challenge in that manner. Id. at 97 . The
explanation, however, does not have to rise to the level of that needed to justify a
challenge for cause . Id . "The trial court may accept at face value the explanation given
by the prosecutor depending upon the demeanor and credibility of the prosecutor ."
Commonwealth v. Snodgrass , Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176, 179 (1992) . Finally, it is up to the
trial judge to determine whether the defendant has proven a case of purposeful
discrimination . Batson , supra at 98 . Accordingly, this Court gives great deference to
the trial court's finding . Snodqrass , supra at 179.
In the case at bar, when defense counsel objected to the prosecution's
peremptory challenges of three black jurors, the prosecution responded with raceneutral explanations for each of the three jurors stricken . The explanations offered were
that: one juror had not completed high school ; another had not completed grade school;
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and the third was unemployed and did not raise her hand when the prosecutor asked if
all agreed that one should be held responsible for their actions . While it would have
been helpful for this Court to know if non-black jurors in similar situations were also
peremptorily challenged by the prosecution, the juror qualification forms were not part of
the record before us . Therefore, we must defer to the judgment of the trial court that
found the prosecution presented plausible race-neutral explanations for exercising its
peremptory challenges so as to strike the only three black jurors from the venire panel .
FAILURE TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE
Appellant also alleges that the trial court's failure to grant defense counsel a
continuance the day before trial constituted reversible error. The decision whether to
grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge . Snodgrass v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 814 S .W.2d 579, 581 (1991) . The trial court is required to
consider several factors including: length of delay; previous continuances ;
inconvenience to the parties involved ; whether the accused caused the delay; the
complexity of the case ; and the identifiable prejudice to the accused if a continuance is
not granted . Id . Appellant's defense counsel stated to the trial court that he did not feel
he was ready to proceed to trial because he had not yet obtained a fingerprint expert .
Appellant also points to several other reasons why defense counsel was not prepared
for trial . We find no merit in Appellant's claims particularly because the jury ultimately
acquitted him of the underlying charge of Receiving Stolen Property Over $300.
Therefore, Appellant was not identifiably prejudiced by the fact that his defense counsel
did not locate a fingerprint expert or have adequate time to review his file . Appellant's
contention that the jury gave him a harsher sentence on the Escape and Fleeing
charges, since the jury was not able to convict him of the underlying charge, is
unavailing. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court erred in refusing to grant
Appellant's continuance .
SENTENCING ERROR
Appellant contends, and the Commonwealth conceded, that Appellant's sentence
violates KRS 532 .110(1)(c) which states that "[t]he aggregate of consecutive
indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term
which would be authorized by KRS 532 .080 for the highest class of crime for which any
of the sentences is imposed ." While KRS 532 .080(6)(b) would cap Appellant's
sentence for the two convictions (both Class D felonies) at no more than twenty years,
here KRS 532 .110(4) requires that these sentences run consecutively. See Gaither v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 963 S .W .2d 621 (1997) . Thus, the trial court did not err in
sentencing Appellant to thirty years in prison .
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Appellant maintains that charging him with both Escape and Fleeing or Evading
the Police was error based on the doctrine of in pari materia which means "[u]pon the
same matter or subject." Black's Law Dictionary 711 (5th ed . 1979) . "'Statutes in pari
materia' are those relating to the same person or thing or having a common purpose ."
Id. In pari materia is merely a rule of judicial construction that advocates construing
statutes having a common purpose together . Commonwealth v . Kash, Ky. App ., 967
S.W.2d 37, 44 (1998) . Here, we think the more appropriate analysis is whether
Appellant's double jeopardy rights were violated by being convicted of two separate
charges that constitute the same offense . In order to determine whether two charges
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arising out of the same course of conduct constitute the same offense, we are required
to use the Blockburger "same elements" test. Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947
S.W.2d 805, 809 (1996) . "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not ." Blockburger v. United States , 284
U .S . 299, 304, 52 S . Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed . 306, 309 (1932) .
KRS 520.030, Escape in the second degree reads :
(1) A person is guilty of escape in the second degree when
he escapes from a detention facility or, being charged with or
convicted of a felony, he escapes from custody .
(2) Escape in the second degree is a Class D felony.
KRS 520 .095, Fleeing or evading police in the first degree reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the first
degree :
(b) When, as a pedestrian, and with intent to elude or
flee, the person knowingly or wantonly disobeys an order
to stop, given by a person recognized to be a peace
officer, and . . . .
2 . By fleeing or eluding, the person is the cause of, or
creates a substantial risk of, serious physical injury or
death to any person or property .
Clearly, each charge contains an element that requires proof of facts that the
other does not. The Escape charge requires that the accused be charged with or
convicted of a felony, while the Fleeing or Evading charge does not. Likewise, the
Fleeing or Evading charge requires proof that the accused caused, or created a
substantial risk of, serious physical injury or death . This element is not required to find
someone guilty of escape. Therefore, Appellant was neither charged with, nor
ultimately convicted of, two separate crimes that constituted the same offense in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause .
For the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm Appellant's conviction .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Elizabeth A . Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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