SCOTTIE D . MORGAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JANUA
NOT TO B
SCOTTIE D . MORGAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H . JERNIGAN, JUDGE
00-CR-34
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
In July of 2000, Appellant, Scottie Morgan, was tried by a jury and convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine, KRS 218A .1432 (a class B felony), operating a
motor vehicle with license suspended, KRS 186 .620(2) (a class B misdemeanor), and
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, KRS 532 .080(2) . He was
sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment . Pursuant to Ky . Const . §1 10(2)(b),
Morgan appeals to this Court as a matter of right arguing that: (1) there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of manufacturing methamphetamine ; (2) evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts was improperly admitted against him ; and (3) the result of a
scientific test confirming the presence of methamphetamine was improperly admitted .
For the reasons discussed herein, we reject Appellant's assertions and affirm the
decisions of the trial court .
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
manufacturing methamphetamine . We believe that the extensive testimony given at
trial, coupled with circumstantial evidence, supports his conviction .
On the afternoon of Sunday, February 13, 2000, Muhlenberg County Sheriff
Jerry Mayhugh was investigating a complaint unrelated to the charges against
Appellant . Mayhugh drove west on Gordon Bradley Road, passing Appellant's
residence, and parked his cruiser in a private driveway about one-half mile away from
Appellant's home. Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Mayhugh saw a blue Chevy S-10 pickup
drive by, heading east on Gordon Bradley Road . Mayhugh recognized the driver as
Appellant, and the passenger as Tim Fleming .
Correctly believing that Appellant's operator's license had been suspended,
Mayhugh pursued the blue pickup toward Appellant's residence, winding through the
hilly road . Although the two cars were close together, Mayhugh was unable to maintain
visual contact throughout the pursuit because of the terrain . Mayhugh did notice,
however, some debris along both sides of the road, debris that had not been there just
a short time earlier when Mayhugh first drove through the area . He also detected a
strong odor of ether as he passed the debris, which he knew from experience to be
associated with methamphetamine.
Mayhugh regained visual contact just as Appellant was turning into his own
driveway . Appellant stopped his vehicle and passenger Tim Fleming exited quickly with
a red duffel bag in hand . Fleming fled toward a nearby wooded area, where he was
eventually caught by Sheriff Mayhugh . Mayhugh thereafter detained Appellant as well .
At trial, the contents of the red duffel bag, as well as all of the items found
alongside of the road were introduced as evidence. According to police testimony, the
duffel bag contained a broken coffee pot, a large plastic container with a strong odor of
ether, two glass Mason jars, numerous coffee filters, a plastic breathing mask with tube
ring attached, several pieces of plastic tubing, a quart of liquid drain cleaner, and two
plastic bottle tops. The debris found on the passenger's side of the road included a
clear pitcher with a bluish green top which emitted a strong odor of ether (Exhibit No. 9),
a Mr. Pibb carton containing lithium batteries, multiple empty pill bottles marked as
containing nasal decongestant tablets, a used battery, and some burned aluminum foil .
On the driver's side of the road, police found a clear plastic bag containing coffee filters,
battery packages, and cold tablet packages .
Cheyenne Albro, the director the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force, testified that all
of the items collected by police are commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine . Aibro further testified that methamphetamine production requires
three key precursors-pseudoephedrine (which can be extracted from cold tablets and
nasal decongestants), lithium metal (which can be extracted from lithium batteries), and
anhydrous ammonia (which is found in fertilizer). Two of these three precursors were
found among the items introduced as evidence . Albro was also permitted to testify
about the results of a test he had run on Exhibit No . 9, the clear pitcher found at the
scene . He found that the pitcher tested positive for the presence of ether amphetamine
or methamphetamine residue . Since all of the precursors required for
methamphetamine production were found near the pitcher, Albro concluded that he had
"no doubt [the residue] would be methamphetamine."
Other witness testimony further supports Appellant's conviction . Rodney
Peveler, whose vehicle was parked in Appellant's driveway when Mayhugh arrived in
pursuit, testified that he had gone there for the purpose of obtaining some
methamphetamine from Appellant . Peveler testified that he had been at Appellant's
home the previous night, February 12th , and that Appellant had left, telling Peveler he
was to "get the liquid out of the seed jug and bring it back to smoke it off." (There was
testimony that one method of ingesting methamphetamine is to sprinkle it on aluminum
foil, heat it, and inhale the fumes .)
Angela Barber also testified about Appellant's methamphetamine production .
Barber stated that she had smoked methamphetamine with Appellant, Tim Fleming,
and Angela Byars at Appellant's residence in the early morning hours of February 13th.
Barber also testified that Appellant had left his house that morning, saying he was gong
to Tom Shepherd's residence "to make some more ." According to Barber, Appellant
offered to trade her some methamphetamine for starter fluid, which is commonly used
in methamphetamine production .
Finally, Tim Fleming, who had been in the truck with Appellant during the chase
with Sheriff Mayhugh, gave eyewitness testimony incriminating Appellant . Fleming
testified that late on the night of February 12th, he and Appellant "cooked" and used
methamphetamine at Tom Shepherd's residence in Muhlenberg County. They
thereafter went back to Appellant's home where they smoked more methamphetamine,
later returning again to Shepherd's residence to finish the manufacturing process they
had begun earlier. Fleming testified that Appellant had used Exhibit No . 9 (the clear
pitcher) to mix the precursors before cooking them into powder form .
In his testimony, Fleming explained that he and Appellant had stayed at
Shepherd's residence until the afternoon of February 13th , at which point they left to go
back to Appellant's home . En route to Appellants' house, however, Sheriff Mayhugh
saw them and chased them . Fleming testified that while in pursuit, he had thrown
various items, including Exhibit No. 9, out of his passenger's-side window. He admitted
that he was too busy to notice whether Appellant was also throwing items out of the
driver's-side window.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented circumstantial evidence, expert testimony,
and eyewitness testimony . We believe that a reasonable jury could conclude from this
evidence that Appellant either manufactured methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1432(1)(1),
possessed the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine with
the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), or both . In this
case, both theories were covered by the statute and supported by evidence, and a
conviction on either theory fulfills the unanimous verdict requirement . Wells v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (1978) . The evidence was therefore sufficient
to sustain the conviction . Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky ., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187
(1991).
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of witnesses
regarding Appellant's behavior immediately preceding his arrest. Appellant filed a
motion in limine , KRE 103(d), to suppress the testimony of Peveler, Barber, and
Fleming that Appellant ingested methamphetamine on February 12 t" and 13', and that
he offered to sell or trade methamphetamine to Peveler and Barber. We agree with the
trial court that this evidence was admissible . KRE 404(b) provides :
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . It
may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .
Although Appellant was not charged with methamphetamine use, the testimony of
witnesses Peveler, Barber, and Fleming was admissible to prove a motive for
manufacturing methamphetamine . Evidence of Appellant's prior use and offers to sell
or trade the substance demonstrate that he manufactured methamphetamine for his
own consumption and/or profit. Cf. Youna v. Commonwealth , Ky., 25 S.W.3d 66, 7071 (2000) (evidence that defendant had manufactured methamphetamine in the past
was admissible to show knowledge of the process .)
In admitting the testimony concerning prior acts, the trial court explicitly
admonished jurors only to consider such testimony "insofar as it may tend to show a
motive, if it does, on the part of the defendant with respect to the offense for which the
defendant is being tried ." We find that admission of this testimony was not unduly
prejudicial, and as such, was not error.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
On March 15, 2000, several months before trial, Appellant filed a discovery
motion under RCr 7.24(1) and (2), seeking discovery and "inspection of all tangible
evidence, photographs and police reports, including any substance analysis
examination ." Rather than enter an order requiring discovery of the requested
information and materials, the trial court entered an order recognizing that the
Commonwealth attorney had an open file policy and that "defendant shall have the right
to re-file a discovery motion if necessary." Appellant did not re-file a motion .
The "open file" did not include any results from tests taken of Exhibit No. 9, the
clear pitcher . Based upon the absence of any such test results, Appellant's counsel
stated during voir dire: "In this case, I think the evidence is going to be presented to you
that there is no quantity of methamphetamine whatsoever that was found." On the
morning of trial, however, expert witness Cheyenne Albro conducted a last-minute field
"swab" test of the glass pitcher. The pitcher tested positive for the presence of either
amphetamine or methamphetamine . During a subsequent off-the-record, in-chambers
discussion, the trial court sustained an objection from Appellant as to the introduction of
those test results at trial . The record makes no mention of any specified grounds for
Appellant's objection. Neither a narrative statement, CR 75.13, nor a bystanders bill,
CR 75.14, was filed to supplement the record with this information .
During Appellant's cross-examination of Albro, the following exchange took
place:
Q.
Did you - you say that normally, I think actually ninety-nine percent
of the time methamphetamine is found in a powder form, is that
correct?
A.
Yes Sir.
Q.
Did you actually see anything when you were looking at that pitcher
to indicate a powder residue?
A.
No, sir, I didn't detect anything with my eyes .
The trial court ruled that this testimony "opened the door" to the introduction by the
Commonwealth of the Exhibit No . 9 test results . The record indicates the same in the
following passage:
THE COURT : Well, I'm going to allow. I think the door was opened . Now,
in chambers there was a discussion off the record, I believe, by the
attorneys and the court in which the Commonwealth's Attorney advised all
that there had been a field test just performed and the court said it would
not allow the introduction of that because there had been no prior
discovery made and it was too late in the game to get into that, but I think
the question that was asked of this witness by the defense counsel does
give the foundation to allow the Commonwealth to ask about the presence
of any residue, so that's my ruling .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Renew my objection .
THE COURT: Yes. Your objection is noted and overruled .
Albro was subsequently permitted to divulge the results of the test he had performed
earlier that same day. He testified that the "swabbing" test had revealed amphetamine
or methamphetamine residue on the interior of the pitcher.
On appeal, Appellant argues that this testimony was improper because
"swabbing" is not a scientifically admissible manner of testing evidence. Appellant
further argues that this issue was preserved by an objection to its admission into
evidence at trial . The Commonwealth contends that, because Appellant did not object
to Albro's testimony specifically on the basis of scientific unreliability, Appellant cannot
raise that issue for the first time on appeal. We agree with the Commonwealth and
hold that the issue of scientific unreliability has not been properly preserved for this
Court's consideration.
KRE 103 (a)(1) permits an appeal on admission of evidence only if a timely
objection was made at trial, and only when such objection "state[s] the specific ground
for objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context." (Emphasis
added .) Although Appellant timely objected to the admission of the test results, the
record is void of any specific ground for objection. Thus, the question before us is
whether the ground for objection was apparent from the context . In the absence of any
indication whatsoever that Appellant's objection was concerned with scientific
unreliability, we find that this ground was not "apparent from the context" and Appellant
therefore cannot raise this issue on appeal . Harris v. Commonwealth , Ky., 342 S .W.2d
535, 539 (1961) (a party is confined to specific grounds of objection to the admission of
evidence and is deemed to waive any other grounds.)
Appellant's argument is further undermined by the fact that a different ground for
objection-failure by the Commonwealth to provide notice-is apparent from the context .
In admitting the evidence over Appellant's objection, the trial court referred back to
statements apparently made during the in-chambers discussion : "the court said it would
not allow the introduction of that because there had been no prior discovery made and
it was too late in the game to get into that. . . ." The trial court's comments reveal that in
the original discussion, Appellant had in fact specified a ground for objection, and it is
clear that such was the Commonwealth's failure to give notice of the test, not its
scientific reliability .
Where, as here, the trial court states the reason for its ruling, the objecting party
then has a duty to state specifically the ground or grounds for the objection if different
from or in addition to the grounds stated by the trial court; otherwise, the objecting party
adopts the ground stated by the trial court. Ramsey v. Commonwealth , Ky., 267
S.W .2d 730 (1954) (errors not brought to the attention of the trial judge and not
preserved by exceptions to his rulings are not available on appeal to this Court) . If
Appellant had contemplated other grounds for objection, he had the opportunity to so
specify and preserve those issues . Instead, Appellant's only response to the trial
court's explanation was a renewed objection .
Although the basis of Appellant's objection was apparent from the context, it was
different from the issue raised by Appellant here on appeal. Appellant did not object to
Albro's testimony on the basis of scientific unreliability at trial, and has thus forfeited his
opportunity to argue the issue before this Court .
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions and sentence .
Lambert, C .J ., Graves, and Wintersheimer, J .J .,concur. Keller, J ., concurs in
result only.
Cooper, J ., concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, by separate opinion in which
Stumbo, J . joins .
Johnstone, J ., dissents without separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Dennis M . Ritchie
Dillingham & Ritchie
P.O . Box 129
Elkton, KY 42220-0129
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
A.B . Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D . Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
#uprttut (fain-t of WentuckLy
2000-SC-0689-MR
SCOTTIE D. MORGAN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H . JERNIGAN, JUDGE
00-C R-34
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
The plurality opinion does not even suggest that a Daubert error did not occur in
this case, or that it was not prejudicial, but only that it was somehow not preserved for
appellate review. To reach this conclusion, it (1) substitutes by misquotation a federal
rule, FRE 103(a)(1), for the applicable Kentucky rule, KRE 103(a)(1), despite the fact
that the federal rule was specifically rejected by this Court when the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence were adopted ; and either (2) reinstates the long-discarded requirement that a
party must formally except to a trial court's ruling in order to preserve an evidentiary
error for appellate review, or (3) creates a new rule of evidence out of thin air. It would
be better to simply admit that Appellant's conviction is being affirmed because he is
guilty than to muddle the rules of evidence in order to manufacture a legal justification
for affirmance that does not exist.
I. THE DAUBERT ERROR.
Shortly after his indictment, Appellant filed a discovery motion under RCr 7.24(1)
and (2), seeking discovery and "inspection of all tangible evidence, photographs and
police reports, including any substance analysis examination ." (Emphasis added .) The
trial judge declined to enter the requested discovery order but instead, on March 27,
2000, entered an order providing, inter alia :
As for the motion of discovery, the Commonwealth's Attorney advises that
he has an "open file policy." After inspecting the Commonwealth's file, the
defendant shall have the right to re-file a discovery motion if necessary .
The motion was not refiled . The plurality opinion's quotation of this order leaves
out the language, "After inspecting the Commonwealth's file," and thus creates the false
impression that defense counsel could have discovered the evidence in question had
he but refiled his discovery motion . As will be seen, a pretrial inspection of the
Commonwealth's file would not have revealed the "substance analysis examination" at
issue in this case because that examination did not occur until the morning of trial .
Regardless, the upshot of the March 27, 2000, order was that no discovery order was
entered, thus no discovery violation could have occurred (which, of course, exemplifies
why an "open file policy" is no substitute for a discovery order) .
During voir dire and without objection, Appellant's counsel made the following
statement to the jury:
Now, there are certain cases that relate to methamphetamine
where a large quantity of methamphetamine might be found and
confiscated by the police. That's not uncommon .
In this case, I think the evidence is going to be presented to you
that there is no quantity of methamphetamine whatsoever that was found .
Cheyenne Albro, director of the Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force, was not
involved in the investigation of this case but was scheduled to testify as an expert
witness about the general nature of methamphetamine, its precursors, and the method
of its manufacture . As noted in the plurality opinion, slip op. at 3, numerous items of
evidence were gathered from or near the scene of Appellant's arrest, including two
glass Mason jars, introduced along with other items as Commonwealth's Exhibit No. 2,
and a clear plastic pitcher with a bluish-green top, introduced as Commonwealth's
Exhibit No. 9 . On the morning of trial (presumably after learning of defense counsel's
voir dire claim that "no quantity of methamphetamine whatsoever was found"), Albro
conducted his own field "swab" test of Exhibit No . 9. He would later testify on redirect
examination that Exhibit No . 9 tested positive for the presence of either amphetamine
or methamphetamine . He would also later testify that he field tested only Exhibit No. 9 .
Specifically, he did not testify that he field tested either of the two Mason jars . During
an off-the-record, in-chambers hearing, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's
initial objection to the admission of the evidence of Albro's field test of Exhibit No . 9. If
any grounds were specified for that in-chambers objection, such is not apparent from
the record .
The following colloquy occurred during defense counsel's cross-examination of
Albro :
Q.
Did you -- you say that normally, I think actually ninety-nine percent
of the time methamphetamine is found in a powder form, is that
correct?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Did you see anything when you were looking at those jars to
indicate a powder residue? [Emphasis added .]
A.
No, sir, I didn't detect anything with my eyes.
The prosecutor argued and the trial judge agreed that this line of questioning
"opened the door" for the admission of the results of Albro's morning-of-trial field test of
Exhibit No . 9, the plastic pitcher. The following then occurred on-the-record with
respect to this ruling :
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow. I think the door was
opened . Now, in chambers, there was a discussion off the record, I
believe, by the attorneys and the court in which the Commonwealth's
Attorney advised all that there had been a field test just performed and the
court said it would not allow the introduction of that because there had
been no prior discovery made and it was too late in the game to get into
that, but I think the question that was asked of this witness by the defense
counsel does give the foundation to allow the Commonwealth to ask
about the presence of any residue, so that's my ruling . [Emphasis added .
Note that the court did not state that defense counsel had stated that his
objection to the admission of this evidence was grounded on a "discovery
violation ."]
DEFENSE COUNSEL : Renew my objection .
THE COURT: Yes. Your objection is noted and overruled .
At the beginning of the Commonwealth's redirect examination of Albro, defense
counsel again renewed his nonspecific objection :
record .
DEFENSE COUNSEL : Your Honor, I renew my objection for the
THE COURT: Alright . So noted . Overruled .
Albro then testified as follows :
Q.
Would you tell us what container that you performed the test on?
A.
The plastic pitcher, exhibit -- I can't see the exhibit number on it.
Q.
Commonwealth's Exhibit 9?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And . . .
A.
There was some question as to any residue that may have been
tested for or on that. At that time I did what we call a swabbing,
which basically we take a dampened cloth or a piece of paper, we'll
wipe the material, let that dry and then perform a field test on it for
methamphetamine, which I did so and the results was that it was a
positive test.
Q.
You swabbed the interior of this plastic jug [sic], let it dry and then
performed a field test on it -- chemical test on it?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And that field test revealed what?
A.
It was a positive test. It showed that there was residue there.
Q.
And that residue was?
A.
Methamphetamine or amphetamine.
Albro never described how he tested the swab or how the result of that test was
manifested, etc .., by odor, change of color, disintegration of the swab, or otherwise . Nor
did he testify in any respect to the scientific reliability of the test that he performed . In
fact, he admitted on additional cross-examination that the test was only a preliminary
test and that a full test to prove whether the swab contained amphetamine or
methamphetamine could only be performed at a forensic laboratory . Nevertheless, on
additional redirect examination, he avowed that he had "no doubt" that the swab
contained methamphetamine because, when Exhibit No. 9 was discovered on the side
of Gordon Bradley Road on February 13, 2000, pseudoephedrine tablets were also
found nearby . (Pseudoephedrine is an over-the-counter cold medicine that is also a
precursor of methamphetamine.) Albro's testimony as to the result of his field test was
-5-
the only direct evidence corroborating the testimony of Tim Fleming that Appellant had
actually manufactured methamphetamine on the night of February 12-13, 2000.
(Fleming, a former codefendant, testified against Appellant pursuant to a plea
agreement .) The coup de grace was administered during the prosecutor's closing
argument :
Now, Timmy Fleming testified that this very pitcher that came from
the Shepherd residence was thrown out by him. But what else did he tell
you? That this very pitcher contained the dope that was cooking,
contained the meth that they were making .
Well, now, how do we know that this contains meth? We know that
this contains meth by the very testimony of Director Cheyenne Albro. He
tested this substance, scraped -- did a moisture -- he told you how he got
a paper towel and wetted it, wrapped it around there, dried it out and did a
field test, and tested positive for methamphetamine .
When faced with a proffer of scientific evidence, the trial judge must determine
that the evidence is both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm . Inc.,
509 U .S . 579, 589, 113 S .Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 L .Ed .2d 469 (1993). Albro's testimony
as to the result of his field test of Exhibit No . 9 was clearly relevant . The issue was
whether the test, itself, was sufficiently reliable to warrant the admission of the result of
the test under KRE 702 . In Daubert , the United States Supreme Court held that upon
the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 (identical to KRE 702), the socalled " Frye test" of general acceptance in the scientific community, Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), became but one factor to consider in determining
the reliability of evidence of a scientific, technical, or other specialized nature . 509 U .S.
at 594, 113 S.Ct. at 2797 . Other factors include whether the method or theory can be
tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, the known or
potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation . Id. at 592-95, 113 S .Ct. at 2796-97 . Daubert was adopted in
Kentucky as to scientific evidence in Mitchell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 908 S .W.2d 100
(1995), overruled on other grounds , Fugate v. Commonwealth , Ky., 993 S .W.2d 931
(1999), and as to evidence of a technical or other specialized nature in Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Thompson , Ky., 11 S .W .3d 575 (2000).
Daubert and Mitchell require a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the proposed testimony is scientifically valid and whether
that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert , 509 U .S .
at 592-93, 113 S .Ct. at 2796 ; Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 101 . No such assessment was
made here . Not only is there no evidence that the field test performed by Albro is
scientifically reliable, there is also no evidence as to how the test was performed or how
the result was manifested . It was error to admit this evidence without a preliminary
determination of its scientific reliability . As stated, the plurality opinion does not dispute
that the Daubert error occurred and that it was prejudicial but, nevertheless, jumps
through hoops to conclude that the error was not preserved for review.
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR.
Defense counsel thrice objected to the admission of evidence of Albro's field
test. As stated supra , the record does not reflect whether any grounds were specified
for his initial, in-chambers objection . However, that objection was sustained, thus
obviating any need to further clarify the record on that point. If an objection is
sustained, the burden is on the offering party (here, the Commonwealth) to preserve
the error by an avowal. KRE 103(a)(2) ; Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17 S .W .3d 520,
523 (2000) . The objecting party is not required to complain that the objection was
sustained for the wrong reason. The "grounds for objection" issue did not arise until the
trial judge reversed his ruling and erroneously held (as discussed infra) that defense
counsel's cross-examination of Albro had "opened the door" to the admission of the
field test evidence in rebuttal . In response to this ruling, defense counsel registered two
more general objections and the trial court did not request that grounds be stated for
either of those objections. Thus, the outcome of this case should be governed by the
language of KRE 103(a)(1) .
However, the plurality opinion misquotes KRE 103(a)(1) by stating :
KRE 103(a)(1) permits an appeal on admission of evidence only if a timely
objection was made at trial, and only when such objection "state[s] the
specific ground for objection, if the specific around was not apparent from
the context."
Slip op . at 8 (alteration and emphasis added by plurality opinion) . KRE 103(a)(1)
actually provides :
[KRE] 103(a) . Effect of erroneous ruling . Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected ; and
(1) Objection . In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, and upon request of
the court stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context ; . . . [Emphasis added .]
The plurality opinion shamelessly deletes the emphasized language from KRE
103(a)(1) and thereby substitutes for the Kentucky rule the language of the
corresponding federal rule, FIRE 103(a)(1), which, indeed, provides :
[FRE] 103(a) . Effect of erroneous ruling . Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected ; and
(1) Objection . In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the
context; . . .
Under the federal rule, a general objection that is overruled does not preserve
error for appellate review on any grounds, United States v. Wilson , 690 F.2d 1267,
1273-74 (9th Cir. 1982), United States v. Hutcher , 622 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir. 1980),
unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context . (More on this latter aspect
of the rule infra.) The drafters of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence recommended
adoption of the federal rule in Kentucky. The Commentary to the final draft explained
how that rule would have differed from existing Kentucky law:
Prior to the adoption of this Rule (as a consequence of a provision
contained in Rule 46 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure), counsel
could object to the admissibility of evidence without giving grounds; only
upon request of the judge was it necessary for an objecting party to state
the reasons for an objection . This so called "general objection" has long
been regarded in most jurisdictions as inadequate to preserve errors for
review. In requiring the statement of a specific ground of objection,
subdivision (a)(1) better serves the objectives set out in the preceding
paragraph . It makes Kentucky law consistent with the Federal Rules and
the law of most other jurisdictions .
Commentary to proposed KRE 103, Evidence Rules Study Committee, Final Draft
(1989).
.
Nevertheless, the recommendation to adopt the federal rule was rejected BY
THIS COURT in favor of the language contained in two preexisting rules to the effect
that grounds for objection need be stated only "on request of the court." CR 46 ; RCr
9.22. See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 1 .10, at 27 (3d
ed . Michie 1993) ("[T]he drafters' recommendation was rejected (at the initiative of the
Kentucky Supreme Court) in favor of the rule that grounds for objection need be given
only when requested by the court ."). Under CR 46, RCr 9.22 and, now, KRE 103(a)(1),
unless specific grounds are requested by the court, a general objection preserves error
on any ground upon which the objection could have been sustained . Price v. Bates,
Ky., 320 S.W .2d 786, 789 (1959) . Of course, that is the direct opposite of the result
mandated by the federal rule which the majority has applied ad hoc in this case.
Worse, however, than the ad hoc application of FRE 103(x)(1) instead of KRE
103(x)(1) to this case is the plurality opinion's additional holding that :
Where, as here, the trial court states the reason for its ruling, the objecting
party then has a duty to state specifically the ground or grounds for the
objection if different from or in addition to the ground stated by the trial
court ; otherwise, the objecting party adopts the ground stated by the trial
court .
Slip op. at 9. There is no authority for this remarkable proposition -- anywhere. The
case cited by the majority, Ramsey v. Commonwealth , Ky., 267 S .W .2d 730 (1954),
was tried under the regime of the former Civil and Criminal Codes of Practice that were
superseded long ago by the present Civil and Criminal Rules of Procedure. Under
former Civil Code § 334 and former Criminal Code § 280, an objection was insufficient
to preserve error unless the objecting party specifically excepted to the court's
subsequent adverse ruling . Blanton v. Commonwealth , 247 Ky. 812, 146 S.W . 10, 11
(1912). When our predecessor Court noted in Ramsey, supra , that "[i]t is an
elementary rule of procedure that errors not brought to the attention of the trial judge
and not preserved by exceptions to his rulings are not available on an appeal to this
Court," 267 S .W.2d at 732, it was referring to the fact that the appellant in that case had
neither objected nor excepted to the admission of the evidence that he claimed was
improperly introduced at trial . Id . at 733 .
Has the majority opinion in this case reincarnated the ancient requirement that
formal and specific exceptions must be registered to an adverse evidentiary ruling in
order to preserve the error for appellate review? Even this rapidly aging writer is too
young to remember when exceptions were required to preserve evidentiary errors . Civil
-1 0-
Rule 46 was adopted in 1953 ; RCr 9 .22 was adopted in 1962 (1962 Ky. Acts, ch . 234,
p. 812) . Both provide that "[f]ormal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are
unnecessary . . . ." In adopting these rules, our predecessors wisely decided that
exceptions were redundant and unnecessary to preserve error where a proper objection
had been made. Nor does KRE 103(a)(1) contain any requirement that an exception
be registered to the overruling of an objection .
The majority's decision in this case has either abrogated those rules or has
created from thin air a new preservation rule never before seen in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, i .e. , if, in response to a general objection, the trial court sustains the
objection but gratuitously states an erroneous ground for its ruling, the party whose
objection was sustained must object to the erroneous ground and state the correct
ground, whether or not requested by the court, or be bound on appeal by the erroneous
ground stated by the trial court . (Most lawyers regard the act of continuing to argue with
a judge after the judge has made a ruling as both an exercise in futility and an invitation
for a stern rebuke -- especially if the ruling was in that lawyer's favor.) We have long
held that a trial judge's decision will be upheld even if that decision was right for the
wrong reason . Noel v. Commonwealth , Ky., 76 S .W.3d 923, 929 (2002); Tamme v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 31 (1998) ; Jarvis v. Commonwealth , Ky., 960
S .W .2d 466, 469 (1998) ; Smith v. Commonwealth , Ky., 788 S .W .2d 266, 268 (1990).
Now we say that a party in whose favor a right decision was made for the wrong reason
cannot on appeal rely on the right reason for that right decision unless that party
informed the trial judge of the right reason at the time the judge made the right decision
for the wrong reason . In the context of this case, that means that Appellant cannot rely
on the Daubert violation as the right reason for the trial judge's ruling sustaining his
objection because he failed to tell the trial judge that he was sustaining the objection for
the wrong reason, i .e . , "discovery violation ." That, of course, means that unless the
appellate court sua sponte discerns the right reason for the trial judge's decision, that
decision will be reversed because of the trial judge's faulty reasoning .
The plurality opinion's next conclusion that it is "apparent from the context" that
the basis for defense counsel's initial objection was "failure by the Commonwealth to
provide notice," slip op . at 8-9, is equally absurd . That was not even the ground stated
by the trial judge as the basis for his ruling . Nevertheless, in applying this same
"apparent from the context" language that is found in both KRE 103(a)(1) and FIRE
103(a)(1), federal courts look primarily at the nature of the evidence to which the
objection pertained and statements made by objecting counsel . Ec . , United States v.
B_oyd , 55 F .3d 667, 671 n .3 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ; United States v. Gilmore , 730 F .2d 550,
554 n .1 (8th Cir. 1984); Werner v. Upjohn Co . , 628 F .2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980) (the
objecting party had also filed a pretrial motion stating grounds for suppression of the
same evidence). In United States v. Schrock, 855 F .2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988), the
grounds for the objection were found "apparent" from both the nature of the testimony
to which the objection was made and from statements made by objecting counsel
during the ensuing bench conference . Id . at 332 n .8.
Where, as here, however, the objection was made and sustained during an offthe-record, in-chambers conference, there is simply no "context" within which the
objection can be viewed . In fact, in the absence of a record to the contrary, especially
in a criminal case, any doubt as to whether defense counsel stated the correct grounds,
or no grounds, for his objection should be resolved against the Commonwealth, not the
defendant. In Gilmore , supra , defense counsel made a general objection, following
-1 2-
which a bench conference occurred that, for some unexplained reason, was not
recorded . 730 F .2d at 554 . The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held under those circumstances that it would "assume" that the ground for the objection
was apparent from the context, thereby giving the objecting party the benefit of the
doubt. Id . at 554 n.1 . The logical assumption here is that defense counsel did not state
"lack of notice" or "discovery violation" as grounds for his objection since he obviously
knew that no discovery order had been entered . (Absent a discovery order, there is no
"notice" requirement with respect to KRE 702 evidence .)
Nevertheless, this appeal is not about the fact that the trial judge initially
sustained defense counsel's off-the-record objection but that he ultimately overruled
defense counsel's two on-the-record objections . Those objections clearly were general,
not specific, and the trial judge did not request that specific grounds be stated for those
objections . The trial judge's stated reason for overruling those objections ("opened the
door") was just as erroneous as his stated reason ("discovery violation") for sustaining
the initial off-the-record objection . As noted supra, Exhibit No . 9 was a plastic pitcher
with a bluish-green top . The question asked of Albro that supposedly "opened the
door" to the admission of evidence of the field test performed on that exhibit pertained
not to the "plastic pitcher" but to the "jars," an obvious reference to the two glass Mason
jars, Exhibit No . 2, which had not been field tested .' But even if that were not so, the
1 Webster's II New College Dictionary defines a "pitcher" as "[a] vessel for
liquids with a handle and a lip or spout for pouring," and a "jar" as "[a] cylindrical glass
or earthenware vessel with a wide mouth and usually having no handles." The same
source defines a "Mason jar" as "[a] wide-mouthed glass jar with a screw top, used for
home canning and preserving ." Albro testified that, during the process of
manufacturing methamphetamine, glass jars are used as receptacles for both the
mixture of precursors and the ether (starting fluid) used to "cook" them . "Very seldom
do we see it in plastic, generally always glass . . . . ..
-1 3-
trial judge's "opened the door" ruling presumably referred to the rule of "curative
admissibility." That rule applies when one party introduces an inadmissible fact and
thereby "opens the door" for the other party to introduce another inadmissible fact that
negatives, explains, or counterbalances the first inadmissible fact. Lawson, supra, §
1 .10 IV, at 30-33 . The evidence elicited from Albro that he did not see any powder
residue on the glass Mason jars was not inadmissible, and thus did not "open the door"
to curative admission of the inadmissible evidence of the field test performed on the
plastic pitcher.
The Commonwealth's brief also cites in support of the "opened the door" theory
two federal cases admitting evidence previously suppressed because illegally obtained
to rebut defense tactics seeking to use the fact of suppression as a shield . Walder v.
United States, 347 U .S . 62, 65, 74 S .Ct. 354, 356, 98 L .Ed . 503 (1954) (previously
suppressed evidence of illegally seized narcotics properly admitted to impeach the
defendant's perjurious testimony denying possession of those narcotics) ; United States
ex rel . Castillo v. Fay, 350 F.2d 400, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1965) (admission of previously
suppressed evidence of illegally seized drug paraphernalia to rebut evidence elicited on
cross-examination of the investigating officer that narcotics were not found during the
search in question was of insufficient constitutional significance to support the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus) . Albro's field test evidence was not inadmissible because it
had been illegally obtained, but because it was not shown to be scientifically reliable .
Thus, it was inadmissible for any purpose, including rebuttal .
"Judges must guard against the temptation, whether personal or of others, to
abandon settled rules of evidence to accommodate their sense of justice in a particular
-1 4-
case ." Sharp v. Commonwealth , Ky., 849 S.W.2d 542, 546 (1993) (Lambert, J ., writing
for the majority) .
[The rules of evidence] bring to the law its objectivity . Their
purpose would be subverted if courts were permitted to disregard them at
will because of an intuitive perception that to do so will produce a better
result in the case at hand . We accept the premise that obeying these
rules is the best way to produce evidence of a quality likely to produce a
just result. We reject the notion of different rules for different cases
because one or the other of the litigants insists that a different ruling will
produce a better result in his particular case.
Fisher v. Duckworth , Ky., 738 S .W.2d 810, 813 (1987) (Leibson, J ., writing for the
majority).
To invoke Justice Holmes's oft-quoted aphorism, "hard caseso make bad law."
Northern Secs. Co. v. United States , 193 U .S . 197, 400, 24 S .Ct. 436, 468, 48 L .Ed .
679 (1904) (Holmes, J ., dissenting) . Facially, this is a hard case, one in which proper
application of the rules of evidence lead inexorably to the conclusion that this conviction
must be reversed for a new trial . Nevertheless, our duty is not to reach a perceived
"better" result by ignoring or distorting sound legal principles, but to apply the facts and
the law as they actually exist and thereby ascertain the "rule of law" that applies to this
case . Unfortunately, the majority of this Court has ignored this basic principle of judicial
method and has, thereby, made some exceedingly "bad law."
Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of Appellant's conviction and sentence for
operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license, but dissent from the affirmance of
his conviction and sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, and would remand
this case to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court for a new trial on the latter charge.
Stumbo, J ., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.