COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. BILLY STEWART JEFFRIES
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2002
TO BE PCJkIS
2000-SC-0274-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1999-CA-0189-MR
SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 1995-CR-0049
BILLY STEWART JEFFRIES
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE STUMBO
REMANDING
Billy Stewart Jeffries', the appellee herein, was convicted of the murder and
attempted rape of an elderly female. This Court affirmed Jeffries' conviction following a
matter-of-right appeal. Jeffries v. Commonwealth , No. 1997-SC-525-MR. Jeffries was
a seventeen-year-old juvenile at the time he was convicted of the crimes brought
against him . He was sentenced on June 9, 1997 . In December 1997, Jeffries reached
his eighteenth year and was sent to the Shelby Circuit Court, which conducted a
hearing pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 640.030(2) . Under this statute,
the trial court must determine whether Jeffries should be given probation or conditional
discharge, returned to the Department of Juvenile Justice for treatment not to exceed
'We note that the appellee, Billy Stewart Jeffries' middle name has been spelled
Stewart as well as Stuart throughout the various pleadings . This opinion uses the name
set forth in the indictment .
six months, and then be discharged, or remanded to the Department of Corrections to
serve the remainder of his sentence in an adult prison.
Prior to Jeffries' eighteen-year-old sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that
a psychological evaluation of Jeffries be conducted by Dr. Katherine Peterson . Jeffries
subpoenaed Dr. Peterson in order to question her with regard to her expertise
concerning sexual offender treatment programs for "non-admitters," that is, convicted
offenders who do not admit they committed a sex crime. During Jeffries' confinement
at the Central Kentucky Youth Development Center (CKYDC), his trial counsel had
requested that Jeffries be placed in a treatment program for non-admitters. Jeffries
contended that he should be allowed to call Dr. Peterson as a witness in order to
question her about his amenability to sexual offender treatment if a non-admitter
program were provided to him . He also subpoenaed witnesses from CKYDC that would
provide testimony regarding his progress in treatment .
The trial court, however, would not allow Jeffries to cross-examine Dr. Peterson
or call any other witnesses on his behalf at the hearing . In addition, the trial court did
not allow avowal testimony of Dr. Peterson or any other witness . The trial court
determined that Jeffries was not prime for probation and placed him in the custody of
the Department of Corrections to serve out the remainder of his sentence in an adult
prison . Jeffries subsequently appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which
reversed the determination of the trial court because its refusal to admit evidence of
rehabilitation was a denial of Jeffries' due process rights. The Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred when it did not allow Jeffries to cross-examine Dr. Peterson and
when it did not permit any evidence by avowal. The Commonwealth, the appellant
herein, moved for discretionary review, which was granted . The Commonwealth now
asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the decision
of the trial court .
The issue to be decided is what process is due a youthful offender during a KRS
640 .030(2) sentencing hearing held after he or she has reached the age of majority.
The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court should apply the same sentencing
procedures during a youthful offender's eighteen-year-old sentencing hearing as
applied in a typical adult sentencing hearing .
KRS 640 .030(2) provides that a youthful offender, following his or her eighteenth
birthday, must be returned to the sentencing court if time remains on his or her
sentence. The sentencing court must then make a determination and decide: 1)
whether to place the youthful offender on probation or conditional discharge ; 2) whether
to return the youthful offender to the Department of Juvenile Justice for six months of
additional treatment, followed by discharge ; or 3) whether to place the youthful offender
in an adult correctional facility .
In Johnson v . Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S .W.2d 12 (1998), we addressed
sentencing hearings of youthful offenders who have attained the age of majority. A
youthful offender has no guarantee of probation and under KRS 640 .030(2), the
sentencing court may only make a decision regarding probation after considering the
factors set forth in KRS 533.010 . Id . at 15. KRS Chapter 533 "Probation and
Conditional Discharge," the statute which applies to the probation of adult offenders, is
equally applicable to youthful offenders . Id .
The Commonwealth argues that the same sentencing guidelines apply to a
youthful offender's KRS 640 .030(2) sentencing hearing, as they apply in an adult
offender's sentencing hearing . The Commonwealth also claims that this view is fully
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supported by Johnson , supra. We agree that our decision in that case supports the
idea that the guidelines regarding an adult offender's sentencing hearing were intended
to apply to a youthful offender's sentencing hearing as well. However, Jeffries did not
receive the same treatment that an adult offender would have received under KRS
532 .050 .
Jeffries should have been afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the
evidence against him at his sentencing hearing . This opportunity is provided for in the
codified presentence procedure for felony convictions found in KRS 532.050. KRS
532.050(6) states :
Before imposing sentence, the court shall advise the defendant or his
counsel of the factual contents and conclusions of any presentence
investigation or psychiatric examinations and afford a fair opportunity and
a reasonable period of time, if the defendant so requests, to controvert
them . The court shall provide the defendant's counsel a copy of the
presentence investigation report. It shall not be necessary to disclose the
sources of confidential information . (Emphasis added).
Here Jeffries received no opportunity to present any evidence or information in his favor
at his sentencing hearing . The sentencing court relied on a report assessing Jeffries'
propensity for committing further crimes against the public . Jeffries was not allowed to
cross-examine Dr. Peterson, the psychiatrist who prepared that report. Nor was he
permitted to present any testimony regarding his progress in his treatment program at
the juvenile facility where he was confined . Furthermore, it should be noted that the
sentencing court did not even allow any evidence to be taken by avowal .
Additionally, Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11 .02(1) requires the sentencing
court to "consider the possibility of probation or conditional discharge" and to "afford the
defendant and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to make a statement or
statements in the defendant's behalf and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment."
In Edmonson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 725 S.W .2d 595 (1987), we held that a trial
court may only exercise its discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
after the defendant has been afforded "a fair opportunity to present evidence at a
meaningful hearing in favor of having the sentences run concurrently or present other
.
matters in mitigation of punishment ." Id at 596 . Applying the same logic to the present
matter, and in view of KRS 532 .050(6) and RCr 11 .02, we hold that a trial court, when
conducting a KRS 640 .030(2) sentencing hearing of a youthful offender, must exercise
its discretion to impose one of the three sentencing alternatives outlined in KRS
640 .030(2) only after the youthful offender has been afforded a meaningful opportunity
to controvert the evidence against him and to present evidence in mitigation of
punishment .
The Court of Appeals below held that it was error for the sentencing court to not
allow Jeffries to present "his side" of the case in mitigation of punishment. The Court of
Appeals further held that Jeffries should have been allowed to introduce testimony of
CKYDC treatment staff by avowal, and that he should have also been permitted to
cross-examine Dr. Peterson . While we affirm the ultimate decision of the Court of
Appeals, our holding today is more limited . We do not reach the issue of whether the
sentencing court committed error in its refusal to permit the testimony of specific
witnesses. Rather, we hold that the trial court committed error by not providing Jeffries
a worthwhile hearing. We decline to prescribe the exact procedures the trial court here,
or trial courts in general, should follow. Instead, the trial court should use its learned
discretion when it must determine what process is due a youthful offender at a
sentencing hearing held pursuant to KRS 640.030(2) . Allowing Jeffries to call CKYDC
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treatment staff as witnesses or allowing him to cross-examine Dr. Peterson may be
necessary to provide Jeffries with an appropriate sentencing hearing . However, any
such decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court simply finds
that, in this instance, the trial court did not provide Jeffries a fair opportunity to
controvert the evidence against him at his eighteen-year-old sentencing . To hold
otherwise would be a violation of Jeffries' right to due process of law.
Jeffries is entitled to receive a meaningful, fair, and equitable opportunity at his
sentencing hearing to controvert evidence presented against him. Further, Jeffries
should be allowed to present evidence in mitigation of punishment. Due process
demands no less. On remand, the trial court will need to conduct a sentencing hearing
pursuant to KRS 640 .030(2) and render a decision regarding Jeffries' future disposition
in conformity with our holding today.
For the aforementioned reasons, we remand this case to the Shelby Circuit
Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C .J . ; and Cooper, J . concur. Keller, J ., concurs in part and dissents in
part by separate opinion . Johnstone, J ., dissents by separate opinion, with Graves and
Wintersheimer, JJ ., joining that separate opinion.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Ky 40601
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOP, APPELLEE:
Suzanne Hopf
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixyremP ~ourf of ~rufixrkV
2000-SC-0274-DG
APPELLANT
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1999-CA-0189-MR
SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT NO . 1995-CR-0049
V.
BILLY STEWART JEFFRIES
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I agree with the majority's decision to remand this matter to the Shelby Circuit
Court for it "to conduct a sentencing hearing pursuant to KRS 640.030(2) and render a
decision regarding [Appellant's] future disposition ."' However, I find the majority's
conclusion "that the trial court committed error by not providing Jeffries a worthwhile
hearing',2 unnecessarily esoteric, and I believe, in its attempt to find a more narrow
holding than the one reached by the Court of Appeals, the majority sidesteps the only
real issue in this case -- i.e., whether the sentencing court denied Appellant procedural
due process when it would not allow Appellant to examine, under oath, Dr. Peterson
and the witnesses Appellant had subpoenaed from CKYDC. The majority "decline[s] to
prescribe the exact procedures the trial court here, or trial courts in general, should
'Majority Opinion,
2
Id at
.
S .W .3d
(Slip Op . at 5).
(200_) (Slip Op. at 6).
follow" 3 and instead concludes, without identifying any specific error committed by the
sentencing court, that "the trial court did not provide Jeffries a fair opportunity to
4
controvert the evidence against him at his eighteen-year-old sentencing ." In my view,
however, the sentencing court either erred when it refused to permit Appellant to
introduce this evidence, in which case we must remand the case to the sentencing
court for a new sentencing hearing where the errors will not be repeated, or it
committed no error, in which case we should affirm the sentencing court's decision to
send Appellant to prison. I see no middle ground . Because I believe the sentencing
court's exclusion of this evidence denied Appellant his due process, I, like the majority,
would affirm the Court of Appeals, but I dissent in part because I disagree with the
scope of the remand directed by the majority opinion .
I believe the dispositive question for this Court is whether, by excluding this
testimony, the sentencing court failed to provide Appellant : (1) the "fair opportunity and
a reasonable period of time . . . to controvert',5 the factual contents and conclusions of
Dr. Peterson's report guaranteed by KRS 532 .050(6) ; or (2) the "opportunity . . . to
present any information in mitigation in punishment ',6 guaranteed by RCr 11 .02.
Because I believe the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the sentencing court's
rulings did, in fact, deny Appellant procedural due process, and I see no reason to
reinvent the wheel, I adopt that portion of Judge Tackett's majority opinion for the Court
of Appeals that states:
3Id . at
(Slip Op . at 5).
4Id . at
(Slip Op . at 6).
5KRS 532 .050(6) .
6 RCr 11 .02(1) .
In the instant case, the sentencing court denied Jeffries
due process in refusing to allow him to present evidence of
his progress towards rehabilitation . Jefferies was not
permitted to call treatment staff at Central Kentucky Youth
Development Center (CKYDC) to testify regarding his
progress . Neither was this evidence permitted by avowal .
Furthermore, Jeffries was prohibited from cross-examining
Dr. Katherine Peterson, the psychiatrist who prepared the
court's report assessing Jeffries' likelihood of committing
further offenses and/or suitability for probation . Refusing to
allow Jeffries to present this evidence was error. Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11 .02 allows information to
be presented in mitigation of punishment . As the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated in Edmonson v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
725 S.W.2d 595, 596 (1987), these requirements "are not
mere procedural formalities, but are substantive and may
not be ignored ." Herein, Jeffries should have been permitted
to present "his side" of the case in mitigation of punishment.
While the Court of Appeals focused its analysis primarily on the question of
whether the sentencing court's ruling violated Appellant's RCr 11 .02 entitlement to
present mitigation evidence, I would emphasize that the exclusion of this evidence also
violated Appellant's KRS 532 .050(6) statutory entitlement to controvert the factual
contents and conclusions in Dr. Peterson's report. In my opinion, KRS 532 .055(6)
allows a defendant to do more than merely vocalize his or her disagreement with a PreSentence Investigation Report or a psychological examination,' and I believe the
sentencing court denied Appellant the opportunity that KRS 532.050(6) guarantees him
when it would not permit Appellant to introduce evidence that controverted Dr.
7See Doolan v. Commonwealth , Ky., 566 S .W .2d 413, 414-415 (1978) (referring
to the Appellant's ability to "substantiate his contention that the prior criminal offenses
listed in the report are not properly attributable to him" and the trial court's ability to
"fairly and accurately authenticate" the veracity of the Appellant's claims (emphasis
added)); Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 967 S .W .2d 12, 13-14 (1998) ("At the
hearing, Appellant presented several witnesses in his behalf, including [a] Youth
Treatment Specialist . . . and . . . a clinical social worker from the . . . center where
Appellant had been confined .").
Peterson's findings by suggesting that Appellant was amenable to treatment and/or
rehabilitation outside of an adult correctional institution . As this Court has held that "the
presentence procedure for felony convictions under KRS 532 .050 is mandatory" 8 and
that "compliance with the provisions of KRS 532.050 is a `must' and is in fact a
prerequisite to the entry of a valid judgment," 9 I believe the trial court's failure to permit
Appellant to introduce evidence to controvert Dr. Peterson's report requires us to
remand this case for resentencing .
While the dissenters correctly observe that "in certain cases proper consideration
for the seriousness of the crime is the paramount concern,"' ° I do not believe that
analysis is germane to the case before the Court. While Appellant's crime was certainly
heinous, the trial court in this case did not deny probation because it found that such a
sentence would place the public in danger by "unduly depreciating the seriousness of
the crime."" In fact, the trial court's written order does not contain any written findings
of fact as to the KRS 533.010(2) bases for denying probation . Instead, the order simply
reflects the court's conclusion -- presumably based upon Dr. Peterson's report and the
trial court's own assumptions regarding amenability to treatment -- that the Department
of Juvenile Justice could not provide Appellant with the treatment he required :
6.
The Department of Juvenile Justice has failed to
provide sexual offender treatment or a meaningful
evaluation of the Defendant. Though they have
recommended to the Court that if the Defendant be
$ Eversole v. Commonwealth , Ky., 575 S .W .2d 457, 461 (1979).
9 1d ., citina Arnold v. Commonwealth , Ky., 573 S .W .2d 344 (1978) .
' °Dissenting Opinion at
Op. at 3).
11 KRS 533 .010(2)(c) .
S.W .2d
(Johnstone, J., dissenting) (Slip
probated, there is a favorable prognosis for success,
this is unsupported by any appropriate evaluation or
information tendered to the Court.
7.
The nature of the offense (i.e. murder, attempted
rape), coupled with the fact that the Defendant has
denied responsibility for the crime and exhibits no
signs of remorse or acceptance of the jury verdict
confirms that the Defendant is not amenable to any
rehabilitation or treatment in the context of the
Department of Juvenile Justice.
Therefore, based on the above findings, IT IS ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant be incarcerated in an
institution operated by the Department of Corrections to
serve out the balance of his sentence .
I would not equate the sentencing court's findings with a determination that "[t]he
defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by
his commitment to a correctional institution . "12 While the finding that the Court actually
made would likely provide a basis for declining to return Appellant to the Department of
Juvenile Justice to complete a treatment program within six months, 13 I have serious
concerns as to whether the sentencing court's decision to deny probation was made in
accordance with KRS 533.010 .
In any event, however, I believe the sentencing court's finding that Appellant's
favorable probation prognosis is "unsupported by any appropriate evaluation or
information tendered to the Court" must be considered in light of the court's erroneous
limitation on Appellant's entitlement to controvert the primary basis for those findings.
Because the sentencing court prevented Appellant from introducing evidence that was
probative as to whether Appellant could receive the necessary treatment in a program
aimed at sexual offenders who have not accepted responsibility for their offenses, I
12
KRS 533 .010(2)(b) .
13
KRS 640 .020(2)(b) .
believe that Appellant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing where he is allowed to
introduce evidence relevant to determining his suitability for treatment in the community .
As KRS 533.010(2) contains a presumption in favor of probation, the sentencing court
should first make an informed decision whether to sentence Appellant to a sentence of
probation or conditional discharge . If, and only if, the sentencing court determines that
probation or conditional discharge is inappropriate because "imprisonment is necessary
for the protection of the public" for one or more of the reasons contained in KRS
533 .010(2)(a)-(c), it should direct that Appellant be incarcerated in an institution
operated by the Department of Corrections ."
See KRS 533.010(2) ("[P]robation or conditional discharge shall be granted,
unless the court is of the opinion that imprisonment is necessary for the protection of
the public . . . ." (emphasis added)). Commentary to KRS 533.010 (Banks/Baldwin
1974) ("This subsection seeks to start the sentencing process with probation or
conditional discharge as the desired disposition with a movement from there to a
sentence of imprisonment only upon a finding of some particular reason justifying the
latter.") ; Turner v. Commonwealth , Ky., 914 S .W .2d 343, 347 (1996) ("After considering
both the nature of the crime and the history of the defendant, the trial court should grant
probation unless to do so would place the public in danger. . . .").
14
Although KRS 640.030(2) requires courts also to consider as a sentencing
option "whether the youthful offender shall be returned to the Department of Juvenile
Justice to complete a treatment program . . . ... KRS 640 .030(2)(b), the sentencing court
in this case need not consider that option upon remand as Appellant is now above the
age of nineteen (19), and "youthful offenders shall not remain in the care of the
Department of Juvenile Justice after the age of nineteen (19)." KRS 640.030(3) .
'5
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprtum (
Evixrf of `~fitufixxkV
2000-SC-0274-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1999-CA-0189-MR
SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 1995-CR-0049
BILLY STEWART JEFFRIES
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
I respectfully dissent. Apparently dissatisfied with the result, the majority has
remanded this case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing . But the majority
opinion simply invites the trial court to reach the same conclusion it reached the first
time :
We do not reach the issue of whether the sentencing court
committed error in its refusal to permit the testimony of
specific witnesses . . . . Instead, the trial court should use its
learned discretion when it must determine what process is
due a youthful offender at a sentencing hearing held
pursuant to KRS 640.030(2) . Allowing Jeffries to call
CKYDC treatment staff as witnesses or allowing him to
cross-examine Dr. Peterson may be necessary to provide
Jeffries with an appropriate sentencing hearing . However,
any such decision lies within the due discretion of the trial
court .
Slip op. at 5-6 (emphasis added) . This is not a case where the trial judge thought he
had no discretion . Judge Stewart recognized that he had discretion, he unequivocally
and unambiguously exercised that discretion, and he did so without abuse . To ask him
to do so again is an exercise in futility.
Though the case for harmless error would be a facile one to make, I believe
there was no error because the law supports the trial court's decision to exclude the
witnesses . The majority casts the issue in this case as "what process is due a youthful
offender during a KRS 640 .030(2) sentencing hearing held after he or she has reached
the age of majority ." Slip op. at 3. But that issue was statutorily decided, as Justice
Stumbo observed in Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S .W.2d 12 (1998) : "The
prefatory language of KRS 640.030 states clearly that[) a youthful offender . . . shall be
subject to the same type of sentencing procedures . . . as an adult . . . ." Johnson , 967
S.W .2d at 15, quoting KRS 640 .030. Instead, I suggest that this case presents a
different issue: Does a trial judge at a sentencing hearing have the discretion to
exclude witnesses, offered by the offender, that the judge finds possess no probative
information?
To properly address that issue, we must consider the facts of this case . As
Judge Emberton succinctly observed in his Court of Appeals' dissenting opinion :
"Jeffries' crime was not one of petty, mischievous, juvenile behavior . He committed a
brutal sexual assault on an elderly woman, beating her savagely about the head and
face with rocks, leaving her to die." Court of Appeals' opinion at 7. After a mere eight
months of incarceration and rehabilitation, Jeffries appeared before the judge as an
adult for a new sentence and requested that he be probated, or at most returned to a
juvenile facility for six months, and then discharged . In fact, those are two of only three
options the legislature gave the judge, the final option being to incarcerate Jeffries as
an adult. KRS 640.030. In making this decision, the legislature instructed the judge to
consider (1) whether there is a substantial risk that Jeffries would commit another crime
if probated or discharged, (2) whether Jeffries is in need of correctional treatment, or
(3) whether probation or discharge would "unduly depreciate the seriousness of
[Jeffries'] crime." KRS 533.010.
This Court has made it abundantly clear that in certain cases proper
consideration for the seriousness of the crime is the paramount concern . In Johnson ,
the youthful offender pled guilty to several counts of complicity to kidnapping and
complicity to murder . At his resentencing as an adult, the trial judge examined the
three KRS 533.010 factors and determined that Johnson was not at risk of committing
further crimes and that Johnson received abundant treatment - to which he responded
quite well - but the judge nonetheless denied probation and sentenced Johnson as an
adult solely because of the serious nature of his offenses . In a unanimous opinion, this
Court upheld the trial court's decision :
Here, the record clearly reflects that the trial court
thoughtfully evaluated both the defendant's character and
condition and the nature and circumstances of the crime he
committed . Based on this evaluation, the court clearly felt
that despite the apparently successful rehabilitation of
Appellant, granting him probation would clearly endanger
the public . This danger presents itself not in the form of
Appellant, personally, but rather in the message his
probation would send to the world. Appellant's crime was
indeed serious in nature, but the circumstances surrounding
the crime indicate that it was also particularly cruel,
committed in a callous way, and was apparently motivated
not by passion or desperation, but rather merely by boredom
and a desire to be entertained . To probate Appellant after
only four years of detention, merely because he has cleaned
up his act and apologized, would send a message to other
children that they can get away with such reprehensible
behavior and suffer only minor consequences . The trial
court, in its discretion, obviously felt that to send such a
message would endanger the public .
Johnson , 967 S.W.2d at 15-16 . Unlike Johnson, who had received four years of
treatment by the time he was resentenced, Jeffries had only received eight months of
treatment . That, of course, is because Jeffries was nearly an adult at the time he
committed his brutal crimes . Moreover, Johnson was one of several accomplices, but
Jeffries acted alone .
With these facts properly framed, it is now possible to examine whether the trial
court's decision to exclude certain witnesses violated Jeffries' due process rights . To
the majority's credit, it avoids the specious argument asserted by both defense counsel
and the majority in the Court of Appeals . With respect to cross-examining Dr.
Peterson, defense counsel suggested that he did not know the criteria for the
sentencing hearing, but he did know that Jeffries had "the right to confront and crossexamine his accusers ." The Court of Appeals' majority opinion reiterated that
argument, citing Eldred v. Commonwealth , Ky., 906 S.W .2d 694, 702 (1994), cert.
denied , 516 U .S. 1154, 116 S. Ct . 1034, 134 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1996) ("A denial of
effective cross-examination is a constitutional error of the first magnitude, and no
showing of want of prejudice will cure it.") But that argument is inapposite in this case:
the right to cross-examine witnesses applies to trial, not sentencing . A convicted
person may be permitted to cross-examine witnesses at a sentencing hearing, but he is
not entitled to do so . See United States v. Silverman , 976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (6th Cir.
1992) (en banc) ("[C]onfrontation rights do not apply in sentencing hearings as at a trial
-4-
on the question of guilt or innocence."); See also United States v . Beaulieu , 893 F.2d
1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carmona , 873 F.2d 569, 574 (2nd Cir.
1989). But these cases do more than suspend confrontation clause rights at
sentencing hearings . These cases stand for the idea that after conviction, the process
due a person is diminished : "The Bill of Rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court
focuses most protections in criminal cases on the adjudication of guilt and innocence .
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies at the trial, but not at sentencing .
The right of confrontation does not apply at sentencing ." Stephen Saltzburg, Due
Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 243, fn. 3 (Spring.
2001) (internal citations omitted) . Cf Harris v. United States ,
U .S.
, 122 S . Ct.
2406, 2415, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524, 538 (2002) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S . 241,
69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949)) (Rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing
hearings and the trial judge is allowed wide discretion as to evidence to be considered
in imposing sentence .) See also United States v. Lopez, 898 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11 th
Cir. 1990) ; United States v. Agvemang , 876 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1989) .
Statutory protections, however, may exceed the constitutional baseline, as the
majority correctly points out. For example, RCr 11 .02 permits a defendant to "present
any information in mitigation of punishment." And KRS 532 .050 permits a defendant to
controvert the PSI or psychiatric examination . In order to examine the fairness of the
due process Jeffries received, we must inspect the evidence he offered . With respect
to the treatment center employees who worked with Jeffries for eight months, Jeffries'
counsel informed the court that the employees would testify that he had performed very
well throughout treatment, that they did not testify on behalf of all of their wards (i.e .,
Jeffries was exceptional), and that Jeffries was not likely to reoffend . While this
testimony undoubtedly would have reflected favorably on Jeffries, it simply did not rise
to the level of mitigation evidence given the trial judge's limited options.
Appellant also complains that the trial judge improperly denied him the right to
cross-examine Dr. Peterson . Although not in the record, Dr. Peterson's report
apparently concluded that Jeffries' amenability to treatment was low and his potential to
reoffend was high . Further, the report indicated, Jeffries' past was a good predictor of
his future - he committed these crimes while on home incarceration for previous
crimes. And the fact that Jeffries was a nonadmitter also weighed against his claims of
rehabilitation . Defense counsel argued that he tried to enroll Jeffries in a nonadmitter
rehabilitation program, but was not permitted to do so. He wanted to examine Dr.
Peterson concerning the efficacy of nonadmitter programs and the possibility that
Jeffries would respond well if he was afforded the opportunity to attend one . The trial
judge correctly determined that this line of inquiry would not be appropriate at the
sentencing hearing . Dr. Peterson's testimony, even if favorable to Jeffries, would have
been little more than speculation : she could only testify that if Jeffries had been in a
nonadmitter program, he might have responded favorably or if he were sentenced to a
nonadmitter program for the following six months - the judge's only option besides
release or incarceration - then he would respond well. Such second guessing and
prediction is hardly the type of evidence contemplated by RCr 11 .02 and KRS 532.050.
Finally, the majority determined that "Jeffries did not receive the same treatment
that an adult offender would have received under KRS 532 .050. Jeffries should have
been afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence against him at his
sentencing hearing ." Slip op. at 4. But the majority offers no case law to support the
claim that these witnesses would have been permitted at an adult sentencing hearing .
In fact, the trial judge asserted that he would not have allowed these witnesses at an
adult proceeding .
To conclude, I agree with Judge Emberton that Jeffries was afforded all the
process he was due by the trial court. A psychological report and a PSI were prepared
on Jeffries and these documents were examined by counsel and the trial judge .
Jeffries was represented by counsel at the hearing . Jeffries' counsel was permitted to
admit evidence and argue on Jeffries' behalf. Given the nature of the crime, the
diminished due process rights at sentencing, the limited probativeness of the proposed
testimony, the limited sentencing choices afforded the trial court, and the court's
discretion to admit evidence, I agree with Judge Stewart that these witnesses would
have been superfluous .
Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join this dissenting opinion .
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