TERRANCE A . BRASHER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 13, 2002
WITHDRAWN : FEBRUARY 20, 2003
REISSUED: FEBRUARY X2003
NOT TO BE
"SixprMmr (90urf of
2000-SC-0130-MR
TERRANCE A. BRASHER
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
1998-CR-2206
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Terrance Brasher, was convicted of manslaughter in the second
degree, trafficking in the first degree while in possession of a firearm, and tampering
with physical evidence . Appellant was sentenced to ten years, thirteen years, and one
year respectively on each of the convictions . The sentences run consecutively and
result in a period of incarceration totaling twenty-four years . Appellant now brings this
appeal as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). For the reasons set forth herein,
we reverse and remand .
Appellant, who was seventeen years of age at the time, was staying at the
residence of his girlfriend, Keisha Tiller. During the early morning hours of July 26,
1998, Keisha Tiller's brother, Terrance Tiller, and Melvina Hamilton attempted to enter
the residence through the back entrance . Appellant heard someone and pointed a gun
at the back door. As Terrance Tiller inserted his key into the doorlock, Appellant fired a
shot through the door, which struck Melvina Hamilton in the chest. After the shooting,
Keisha Tiller gathered up some drugs and drug paraphernalia and placed them in a
box . Appellant took the box and concealed it in a neighbor's yard . He subsequently
returned and placed the gun in the same box.
The police arrived and took Appellant, Keisha Tiller, and Terrance Tiller to the
station house for questioning . They all received Miranda warnings, and were
questioned about what knowledge they possessed regarding the earlier events . Later
that morning, the police told Appellant that Melvina Hamilton passed away. Appellant
then confessed that he was the one who shot her earlier that morning . Appellant was
subsequently charged with wanton murder, trafficking while in possession of a firearm,
and tampering with physical evidence . Appellant was originally brought into court as a
juvenile, but was soon transferred to circuit court for trial as an adult on the grounds
that a firearm was involved in the crimes charged . A jury found Appellant guilty of
second-degree manslaughter, trafficking while in possession of a firearm, and
tampering with physical evidence. The jury's recommended sentences totaled twentyfour years, which were to run consecutively, and were adopted by the trial court.
Appellant then brought this matter of right appeal.
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION
Appellant argues that his confession should have been suppressed because it
was taken in violation of KRS 610 .220 . KRS 610.220(2) provides that a juvenile cannot
be held in custody for more than two hours . Appellant argues that he was in custody
for a time period greater than two hours, and his parents were never notified . He
argues that he was held illegally and any statements that he made, including his
confession, should have been suppressed by the trial court as "fruit of the poisonous
tree."
The trial court denied the motion to suppress Appellant's confession and allowed
the confession into evidence . The trial court found that while statutes concerning
juveniles, like KRS 610.220, should not be taken lightly, a violation of the statute alone
did not support suppression in this case . Rather, the trial court found that given the
totality of the circumstances, Appellant understood the consequences of waiving his
rights and that the confession was voluntary .
Appellant asserts that KRS 610 .220 was violated, and a new trial is required at
which his confession would be excluded . We disagree . The violation of KRS 610.220,
or any similar statute, should not be the sole determinative factor with regard to a
motion to suppress a confession. We find that the better approach, which was followed
by the trial court, is to ascertain if the confession was voluntary based on the totality of
the circumstances . This approach has been adopted by many of our sister states
regarding the voluntariness of a juvenile's statements . State v. Sugg, 456 S .E.2d 469
(W . Va . 1995) ; In Re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271 (R .I . 1987) ; Commonwealth v. Williams , 475
A.2d 1283 (Pa . 1984). That being said, however, we cannot ignore the significance of
statutes like KRS 610 .220 that concern juveniles . Regarding a similar statute, KRS
610.200, it has been said that "where a juvenile defendant properly challenges the
voluntariness of his or her confession, trial courts should consider an investigating
officer's failure to comply with KRS 610.200 as evidence relevant to the voluntariness
inquiry." Murphy v. Commonwealth , Ky., 50 S .W .3d 173, 187 (2001) (Justice Keller,
concurring) . "[T]rial courts should consider police authorities' compliance with the
provisions of KRS 610 .200 as an important variable in determining whether a juvenile's
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confession was given voluntarily." Id. We recognize that statutes like KRS 610.220
and 610 .200 are important for the protection of juvenile defendants in our penal system .
However, we decline to accept Appellant's argument that his confession must be
automatically suppressed . There existed evidence at trial that tended to show that the
interviewing officers did not even know Appellant's age until after he confessed . Trial
courts should always consider whether statutes such as KRS 610 .220 have been
violated in determining whether to suppress a voluntary confession . However, that is
only one factor to be considered, and trial courts should review the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the confession before a decision is rendered . We find that
this is the approach the trial court selected in addressing this issue, and find no error
was committed .
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT SEPARATE TRIALS
Appellant asserts that it was error for the trial court to fail to sever the trials on
the wanton murder and drug trafficking charges. Appellant further claims that he
suffered unfair prejudice based on the fact that evidence concerning the murder charge
would not be otherwise admissible in a separate trial for the trafficking offense .
Likewise, Appellant claims that evidence concerning the trafficking charge would not
otherwise be admissible in a separate trial for the murder . We disagree with Appellant's
assertions and find no error in the trial court's decision to not grant separate trials.
RCR 6 .18 provides for joinder of two or more offenses if they are "transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan ." RCr 9 .16
provides that a trial court must grant separate trials if it appears that a joinder of
offenses would be prejudicial to the defendant. In general, we have held that a trial
judge has broad discretion in deciding if a motion for separate trials should be granted
or denied, and a defendant has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced and that
there was a clear abuse of discretion . Sherley v. Commonwealth , Ky., 889 S.W.2d 794,
800 (1994) ; Harris v. Commonwealth , Ky., 556 S.W .2d 669, 670 (1977) . Here it was
incumbent upon Appellant to show that the trial judge abused her discretion in not
granting his motion to sever the wanton murder and trafficking offenses into separate
trials. Because Appellant failed to show any abuse by the trial judge, he has not proven
that he suffered any prejudice in having the two charges tried at the same time .
It is our opinion that the murder and trafficking offenses were closely connected
in order to be joined under RCr 6 .18. The weapon that caused the death of Melvina
Hamilton was found in the same location as the narcotics and paraphernalia, over
which Appellant possessed control . Appellant was also convicted of tampering, which
can be linked to both the wanton murder and drug trafficking charges . In addition, the
specific trafficking charge in question involves possession of a firearm . Here the
firearm was the weapon used to end the life of Melvina Hamilton . There was ample
evidence to support joining the offenses into one trial . Appellant has made no showing
that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision . Hence, we find no error in the trial
court denying Appellant's motion for separate trials .
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant contends that the jury instructions concerning imperfect self-protection
were improperly worded and deprived him of his right to present a defense to a properly
instructed jury and his right to a fair trial. We agree.
The jury was instructed on three different degrees of homicide : wanton murder,
second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide . Based on the evidence,
Appellant was also entitled to instructions on the defenses of self-protection, protection
of others, protection against burglary, and imperfect self-defense (i .e ., wanton or
reckless belief as to need for, or degree of, physical force .) See KRS 503 .050 and KRS
503 .120 . At the jury-instruction hearing, the parties discussed the appropriate imperfect
self-protection instructions based on our decision in Elliott v. Commonwealth , Ky., 976
S .W .2d 416 (1998), in which we shed light on the proper application of KRS 503 .120(1).
Defense counsel argued that according to Elliott , if the defendant had a wanton
belief regarding the need for or degree of protection required, the defendant could not
be convicted of a homicide greater than second-degree manslaughter and if the
defendant had a reckless belief regarding self-protection, the defendant could not be
convicted of a homicide greater than reckless murder . The trial court, however,
concluded that under Elliott , if a defendant had a wanton or reckless belief regarding
self-protection, that belief merely precluded a conviction for intentional homicide . That
is, under the trial judge's interpretation of Elliott , a defendant's reckless belief regarding
self-protection could preclude an intentional homicide conviction, but could not reduce a
conviction from second-degree manslaughter to reckless homicide . Accordingly, the
trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the defendant had either a reckless or
wanton belief regarding self-protection, "[t]hen the defenses of self-protection,
protection of others and protection against burglary were not available to the Defendant
and you will find the Defendant either not guilty or guilty under Instructions No. 1
[wanton murder], 2 [second-degree manslaughter], and 3 [reckless homicide] without
regard to those defenses ." (Emphasis added). The trial court arrived at this instruction
by altering model jury instruction §11 .0813 (see 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to
Juries (Criminal) ).
In Commonwealth v. Hage , Ky., 41 S.W.3d 828 (2001), we revisited the "wanton
or reckless belief qualification ." Unlike Elliott , Halter involved both intentional and
unintentional homicide instructions, so the resolution of the present issue is more
readily apparent. In Halter , Justice Cooper wrote that " . . a recklessly held belief in the
need to act in self-protection is a defense to an offense requiring either intent or
wantonness . . . ." Halter at 842 (emphasis added) . It is clear from Hager that the
position advocated by defense counsel at trial in this case was correct. The instructions
the trial court gave the jury effectively nullified Appellant's self-protection defense if the
jury found Appellant acted recklessly or wantonly . Appellant was ultimately convicted of
second-degree manslaughter, a crime with a wanton mental state . Under Hager, if the
jury found that Appellant acted recklessly in defending himself, he should not have
been convicted of a homicide greater than reckless homicide . Because the instructions
in this case do not permit that result, they are improper . Because this error may have
resulted in a conviction of second-degree manslaughter instead of reckless homicide,
we cannot say the error was harmless . Accordingly, we reverse the trial court on this
issue and remand this case for a new trial consistent with this opinion and our opinion
in Hca er.
EVIDENCE CONCERNING TRAFFICKING CONVICTION
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
the trafficking offense . He now asks this Court to reverse this case and direct the trial
court to enter a directed verdict of acquittal on the trafficking charge . Appellant
concedes taking possession of the drugs, but asserts his clear intent was directed
toward disposal or destruction of the drugs . He further asserts that this is all that the
Commonwealth could prove .
We have held a "trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the
defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence."
Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186,187-88 (1991). Here the
Commonwealth produced evidence far greater than a mere scintilla . There is evidence
that Appellant exercised control over the drugs when he placed the gun in the box
containing the drugs, which he had already deposited in a neighbor's yard . In addition,
only the fingerprints of Appellant could be identified on the box containing the drugs .
While much of the evidence is circumstantial, it cannot be said that there was a lack of
sufficient evidence for a rational jury to reach a decision . Whenever a motion for a
directed verdict is made, "the trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony." Id . At 187. Without question, the evidence
presented was sufficient to go to the jury, and we find nothing improper with the jury's
decision . The trial court did not commit error when it denied Appellant's motion for
directed verdict of acquittal .
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW
APPELLANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE KEARNY
Appellant contends that he was denied his right to confrontation when the trial
court would not permit him to cross-examine Detective Kearny, the officer who elicited
Appellant's confession, regarding an earlier suppression hearing . Appellant sought to
question Kearny about his knowledge of KRS 610 .220 and if he was aware of
Appellant's age. The trial judge would not allow that line of questioning on crossexamination because she did not want the substance of the suppression hearing to be
presented before the jury. Appellant asserts that the trial court's decision was incorrect,
and that the testimony elicited from Kearny on cross-examination was relevant to show
bias. We agree with Appellant that the trial court should have allowed his crossexamination . It was error for the trial court to not allow the jury to hear the crossexamination of Kearny. However, we find the error to be nonprejudicial . The test of
nonprejudicial, or harmless, error is whether there is any substantial possibility that the
outcome of the case would have been any different without the presence of that error.
Commonwealth v. McIntosh , Ky., 646 S .W .2d 43, 45 (1983). While we agree that
Appellant should have been allowed to cross-examine Kearny in order to show bias, the
avowal produced no testimony that would have influenced the jury's decision .
"PROFILE" TESTIMONY
Appellant also alleges that it was error for the trial court to allow a former
narcotics officer to give testimony, which Appellant characterizes as "profile" testimony .
However, this issue was not properly preserved because the objection was not timely
made. RCr 9.22 . Appellant also urges this Court to review this issue as "substantial
error" under RCr 10 .26 . We decline to do so because there is nothing to suggest that
manifest injustice occurred . This issue is not preserved and merits no consideration
from this Court .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
reversed and this case is remanded for trial in accordance with this Opinion .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur . Cooper, J.,
concurs in result only. Wintersheimer, J ., dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
,9ixpxme Courf of ~rnfurkg
2000-SC-0130-MR
TERRANCE A. BRASHER
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSO N, JUDGE
1998-CR-2206
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND WITHDRAWING AND REISSUING OPINION
The petition for rehearing filed by the Appellant, Terrance A. Brasher, is hereby
granted . There shall be no additional briefing .
The Memorandum Opinion of the Court rendered herein on June 13, 2002, is
hereby withdrawn and the attached Memorandum Opinion is reissued in lieu thereof .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents and would not grant rehearing .
Entered : February 20, 2003.
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