DENVER DENNIS ALLEN V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003
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DENVER DENNIS ALLEN
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A circuit court jury found Appellant, Denver Dennis Allen, guilty of two
counts of first-degree sodomy : count one being that Appellant committed first-degree
sodomy against K.M. and count two being that he committed first-degree sodomy
against N .B. Accordingly, he was sentenced "to two terms of twenty-three years
imprisonment, to run concurrently . He now seeks to have this Court reverse both
convictions and remand his case for a new trial on both counts or, alternatively, reverse
and remand the first-degree sodomy conviction with respect to K.M .
K.M. and N.B . were neighborhood friends . During the 1998-1999 school
year, the two girls, ages ten and eleven respectively, would visit Appellant at his
apartment in order to get cigarettes. The girls testified that he would also give them
beer, wine, and food stamps. While at his home, Appellant would show the girls
pornographic magazines which depicted women "licking" each other. On several
occasions, Appellant asked K.M . and N .B . if he could perform oral sex on them .
According to testimony at trial, during two separate visits, Appellant sodomized the girls
by performing oral sex on each.
On April 9, 1999, a Kenton Circuit Court Grand Jury indicted Appellant on
two counts of first-degree sodomy. The trial for both counts commenced on July 13,
1999 . The Commonwealth called K .M ., one of the victims who at the time of trial was
eleven years old, as a witness . She was a difficult witness to examine on both direct
and cross, although more so during cross-examination . The Commonwealth's entire
direct examination occurred in the courtroom . On direct, K.M . would cry and lay her
head down when questioned about the sodomy . Her emotional state heightened,
however, when defense counsel began his cross-examination . Before the cross
started, the trial judge permitted the Commonwealth's Attorney to place an easel
between K.M . and the defendant . As the defense attorney began to question K.M ., her
behavior deteriorated : she cried, refused to answer questions, and placed her head on
the table in front of her. The trial court recessed twice and had two victim advocates sit
at the witness stand beside K .M., but that did not help her condition . Then the trial
judge moved K.M . to his chambers where only he, the two attorneys, and the victim
advocate were present. Cross-examination was conducted in chambers and the jury
watched via closed circuit television . K.M . remained very emotional and silent for much
of the examination . After it was over, the jury advised the judge that it was unable to
hear K.M .'s responses on the television . Accordingly, the judge replayed the video tape
cross-examination for the jury the next morning .
On July 14, 1999, the jury convicted Allen on both counts of first-degree
sodomy, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years imprisonment .
Appellant now appeals as a matter of right . Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b) .
Appellant asserts three claims of error: (1) that the trial court abused its
discretion when it allowed K.M. to testify via closed circuit television, thereby violating
the procedures outlined in KRS 421 .350(2) and KRS 421 .350(4) and violating
Appellant's federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation and to a fair and
impartial jury trial; (2) that the trial court erred to Appellant's substantial prejudice by
allowing two different victim advocates, as well as a police officer, to remain with K.M.
during her testimony thereby violating KRS 421 .350(2); and (3) the trial court erred by
overruling defense counsel's motions to strike the entire testimony of K.M . on the basis
of incompetency .
I. KRS 421 .350(2) and (5)
The first issue Appellant raises is that the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to comply with the procedures outlined in KRS 421 .350(2) and KRS
421 .350(5)' by allowing K.M ., a victim in this case, to testify via closed circuit television .
He argues that allowing the closed circuit television testimony denied him his federal
and state constitutional rights to confrontation and to a fair and impartial trial . U .S .
Const. amends . VI, XIV; Ky. Const. §§ 2, 11 .
KRS 421 .350(2), entitled: "Testimony of child allegedly victim of illegal
sexual activity," provides :
The court may, on the motion of the attorney for any party
and upon a finding of compelling need, order that the
testimony of the child be taken in a room other than the
'Throughout the briefs, both parties cite to the "compelling need" definition as subsection
(4), however the definition is actually found in subsection (5).
3
courtroom and be televised by closed circuit equipment in
the courtroom to be viewed by the court and the finder of
fact in the proceeding . Only the attorneys for the defendant
and for the state, persons necessary to operate the
equipment, and any person whose presence the court finds
would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child
may be present in the room with the child during his
testimony . Only the attorneys may question the child . The
persons operating the equipment shall be confined to an
adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits
them to see and hear the child during his testimony, but
does not permit the child to see or hear them. The court
shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the
testimony of the child in person, but shall ensure that the
child cannot hear or see the defendant.
KRS 421 .350(2). This statute defines a child as one who is twelve years of age or
younger. KRS 421 .350(1). Essentially, the statute allows the trial court to obtain the
child victim's testimony via closed circuit television upon a showing that there is a
compelling need to do so . KRS 421 .350(5) defines "compelling need." It provides that:
"For the purpose of subsection (2) . . . of this section, `compelling need' is defined as
the substantial probability that the child would be unable to reasonably communicate
because of serious emotional distress produced by the defendant's presence."
This Court has recently held that to lawfully permit a child witness to testify
via closed-circuit television pursuant to KRS 421 .350(2), the proof must demonstrate a
"compelling need" for such action . In Price v. Commonwealth , during the testimony of
the child victim, the appellant was excluded from the courtroom and was required to
watch the proceedings from another room on closed-circuit television . This was so,
despite the fact that the testimony of the child witness "was lucid and unemotional . ,3
We held the trial court to have erred and commented as follows :
2 Ky., 31 S.W .3d 885 (2000).
3 Id. at 891 .
No hearing was held nor finding made with respect to
whether there was a compelling need to employ [KRS
421 .350(2)]. . . . The record does not contain a motion by
the Commonwealth to permit [the child] to testify outside the
presence of Appellant . The procedure described in KRS
421 .350(2) may not be utilized absent proof and a specific
finding of a compelling need therefor.
Appellant, herein, makes much of the absence of a motion by the Commonwealth and
the absence of an express finding of a "compelling need ." Relying on the language
quoted hereinabove, Appellant contends that Price mandates reversal.
This case differs significantly from Price. Here, the child witness was
reluctant, perhaps uncooperative, and certainly highly emotional . The trial court
attempted to fashion a means to elicit the testimony by placing an easel between the
child and the defendant to block her view, but this was unsuccessful . The trial court
also sought other means to minimize any anxiety, but to no avail . After a recess to give
K .M. an opportunity to regain her composure, the Commonwealth suggested that K.M .
testify outside the courtroom and, over the defendant's objection, the trial court granted
the motion and allowed the statutory procedure to be followed . While the trial court did
not expressly find a compelling need, from the circumstances and the trial court's failed
attempts to otherwise obtain the testimony, there is no doubt that the court believed
there was a compelling need .
This case is more analogous to Danner v. Commonwealth s in which the
victim was twelve or younger when the crimes were committed, but older than twelve
when she gave testimony. Despite her age, we held the statute to be ambiguous in
certain respects and relied extensively on trial court discretion . Herein, there were
4 Id . at 894 .
5 Ky., 963 S .W .2d 632 (1998).
ample grounds for the trial court to determine the existence of a compelling need and
utilization of KRS 421 .350(2) . The trial court's ruling, though not expressly stated,
leaves no doubt that such a determination was made . Under no circumstances did the
trial court lightly regard the right of the defendant to be present at all stages of the trial
and his right to confront the witness face to face .' There was no abuse of discretion .
II. Victim Advocates
Appellant's second argument is that the trial court erred to his substantial
prejudice when it allowed two different victim advocates and a police officer, who was a
testifying witness for the Commonwealth, to remain with K.M . during her testimony.
During the trial, K.M. became upset. As a result, the trial court allowed
two different victim advocates to sit beside K.M., at different times during crossexamination, in order to calm and comfort her in hopes of getting her to answer the
questions . In addition, a testifying witness for the Commonwealth, Detective Marty
Epperson, also joined K.M ., but the trial court sustained an objection to the detective's
presence . The record reflects that the trial court overruled the objection to the
presence of the advocates because :
The statute mandates that we accommodate child witnesses
in many respects . Shorten the length of their testimony,
making them comfortable, blocking their sight line to the
defendant, in these kind of cases and so on . Unless they
are telling her what to say, which I don't think is true, if they
are merely trying to calm her down, so we can get through
this, that's perfectly acceptable .
As a result, one of the victim advocates remained with K.M. during her entire testimony
on cross-examination . Appellant now argues that this bolstered K.M .'s credibility,
'See Temple v. Commonwealth , 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769 (1879) .
6
thereby denying him a fair and impartial jury trial .
Both Appellant and the Commonwealth assert that KRS 421 .350 allows
testifying child witnesses to be accommodated during trial . Appellant, however, argues
that allowing the advocate to accompany the victim on the stand is going too far. He
even cites to other states to make this argument . He fails, however, to cite to KRS
421 .575. This statute, entitled: "Role of victim advocates in court proceedings,"
provides that:
In all court proceedings, a victim advocate, upon request of
the victim, shall be allowed to accompany the victim during
the proceeding to provide moral and emotional support. The
victim advocate shall be allowed to confer orally and in
writing with the victim in a reasonable manner. However, the
victim advocate shall not provide legal advice or legal
counsel to the crime victim in violation of KRS 421 .570 and
524.130 .
KRS 421 .575 . At a minimum, the trial court has discretion under the statute to permit
the victim advocate to sit with a child victim during her testimony.
III. Competency
Appellant's final argument is that the trial court erred to his substantial
prejudice when it overruled his motion to strike the entire testimony of K.M . on the basis
of incompetency . The governing rule is KRE 601, entitled "Competency." It provides :
(a) General. Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided for in these rules or by statute .
(b) Minimal qualifications . A person is disqualified to testify as a
witness if the trial court determines that he :
(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive accurately the matters
about which he proposes to testify ;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts ;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as to be
understood, either directly or through an interpreter; or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of a witness
to tell the truth.
KRE 601 . Appellant's argument, specifically, is that K.M. "lacked the capacity to
express [herself] so as to be understood, either directly or through an interpreter ."'
Therefore, he argues, the trial court abused its discretion when it ultimately admitted
her testimony .
This Court recently addressed the issue of competency of a child
witness . 8 In that case, the appellant argued that the eleven-year-old child witness was
incompetent to testify against him because of inconsistencies in her testimony about
the sexual abuse he committed against her. That case is factually distinguishable from
the present one because there the witness had difficulty recollecting facts. KRE
601(b)(2) . However, the Court made clear that "KRE 601 recognizes a presumption of
competency and permits disqualification of a witness only upon proof of
incompetency."9 The Court looked to the Commentary to KRE 601 for guidance. It
provides :
This provision serves to establish a minimum standard of
testimonial competency for witnesses. It is designed to
empower the trial judge to exclude the testimony of a
witness who is so mentally incapacitated or so mentally
immature that no testimony of probative worth could be
expected from the witness. It should be applied grudgingly,
only against the "incapable" witness and never against the
"incredible" witness, since the triers of fact are particularly
adept at judging credibility .'o
During her testimony, K.M. cried, placed her head on the desk in front of
her, and refused to answer many questions . This happened during both the direct and
7KRE 601(b)(3) .
'See Price v. Commonwealth .
9Price , 31 S .W.3d at 891 .
lo Commentary to KRE 601, Evidence Rules Study Committee, Final Draft (1989) .
8
cross examinations, although the record reflects that it was more difficult to examine
her on cross . Twice during cross-examination, the trial court expressed concern about
K.M .'s competency to testify . However, at the end of her testimony, the record reflects
that after defense counsel's motion to strike K.M.'s testimony, the trial court stated :
[K.M .'s] difficulty in answering questions occurred on direct
as well as cross. She has limited information to give the
jury, not able to give a lot of information is a plus. The
difficulty in questioning her is balanced by the fact that she
was not able to give that much information on direct anyway.
It was not as if she gave sterling information on direct and
then shut down on cross. . . .
It is clear from the record that K.M. was a very difficult witness to examine,
especially during cross-examination . At one point during that examination, the trial
court instructed defense counsel to stop asking questions dealing with the events of the
sodomy, which was the heart of the case against Appellant . Defense counsel objected
to the admission of her testimony on two separate occasions, both of which the trial
court overruled .
This Court has held that "[a] decision by the trial court [concerning
evidentiary matters] will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion ."" It
is well established that "[i]t is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine
whether a witness is competent to testify."" This is because "[t]he trial judge is in the
unique position to observe witnesses and to determine their competency ."" The
standard that the trial court should use when determining whether a child witness is
"
Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1996) .
Wombles v. Commonwealth , Ky., 831 S .W .2d 172, 174 (1992) (citing Pendleton v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549, 551 (1985)) .
12
13
Id . (quoting Stincer v. Commonwealth , Ky., 712 S.W.2d 939 (1986)) .
9
competent to testify is "whether she (or he) is sufficiently intelligent to observe, recollect
and narrate the facts and has a moral sense of obligation to speak the truth ." 14 The trial
court committed no abuse of discretion when it admitted K.M .'s testimony over the
objections by defense counsel . It is clear from the record that the court had
reservations about K.M.'s competency from its own comments at side-bar, but resolved
the close question in favor of allowing the testimony .
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court .
Lambert, C .J ., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and
Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. Stumbo, J ., dissents by separate opinion .
'4
Capps v. Commonwealth , Ky., 560 S .W .2d 559, 560 (1977) (quoting Moore v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 384 S .W .2d 498 (1964)) .
10
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Carol R. Camp
John Palombi
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocates
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : JANUARY 23, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
~u#reme 11nud of lKienturkLi
1999-SC-0897-MR
DENVER DENNIS ALLEN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO . 99-CR-00174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Respectfully, I must dissent. While I have great sympathy for the difficulty
inherent in obtaining coherent, competent testimony from child victims of sexual abuse,
in the case herein, the trial court erred in implementing KRS 421 .350(2) so as to obtain
the testimony of K.M . without first making a finding of a compelling need . Prior to the
making of such a finding there must be a motion by the Commonwealth and a specific
finding of necessity . In Price v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 31 S.W.3d 885, 894 (2000), we
stated
No hearing was held nor finding made with respect to
whether there was a compelling need to employ
[KRS.421 .350(2)] . . . . The record does not contain a motion
by the Commonwealth to permit [the child] to testify outside
the presence of Appellant . The procedure described in KRS
421 .350(2) may not be utilized absent proof and a specific
finding of a compelling need therefor.
The requirements of the statute must be met before the Constitutional right to confront
witnesses is to be compromised . This is reversible error.
Additionally, and more importantly, I doubt that the child victim in this case was
competent to testify at this trial . She was eleven years old at the time of the trial and
was difficult to examine on both direct and cross examination . During the direct
examination, K .M . cried and laid her head down when questioned about the sodomy
charge . When cross examination began, K.M . became even more emotional even
though an easel was placed between the victim and the defendant . She refused to
answer questions, cried and placed her head on the table in front of her. Court was
recessed twice to allow the child to regain her composure and the trial judge permitted
two victim's advocates to sit with her at the witness stand . She was still unable to
respond to defense counsel's questions . Finally, K.M., counsel and the trial judge
moved to chambers and the examination continued with the jury watching via closed
circuit television . At one point during the cross examination, the trial court instructed
counsel to cease asking questions dealing with the sodomy count, which was in fact the
heart of the case against Appellant . On two occasions during the cross, the trial court
expressed concern over K.M .'s competency and twice counsel moved to strike her
testimony . After the testimony was completed, the jury advised the court that they were
unable to hear K.M .'s responses on the television so the court had to have the tape
played for the jury the next day .
While it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a
witness is competent to testify, this particular testimony degenerated into a painful
exercise in torture for the child involved . The jury twice saw an inarticulate child
reduced to tears and unable to answer questions that went to the heart of the case
against the defendant against whom she was testifying . While she may have had the
capacity to observe and recollect the facts about which she testified, she was certainly
not able to narrate them in a coherent fashion due to her highly emotional state . I
would reverse and remand for a new trial .
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