ROBERT L. TEMPLETON V. KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
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2001 -SC-0459-KB
ROBERT L. TEMPLETON
V.
IN SUPREME COURT
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENT
OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to SCR 3.480(3), Movant, Robert L. Templeton, requests that Kentucky
Bar Association (KBA) proceedings against him be terminated on the basis of his
admission that he violated those provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct set
forth in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Inquiry Commission’s charge against him, and by
imposition of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year. For the
reasons described herein, the KBA concurs with this request.
On February 6, 2001, the Inquiry Commission issued a seven-count amended
charge against Movant regarding his representation of Michelle Rowe. In August 1995,
Rowe’s father, John Petty, died leaving his entire estate to his spouse. Rowe retained
Movant to file a lawsuit against Petry’s widow alleging fraud in her dealings with Petty.
On November 29, 1995, Rowe and her husband caused Petty’s home to be sold. As a
condition of the sale, $10,000.00 of the proceeds was placed in Movant’s escrow
account to protect the buyers if the widow challenged the sale. After the conditions of
the sale had been met, Movant was to deduct his fee from the $10,000.00 and release
the balance to Rowe. At the time these charges were filed, Movant had not done so.
On October 4, 1999, Rowe terminated her attorney/client relationship with
Movant and requested, by letter, that he send her an itemized bill, deduct his fee from
the escrow account, and forward to her the balance of the account and her file. Rowe
repeated her demands by letter of January 28, 2000. Movant failed to respond to either
letter or to comply with the requests. On May 17, 2000, Rowe’s husband filed a Bar
Complaint against Movant. Movant did not respond. The Kentucky Bar Association
sent Movant a letter reminding him of his failure to respond. Movant still did not
respond. The Inquiry Commission then ordered Movant to respond before August 12,
2000. Again, he did not respond. On August 29, 2000, the Inquiry Commission
initiated proceedings seeking temporary suspension of Movant’s license to practice law.
On December 21, 2000, this Court entered an order temporarily suspending Movant
from the practice of law. Inauiry Commission v. Templeton, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 570 (2000).
Movant has not been reinstated.
On January 8, 2001, Movant filed a petition requesting that the order of
temporary suspension be dissolved. Attached to this petition was an invoice dated
“January 2001” containing an itemization of legal services performed on behalf of Rowe
and charging a total fee of $8,654.00.
On January 12, 2001, Rowe received from
Movant her file, the January 2001 invoice, and a check drawn on Movant’s escrow
account in the sum of $1,346.00. Along with an affidavit filed with the Kentucky Bar
Association, Mrs. Rowe and her husband furnished an invoice they received from
Movant, dated April 7, 1998, containing an itemization of services performed as of that
date supporting a total fee of approximately $4,000.00.
The Rowes contended that any
services performed by Movant on their behalf after April 7, 1998 were negligible.
Count I of the amended charge filed against Movant by the Inquiry Commission
alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-I .16(d), “Declining or terminating representation,” for
failing to “surrender[] papers and property to which the client is entitled and refund[] any
advance payment of fee that has not been earned.”
Count II alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-I. 15(b), “Safekeeping property,” for
failing to “promptly deliver to the client . . . any funds or other property that the client . .
is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client . . promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.”
Count III alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-8.3(c), “Misconduct,” for “engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” for failing to return
Rowe’s funds and belongings after being requested to do so on two different occasions.
The KBA explains that this Count differed from Count II in that it was premised upon
Movant’s having either commingled Rowe’s money with his own or misappropriated
Rowe’s money to his own use.
Count IV alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-I .4(a), “Communication,” for failing to
“keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information” by not responding to telephone calls and the
two letters requesting return of funds and property belonging to Rowe.
Count V alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-8.1(b), “Bar admission and disciplinary
matters,” for “knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority” by failing to respond to the Bar Complaint filed by
Rowe.
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Count VI alleged another violation of SCR 3.130-8.3(c), “Misconduct,” for
“engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” by
preparing and sending an incorrect itemized invoice to Rowe.
Count VII alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-3.3(a)(l), “Candor towards the
tribunal,” by making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal” by knowingly
filing an incorrect itemized invoice with this Court in support of Movant’s petition to
dissolve the order of temporary suspension.
Movant denies Counts III, VI, and VII, asserting that he did not engage in
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation with respect to Rowe’s money and that
the January 2000 itemized invoice was correct in that he performed all of the work listed
in the invoice. Movant asks that these charges be dismissed. Movant admits the
charges set forth in Counts I, II, IV and V.
In concurring with the proposed disposition, the KBA advises that, after
investigating and obtaining additional documentation with respect to the services
itemized in the January 2000 invoice, it is satisfied that those services were, in fact,
performed; and, thus, Counts VI and VII, which were premised upon the filing of an
incorrect itemized invoice, should be dismissed. The KBA also advises that its
investigation also revealed that Movant neither commingled Rowe’s money with his own
nor misappropriated it to his own use; thus, the charge in Count III essentially merged
with the charges in Count II.
In agreeing to Movant’s motion for a one-year suspension, the KBA relies on
prior cases in which one-year suspensions were imposed for similar violations. These
cases involved attorneys who had failed to promptly return unearned portions of fees
upon termination of representation. Kentuckv Bar Association v. Thomas, Ky., 894
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S.W.2d 639 (1995); Kentuckv Bar Association v. Boling, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 597 (1995);
Kentucky Bar Association v. Harris, Ky., 875 S.W.2d
97 (1994).
Upon the foregoing facts, charges, and precedents, it is ordered that:
1. Counts III, VI, and VII of the charges against Movant are dismissed.
2. Movant is adjudged to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
described in Counts I, II, IV and V and is hereby suspended from the practice of law in
the Commonwealth of Kentucky for one year. The period of suspension shall
commence on December 21,200O and continue until such time as Movant is reinstated
to the practice of law by order of this Court pursuant to SCR 3.510 or any controlling
amendment to SCR 3.510.
3. In accordance with SCR 3.450 and SCR 3.480(3), Movant is directed to pay
all costs associated with the disciplinary proceedings against him, said sum being
$165.90, for which execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this opinion and
order.
4. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, Movant shall, within ten (10) days from the entry of
this order, if he has not already done so, notify all clients in writing of his inability to
represent them, and notify all courts in which he has matters pending of his suspension
from the practice of law, and furnish copies of said letters of notice to the Director of the
Kentucky Bar Association.
5. Pursuant to an additional agreement between the KBA and Movant, before
seeking reinstatement to the practice of law, Movant shall be evaluated by an
independent medical professional chosen by the Character and Fitness Committee, but
subject to selection of a different medical professional should a conflict of interest arise
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with the original selection. Movant shall pay all fees and costs associated with the
evaluation.
Cooper, Johnstone, Keller and Stumbo, JJ., concur. Graves, J., dissents by
separate opinion, with Lambert, C.J., and Wintersheimer, J., joining that dissent.
ENTERED: September 27,200l.
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TO BE PUBLISHED
2001 -SC-0459-KB
MOVANT
ROBERT L. TEMPLETON
V.
IN SUPREME COURT
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENT
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Respectfully, I must dissent. The Kentucky Bar Association desires to dismiss
Counts III, VI, and VII and punish Respondent in accordance with his admitted guilt of
Counts I, II, IV, and V. Given the evidence that Respondent padded his bill and did not
return Rowe’s escrow money until forced to do so, dismissal of Counts III, VI, and VII is
not justified. This Court should instead resolve these issues to determine whether
Respondent is guilty and deserving of greater punishment. If so, Rocky and Michelle
Rowe are entitled to repayment of the money taken by Respondent.
Respondent’s tardiness in returning Rocky and Michelle Rowe’s money and the
irregularities in Respondent’s bill lie at the heart of the complaint against Respondent.
The present arrangement, wherein Respondent gains the dismissal of the three more
serious charges by admitting to the lesser counts, does not produce a just result. Not
only does this decision leave the Rowes without a remedy for their loss, it also prevents
further inquiry into events which could warrant a much stiffer penalty for Respondent.
Respondent himself requested that he be suspended for one year in return for dropping
charges III, VI, and VII, perhaps because he knew that a close examination of the facts
would result in greater punishment.
In their affidavit, the Rowes stated that they expected Respondent’s bill to be
very close to $4,000. They were understandably alarmed when the bill proved to be
more than twice that figure. Even more disconcerting were the charges for work done
years before which were not included in any prior invoices up to that date. Given the
delays and incompetence that Respondent has already admitted, it is more than
probable that the Rowes’ claims are well-founded. Regardless of the positions of both
the Kentucky Bar Association and Respondent, justice requires that this Court examine
charges III, VI, and VII so that the Rowes will have a potential remedy and Respondent
will receive his proper punishment.
Respondent’s actions have accelerated the decline in the public’s perception of
the morality of lawyers, and have undermined the public confidence in the legal
profession.
Lambert, C.J., and Wintersheimer, J., join in this dissent.
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