DWAYNE EARL BISHOP V. JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE, FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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DWAYNE EARL BISHOP
V.
APPELLANT
ORIGINAL ACTION FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-850
FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT NO . 00-CR-00061
JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE,
FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant Dwayne Earl Bishop was indicted by a Floyd County grand jury for the
murder of his estranged wife, Carolyn Bishop . The issue now before us pertains to the
post-indictment issuance of grand jury subpoenas to two prospective defense trial
witnesses requiring them to testify before the grand jury about their knowledge of facts
pertaining to this case . Appellant believes the sole or dominant purpose of the
subpoenas was to allow the prosecutor to improperly discover evidence relevant to
Appellant's defense in order to facilitate the prosecutor's preparation for trial . The trial
judge denied Appellant's motion to quash the subpoenas and overruled Appellant's
request for permission to question the prosecutor under oath as to the purpose of the
proposed grand jury investigation . Appellant then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a
writ prohibiting the trial judge from allowing the Commonwealth to use the grand jury
process for the purpose of discovery and trial preparation . The Court of Appeals
denied the petition, holding that (1) Appellant does not have "standing to prevent
testimony by these witnesses before the grand jury," and (2) Appellant "has an
adequate remedy through motions to exclude or suppress the results of the improper
use of the grand jury ." Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky . Const. §
115.
Carolyn Bishop was murdered on or about August 31, 2000 . Her body was
discovered on September 2, 2000. In late September or early October 2000, Kentucky
State Police Detective Glenn Thompson interviewed Samantha Kidd, the nine-year-old
daughter of Appellant's girlfriend, Pamela Kidd . According to Thompson's report,
Samantha identified several items of clothing connected to the murder as being similar
to clothing owned by Appellant . Detective Thompson subsequently testified before a
Floyd County grand jury, but did not include in his testimony the information he had
obtained from Samantha Kidd . On October 26, 2000, the grand jury returned
indictment number 00-CR-00061 charging Appellant with murder. Following
arraignment, trial was scheduled for June 18, 2001 . Meanwhile, Pamela Kidd filed an
internal affairs complaint against Detective Thompson regarding his interview of
Samantha .
Sometime prior to April 16, 2001, the prosecutor had a conversation with Pamela
Kidd at which time Kidd advised that she knew Appellant did not commit the murder,
-2-
that she had spoken with Appellant numerous times by telephone on the day of the
murder, that he could not have done it, and that she had information regarding a house
located near the area where the victim's body was discovered that was the real location
of the murder. According to an affidavit filed by the prosecutor, Kidd also "implied" that
individuals other than Appellant actually committed the murder; and when the
prosecutor suggested that she furnish this information to the grand jury, Kidd stated that
neither she nor her daughter, Samantha, would testify before the grand jury or at trial.
On April 16, 2001, subpoenas were issued under the caption of indictment number 00CR-00061 commanding Pamela and Samantha Kidd to appear before the grand jury for
the purpose of testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth .
In its written response to the motion to quash the subpoenas, the
Commonwealth gave the following explanation for their issuance :
In this case, there is a minor child who has made very important
statements regarding the murder case to the lead Detective . The
statements were made while the girl was in the custody of her father .
Subsequently, when custody was returned to the mother (the adult
witness subpoenaed herein), the Commonwealth learned the mother had
made threats that she would not permit the minor witness to testify in any
way, shape or form. This is blatant witness intimidation and the Grand
Jury is entitled to subpoena both the adult witness and the minor witness
in order to discover information on this matter . Of course, there is also all
the information contained in the Commonwealth's Attorney's Affidavit
whereby the adult witness has admitted that she has relevant and
exculpatory information with regard to the murder case. After receiving
such information, it is the Commonwealth's absolute duty to present same
to the Grand Jury.
A grand jury is charged "to inquire into every offense for which any person has
been held to answer and for which an indictment or information has not been filed, or
other offenses which come to their attention or of which any of them has knowledge ."
RCr 5 .02 (emphasis added) ; Bowling v. Sinnette , Ky., 666 S .W.2d 743, 745 (1984). It
follows that, after an indictment or information has been filed, the grand jury's function
with respect to that particular indictment is concluded. On the basis of additional
inculpatory evidence, the grand jury can issue a new, superseding indictment charging
the defendant with additional offenses or naming additional defendants ; however, there
is no authority permitting a grand jury to recall or quash a rendered indictment on the
basis of newly discovered exculpatory evidence, or to amend a rendered indictment to
add new charges or additional parties . The proper procedure upon discovery of other
culpable parties is for the grand jury to render either a superseding indictment or
separate indictments against the new parties and for the Commonwealth to move, in
the case of a superseding indictment, for dismissal of the original indictment, or, in the
case of new indictments against additional parties, for a joinder of indictments for
purposes of trial . RCr 9 .12 . Since the Floyd County grand jury has no present authority
to hear additional evidence with respect to indictment number 00-CR-00061, it is
reasonable for Appellant to suspect that the purpose of the grand jury subpoena issued
to Pamela Kidd is to discover the nature of her claimed exculpatory evidence so as to
facilitate the prosecutor's preparation for trial.
We do not question the grand jury's authority to investigate Pamela Kidd's
alleged violations of KRS 524 .040 and KRS 524.050 (though the prosecutor's affidavit
does not allege the commission of an offense but only a threat to commit an offense) .
However, it cannot do so within the context of indictment number 00-CR-00061, the
murder indictment against Appellant . Thus, it is also reasonable for Appellant to
suspect that the purpose of the grand jury subpoena issued to Samantha Kidd is not to
obtain evidence against Pamela Kidd but to obtain Samantha's sworn testimony to the
information she had previously furnished to Detective Thompson, presumably for
possible impeachment purposes. If the purpose of subpoenaing Pamela and
Samantha Kidd before the grand jury is to use the grand jury proceedings as a guise for
trial preparation, the subpoenas must be quashed . In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Fernandez Diamante) , 814 F .2d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1987) ; cf. Howard v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 395 S .W.2d 355, 358-59 (1965) .
Inquiry into a claim of grand jury abuse is neither a pure question of fact nor a
pure question of law. United States v. Flemmi, 245 F .3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) . Despite
having made a prima facie showing that there was no valid purpose for the issuance of
these subpoenas, Appellant has been denied the opportunity to conduct even an
inquiry into the purpose of this grand jury investigation . The trial court's order recites
that "the appearance of witnesses before the Grand Jury does not constitute the taking
of depositions," and that "the Commonwealth indicates that [Samantha Kidd] is not
being called to testify directly about the case against the Defendant, Dwayne Earl
Bishop, [but] to testify as to possible witness intimidation by someone against her other
than Dwayne Earl Bishop ." Of course, the issue is not whether the appearance of a
witness before the grand jury is a deposition, but whether the grand jury process is
being improperly used as a substitute for discovery depositions which, absent court
order or agreement of the parties, are not permitted in a criminal case . RCr 7.10. And
if the purpose of Samantha's testimony is to elicit evidence of separate criminal activity
by her mother, why was the subpoena issued under the caption of the murder
indictment against Appellant?
The Court of Appeals' holding that criminal defendants do not have standing to
inquire into grand jury investigations is generally correct, but only "[s]o long as it is not
the sole or dominant purpose of the grand jury to discover facts relating to [a
defendant's] pending indictment." United States v. Breitkreutz , 977 F .2d 214, 217 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v . George, 444 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1971)) . See
generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fernandez Diamante
supra , at 65-68 . The
fact that the subpoenas were issued under the caption of indictment number 00-CR00061 warranted an inquiry into the "sole or dominant purpose" of the grand jury's
investigation . The Court of Appeals' conclusion that Appellant has an "adequate
remedy through motions to exclude or suppress the results of the improper use of the
grand jury" begs the question . Appellant has been precluded from determining whether
the grand jury is being improperly used . And if the sole or dominant purpose of this
grand jury investigation is to discover facts relating to Appellant's defense so as to
assist the Commonwealth in its trial preparation, a motion to "exclude or suppress" the
results of that discovery would be an exercise in futility . As noted in the famous case of
Bender v. Eaton , Ky., 343 S .W.2d 799 (1961), once information is improperly
discovered, it cannot be recalled . Id . at 802 . Said another way, that which has been
discovered cannot be "undiscovered" by subsequent motions and appeals .
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand with directions to
issue the requested writ prohibiting the trial court from allowing the grand jury to
subpoena defense trial witnesses for testimony until an evidentiary hearing has been
held and a determination made as to whether the sole or dominant purpose of the
issuance of those subpoenas is to facilitate discovery by the Commonwealth of facts
pertaining to Appellant's defense against that indictment and, if so, to quash the
subpoenas .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, Johnstone, and Stumbo, JJ ., concur. Keller, J ., concurs
in part and dissents in part by separate opinion . Wintersheimer, J ., dissents because
Bishop had an adequate remedy through motions to exclude or suppress the results of
any improper use of the grand jury .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Harolyn R. Howard
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
282 South Mayo Tr - Suite 1
Pikeville, KY 41501
Vicki Lynne Ridgway
P.O. Box 173
Raccoon, KY 41557
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE, FLOYD CIRCUIT
COURT:
Hon. John David Caudill, pro se
P .O. Box 428
Prestonsburg, KY 41653
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Arnold Brent Turner
Turner, Hall & Stumbo, PSC
43 South Lake Drive
P .O. Box 388
Prestonsburg, KY 41653
RENDERED : OCTOBER 17, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2001-SC-0443-MR
DWAYNE EARL BISHOP
V.
APPELLANT
ORIGINAL ACTION FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-850
FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2000-CR-00061
JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I agree with the majority's conclusion that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ
of prohibition is appropriate in this case because it is unlikely that post hoc appellate
review will provide Appellant with a meaningful remedy if the Commonwealth actually
uses the grand jury's investigative powers for the "sole or dominating purpose of
preparing an already pending indictment for trial ."' Accordingly, I concur in the
majority's holding to the extent that it remands this case to the Court of Appeals and
' Howard v. Commonweath , Ky., 395 S .W.2d 355, 358-359 (1965) (quoting
United States v . Dardi , 330 F.2d 316 (2 "d Cir. 1964)) .
instructs it to issue a writ "prohibiting the trial court from allowing the grand jury to
subpoena defense trial witnesses until . . . a determination [is] made as to whether the
sole or dominant purpose of the issuance of those subpoenas is to facilitate discovery
by the Commonwealth . . . .
"2
I dissent, however, and write separately from the
majority, because I disagree with the majority's suggestion that, in order to make the
necessary determination, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing 3 at which
defense counsel presumably would examine the Commonwealth's Attorney under oath
regarding the reasons for the subpoena's issuance and the topics upon which the
attorney intends to examine the witness before the grand jury. While I recognize that
the trial court in this case now must reach an informed decision as to the reason that
these subpoenas were issued, I fear that the majority overlooks the possibility that the
remedy it has fashioned here could - not only in this case, but in future cases impair legitimate grand jury investigations by lifting the veil of secrecy surrounding those
proceedings . In my opinion, this Court should require a higher threshold of evidence of
wrongdoing before it subjects attorneys for the Commonwealth to cross-examination
under oath as to details of ongoing grand jury investigations . Accordingly, I dissent
from the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the trial court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether the Commonwealth is misusing the
grand jury's subpoena power to prepare its case against Appellant for trial.
And, I
propose an alternative procedure that would - by allowing trial courts the discretion to
determine, in a particular case, the appropriate means to examine evidence as to the
2Majority Opinion at
S .W .3d
(200_) (Slip Op . at 6) .
3Id . (directing the Court of Appeals to issue a writ directing the trial court to
quash the subpoenas "until an evidentiary hearing has been held and a determination
made . . . .").
prosecuting attorney's motives - shield criminal defendants from abuses of the grand
jury's subpoena power while also maintaining grand jury secrecy to the greatest extent
possible .
Grand juries are charged with investigating all "offenses which come to their
attention or of which any of them has knowledge,"' and "[c]ourts are extremely reluctant
to scrutinize grand jury proceedings as there is a strong presumption of regularity that
attaches to such proceedings ."' While Commonwealth's Attorneys assist grand juries in
their investigations,' the prosecution may not use the grand jury to conduct discovery in
connection with a pending indictment. Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult to draw a
bright line between legitimate investigations and improper trial preparation :
While it is easy to say that the court's inquiry must focus
on the primary purpose underlying the grand jury's
involvement, there is a fine line between an improper "trial
preparation" use of a grand jury and a proper "continuing
investigation ." The fine line is difficult to plot and, in most
instances, determining whether a prosecutor has
overstepped it will depend on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.'
In recognition of this difficulty, courts have applied a presumption of regularity to such
subpoenas and assigned to the moving party the burden of demonstrating the
Commonwealth's improper use of grand jury proceedings .'
'RCr 5 .02 . See also KRS 29A.240 .
5Commonwealth v. Baker, Ky .App .,11 S.W.3d 585, 588 (2000) .
6RCr 5.14.
' United States v. Flemmi , 245 F .3d 24, 28 (1 sc Cir. 2001) .
8Id .
When a party alleges that the Commonwealth is preparing to use the grand jury
improperly and moves to quash a subpoena issued on the grand jury's behalf, a trial
court's inquiry into that allegation is complicated by the fact that it does not have the
benefit of hindsight9 and must attempt to assess the Commonwealth's motives before
the Commonwealth questions the witness in front of the grand jury. Because grand jury
proceedings are secret," an open and public inquiry into the reason(s) why a particular
witness has been subpoenaed could compromise that secrecy and impair the grand
jury's legitimate investigatory functions . Accordingly, I believe that a procedure
designed to protect criminal defendants from potential abuses of the grand jury's
subpoena power must also consider the importance of maintaining the secrecy of grand
jury investigations .
To this end, I believe that, in this and in future cases, trial courts' factual findings
in this regard should be made in accordance with a procedure that allows trial courts
the discretion to conduct evidentiary hearings in appropriate cases, but that recognizes
the presumption of regularity in grand jury proceedings and thus requires prosecuting
attorneys to reveal information about grand jury investigations only when necessary.
Thus, I believe that the moving party first should be required to make a prima facie
showing that the prosecuting attorney intends to use the grand jury "for the sole or
9 1d . ("Thus,' if a grand jury's continued [investigation] results in the indictment of
parties not previously charged, the presumption of regularity generally persists . So too
when the grand jury's investigation leads to the filing of additional charges against
previously indicted defendants ." (emphasis added)) .
`
°RCr 5 .16, 5 .18, 5 .24 . See also United States v. Calandra , 414 U .S . 338, 343,
94 S .Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed .2d 561, 568 (1974) ("Traditionally, the grand jury has been
accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to
monitor its proceedings . It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of
its inquiry ." (emphasis added)) .
dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial." The moving
party could satisfy this prima facie showing by filing an affidavit or other evidence
demonstrating that: (1) the grand jury has already returned an indictment against the
moving party ; and (2) after the return of the indictment, a witness who is likely to testify
at the trial of the pending indictment has been subpoenaed to testify before the grand
jury . If, after reviewing this evidence, the trial court is satisfied that the moving party
has made a prima facie showing, the trial court should then require the prosecuting
attorney to file, under seal, an affidavit identifying his or her reasons for subpoenaing
the witness to testify before the grand jury" and outlining the topics upon which he or
she intends to examine the witness . If the trial court is satisfied from an in camera
review of the prosecuting attorney's affidavit that the Commonwealth is not using the
grand jury for trial preparations, it should make a finding of fact to that effect and deny
the motion to quash the subpoena. But, if the trial court is not satisfied with the
Commonwealth's explanation after reviewing the affidavit, the trial court could either
quash the subpoena, or, in its discretion, receive additional evidence in a closed
hearing before making factual findings and ruling upon the motion to quash .
While I recognize a hypothetical risk that the procedure outlined above could
lead to an erroneous decision by the trial court that prejudiced a criminal defendant
under a pending indictment - i.e., in an extremely unlikely case where an attorney for
the Commonwealth submitted a false affidavit as to the purpose behind a witness's
" Cf. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fernandez DiamaoU , 814 F .2d 61, 65 (1St
Cir. 1987) ("The government contended that the prime purpose of the Puerto Rico
grand jury was the investigation of crimes other than those named in the Connecticut
indictment . In support of this claim, the government submitted a sealed affidavit . . . . .. ).
testimony before the grand jury - I do not believe this theoretical possibility supports
the majority's view that an evidentiary hearing is a necessary first stage in this inquiry .
If a trial court were to deny a motion to quash the subpoena on the basis of
representations made by an attorney for the Commonwealth in an affidavit, and a
witness subsequently testified before the grand jury, the trial court could, in its
discretion, elect to review the witness's grand jury testimony . '2 And, if, upon such
review, the trial court were to determine that the witness was in fact subpoenaed before
the grand jury for the sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending
indictment for trial, the trial court could and should grant any and all relief reasonably
necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial - beginning with, but not limited
to, preventing the Commonwealth from benefitting from its improper use of the grand
jury by: (1) prohibiting the Commonwealth from using the witness's grand jury testimony
for any purpose at trial and suppressing any evidence the Commonwealth obtained as
a result of or in response to the witness's grand jury testimony ; and (2) disqualifying the
Commonwealth Attorney's office involved in the abuse from further prosecution of the
indictment in question and prohibiting any member of that office from directly or
indirectly communicating the substance of any information gleaned from the grand jury
examination to any attorney subsequently appointed to prosecute the indictment .
In this case, I believe Appellant has made a prima facie showing that the
prosecuting attorney may have issued these subpoenas to examine defense witnesses
before the grand jury in connection with trial preparations . Under the procedure
outlined above, this prima facie showing "puts the ball in the Commonwealth's court."
' 2 Cf . United States v. Doe
, 455 F .2d 1270
-6-
(1S t
Cir. 1972) .
Although the majority opinion indicates that the Commonwealth filed a written response
to Appellant's motion to quash the subpoenas and attached an affidavit," the passage
quoted in the majority opinion actually appeared in the Commonwealth's Response to
Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Supplement the Original Petition for Writ of Prohibition
and/or Mandamus in the Court of Appeals - a pleading filed nearly two (2) weeks after
the trial court ruled on the motion to quash - and the affidavit referred to in the
majority opinion was not even prepared until ten (10) days after the trial court's ruling .
In fact, it is not clear from the limited record before us in this proceeding that the
Commonwealth ever filed a written response to the motion to quash . No copy of such a
pleading is attached to any of the pleadings filed either in this Court or in the Court of
Appeals, and the trial court's order denying the motion suggests that the basis for its
conclusion was an oral representation (and an "off-the-record" one at that) by the
Commonwealth:
In an off the record conversation between the Court,
Defense Counsel and the Commonwealth, the
Commonwealth indicated that they had subpoenaed a
witness who is a minor, and although the Commonwealth
indicates that the witness is not being called in to testify
directly about the case against the Defendant, Dwayne Earl
Bishop, it is calling her in to testify as to possible witness
intimidation by someone against her other than Dwayne Earl
Bishop ; and, therefore, the Court hereby OVERRULES the
motion to quash that subpoena . (Emphasis added) .
Although the Commonwealth's Attorney apparently told the trial court informally
that the subpoenas had been issued to allow the grand jury to investigate potential
witness intimidation as well as the possibility of other persons' involvement in the
homicide for which Appellant has already been indicted, such statements do not
'3
Majority Opinion, supra note
at
-7-
(Slip Op. at 3).
constitute evidence upon which the trial court could base findings of fact. Thus, in my
opinion, after the Court of Appeals issues a writ directing the trial court to quash the
subpoenas pending the trial court's resolution of the underlying issue, the trial court
should : (1) direct the Commonwealth's Attorney to file an affidavit as outlined above ;"
(2) consider this sworn testimony, as well as any other evidence it deems necessary ;
(3) make a finding of fact as to whether the Commonwealth subpoenaed these
witnesses before the grand jury for the "sole or dominating" purpose of obtaining
discovery and/or preparing for Appellant's trial ; and (4) rule on Appellant's motion to
quash .
While I recognize that the Commonwealth Attorney filed an affidavit as an
attachment in a pleading he filed in the Court of Appeals, this affidavit merely outlined
the substance of a telephone conversation between Ms . Pamela Kidd and the
Commonwealth Attorney and neither stated explicitly why the witnesses had been
subpoenaed before the grand jury nor set forth the topics upon which the affiant
intended to examine the witnesses.
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