COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS; MARK A. LOVELY; DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL BOARD V. PHILLIP WHITWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; ROY H. ALLEN; DANIEL F. BILLINGTON; MASON G. BILLINGTON; RICHARD A. BLACKMAN; TIMOTHY BRYANT; BENJAMIN JOSEPH BUNCH; WILLIAM TRACY CASSIDY; KENNY COLLINS; WARFIELD CROWLEY; BOYD T. CURRY; LARRY W. CURRY; WILLIAM LAWRENCE DARING; FRANK DOUGLAS; ARCHIE F. EMBRY; JERRY GARLAND; PAUL T. GARVIN; AUBREY LEN GRACE; KENNETH JAMES GRIDER; JAMES HOWARD HOGAN; JOSHUA HOGAN; THOMAS L. HILTON; JOE JOHNSON; PHYLLIS JOYCE; TEDDY DEAN LAWSON; BOBBY LITTLE; WILLIAM M. LOGAN; JACKIE D. MANN; DONALD E. MARKSBERRY; JEFFREY PAUL M INTOSH; GEORGE W. MCPHERSON; C PAUL A. MCPHERSON; KENNETH MINOR; CECIL R. MOORE; ROGER DARRYL MURPHY DANNY RAY O'DELL; BRIAN L. PAYNE; LEO J. PAYNE; EGBERT WAYNE RIDDLE; REGGIE C. ROBERSON; CHARLES E. STUBBLEFIELD; JAMES NEAL STUMBO; FRED SULLIVAN; JAMES A. TATE; ROGER S. TAUL; BOBBY THOMAS; ANTHONY LEE WAKEFIELD; PHILLIP WHITWORTH; ROGER WOOSLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 16,2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
c-i
r;;>+
“, ..A& ’
:
2000-SC-0895-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS;
MARK A. LOVELY; DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL BOARD
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
99-CA-1352-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 94-Cl-0555
PHILLIP WHITWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED;
ROY H. ALLEN; DANIEL F. BILLINGTON;
MASON G. BILLINGTON; RICHARD A. BLACKMAN;
TIMOTHY BRYANT; BENJAMIN JOSEPH BUNCH;
WILLIAM TRACY CASSIDY; KENNY COLLINS;
WARFIELD CROWLEY; BOYD T. CURRY;
LARRY W. CURRY; WILLIAM LAWRENCE DARING;
FRANK DOUGLAS; ARCHIE F. EMBRY;
JERRY GARLAND; PAUL T. GARVIN;
AUBREY LEN GRACE; KENNETH JAMES GRIDER;
JAMES HOWARD HOGAN; JOSHUA HOGAN;
THOMAS L. HILTON; JOE JOHNSON;
PHYLLIS JOYCE; TEDDY DEAN LAWSON;
BOBBY LITTLE; WILLIAM M. LOGAN;
JACKIE D. MANN; DONALD E. MARKSBERRY;
JEFFREY PAUL M INTOSH; GEORGE W. MCPHERSON;
C
PAUL A. MCPHERSON; KENNETH MINOR;
CECIL R. MOORE; ROGER DARRYL MURPHY
DANNY RAY O’DELL; BRIAN L. PAYNE;
LEO J. PAYNE; EGBERT WAYNE RIDDLE;
REGGIE C. ROBERSON; CHARLES E. STUBBLEFIELD;
JAMES NEAL STUMBO; FRED SULLIVAN;
JAMES A. TATE; ROGER S. TAUL;
BOBBY THOMAS; ANTHONY LEE WAKEFIELD;
PHILLIP WHITWORTH; ROGER WOOSLEY
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
REVERSING
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming in part, reversing
in part and remanding an opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court which granted
summary judgment to the Department of Parks on the breach of contract claims brought
by some of its contract employees.
The Department of Parks argues that the persons involved were at all times atwill or temporary employees; that the employees are precluded from prosecuting this
action because of the election of remedies doctrine; that the case must be dismissed
because of sovereign immunity and that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion
when it reversed the circuit court order. The employees respond that the Court of
Appeals was correct when it reversed the summary judgment of the circuit court in favor
of the Department of Parks on sovereign immunity because it was premature, and they
contend that the other arguments of the Department of Parks are not at issue in this
appeal.
This class action lawsuit was filed in circuit court against the Department of Parks
by employees hired by oral contract as temporary maintenance and construction
workers pursuant to KRS 56.491(5)
and KRS 148.026. The employees were hired over
a period of years and worked as electricians, plumbers and carpenters, etc. They
allege that they were orally promised eleven months of work per year. A dispute arose
when the Department began requiring the employees to sign a certification as to a
condition of further state service. This document required the employees to
acknowledge their status as “P-9” or temporary, nonmerit state employees who were
-2-
only allowed nine months of work per year. The Department undertook this policy after
being informed by the Kentucky Retirement System that temporary P-9 employees who
worked in excess of nine months per year were eligible for coverage in the retirement
system. The Department began suspending the employment of the employees when
they refused to sign the certification or when they completed nine months of
employment.
The legal action began in 1993 when the employees filed an appeal to the
Kentucky Personnel Board, contending that they were full-time state employees,
qualified for Kentucky Retirement benefits. The Board rejected that appeal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. That dismissal was then appealed to the circuit court in 1994
and was filed along with the class action presently before this Court. The 1994 appeal
was remanded to the Board for consideration of whether the class plaintiffs were, by
virtue of their hiring under KRS 56.491(5) and KRS 148.026, infringing upon the
principles of the merit system. On remand, the Board, following a six-day evidentiary
hearing, once again denied the appeals. An appeal from that decision filed by the same
employees and raising the same issues is currently pending in Franklin Circuit Court,
presumably awaiting the outcome of this case.
Thereafter, the circuit court granted the class action certification. After the
employees filed an amended class action complaint and filed a motion for partial
summary judgment, the Department responded by filing a motion for summary
judgment.
The circuit judge entered a summary judgment in favor of the Department
finding that a suit on oral contracts was barred by sovereign immunity. As to the
employees’ claim that the oral contracts may have been ratified by the Department on
the basis of internal written documents in their personnel files, the circuit court found
-3-
that an oral contract with the Commonwealth is void and not capable of being ratified by
any subsequent writing which may appear in a personnel file. The employees offered
no evidence as to the actual existence of such documents.
The Court of Appeals held that although sovereign immunity barred suit on an
oral contract, the oral contracts were not void and a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the oral contracts were ratified in some way by written documents.
This Court accepted discretionary review.
I. Summary Judgment
The standard for summary judgment is abundantly clear in Kentucky. A movant
must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56.03. The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for a summary
judgment and all doubts must be resolved in favor of that party. Summary judgment
should be used only when, as a matter of law, it appears it would be impossible for the
respondent to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in favor of the
respondent and against the movant. See Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985).
The proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when it
appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at trial
warranting judgment in the respondents’ favor. It is proper where the movant shows
that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances. James Graham Brown
Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273 (1991).
The mere fact that legal conclusions may be drawn from undisputed evidentiary
facts in controversy does not prevent summary judgment. Murphy v. Lumbermens
-4-
Mutual Casualty Co., Ky.App., 580 S.W.2d
502 (1979). When any claim has no
substance,or controlling facts are not in dispute, a summary judgment can be proper.
Brown, supra.
In Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991)
this Court reaffirmed the standards set out in Paintsville Hospital, supra, that summary
judgments are to be cautiously applied and should not be used as a substitute for trial.
Under the rule and cases noted, a movant must convince the circuit court that based on
the evidence in the record there is no material fact at issue. The movant will not
succeed unless the right to summary judgment is shown with such clarity that there is
no room left for controversy.
Only when it appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in its favor, should a motion for summary judgment be
granted. A party opposing a properly documented summary judgment cannot defeat it
without presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a
material issue of fact. See Perrv v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., Ky., 860 S.W.2d 762
(1993); Western American Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, Ky., 865 S.W.2d 320 (1993); Hubble v.
Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169 (1992); Brown, supra; Steelvest, supra.
II. Circuit Court Decision
The circuit court correctly determined that even if the employees could establish
that they had oral contracts with the state which allowed them to work longer than nine
months, they were precluded by sovereign immunity from suing on an oral contract.
KRS 45A.245( 1) waives sovereign immunity for a lawfully authorized written contract.
As recognized by Withers v. Universitv of Kentuckv, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 430 (1997) the
state cannot be sued except upon a specific and explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
-5-
Thus, the circuit judge correctly determined that the public policy of the Commonwealth
bars claims on oral contracts. The employees in this action were unable to show any
specific and explicit waiver of sovereign immunity as required by Withers, supra. c
S u
h
a waiver cannot be implied from KRS 148.026. That statute provides that the
Commissioner of Parks may employ or contract with such persons, firms or corporations
as he deems necessary or desirable to accomplish the duties and functions assigned by
law to the Department of Parks. There is no express language waiving sovereign
immunity for the contracts alleged in this matter.
Nor can a waiver be implied from KRS 56.491(5). It provides that a capital
construction project not exceeding the statutorily designated amount may be performed
by employees of the requesting agency or by individuals hired specifically for the project
who shall be exempt from the requirements of KRS Chapter 18A, if the project is
approved and authorized by the Cabinet. Chapter 18A is the comprehensive statute
which deals with state personnel.
The Court of Appeals was in error when it reversed and remanded this case to
the circuit court to allow employees to introduce internal documents as proof of the
ratification of the oral contracts for temporary employment. Even if such documents
exist, they cannot be construed as constituting a written employment contract because
the Commissioner of Parks has no authority to hire employees in violation of the terms
of KRS 148.026 and KRS 56.491(5). Although the General Assembly has authorized
the Commissioner of Parks to hire temporary employees for construction projects, it did
not authorize the Commissioner to convert them into merit system employees and he
had no statutory authority to do so. None of the employees in this case participated in
the competitive hiring procedures mandatory for merit system employees and their
-6-
wages are not subject to the constraints of the state classification and compensation
system governing merit employees. All compensation comes from the specific project
budgets.
The employees were on notice that under KRS 148.026, project officers are not
authorized to promise or guarantee work for any specific period except to complete a
project. As noted in Clark County Constr. Co. v. State Hiqhwav Com’n, 248 Ky. 158, 58
S.W.2d 388 (1933) ‘I, . . anyone who deals or contracts with public officials or with
public bodies must at his own peril take notice of their authority since they can only act
within the limits of express or necessarily implied powers conferred upon them by law.”
Again, as stated in Calvert v. Allen Counts Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450, 67 S.W.2d 701
(1934), “It is equally well established that one dealing with public officials, boards, or
commissions must take notice of their authority to act and the law charges him with the
knowledge of any and all limitations upon such power.” See also All-American Movers,
Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel Hancock, Ky.App., 552 S.W.2d 679 (1977). Accord
Louisville Civil Service Bd. v. Blair, Ky., 711 S.W.2d 181 (1986).
Suit cannot be instituted against the Commonwealth on a claim unless sovereign
immunity has been specifically waived, as it has been on a lawfully authorized written
contract. All-American Movers, suora. KRS 45A.245(1) provides that any person
having a lawfully authorized written contract with the Commonwealth may bring an
action against the Commonwealth on the contract . . . .
As noted by this Court in Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 392
(1963) cases which have permitted the state to be sued on a contract . . . without
express legislative consent, are unsound. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that state
employees are limited in their property rights to employment by the constraints of the
-7-
state legislature which created those rights. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96
S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
We recognize that the concept of sovereign immunity does not provide that all
oral contracts with the Commonwealth are void perse, but simply indicates that a
lawsuit cannot be brought against the Commonwealth to enforce oral contracts. That
conclusion does not open the door to a challenge to the decision of the circuit court
under summary judgment principles.
The employees take issue with the word “void” as used by the circuit court. The
word “void” has a number of definitions but one of them includes the statement that it is
useless and ineffective or lacking in legal force or validity. See Webster’s New
’
Riverside Dictionary 1293 (2nd Ed. 1998). Lvkins v. Oaks, 286 Ky. 332, 150 S.W.2d
231 (1941), citing a number of older cases and legal authorities, states that a void
contract cannot be ratified. Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (7th Ed. 1999) defines void as
being of no legal effect; null, and further states that a contract is void ab initio if it
seriously offends law or public policy, in contrast to a contract that is merely voidable at
the election of one party to the contract. Here, we find that sovereign immunity prohibits
absolutely the making of a claim against the state without an express waiver. Legally
enforceable contracts with the state are to be in writing.
The fact that the circuit judge used the word “void” to describe his judicial
reasoning is not reversible error. It may have been a poor choice of language, but it
does express a reasonable basis for his rationale in support of the sovereign immunity
analysis. Certainly, the concept of sovereign immunity prevents the enforcement of the
oral contract in question. Thus, we believe it was correct for the circuit court to
-8-
determine in effect that the oral agreement sought to be used in this case was
unenforceable from the beginning.
III. Summary Judgment Application
We recognize that simply because a case may be disposed of on a writing such
as a contract does not always mean that it is appropriate for summary judgment
particularly if the matters of parol evidence necessary to place the document in its
context are genuinely in issue. See Conrad Chevrolet Inc. v. Rood, Ky., 862 S.W.2d
312 (1993). This matter is disposed of on the basis of sovereign immunity thus any
parol evidence that might be discovered is of no value. It should be remembered that
the circuit court is not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that
would be otherwise required by CR 52.01 when entering a summary judgment because
the rule specifically provides that they are not necessary. See Allen v. Martin, Ky.App.,
735 S.W.2d 332 (1987). Here, the circuit judge did give legal reasons for the decision.
As noted in Old Mason’s Home of Kentucky, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky.App., 892 S.W.2d
304 (1995), summary judgment is proper when it is manifest that the opposing party
cannot strengthen the case at trial and the moving party would be entitled ultimately to a
directed verdict. See also Palmer v. Int’l Ass’n. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117 (1994). That is the situation here. We find it
unnecessary to address any of the other arguments raised by the parties.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the summary judgment in
favor of the Department of Parks granted by the circuit court is reinstated.
Lambert, C.J., Cooper, Graves and Johnstone, JJ., concur. Keller, J., dissents
by separate opinion in which Stumbo, J., joins.
-9-
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Henry J. Curtis
Office of General Counsel
500 Mero Street
Capital Plaza Tower, Room 1212
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Michael L. Judy
Paul C. Harnice
Johnson, Judy, True & Guarnieri, LLP
326 West Main Street
Frankfort, KY 40601
-lO-
RENDERED: MAY 16,2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
2000-SC-0895-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS;
MARK A. LOVELY; DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL BOARD
V.
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
99-CA-1352-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 94-Cl-0555
PHILLIP WHITWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED;
ROY H. ALLEN; DANIEL F. BILLINGTON;
MASON G. BILLINGTON; RICHARD A. BLACKMAN;
TIMOTHY BRYANT; BENJAMIN JOSEPH BUNCH;
WILLIAM TRACY CASSIDY; KENNY COLLINS;
WARFIELD CROWLEY; BOYD T. CURRY;
LARRY W. CURRY; WILLIAM LAWRENCE DARING;
FRANK DOUGLAS; ARCHIE F. EMBRY;
JERRY GARLAND; PAUL T. GARVIN;
AUBREY LEN GRACE; KENNETH JAMES GRIDER;
JAMES HOWARD HOGAN; JOSHUA HOGAN;
THOMAS L. HILTON; JOE JOHNSON;
PHYLLIS JOYCE; TEDDY DEAN LAWSON;
BOBBY LITTLE; WILLIAM M. LOGAN;
JACKIE D. MANN; DONALD E. MARKSBERRY;
JEFFREY PAUL M INTOSH; GEORGE W. MCPHERSON;
C
PAUL A. MCPHERSON; KENNETH MINOR;
CECIL R. MOORE; ROGER DARRYL MURPHY;
DANNY RAY O’DELL; BRIAN L. PAYNE;
LEO J. PAYNE; EGBERT WAYNE RIDDLE;
REGGIE C. ROBERSON; CHARLES E. STUBBLEFIELD;
JAMES NEAL STUMBO; FRED SULLIVAN;
JAMES A. TATE; ROGER S. TAUL;
BOBBY THOMAS; ANTHONY LEE WAKEFIELD;
PHILLIP WHITWORTH; ROGER WOOSLEY
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I agree with the Court of
Appeals that the trial court granted summary judgment prematurely before Appellees
had an opportunity, through pre-trial discovery, to produce evidence that their breach of
contract claims were brought under “lawfully authorized written contract[s] with the
Commonwealth.“’
Although I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth would be
entitled to summary judgment unless Appellees can demonstrate that they were
employed under lawfully authorized written contracts, I believe the record before us
leaves that question unanswered.
The issue at the center of this controversy concerns the nature of Appellee’s
employment with the Department of Parks (“the Department”). Appellees claim that,
while they were initially hired pursuant to oral contracts with the Department, their
employment contacts were subsequently ratified by “contracts, written agreements, or
other documents that memorialize and ratify the initial oral agreements,” and that are
contained in Appellees’ personnel files maintained by the Department. The majority
concludes that - because Appellees were initially hired under oral agreements further discovery would not affect summary judgment because any written agreement
purporting to contract with Appellees would exceed the Commissioner’s statutory
authority and thus would not be “lawfully authorized.”
flawed.
‘KRS 45A.245( 1)
I find the majority’s reasoning
KRS 148.026 permits the Commissioner to enter into any employment contracts
he or she “deem[s]
necessary or desirable,” and allows the Commissioner to “fix the
compensation and the terms of employment . . . of those contracted with”:
The commissioner of parks may employ or contract with
such other persons, firms or corporations as he may deem
necessary or desirable to accomplish the duties and
functions assigned by law to the Department of Parks; may
fix the compensation and the terms of employment or
contract of those employed or contracted with; and may
assign to them such duties and responsibilities as he may
determine; provided, however, that any contract shall be
approved by the Finance and Administration Cabinet before
it shall become effective. Individuals employed by the
commissioner of parks on a temporary basis for specific
construction projects under KRS 56.491(5) or for
maintenance projects shall be exempt from the requirements
of KRS 18A.005 to 18A.200.’
Accordingly, if Appellants - pursuant to the Commissioner’s general employment and
contracting authority - hired Appellees under oral contacts that were later approved in
writing by the Finance and Administration Cabinet, Appellees may be entitled to prevail
on their claims.
In my view, today’s majority “puts the cart before the horse” by reaching a factual
determination as to the nature of Appellee’s employment and then concluding that a
contract saying anything different would have been unauthorized. The contested issue
of fact in this case concerns the nature of Appellee’s employment, and I believe it is
inappropriate to decide that issue without considering the possibility that a written
employment contract may exist that resolves the question. Although the majority
believes that KRS 56.491(5)3
is somehow implicated, I disagree and would characterize
‘KRS 148.026.
‘KRS 56.491(5):
(continued...)
-3-
that issue as a red herring. Appellees do not claim that they were hired “specifically for
[a] project” and later converted into merit system employees.
Instead, Appellees’ claim
is fairly straightforward - they were hired under contracts and that the Department
breached those contracts. While Appellant claims that summary judgment was proper
because Appellees were project employees, Appellees dispute that claim and ask for
the opportunity to produce written contracts containing the terms of their employment.
This factual dispute, standing alone, precludes summary judgment.
Although I reach a different result from the majority, I agree with several
statements of law set forth in the majority opinion.
I agree that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity does not make all oral contracts with the Commonwealth of
Kentucky void per se.4
I also agree, however, that sovereign immunity precludes
claims against the Commonwealth unless the General Assembly has waived that
immunity and, because no such waiver exists for them, oral contracts are not
enforceable against the Commonwealth.
However, I do not agree with the conclusion
3(... continued)
A capital construction project, the total cost of completion of
which the Finance and Administration Cabinet determines
will not exceed two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000),
may be performed by the employees of the requesting
agency or by individuals hired specifically for the project who
shall be exempt from the requirements of KRS Chapter 18A,
if the project is approved and authorized by the cabinet.
Necessary materials and supplies shall be procured in
accordance with the standard purchasing procedures and
policies of the cabinet as defined in KRS Chapter 45A.
4A “void contact” is defined as “[a] contract that is of no legal effect, so that there
is really no contract in existence at all,” and “[Iloosely, a voidable contract.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 326 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, like all contracts under KRS 148.026, an
initial oral contract will have no legal effect until authorized in writing by the Finance and
Administration Cabinet. Following such approval, however, it is an enforceable
contract.
-4
- apparently reached by the majority - that an oral contract cannot be enforced
against the Commonwealth even if it is subsequently ratified in writing. KRS 148.026
provides otherwise. If Appellees uncover written approval of their employment
contracts during the discovery process, sovereign immunity will not prohibit their claims
against the Commonwealth because, under such circumstances, the General Assembly
has waived sovereign immunity.5
By entering summary judgment in this case before Appellees had an opportunity
to discover whether written contracts of employment exist, the trial court may have
decided the ultimate issue in this case without considering direct evidence as to the
nature of the employment relationship. The majority states that “[t]he employees
offered no evidence as the actual existence of such documents.“” While this
observation is correct, I believe it is a mistake to cast aspersions upon the sufficiency of
‘KRS 45A.245:
(1)
(2)
Any person, firm or corporation, having a
lawfully authorized written contract with the
Commonwealth at the time of or after June 21,
1974, may bring an action against the
Commonwealth on the contract, including but
not limited to actions either for breach of
contracts or for enforcement of contracts or for
both. Any such action shall be brought in the
Franklin Circuit Court and shall be tried by the
court sitting without a jury. All defenses in law
or equity, except the defense of governmental
immunity, shall be preserved to the
Commonwealth.
If damages awarded on any contract claim
under this section exceed the original amount
of the contract, such excess shall be limited to
an amount which is equal to the amount of the
original contract.
‘Majority Opinion at _ _
(200-) (Slip Op. at 4)
S.W.3d,
-5-
Appellees’ evidence without considering the fact that their efforts to obtain evidence
were stymied by limitations on pretrial discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s summary judgment because the trial court denied Appellees the opportunity
to seek such evidence, and I believe this Court should affirm that decision.
Thus, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety, and I
would remand this matter to the Franklin Circuit Court with instructions for it to
reconsider summary judgment after permitting Appellees an opportunity to seek
evidence of written employment contracts through discovery. If Appellees fail to
discover such evidence, then and only then would summary judgment dismissing their
claims be appropriate.
Stumbo, J., joins this dissenting opinion.
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.